A Priori Objections

Author(s):  
Christopher A. Shrock

Howard Robinson and Bertrand Russell challenge the treatment of secondary qualities as objective, causally relevant, physical properties on non-empirical grounds. Robinson says that no combination of physical properties can account for the phenomenological aspects of secondary qualities. Russell, similarly, sees secondary qualities as knowable through acquainence, unlike scientific properties. Again, the answer involves a sharp distinction between perceived properties and sensations.

Author(s):  
Frank Jackson

Physicalism is a thesis in metaphysics: the nature of the mind and its states are such that we need no more than the physical properties to give a complete account of them. According to a priori physicalism, this thesis in metaphysics implies a thesis about a priori entailment. If the thesis in metaphysics is true, a sufficiently rich account of a subject—you, me, or … —given in physical terms a priori entails how that subject is mentally. Why do some physicalists want to make things difficult for themselves by embracing a priori physicalism; why do they believe that a posteriori physicalism—a prima facie less demanding version of physicalism—is not an option? This is the topic of this chapter. As we will see, there are a number of reasons that have or might be given.


Geophysics ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. H9-H18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulio Vignoli ◽  
Rita Deiana ◽  
Giorgio Cassiani

The reconstruction of the GPR velocity vertical profile from vertical radar profile (VRP) traveltime data is a problem with a finite number of measurements and imprecise data, analogous to similar seismic techniques, such as the shallow down-hole test used for S-wave velocity profiling or the vertical seismic profiling (VSP) commonly used in deeper exploration. The uncertainty in data accuracy and the error amplification inherent in deriving velocity estimates from gradients of arrival times make this an example of an ill-posed inverse problem. In the framework of Tikhonov regularization theory, ill-posedness can be tackled by introducing a regularizing functional (stabilizer). The role of this functional is to stabilize the numerical solution by incorporating the appropriate a priori assumptions about the geometrical and/or physical properties of the solution. One of these assumptions could be the existence of sharp boundaries separating rocks with different physical properties. We apply a method based on the minimum support stabilizer to the VRP traveltime inverse problem. This stabilizer makes it possible to produce more accurate profiles of geological targets with compact structure. We compare more traditional inversion results with our proposed compact reconstructions. Using synthetic examples, we demonstrate that the minimum support stabilizer allows an improved recovery of the profile shape and velocity values of blocky targets. We also study the stabilizer behavior with respect to different noise levels and different choices of the reference model. The proposed approach is then applied to real cases where VPRs have been used to derive moisture content profiles as a function of depth. In these real cases, the derived sharper profiles are consistent with other evidence, such as GPR zero-offset profiles, GPR reflections and known locations of the water table.


Author(s):  
Howard Sankey

Abstract In The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell presents a justification of induction based on a principle he refers to as “the principle of induction.” Owing to the ambiguity of the notion of probability, the principle of induction may be interpreted in two different ways. If interpreted in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability, the principle of induction may be known a priori to be true. But it is unclear how this should give us any confidence in our use of induction, since induction is applied to the external world outside our minds. If the principle is interpreted in light of the objective interpretation of induction, it cannot be known to be true a priori, since it applies to frequencies that occur in the world outside the mind, and these cannot be known without recourse to experience. Russell’s principle of induction therefore fails to provide a satisfactory justification of induction.


Author(s):  
Christopher A. Shrock

A final objection to the treatment of secondary qualities as objective, causally relevant, physical properties says that perceived physical properties must resemble the ideas they cause in the perceiver. This approach assumes Indirect Realism (and therefore the falsity of Direct Realism), but it was ubiquitous in Reid’s day. This chapter traces Reid’s rejection of the Way of Ideas as it bears on his defense of Direct Realism and theory of secondary qualities. Although this objection would not be likely to get traction among contemporary philosophers, this chapter presents Reid’s case for historical interest and consistency.


Author(s):  
Sander Verhaegh

During the past few decades, a radical shift has occurred in how philosophers conceive of the relation between science and philosophy. A great number of analytic philosophers have adopted what is commonly called a “naturalistic” approach, arguing that their inquiries ought to be in some sense continuous with science. Where early analytic philosophers often relied on a sharp distinction between science and philosophy—the former an empirical discipline concerned with fact, the latter an a priori discipline concerned with meaning—philosophers today largely follow Willard Van Orman Quine (1908–2000) in his seminal rejection of this distinction. This book offers a comprehensive study of Quine’s naturalism. Building on Quine’s published corpus as well as thousands of unpublished letters, notes, lectures, papers, proposals, and annotations from the Quine archives, this book aims to reconstruct both the nature (chapters 2–4) and the development (chapters 5–7) of his naturalism. Accordingly, this book aims to contribute to the rapidly developing historiography of analytic philosophy and to provide a better, historically informed, understanding of what is philosophically at stake in the contemporary naturalistic turn.


Author(s):  
Vlatko Vedral

In our search for the ultimate law, P, that allows us to encode the whole of reality we have come across a very fundamental obstacle. As Deutsch argued, P cannot be all-encompassing, simply because it cannot explain its own origins. We need a law more fundamental than P, from which P can be derived. But then this more fundamental law also needs to come from somewhere. This is like the metaphor of the painter in the lunatic asylum, who is trying to paint a picture of the garden he is sitting in. He can never find a way to completely include himself in the picture and gets caught in an infinite regression. Does this mean we can never understand the whole of reality? Maybe so, given that any postulate that we start from needs its own explanation. Any law that underlies reality ultimately needs an a priori law. This puts us in a bit of a ‘Catch 22’ situation. So, are we resigned to failure or is there a way out? Is there some fundamental level at which events have no a priori causes and we can break the infinite regression? What does it mean for an event to have no a priori cause? This means that, even with all prior knowledge, we cannot infer that this event will take place. Furthermore, if there were genuinely acausal events in this Universe, this would imply a fundamentally random element of reality that cannot be reduced to anything deterministic. This is a hugely controversial area, with various proponents of religion, science, and philosophy all having a quite contrasting set of views on this. Often people get very emotional over this question, as it has profound implications for us as human beings. Could it be that some events just don’t have first causes? The British philosopher Bertrand Russell thought so. In Russell’s famous debate with Reverend Copleston on the origin of the world, Copleston thought everything must have a cause, and therefore the world has a cause – and this cause is ultimately God himself.


Author(s):  
Felipe Maya Restrepo
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  

En este artículo examino algunos presupuestos filosóficos de Bertrand Russell que subyacen a su descubrimiento de las paradojas en la teoría de conjuntos de Cantor: los juicios a priori y sintéticos de Kant, el logicismo de Leibniz, la cosmovisión hegeliana, el argumento ontológico de san Anselmo.


Mind ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 101 (402) ◽  
pp. 263-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
JIM EDWARDS
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  

2009 ◽  
Vol 55 (193) ◽  
pp. 931-937 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles W. Holland ◽  
Sridhar Anandakrishnan

AbstractSeismic reflection techniques are a powerful way to probe physical properties of subglacial strata. Inversion of seismic data for physical properties may be hampered, however, by lack of knowledge of the source amplitude as well as lack of knowledge of the compressional and shear attenuation in the ice. New methods are described to measure the source signature that require no a priori knowledge of the ice attenuation profile. Another new method is described to obtain the angular dependence of the subglacial bed reflection coefficient that is relatively insensitive to knowledge of the ice attenuation. Finally, a correction is provided to a long-standing error in the literature regarding measurement of the bed normal incidence reflection coefficient.


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