The Sino-DPRK Split and Origins of US-DPRK Bilateralism

Author(s):  
Eungseon Kim

North Korea has identified its official foreign policy as being focused on ‘self-reliance’ since the mid-1906s. Kim Il Sung (Kim Il-sŏng) had been long preoccupied with external interference in internal affairs, so the escalation of the Sino-Soviet schism created an environment in which to eliminate foreign influence in domestic politics and strengthen his control. North Korea did not only try to balance between the two giant socialist countries, but also expand its diplomatic sphere outside the communist bloc such as with Third World and European countries. In addition, it pursued direct contact with the US to achieve its longstanding goals, the removal of US troops stationed in the South and the replacement of the 1953 armistice with a permanent peace treaty. Since then demands for bilateral talks have become the most distinctive feature of North Korea’s foreign policy. With the advent of détente in the early 1970s, discontent with their Chinese comrades also led Kim to seek US-DPRK talks. Despite a mutual hostility generated during the era of the Cultural Revolution, Kim Il Sung’s first response to China’s rapprochement with the US was not negative, anticipating the potential for Chinese assistance in accomplishing North Korean diplomatic objectives in its relations with the US. At odds with Kim’s expectation, however, Chinese behavior did not meet North Korea’s demands. China, as well as the US, preferred the status quo to a rapid change in the region, even though they fully supported the beginnings of inter-Korean dialogue that culminated in the conclusion of the Joint Communiqué. Also, Kim Il Sung felt that, in the UN, China was more interested in seeking compromise with the US than asserting North Korea’s requests. Kim Il Sung’s dissatisfaction with China’s halfhearted stance during the détente strengthened his mistrust that Beijing did not consider North Korea’s national interests. As a result, North Korea deliberately excluded China in its offer of negotiations to the US such as the Tripartite Talks between the US and two Koreas, insisting on bilateral meetings with the US.

Asian Survey ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-54
Author(s):  
Kent E. Calder

Japanese domestic politics grew more volatile and complex in 2017, as LDP electoral reversals were followed by opposition fragmentation and then conservative consolidation. Foreign policy was dominated by the security challenge of North Korea, but also involved deepened relations with the US and Europe, as well as unanticipated improvement with China and South Korea. Macroeconomic trends were positive, but structural reform proceeded only slowly. Japanese society remained slow to change.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 132-141
Author(s):  
Hasbi Aswar

A speech from the President of United States, Donald Trump, who explicitly state Jerusalem as the capital city of Israel triggering debate that threatens harmonization of the Middle East. Disagreement appear from South East Asia state up to European state regarding to Trump’s statement, which turn into United States foreign policy. Trump’s statement described as the main reason of increasing tension Palestinian – Israel conflict. This essay argues that The US policy toward Jerusalem was merely influenced by domestic politics in the sense that to satisfy Trump`s main voters of the Republican Party that is Evangelical Christian base.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 737-755 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Marie Blum ◽  
Christopher Sebastian Parker

President Trump is often at odds with the conservative establishment over a range of issues, not least of which is foreign policy. Yet it remains unclear whether supporting “Trumpism” is commensurate with coherent foreign policy views that are distinct from conventionally conservative positions. We evaluate whether the foreign policy views of Trump’s supporters, both in the voting public and among activists, differ from those of other Republicans. We use the 2016 ANES to examine Republican primary voters and the new 2016 State Convention Delegate Study to assess Republican activists. In doing so, we reveal systematic differences in foreign policy preferences between Trump supporters and more establishment conservatives. We demonstrate that the status-threat model need not be confined to domestic politics. Indeed, it may be extended to explain foreign policy preferences on the political right, that of Trump’s supporters in the present case. In doing so, we also find evidence that status threat may well be the source of fracture in the Republican Party.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hossein Aghaie Joobani ◽  
Umut Can Adısönmez

Throughout its Republican history, Turkey has attempted to formulate a “non-interventionist” foreign policy toward its neighbouring countries. Since the onset of the Arab Uprisings, however, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has abjured the traditional policy of “non-military engagement”, adopting instead an assertive and security-oriented foreign policy that has paved the way for the securitization of the Syrian conflict in terms of its Kurdish component and of wider geopolitical aspects. This article aims to explore why and in what ways this abrupt shift toward securitization has occurred while discussing its broader implications on Turkish domestic politics as well. Using the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, the article will unpack and analyse the internal and external dimensions of threat construction and otherization processes underlying Ankara’s securitization policy toward Syria to make the case for the obsolescence of Turkey’s traditional non-interventionist policy, which, we argue, results from an ontological insecurity approach toward the Syrian conflict. The article finds that Turkey’s securitization policy (i.e. interventionist approach) was chiefly driven by the fear of Kurdish autonomy and the growing Russo-Assad-Iranian alliance in Syria; and by the grand ambition of bringing the Muslim Brotherhood into power in Syria and consolidating Turkey’s agential importance in Western security architecture under the aegis of the US.  


Skhid ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 36-44
Author(s):  
Yaroslav POPENKO ◽  
Ihor SRIBNYAK ◽  
Natalia YAKOVENKO ◽  
Viktor MATVIYENKO

The article covers the course of negotiations between the plenipotentiaries of Romania and the leading states of the Entente and the Quadruple Alliance during the First World War. Facing the dilemma of determining its own foreign policy orientation – by joining one of the mentioned military-political blocs, the Romanian government was hesitating for a long time to come to a final decision. At the same time, largely due to this balancing process, official Bucharest managed to preserve its sovereign right to work out and make the most important decisions, while consistently defending Romania's national interests. By taking the side of the Entente and receiving comprehensive military assistance from Russia, Romania at the same time faced enormous military and political problems due to military superiority of the allied Austrian and German forces at the Balkan theater of hostilities. Their occupation of much of Romania forced official Bucharest to seek an alternative, making it sign a separate agreement with the Central Block states. At the same time, its ratification was being delayed in every possible way, which enabled Romania to return to the camp of war winners at the right time. At the same time, official Bucharest made the most of the decline and liquidation of imperial institutions in Russia and Austria-Hungary at the final stage of the First World War, incorporating vast frontier territories into the Kingdom. Taking advantage of the revolutionary events in Russia, the Romanian government succeeded, in particular, in resolving the “Bessarabian problem” in its favor. In addition, Romania included Transylvania, Bukovina and part of Banat. An important foreign policy achievement of Romanian diplomacy was signing of the 1918 Bucharest Peace Treaty, as well as its participation in the Paris Peace Conference.


2013 ◽  
Vol 05 (01) ◽  
pp. 14-31
Author(s):  
Yongnian ZHENG ◽  
Liang Fook LYE ◽  
Gang CHEN

China devoted much effort to manage its relations with Asia-Pacific countries in 2012 due to the US pivot to the region. China views the military-centric focus of the US pivot as directed at China and as emboldening regional countries to be more assertive in their territorial claims vis-à-vis China. In 2013, the Chinese leadership will likely strike a balance between seeking a stable external environment and standing firm on issues concerning China's national interests.


2004 ◽  
Vol 180 ◽  
pp. 1095-1097
Author(s):  
Patrick Belton

Suisheng Zhao has assembled this volume from articles recently published in the Journal of Contemporary China, which he edits. Its chapters cover recognizable terrain for political scientists: whether China, as a rising power, will seek to maximize its relative or absolute gains; the likelihood its increasing power will tend towards status-quo or belligerent lines; and the degree of Chinese ‘exceptionalism’ when compared with other countries. As the subtitle might suggest, the contributions present China in a favourable light, stressing how China's leaders have spurned ideological purism for the pragmatic weighing of national interests, with only nationalism to serve as a double-edged sword by conferring legitimacy on the government, but potentially also taking it away. The assertion that strategic calculations govern Chinese foreign policy contrasts with other interpretations, such as those of David Lampton in Same Bed, Different Dreams, who assigns a large role to domestic politics, or Peter Gries in Understanding Chinese Nationalism, who highlights the constraining role of nationalist ideology on the ability of China's leaders to de-escalate crises with other countries. Zhao's contribution lies less in defending the assertion of pragmatism against those competing perspectives and more in drawing upon it in offering fresh material.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Metawe

Purpose This paper aims to contend that populism is damaging to both domestic and international politics; not only does it erode liberal democracy in established democracies but also fuels authoritarianism in despotic regimes and aggravates conflicts and crises in international system. Design/methodology/approach The research is divided into two main sections. First, it examines how populist mobilization affects liberal democracy, and refutes the claims that populism is beneficial and reinforcing to democracy. Second, it attempts to demonstrate how populism is damaging to domestic politics (by undermining liberal democracy and supporting authoritarianism) as well as international relations (by making interstate conflicts more likely to materialize). Theoretically, populism is assumed to be a strategy used by politicians to maximize their interest. Hence, populism is a strategy used by politicians to mobilize constituents using the main features of populist discourse. Findings The research argues that populism has detrimental consequences on both domestic and international politics; it undermines liberal democracy in democratic countries, upsurges authoritarianism in autocratic regimes and heightens the level of conflict and crises in international politics. Populism can lead to authoritarianism. There is one major undemocratic trait shared by all populist waves around the world, particularly democracies; that is anti-pluralism/anti-institutions. Populist leaders perceive foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics, because they consider themselves as the only true representatives of the people. Therefore, populist actors abandon any political opposition as necessarily illegitimate, with repercussions on foreign policy. Originality/value Some scholars argue that populism reinforces democracy by underpinning its ability to include marginalized sectors of the society and to decrease voter apathy, the research refuted these arguments. Populism is destructive to world democracy; populists are reluctant to embrace the idea of full integration with other nations. Populists reject the idea of open borders, and reckon it an apparent threat to their national security. The research concludes that populists consider maximizing their national interests on the international level by following confrontational policies instead of cooperative ones.


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