To Be or Not to Be? The North Korean Challenge to British Foreign Policy, 1971–1976

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 212-237
Author(s):  
Tae Joon Won
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
North Korea ◽  
South Korean ◽  
The North ◽  
British Foreign Policy ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
Legal Duty ◽  
Illegal Activities ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
North Vietnam

This article seeks to explore the arguments that occurred mainly within the British Foreign Office and in its discussions with other government ministries in the early 1970s concerning the matter of affording diplomatic recognition to North Korea. Legal experts within the Foreign Office were concerned that London's non-recognition of Pyongyang could render Britain's position hypocritical and even illegal vis-à-vis its potential recognition of North Vietnam. British diplomats in Seoul however were adamant that North Korea should be not recognized for fear of angering both the South Korean and the American allies and damaging British commercial interests in South Korea. The Foreign Office ministers decided to delay the inevitable recognition for as long as they could, but then the illegal activities of North Korean diplomats in Europe came to light in 1976 and subsequently put an end to potential public queries about Britain's legal duty to recognise the North Korean regime.

South Korean Politics and Foreign Policy in 2017 and 2018

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (01) ◽  
pp. 123-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaewoo CHOO
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
South Korea ◽  
High Altitude ◽  
North Korea ◽  
The United States ◽  
Basic Strategy ◽  
South Korean ◽  
The North ◽  
High Altitude Area

The election of Moon Jae-in in South Korea signals a shift to a more conciliatory approach towards North Korea. Moon’s basic strategy towards the North contradicts that of the United States, emphasising a “dual-track” policy of seeking North Korea’s denuclearisation while calling for dialogue to facilitate inter-Korean summit and not North Korea’s denuclearisation. Moon’s acceptance of China’s “Three oppositions” to the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence is controversial as they are not within Korea’s jurisdiction.

See No Evil, Hear No Evil: The First Thatcher Government and the Problem of North Korea, 1979–1983

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 232-255
Author(s):  
Tae Joon Won
Keyword(s):  
North Korea ◽  
Vienna Convention ◽  
Military Aid ◽  
Margaret Thatcher ◽  
The North ◽  
High Commissioner ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
Important Means ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
The Right

This article explores the diplomatic challenges which confronted the first Margaret Thatcher administration in regard to Britain's Cold War policy of non-recognition of North Korea. The request of St. Vincent and the Grenadines to simultaneously appoint its resident High Commissioner to London as its non-resident Ambassador to Pyongyang had to be opposed by the British Foreign Office despite the fact that St. Vincent was not a party to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, while London had to consider breaking the provisions of the 1883 Paris Convention in order not to recognize the ‘right of priority’ of patents which had been approved in Pyongyang as was required. Also, North Korea's stated intention to join the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization and therefore establish its permanent mission in London forced the Foreign Office to attempt to block North Korea's admittance to the IMCO despite the principle of universality of international organizations, while Britain's inability to talk directly to the North Koreans deprived London of an important means with which to stop North Korean military aid from arriving in Zimbabwe.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asle Toje
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Present State ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
The Sun ◽  
Policy Debate ◽  
Imperial Germany ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
German Parliament

We do not want to place anyone into the shadow, we also claim our place in the sun.” In a foreign policy debate in the German parliament on December 6. 1897 the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Bernhard von Bülow, articulated the foreign policy aspirations of the ascendant Wilhelmine Germany. This proved easier said than done. In 1907, Eyre Crowe of the British Foreign Office penned his famous memorandum where he accounted for “the present state of British relations with France and Germany.” He concluded that Britain should meet imperial Germany with “unvarying courtesy and consideration” while maintaining “the most unbending determination to uphold British rights and interests in every part of the globe.”...

Expedition turned Invasion: The 1888 Sikkim Expedition through British, Indian and Chinese eyes

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
YI MENG CHENG
Keyword(s):  
English Language ◽  
British Government ◽  
British India ◽  
Intelligence Gathering ◽  
Peace Negotiations ◽  
British Foreign Policy ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
The Subject ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
Chinese And English

Abstract A fresh look at the 1888 Sikkim Expedition using both Chinese and English language sources yields very different conclusions from that of previous research on the subject. During the course of policymaking, the British Foreign Office and the British Government of India did not collaborate to devise a plan to invade Tibet; conversely, their aims differed and clashed frequently. During the years leading to war, the largest newspapers in British India gave plenty of coverage to the benefits of trade with Tibet, thus influencing British foreign policy and contributing indirectly to the outbreak of war. The Tibetan army was soundly defeated in the war, while the British troops suffered only light casualties. Although the Tibetan elites remained committed to the war, the lower classes of Tibetan society quickly grew weary of it. During the war, the British made much use of local spies and enjoyed an advantage in intelligence gathering, which contributed greatly to their victory. Finally, although the war was initially fought over trade issues, the demarcation of the Tibetan-Sikkim border replaced trade issues as the main point of contention during the subsequent peace negotiations. During the negotiations, Sheng Tai, the newly appointed Amban of Tibet, tried his best to defend China's interests.

The Owl of Minerva Flies Only at Dusk?

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 545-563
Author(s):  
Josip Glaurdić
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Clear Picture ◽  
The West ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
True Nature ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
Run Up ◽  
British Foreign Office ◽  
High Level

Could the Western foreign policy makers have done anything to prevent the violence accompanying the breakup of Yugoslavia? The answer to that question largely depends on their level of awareness of what was happening in the South Slavic federation in the run-up to war. This article analyzes a string of newly declassified documents of the British Foreign Office related to the February 1991 visit of a high-level British political delegation to Yugoslavia, together with interviews with some of the meetings’ protagonists. These declassified documents and interviews offer a unique snapshot in the development of the Yugoslav crisis and Britain’s policy in the region. They give us a clear picture of the goals and strategies of the principal Yugoslav players and show us what the West knew about the true nature of the Yugoslav crisis and when. The article’s conclusions are clear. Yugoslavia’s breakup and impending violence did not require great foresight. Their cause was known well in advance because it was preannounced—it was the plan of the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milošević to impose a centralized Yugoslavia upon the other republics or, if that failed, to use force to create a Greater Serbia on Yugoslavia’s ruins. Crucially, British policy at the time did nothing to dissuade Milošević from his plan and likely contributed to his confidence in using violence to pursue the creation of a new and enlarged Serbian state.

Limits of engagement? The sunshine policy, nuclear tests, and South Korean views of North Korea 1995–2013

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joonbum Bae
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Strong Evidence ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Relative Impact ◽  
The South ◽  
South Korean ◽  
Nuclear Tests ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Public Views

Abstract Can positive domestic messages generated by a foreign policy of engagement toward another country change public views regarding that state? How resistant are such changes to events that contradict the positive messages? I argue that while positive government messages about an adversary can significantly improve public opinion, highly consequential foreign policy events that contradict the messages influence public opinion at the cost of elites’ ability to shape it through their messages. Such differing effects can lead to a polarization of opinion when the content of the messages and the nature of events diverge from each other. Leveraging the unpredictability of North Korea’s foreign policy behavior, the South Korean government’s sustained policy of engagement toward it during the years 1998–2007, and North Korea’s first two nuclear tests to examine the relative impact of consequential foreign policy events and elite messages on public opinion, I find strong evidence consistent with this argument.

A Comparative Study on the Attitudes of Foreign Correspondents in Korea: Focusing on Their Views on North Korea

2009 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-110
Author(s):  
Byung Jong Lee
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Editorial Policy ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
Controversial Issues ◽  
Foreign Correspondents ◽  
The North ◽  
Foreign Countries ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Because newspaper readers or television viewers cannot directly experience or witness events that are happening in foreign countries, they have to rely heavily on foreign correspondents for their perspectives on the world. But the views of foreign correspondents can never be fully objective. Their views are often shaped by the government policies of the countries their companies belong to. Also, their attitudes are affected by the editorial policies of the companies they work for. Particularly for such controversial issues as North Korea, foreign correspondents' viewpoints are highly influenced by their government and company policies. The question is how foreign correspondents react when their government foreign policy is different from their company editorial policy. To examine the impact of government and company policies on the attitudes of foreign correspondents, this paper interviewed eight foreign correspondents covering North Korea. The results show government foreign policy and company editorial policy strongly influence the foreign correspondents' attitudes toward the North.

scholarly journals System Dynamics as a Foreign Policy Tool to Resolve the North Korean Dilemma

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-152
Author(s):  
Brendon Cagney ◽  
Ernest Wong
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
The North ◽  
Policy Tool ◽  
To Come

Since its establishment as a nation-state after World War II, North Korea has undermined regional stability and has increased the threat to global security. The North Korean regime has shown time and time again that it will stop at nothing to maintain its power and portray itself as a strong and prosperous nation. Today the worry over North Korea extends well beyond its substantial conventional firepower—its asymmetric gains in chemical, biological, nuclear, and cyber warfare capabilities have given rise to a new set of complexities that frustrate international accord. Kim Jong-Un, North Korea’s current Supreme Leader, has pressed vehemently against the challenges he perceives from adversaries, both foreign as well as domestic, in order to promote his nation’s self-interest. As a consequence, the international community typically responds in kind with political and economic sanctions intended to curb further North Korean provocations. However, history has repeatedly shown how such sanctions serve as merely temporary measures that postpone continued advances in North Korea’s military effectiveness. In this paper, the authors leverage system dynamics to better characterize the current situation in North Korea and attempt to provide useful insights into understanding why the Kim Jong-Un regime behaves in the way that it does. By doing so, the authors encourage policy makers to employ system dynamics as a foreign policy tool to come up with more effective ideas and solutions for dealing with today’s North Korean dilemma.

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