scholarly journals Ewolucja zmian i zadania banków centralnych w świetle doświadczeń kryzysu finansowego

Author(s):  
Agnieszka Alińska ◽  
Bogusław Pietrzak ◽  
Katarzyna Wasiak

Communication policy of central banks in the framework of direct inflation targeting strategy and related strategies is important. Its tools include forward guidance as a method of influencing the expectations of market participants. Although forward guidance was used before the outbreak of the financial crisis, it was not popular. After 2008, under conditions of zero interest rate, monetary authorities have begun After 2008, under conditions of zero interest rate, monetary authorities have begun to use the forward guidance as an unconventional and effective instrument allowing monetary policy to have impact on market interest rates. However, the riskswhen using forward guidance include the possibility of misinterpretation of the conditional nature of the declaration of the monetary authorities.

Author(s):  
Ilona  Skibińska-Fabrowska

Communication policy of central banks in the framework of direct inflation targeting strategy and related strategies is important. Its tools include forward guidance as a method of influencing the expectations of market participants. Although forward guid a method of influencing the expectations of market participants. Although forward guidance was used before the outbreak of the financial crisis, it was not popular. After 2008, under conditions of zero interest rate, monetary authorities have begun to use the forward guidance as an unconventional and effective instrument allowing monetary policy to have impact on market interest rates. However, the risks when using forward guidance include the possibility of misinterpretation of the conditional nature of the declaration of the monetary authorities. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Jakub Rybacki

The effect of forward guidance on interest rate expectations in small, open economies is often described as heterogeneous. There are examples when financial markets adjusted term structure to reflect interest rate forecasts provided in the projections published by the central banks. On the other hand, medium-term expectations can persistently deviate from trajectories presented by decision-makers, influenced by foreign monetary policy. Our aim is to find the maximal forecast horizon where the domestic forward guidance of local banks in European economies affects market interest rate expectations strongly as compared to the ECB policy. We analyzed the term structure of interest rates in Sweden, Norway, and the Czech Republic. Central banks in these three economies provide the most mature forward guidance, e.g., regularly publishing interest rate forecasts with detailed discussions. The three-month interbank rate path calculated with the Nelson-Siegel model was contrasted with both the trajectory of policy rates presented in central bank projections and that implied by the three-month EURIBOR. We found that interest rate expectations were more influenced by ECB policy than by domestic assumptions when the forecast horizon exceeds four quarters.


2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 161-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Arshad Khan ◽  
Ather Maqsood Ahmed

Monetary policy which until recently aimed at targeting monetary aggregates has quietly given way to adjusting interest rates. Most of the Central Banks now focus on money reaction function that directly targets inflation or price level. This paper examines the way monetary policy is being conducted in the four major South Asian economies, namely, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The analysis is based on a variant of the Taylor rule framework. Using quarterly data over the period 1990Q1 to 2012Q4, the study finds that the monetary authorities in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have accommodated some degree of inflationary pressure, whereas Bangladesh has continuously smoothened interest rate while setting its monetary policy. Besides pursuing a mild monetary policy stance against inflation, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are also giving importance to foreign interest rate and real exchange rate movements to justify their relevance in monetary policy setting. However, the same has not been found to be true for Bangladesh. JEL Classification: E52, E58, E60 Keywords: Monetary Policy Rule, Central Banks, SAARC Countries


2020 ◽  
pp. 39-52
Author(s):  
Oleg Buklemishev

In recent years, inflation targeting has become a staple of international monetary policy. The paper considers different challenges this monetary policy regime faces with regard to suppressed inflation, attaining the zero lower bound on the policy interest rates, and committing central banks to simultaneously pursue additional objectives such as financial stability. Inflation targeting has proved inefficient in raising inflation to the target zone from below, and unorthodox monetary policy tools have not proved their validity in this regard yet. As a result, monetary authorities are more inclined to discretion allowing them to compromise different aspects of “pure” inflation targeting. The value of this discretion is based on asymmetric information and boosted by additional functions assumed by central banks. However, it might bring about serious problems of dynamic inconsistency, compounded political uncertainty, and bureaucratic misconduct. Since none of the alternatives to inflation targeting currently looks fully satisfactory, it is concluded that the inflation targeting regime should be transformed to take into account the current situation, but a necessary precondition for the effectiveness of the new regime is enhanced accountability of central banks.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 123
Author(s):  
Ergys Misha

The Taylor’s Rule Central Banks is applying widely today from Central Banks for design the monetary policy and for determination of interest rates. The purpose of this paper is to assess monetary policy rule in Albania, in view of an inflation targeting regime. In the first version of the Model, the Taylor’s Rule assumes that base interest rate of the monetary policy varies depending on the change of (1) the inflation rate and (2) economic growth (Output Gap).Through this paper it is proposed changing the objective of the Bank of Albania by adding a new objective, that of "financial stability", along with the “price stability”. This means that it is necessary to reassess the Taylor’s Rule by modifying it with incorporation of indicators of financial stability. In the case of Albania, we consider that there is no regular market of financial assets in the absence of the Stock Exchange. For this reason, we will rely on the credit developmet - as a way to measure the financial cycle in the economy. In this case, the base rate of monetary policy will be changed throught: (1) Targeting Inflation Rate, (2) Nominal Targeting of Economic Growth, and (3) Targeting the Gap of the Ratio Credit/GDP (mitigating the boom cycle, if the gap is positive, and the contractiocycle if the gap is negative).The research data show that, it is necessary that the Bank of Albania should also include in its objective maintaining the financial stability. In this way, the contribution expected from the inclusion of credit gap indicators in Taylor’s Rule, will be higher and sustainable in time.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (342) ◽  
pp. 89-116
Author(s):  
Irena Pyka ◽  
Aleksandra Nocoń

In the face of the global financial crisis, central banks have used unconventional monetary policy instruments. Firstly, they implemented the interest rate policy, lowering base interest rates to a very low (almost zero) level. However, in the following years they did not undertake normalizing activities. The macroeconomic environment required further initiatives. For the first time in history, central banks have adopted Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP). The main aim of the study is to explore the risk accompanying the negative interest rate policy, aiming at identifying channels and consequences of its impact on the economy. The study verifies the research hypothesis stating that the risk of negative interest rates, so far unrecognized in Theory of Interest Rate, is a consequence of low effectiveness of monetary policy normalization and may adopt systemic nature, by influencing – through different channels – the financial stability and growth dynamics of the modern world economy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 1159-1174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Caldas Montes ◽  
Cristiane Gea

Purpose The evidence concerning the effects of the inflation targeting (IT) regime as well as greater central bank transparency on monetary policy interest rates is not conclusive, and the following questions remain open. What is the effect of adopting IT on both the level and volatility of monetary policy interest rate? Does central bank transparency affect the level of the monetary policy interest rate and its volatility? Are these effects greater in developing countries? The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature by answering these questions. Hence, the paper analyzes the effects of IT and central bank transparency on monetary policy. Design/methodology/approach The analysis uses a sample of 48 countries (31 developing) comprising the period between 1998 and 2014. Based on panel data methodology, estimates are made for the full sample, and then for the sample of developing countries. Findings Countries that adopt the IT regime tend to have lower levels of monetary policy interest rates, as well as lower interest rate volatility. The effect of adopting IT on both the level and volatility of the basic interest rate is smaller in developing countries. Besides, countries with more transparent central banks have lower levels of monetary policy interest rates, as well as lower interest rate volatility. In turn, the effect of central bank transparency on both the level and volatility of the basic interest rate is greater in developing countries. Practical implications The study brings important practical implications regarding the influence of both the IT regime and central bank transparency on monetary policy. Originality/value Studies have sought to analyze whether IT and central bank transparency are effective to control inflation. However, few studies analyze the influence of IT and central bank transparency on interest rates. This study differs from the few existing studies since: the analysis is done not only for the effect of transparency on the level of the monetary policy interest rate, but also on its volatility; the central bank transparency index that is used has never been utilized in this sort of analysis; and the study uses panel data methodology, and compares the results between different samples.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 181
Author(s):  
Setyo Tri Wahyudi ◽  
Rinny Apriliany Zakaria ◽  
Nurul Badriyah

The monetary policy transmission mechanism has many ways in influencing inflation. This method became known as the monetary path. The use of appropriate channels in monetary policy will affect whether or not the objectives of the monetary policy are achieved. This study aims to determine which monetary path is appropriate for Indonesia, which is a developing country with an open economic system. The data used are secondary data taken from Bank Indonesia for the period 2005 to 2016. The research variables include inflation, BI-rate, credit interest rates (SBB), gross domestic product (GDP), exchange rate, bank reserve (BBR), and the amount of credit extended. This study focuses on the path of interest rates, exchange rates and bank credit using the Error Correction Model (ECM). The results of this study indicate that the right monetary path for Indonesia is the credit channel. This is because the value of the Error Correction Term (ECT) coefficient on the ECM model shows that the coefficient of the credit channel is smaller than the interest rate and exchange rate channel, which means that the imbalance that occurs can be resolved more quickly with the credit channel.


2018 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 47-63
Author(s):  
Mathias Binswanger

Zusammenfassung: Als Folge der jüngsten Finanzkrise ist der Einfluss der Zentralbanken auf die Geldschöpfung weitgehend verloren gegangen. Denn die Kontrolle über Reserven funktioniert nur solange, wie diese knapp sind und deren Bezug an bestimmte Bedingungen geknüpft werden kann. Seither halten die Geschäftsbanken in den ökonomisch wichtigsten Ländern de facto dermaßen viele Reserven, dass sie nicht mehr auf die jeweilige Zentralbank angewiesen sind. Diese Entwicklung lässt sich sowohl für die FED als auch für die EZB aufzeigen. Dies führt zu geldpolitisch neuen Herausforderungen, die bisher kaum beachtet wurden. Die Einflussmöglichkeit der Zentralbanken auf den Geldschöpfungsprozess der Geschäftsbanken wurde noch nie in so großem Stil ausgehebelt. Deshalb müssen Zentralbanken in Zukunft ihr Repertoire an geldpolitischen Massnahmen erweitern. Nur mit dem Drehen an der Zinsschraube wird man den Geldschöpfungsprozess in Zukunft kaum mehr in gewünschter Weise beeinflussen können. Summary: As a result of the recent financial crisis, the influence of central banks on money creation has largely disappeared. Controlling this process only works as long as money creation of commercial banks also leads to a need for additional reserves from the central bank. However, the large asset purchase programs of monetary authorities after the financial crises resulted in an enormous increase in reserves at commercial banks. Therefore, commercial banks have enough reserves to create additional money at large amounts and do not depend on central banks any more. This development is indicative for both the FED and the ECB. Therefore central banks face the challenge how they can restore their influence on the process of money creation. Just lowering or increasing interest rates, which was the major way of conducting monetary policy in the past, will not work anymore in the future.


Author(s):  
Fatemeh Mokhtarzadeh ◽  
Luba Petersen

AbstractCentral banks are increasingly communicating their economic outlook in an effort to manage the public and financial market participants’ expectations. We provide original causal evidence that the information communicated and the assumptions underlying a central bank’s projection can matter for expectation formation and aggregate stability. Using a between-subject design, we systematically vary the central bank’s projected forecasts in an experimental macroeconomy where subjects are incentivized to forecast the output gap and inflation. Without projections, subjects exhibit a wide range of heuristics, with the modal heuristic involving a significant backward-looking component. Ex-Ante Rational dual projections of the output gap and inflation significantly reduce the number of subjects’ using backward-looking heuristics and nudge expectations in the direction of the rational expectations equilibrium. Ex-Ante Rational interest rate projections are cognitively challenging to employ and have limited effects on the distribution of heuristics. Adaptive dual projections generate unintended inflation volatility by inducing boundedly-rational forecasters to employ the projection and model-consistent forecasters to utilize the projection as a proxy for aggregate expectations. All projections reduce output gap disagreement but increase inflation disagreement. Central bank credibility is significantly diminished when the central bank makes larger forecast errors when communicating a relatively more complex projection. Our findings suggest that inflation-targeting central banks should strategically ignore agents’ irrationalities when constructing their projections and communicate easy-to-process information.


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