Patrimony not Equity: The Trust in Scotland

Author(s):  
Kenneth G C Reid

This chapter examines the importance of patrimony as an organising principle of trust in the absence of equity. The law of property in Scotland and other mixed jurisdictions is always civilian; like civil law countries, they do not have a separate system of equity, or acknowledge the distinction between legal and beneficial ownership; and yet all mixed systems have the trust. In addition to the common law trust, there is the civil law trust. Of the civil law trusts, a special place may be claimed for the Scottish trust, the oldest such trust by far and one of the most widely used in practice. The chapter first considers trusts in relation to contracts and real rights before discussing the two patrimonies of a trustee: a private patrimony and a trust patrimony. It also assesses the impact of a trustee's death on the integrity of patrimony, along with the rights of trustees and trust beneficiaries.

2021 ◽  
pp. 414-470
Author(s):  
André Naidoo

This chapter explains the law relating to the requirements and remedies for misrepresentation. The rules that the chapter covers developed originally in the context of all types of contracts. However, more recent legislation has introduced some specific protection for consumers. Consequently, the common law rules and older legislation that the chapter covers are now more applicable to non-consumer contracts, i.e. contracts between businesses and those between private parties. The chapter starts by addressing the kind of false statements that can result in a remedy. It then addresses the common law and legislative remedies that could be available to the innocent party. Finally, the chapter turns to the impact of the more recent consumer legislation before finally examining the extent to which an exemption clause could cover liability for misrepresentation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (79) ◽  
pp. 58-72
Author(s):  
Edilene Santana Santos ◽  
Laura Calixto ◽  
Maira Ferreira Bispo

ABSTRACT This article aims to assess the impact of the New Guideline of the Brazilian Accounting Pronouncements Committee (Comitê de Pronunciamentos Contábeis - OCPC 07) on improving formal features (size, readability, and specificity) of Brazilian companies’ Notes. OCPC 07 is one of the world’s first guidelines issued in response to the current demand for the downsizing of companies’ Notes, which according to standard setters and market agents have become too extensive, thus characterizing a disclosure overload. This is a unique study on the subject. The results suggest the effectiveness, although limited, of the new standard in promoting a departure from the habits of secrecy and formalism rooted in centuries of legal-accounting civil law tradition, and indicate that there is still room for complementary improvement initiatives in the form of incentives for firms and increased enforcement. Three complementary methodological approaches are used: (1) an analysis of both the evolution of note size after OCPC 07 and the factors explaining that size and its variation; (2) an examination of indicators of readability, conciseness, and specificity of the note on accounting policies; and (3) a size comparison of the Notes of Brazilian and British companies, a benchmark of the common law tradition. An average reduction of 10% in Note size was found two years after the introduction of Guideline (Orientação) 07 by the (OCPC 07). This downsizing was not generalized, but instead identified only among firms in the Novo Mercado and among those audited by two of the Big Four. Even in firms that reduced their notes by at least 20%, no significant improvements in readability levels could be perceived, nor in habits of copy-pasting the auditors’ templates, which could signal a focus on firms’ real practices in the note on accounting policies. Brazilian Notes remain far from the benchmark and are still 40% longer than British ones, despite an equivalent number of pages being expected.


2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 657-683 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Parkinson

This article argues that the express trust should be understood as a species of obligation rather than as a means of organising the ownership of property. Two propositions seem fundamental to the traditional understanding of the trust as an aspect of property law. Firstly, in the nature of the trust, there must be a separation of legal and beneficial ownership. Secondly, there must be trust property. Neither is necessarily true. With many discretionary trusts and other recognised types of express trust it is impossible to locate the beneficial estate. Furthermore, the requirement for there to be trust property is, on closer analysis, a requirement of certainty of obligation in relation to specific subject-matter within which the trust property can be located.The article explores the implications of understanding the trust as a species of obligation. It allows all express trusts, including charitable trusts, to be explained as resting on the same fundamental concepts. The trust in the common law world may still be distinguished from contract and from the civil law forms of the trust. This new conceptualisation also illuminates what is the irreducible core content of the trust. The article concludes with a new definition of the express trust.


Author(s):  
Daniel Visser

Unjustified enrichment confronted both civil and common lawyers with thinking which was often completely outside the paradigm to which they had become accustomed. The recognition of unjustified enrichment as a cause of action in its own right in English law created a new arena of uncertainty between the systems. This article argues that comparative lawyers can make an important contribution to the future of the fractured and fractious world of unjustified enrichment. It may help to uncover the enormous wealth of learning of which both the common law and the civil law are the repositories, and so bring the same level of understanding to the law of unjustified enrichment which has, over the years, been achieved between the systems in regard to contract and tort.


Author(s):  
Gary F Bell

Indonesia is one of the most legally diverse and complex countries in the world. It practises legal pluralism with three types of contract law in force: adat (customary) contract laws, Islamic contract laws (mostly concerning banking), and the European civil law of contract, transplanted from the Netherlands in 1847, found mainly in the Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata). This chapter focuses on European civil law as it is the law used for the majority of commercial transactions. The civil law of contract is not well developed and there is a paucity of indigenous doctrine and jurisprudence, since most significant commercial disputes are settled by arbitration. The contours of the law are consistent with the French/Dutch legal tradition. In the formation of contracts, the subjective intention of the parties plays a greater role than in the common law. As with most jurisdictions with a Napoleonic tradition, the offer must include all the essential element of the contract, there is no concept of ‘invitations to treat’ or of ‘consideration’, the common law posting rule is rejected, and the contract is formed only when the acceptance is received. There are generally few requirements of form but some contracts must be in writing and some in a notarial deed.


Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter explains briefly the origins and development of the common law tradition in order to better understand the rise of judicial review in the seven common law countries discussed in this volume. The common law legal tradition is characterized historically, in public law, by limited, constitutional government and by forms of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. In private law, the common law tradition is characterized by judge-made case law, which is the primary source of the law, instead of a massive code being the primary source of the law. The common law tradition is also characterized by reliance on the institution of trial by jury. Judges, rather than scholars, are the key figures who are revered in the common law legal tradition, and this is one of the key things that distinguishes the common law legal tradition from the civil law legal tradition. The common law legal tradition emphasizes judicial power, which explains why it has led to judicial review in the countries studied in this volume. It is the prevailing legal tradition in the four countries with the oldest systems of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation: the United States, Canada, Australia, and India. Thus, judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation in these four countries is very much shaped by common law attitudes about the roles of judges.


1997 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 521-560
Author(s):  
Michael Chesterman

To allow Court orders to be disobeyed would be to tread the road towards anarchy. If the orders of the Court can be treated with disrespect, the whole administration of justice is brought into scorn. Daily, thousands of Canadians resort to our Courts for relief against the wrongful acts of others. If the remedies that Courts grant to correct those wrongs can be ignored, then there will be nothing left but for each person to take the law into his own hands. Loss of respect for the Courts will quickly result in the destruction of our society. [O'Leary J, in Canada Metal Co. Ltd v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (1975) 48 DLR 3d 641, 669 (High Court of Ontario)]


1945 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lord Wright

In preparing the few and elementary observations which I am about to make to you tonight I have wondered if the title I chose was apt or suitable. The Common Law is generally described as the law of liberty, of freedom and of free peoples. It was a home-made product. In the eighteenth century, foreign lawyers called it an insular and barbarous system; they compared it to their own system of law, developed on the basis of Roman and Civil Law. Many centuries before, and long after Bracton's day, when other civilised European nations ‘received’ the Roman Law, England held back and stood aloof from the Reception. It must have been a near thing. It seems there could have been a Reception here if the Judges had been ecclesiastics, steeped in the Civil Law. But as it turned out they were laymen, and were content as they travelled the country, and in London as well, to adopt what we now know as the Case System, instead of the rules and categories of the Civil Law. Hence the method of threshing out problems by debate in Court, and later on the basis of written pleadings which we find in the Year Books. For present purposes, all I need observe is that the Civil Lawyer had a different idea of the relation of the state or the monarch to the individual from that of the Common Lawyer. To the Civil or Roman Lawyer, the dominant maxim was ‘quod placuit principi legis habet vigorem’; law was the will of the princeps. With this may be compared the rule expressed in Magna Carta in 1215: No freeman, it was there said, was to be taken or imprisoned or exiled or in any way destroyed save by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land. Whatever the exact application of that phrase in 1215, it became a text for fixing the relations between the subject and the State. Holdsworth quotes from the Year Book of 1441; the law is the highest English inheritance the King hath, for by the law he and all his subjects are ruled. That was the old medieval doctrine that all things are governed by law, either human or divine. That is the old doctrine of the supremacy of the law, which runs through the whole of English history, and which in the seventeenth century won the day against the un-English doctrine of the divine right of Kings and of their autocratic power over the persons and property of their subjects. The more detailed definition of what all that involved took time to work out. I need scarcely refer to the great cases in the eighteenth century in which the Judges asserted the right of subjects to freedom from arbitrary arrest as against the ministers of state and against the validity of a warrant to seize the papers of a person accused of publishing a seditious libel; in particular Leach v. Money (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1001; Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 St. Tr. 1029; Wilkes v. Halifax (1769) 19 St. Tr. 1406. In this connexion may be noted Fox's Libel Act, 1792, which dealt with procedure, but fixed a substantive right to a trial by jury of the main issue in the cases it referred to.


1970 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Anderson

This discussion raises a nu1nber ojissues related to the introduction of the economic torts into New Zealand labour law during the 1970s. These include the question of whether such major innovations accorded with the principles normally accepted by comparative lawvers when considering legal transplants. and the basic question of whether the common law as developed in Britain is, in this case, suitable for New Zealand circumstances. The impact of the law in New Zealand is then outlined and the changes introduced hy the Labour Relations Act are briefly considered.


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