Variations of the Mixed Discourse

Author(s):  
Chantal Jaquet

Lastly, on the basis of this definition, the author shows how affects shed light on the body-mind relationship and provide an opportunity to produce a mixed discourse that focuses, by turns, on the mental, physical, or psychophysical aspect of affect. The final chapter has two parts: – An analysis of the three categories of affects: mental, physical, and psychophysical – An examination of the variations of Spinoza’s discourse Some affects, such as satisfaction of the mind, are presented as mental, even though they are correlated with the body. Others, such as pain or pleasure, cheerfulness (hilaritas) or melancholy are mainly rooted in the body, even though the mind forms an idea of them. Still others are psychophysical, such as humility or pride, which are expressed at once as bodily postures and states of mind. These affects thus show us how the mind and body are united, all the while expressing themselves differently and specifically, according to their own modalities.

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-43
Author(s):  
Surjo Soekadar ◽  
Jennifer Chandler ◽  
Marcello Ienca ◽  
Christoph Bublitz

Recent advances in neurotechnology allow for an increasingly tight integration of the human brain and mind with artificial cognitive systems, blending persons with technologies and creating an assemblage that we call a hybrid mind. In some ways the mind has always been a hybrid, emerging from the interaction of biology, culture (including technological artifacts) and the natural environment. However, with the emergence of neurotechnologies enabling bidirectional flows of information between the brain and AI-enabled devices, integrated into mutually adaptive assemblages, we have arrived at a point where the specific examination of this new instantiation of the hybrid mind is essential. Among the critical questions raised by this development are the effects of these devices on the user’s perception of the self, and on the user’s experience of their own mental contents. Questions arise related to the boundaries of the mind and body and whether the hardware and software that are functionally integrated with the body and mind are to be viewed as parts of the person or separate artifacts subject to different legal treatment. Other questions relate to how to attribute responsibility for actions taken as a result of the operations of a hybrid mind, as well as how to settle questions of the privacy and security of information generated and retained within a hybrid mind.


Author(s):  
Markus Reuber ◽  
Gregg H. Rawlings ◽  
Steven C. Schachter

This chapter explores how dissociation of awareness of either the mind or the body can be experienced by everyone to some degree. It has been suggested that in Non-Epileptic Attack Disorder (NEAD), a protective mechanism of enabling individuals to detach from the difficult emotions they have not yet been able to make sense of has led to a detachment from the awareness of the body, thus resulting in physical symptoms that resemble epileptic seizures. Treatment therefore lies in improving both mind and body awareness. Working with individuals with NEAD or Dissociative Seizures introduces one to the multifaceted nature of humanity. Although there are common themes that emerge through psychological assessment—such as prior experience of illness, neurological insult or physical injury to a specific body part, difficulty recognizing stress in the body or mind, or a tendency to use unhelpful coping strategies during prolonged periods of stress,—no two persons with NEAD have the same seizures because each individual’s experience is unique, making the nature and clinical presentation of the seizure-like experiences idiosyncratic. Despite this, it is always possible to discover the reason that individuals with NEAD experience the symptoms they do, even if it is sometimes initially hard for the individual to accept or believe this.


Humanities ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 109
Author(s):  
Alberto Tondello

In Agency and Embodiment, Carrie Noland describes gesture as “a type of inscription, a parsing of the body into signifying and operational units”, considering it as a means to read and decode the human body. Through an analysis of James Joyce’s collection of Epiphanies, my paper will examine how gesture, as a mode of expression of the body, can be transcribed on the written page. Written and collected to record a “spiritual manifestation” shining through “in the vulgarity of speech or gesture, or in a memorable phase of the mind itself”, Joyce’s Epiphanies can be considered as the first step in his sustained attempt to develop an art of gesture-as-rhythm. These short pieces appear as the site in which the author seeks, through the medium of writing, to negotiate and redefine the boundaries of the physical human body. Moving towards a mapping of body and mind through the concept of rhythm, and pointing to a collaboration and mutual influence between interiority and exteriority, the Epiphanies open up a space for the reformulation of the relationship between the human body and its environment. Unpacking the ideas that sit at the heart of the concept of epiphany, the paper will shed light on how this particular mode of writing produces a rhythmic art of gesture, fixing and simultaneously liberating human and nonhuman bodies on the written page.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 126
Author(s):  
Gunne Grankvist ◽  
Petri Kajonius ◽  
Bjorn Persson

<p>Dualists view the mind and the body as two fundamental different “things”, equally real and independent of each other. Cartesian thought, or substance dualism, maintains that the mind and body are two different substances, the non-physical and the physical, and a causal relationship is assumed to exist between them. Physicalism, on the other hand, is the idea that everything that exists is either physical or totally dependent of and determined by physical items. Hence, all mental states are fundamentally physical states. In the current study we investigated to what degree Swedish university students’ beliefs in mind-body dualism is explained by the importance they attach to personal values. A self-report inventory was used to measure their beliefs and values. Students who held stronger dualistic beliefs attach less importance to the power value (i.e., the effort to achieve social status, prestige, and control or dominance over people and resources). This finding shows that the strength in laypeople’s beliefs in dualism is partially explained by the importance they attach to personal values.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (5) ◽  
pp. 769-806
Author(s):  
Peter Goldberg

A psychosomatic model of dissociation is proposed that addresses the ever adjusting mind-body relation—the constant titration of the quality and degree of the psyche’s embeddedness in the sensorial and temporal life of the body. The model highlights the function of hypnoid mechanisms (autohypnosis, distraction, somatic autostimulation) and of altered states of consciousness in facilitating and masking the work of mind-body dissociation. Transient altered states, which enable new and creative forms of mind-body experience in everyday life and in the therapy situation, are contrasted with pathological forms of retreat into alter worlds—rigidly organized, timeless, often inescapable trancelike states of mind-body dislocation. These pathological dissociative structures reshape the life of the mind and of the body, requiring new clinical approaches to these phenomena.


Author(s):  
Daniel J. Wallace ◽  
Janice Brock Wallace

Let’s continue on the self-help road to improving fibromyalgia symptoms. Suppose we are eating healthy, well-balanced meals, are no longer smoking, have learned to pace ourselves, cope with changes in the weather, are sleeping well, and have reconfigured the house. At this point, how can the body be trained to reduce pain, stiffness, and fatigue? This chapter will explore how physical, mental, and complementary modalities allow fibromyalgia patients to feel better about their bodies and minds. Therapeutic regimens that help the body and mind, whether physical therapy, yoga, acupuncture, or chiropractic methods, are all based on similar tenets of body mechanics: 1. Fibromyalgia patients will never improve unless they have good posture. Bad posture aggravates musculoskeletal pain and creates tight, stiff, sore muscles. Therefore, stretch, change positions, and have a good workstation that does not require too much leaning or reaching. 2. The way we get around is a demonstration of body mechanics. The fundamental principles of good body mechanics in fibromyalgia include using a broad base of support by distributing loads to stronger joints with a greater surface area, keeping things close to the body to provide leverage, minimizing reaching, and not putting too much pressure on the lower back. Also, don’t stay in the same position for a prolonged period of time. 3. Exercise is necessary. It improves our sense of well-being, strengthens muscles and bones, allows restful sleep, relieves stress, releases serotonin and endorphins, which decreases pain, and burns calories. 4. Don’t be shy about using supports. Whether it be an armrest, special chair, brace, wall, railing, pillow, furniture, slings, pockets, or even another person’s body, supports allow fibromyalgia patients to decrease the amount of weight or stress that would otherwise be applied to the body, producing discomfort or pain. 5. All activities should be conducive to relaxation and stress reduction, whether they be deep breathing, meditation, biofeedback, or guided imagery. There are a surprisingly large number of ways these activities can be carried out. They are discussed in the next few sections.


2003 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew G. Looper

Following trends in anthropology, the human body has recently become an important topic of discourse in archaeology. While some anthropologists consider the body as a social metaphor or site of symbolic inscription, others have questioned the validity of approaches based on the dichotomization and hierarchization of the mind and body. Semasiology, in particular, offers an epistemologically sound basis for interpreting the body, by grounding agency in the socially-structured actions that constitute corporeal space. This article applies the semasiological concept of the action-sign to archaeological problems through an examination of the interrelationship between Tairona anthropomorphic imagery and remains of ceremonial architecture at Pueblito, an archaeological site in Colombia. In both cases, physical remains constitute the traces of the actions through which agential persons created sacred spaces, and the meanings of these spaces may be more fully reconstructed by comparing diverse modes of embodiment. Tairona figural art and architecture constitute a creative technology, serving as an indexically-bound nexus of embodied social action.


2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 347-362
Author(s):  
Rona Cohen ◽  

This essay explores Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophical return to Cartesian philosophy, specifically to Descartes’s preoccupation with the relation of mind and body, as a fertile ground from which to develop an ontology of the body in (1992). It explores Nancy’s reasons for revisiting the Cartesian thinking framework, which on the face of it, is of little value to an ontology of the body. I argue that Descartes’s impasse in accounting for both mind/body dualism and their union constitutes Nancy’s point of departure in constructing an ontology of the body in , thereby transforming Descartes’s impasse into a productive aporia, in the Derridean sense of the term. To fully understand the significance of the notion of “relation” in Nancy’s’ philosophy, I turn to his reading of Lacan’s famous aphorism “there is no sexual relation” and explore its ontological implications.


Philosophy ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 511-535
Author(s):  
P. M. S. Hacker

AbstractThis dialogue on the mind/body relation is a sequel to my dialogue ‘On the Nature of the Mind’, but can be read independently of it. The five disputants include an imaginary neuroscientist from California, an Oxford don from the 1950s, a lady, Peter Strawson and Alan White. They examine the peculiar idioms of having: having a body, having a mind, having a soul and having a self. To have a mind, it is concluded, is not to own anything, but to be able to do a variety of things: to reason from premises to conclusions; to act, think, and feel things for reasons. To have a body is to possess a variety of somatic characteristics. Hence a distinction is drawn between the body one is, and the body one has. Accordingly, the problem of the relation between my mind and my body simply disintegrates, since there can be no relation between my intellectual abilities and my somatic features.


1995 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-101
Author(s):  
Bruce M. Thomas
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
The Real ◽  
De Re ◽  

Descartes contends that he, or his mind, is really distinct from his body. Many philosophers have little patience with this claim. What could be more obvious than that the mind depends on the body? But their impatience often dissolves when they recognize that Descartes only asserts a de re modal statement. To say that one thing is really distinct from another is to say that each can exist apart from the other (AT VII 162: CSM II 114). But should we grant Descartes this de re modal claim itself?Descartes's argument for the real distinction is based on the assumption that clear and distinct conception provides a reliable guide to possibility.


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