scholarly journals Eksistensi Pemberantasan Korupsi dalam Perjanjian investasi Internasional di Indonesia

INTEGRITAS ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Hesti Widyaningrum

The International Investment Agreements can actually weaken the existence of law enforcement in Indonesia over the eradication of corruption. Surely, an International Investment Agreementa in Indonesia should include a prohibition of corruption in pre, post and International Investment Agreements as India did in their model Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT). In addition, Investors can sue the State for corruption law enforcement against him, through legal gap in fair n Equitable Treatment (FET) content on the grounds of "denial of justice." Futhermore, Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism content further strengthens Investor positions in International Arbitration, because only Investors can sue countries with compensation of up to billions of dollars. As a result, the State losses become 2 (two) times, the losses incurred by the act of corruption committed by the defendant and the cost of the case in International Arbitration. Similarly, Indonesia should also immediately adopt the FET concept in the Indonesia-New Model BIT where this content limits Investors to sue the State even in criminal law enforcement.

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mmiselo Freedom Qumba

This article focuses on the 2016 Amended Annex 1 to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Finance and Investment Protocol (FIP) (the Amended Annex), which entered into force on 22 August 2017. It aims at a comprehensive assessment of the adequacy of the Amended Annex in balancing investor protection with SADC member states’ quest for domestic policy space in the content of the treaty provisions. Prior to the amendment, the 2006 SADC FIP contained clauses that were considered challenging in the old international investment agreements (IIAs) – such as broad definitions of “investor” and “investment”, provision for international arbitration as a recourse, and according foreign investors fair and equitable treatment (FET) and most favoured nation (MFN) treatment. The challenges associated with bilateral investment treaties (BITs) (especially investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, restrictions on sovereign policy space and regulatory autonomy) necessitated a review by the SADC member states of the 2006 SADC FIP. The purpose of this article is to reflect on the implications of the 2016 Amended Annex 1 to the SADC FIP with a view to finding a balance between protection enjoyed by investors and the host states’ right to regulate. The article adopts a comparative international law approach, which is useful in order better to understand a SADC member country’s approach to foreign investment protection.


Author(s):  
CÉLINE LÉVESQUE

Abstract The practice of arbitrators and counsel in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases simultaneously playing both roles — known as “double-hatting” — has been the subject of much controversy in recent debates on ISDS reform, notably, at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL) Working Group III where a Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators in International Investment Disputes is under discussion. While Canada has been less than consistent in its approaches to ISDS in recent international investment agreements (IIAs), its position against double-hatting has been rather constant. This article explores whether this stance reveals a commitment on the part of Canada towards increased judicialization of ISDS or reflects a “flavour of the month” reform likely to change with differing IIAs and negotiating partners. Analysis of Canada’s recent IIA practices, including its model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, released in May 2021, and the positions it has taken at UNCITRAL’s Working Group III, lead the author to conclude that Canada appears committed to increased judicialization of ISDS in the long run.


Author(s):  
Andrew D. Mitchell ◽  
Elizabeth Sheargold ◽  
Tania Voon

International trade and international investment agreements typically contain provisions requiring the parties to comply with good governance principles, such as procedural fairness and transparency. These provisions are increasingly the subject of disputes before international tribunals. The scope of these obligations is often unclear, as treaty provisions usually employ broad standards rather than specific rules. For example, the requirement to accord investors ‘fair and equitable treatment’ is common in international investment agreements, while WTO agreements demand the ‘reasonable and impartial administration of measures’. This article compares approaches in international investment and trade law to three aspects of good governance: procedural fairness, transparency, and reasonable administration of measures. Despite textual differences, the standards adopted by these two regimes are remarkably similar. Consequently, decisions from these two branches of international economic law may provide States, tribunals, market participants and scholars with valuable insights into the conduct required by good governance obligations.


Author(s):  
Yannaca-Small Katia ◽  
Earnest David

The term ‘frivolous’ is sometimes used to describe a claim which is filed with knowledge that it has little or no chance of succeeding. This chapter examines the procedures available under international investment agreements and international arbitration rules to address on a preliminary and expedited basis claims that are frivolous in the sense of being baseless and unmeritorious, regardless of claimant’s motives. The current trend towards preliminary and expedited consideration of a request that an application in investor-state arbitration be dismissed as frivolous is rooted in the 2004 US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty and the 2006 amendment to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID) Rule 41(5). There is also an emerging focus on the summary disposition of such frivolous claims in international arbitration rules traditionally concerned with commercial arbitration.


Author(s):  
Roland Kläger

Fair and equitable treatment is a central norm in international investment law. This norm is contained in the vast majority of international investment agreements as one of the main standards for the protection of foreign investors. Historically, international investment agreements contained short and general clauses of fair and equitable treatment, which were formulated either as free-standing provisions with a reference to general international law, or to the international minimum standard of customary international law. Especially since the first decade of the 21st century, drafting approaches to fair and equitable treatment became increasingly diverse and generated complex and elaborate clauses seeking to address the different elements of the norm that have developed over time. The drafting approaches reflect the long-standing controversies with regard to fair and equitable treatment and the question of whether this concept is to be constructed in accordance with the international minimum standard or as an independent and self-contained standard possibly exceeding customary international law. Both concepts have remained vague and have created difficulties in the interpretation of fair and equitable treatment, which due to its general character became a prominent cause of action in investor-state arbitration proceedings. The evolution of arbitral jurisprudence stimulated the emergence of different elements of fair and equitable treatment, including the protection of the investor’s legitimate expectations, the protection against discrimination and arbitrary treatments, and the principles of due process, denial of justice, and transparency. The increasing number of cases on the basis of fair and equitable treatment also led to concerns and criticism that a far-reaching concept of the norm would threaten the host states’ sovereignty and their right to regulate, as well as the principle of sustainable development. These concerns and the fact that a growing number of investment disputes were brought against developed countries motivated first the North American Free Trade Agreement member states and subsequently other states and the European Union to adapt their international investment agreements in order to try to concretize the concept of fair and equitable treatment and to limit the discretion of arbitrators. The concept of fair and equitable treatment has also received considerable attention by scholars who propose a variety of different approaches to the interpretation of the norm and the balancing of the conflicting private and public interests at stake.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 828-859
Author(s):  
Peter Tzeng

Abstract Disputed maritime areas are often sources of valuable natural resources, but they are also often sources of conflict. It is thus important for investors investing in such areas to know the array of investment protection mechanisms available to them. This article examines four such mechanisms (dispute settlement under international investment agreements (IIAs), dispute settlement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), dispute settlement under contracts, and political risk insurance) in the context of three scenarios of disputed maritime areas (unregulated areas, joint development areas, and provisionally delimited areas). It concludes that dispute settlement under IIAs and UNCLOS face significant obstacles not only on jurisdiction and admissibility, but also on the merits. As a result, the most practical solution for investors is to rely on dispute settlement under contracts or political risk insurance to protect their investments.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 551-569 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Burgstaller

The eu institutions are committed to include investor-State arbitration clauses in eu iias with third States. However, there are at least three unresolved problems in doing so. First, the eu is not, and is unlikely to become, a Contracting Party to the icsid Convention. While this deficiency may be remedied by replicating relevant provisions of the icsid Convention, eu investors cannot benefit from icsid’s institutional clout which could facilitate enforcement of awards. Secondly, there may be problems from an eu law perspective. Arguably, the eu could only include investor-State arbitration clauses in eu iias with third States following a change in eu primary law such that investment tribunals could request a preliminary ruling from the cjeu in accordance with Article 267 tfeu. Thirdly, to date there appears to be no agreement within the eu on the question who will be the proper respondent in an arbitration.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-318
Author(s):  
Dilini PATHIRANA

AbstractSri Lanka is the first country against which a foreign investor has had recourse to international arbitration based on the dispute settlement clause in a bilateral investment treaty (BIT). This was the case of AAPL v. Sri Lanka. Since then, the country has been challenged twice before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), while its latest encounter was in the case of Deutsche Bank AG v. Sri Lanka. In the intervening years between these two cases, Sri Lanka maintained silence and failed to alter its BITs in a global context where the conventional attitude on international investment agreements (IIAs) is being increasingly reconsidered. This paper provides an overview of Sri Lanka’s BITs, which highlights the urgency of reconsidering the country’s investment treaty-making practice. It suggests some modifications to align the country’s investment treaty-making practice with international investment law (IIL) developments.


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