scholarly journals Using Blockchain to Improve Decision Making That Benefits the Public Good

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moran Cerf ◽  
Sandra Matz ◽  
Aviram Berg
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Good ◽  
The Public

Interest Groups, Iron Triangles and Representative Institutions in American National Government

1984 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas L. Gais ◽  
Mark A. Peterson ◽  
Jack L. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
National Government ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
The Public

President Carter will perhaps be remembered most for his perceived incompetence, an impression produced largely by his inability to forge coalitions in Congress, and by his failure as an ‘outsider’ to intervene effectively in the established policy-making processes in Washington. In his farewell address, Carter alluded to what he believed to be the source of his troubles – the fragmentation of power and decision-making exploited by influential special interests. Carter believed that he was trapped in a web of organized groups allied with well-placed congressional and bureaucratic sympathizers seeking to protect their narrowly defined interests and frustrating his own broader vision of the public good.

scholarly journals The Lockean Constitution: Separation of Powers and the Limits of Prerogative

2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 543-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Jenkins
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Modified Model ◽  
The Public ◽  
Per Se

In the post-9/11 era, many legal scholars have advanced theories of constitutional law that make allowance for unreviewable discretionary decision making by the executive branch, particularly in the context of the “war on terror”. Drawing on Lockean constitutional theory for normative support, the author develops an alternative constitutional model that addresses the problem of discretionary executive power. Locke’s constitution divides political power between the executive and the legislature, with the latter checking and balancing the former. Both the executive and the legislature have a fiduciary trust to act for the public good. Locke closely links the public good and the constitution such that any breach of the constitution is per se a breach of the public good. Therefore, unreviewable decision making by the executive always violates its trust because it is a breach of the constitution. After setting out Locke’s theory of separation of powers, the author presents a modified model that makes the judiciary, in addition to the legislature, responsible for the accountability of executive decision makers. Although the executive retains its prerogative power, it must always remain accountable to the legislature and the courts, even in emergencies.

The Effect of Fiscal Transparency on the Provision of a Public Good: An Experimental Analysis

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-323
Author(s):  
Julian Krause
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
Government Spending ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Fiscal Transparency ◽  
City District ◽  
Set Up

This paper presents a model and experimental results of a public good game to explore the effects of fiscal transparency on the provision of a public good. Two types of fiscal transparency are explored. The first is the transparency of the decision-making process and the second is the transparency of government spending. To answer this question a model for the public good “city district quality” with heterogeneous agents is set up and the design and the results of the experiment are presented.

scholarly journals Network rewiring promotes cooperation in an aspirational learning model

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anuran Pal ◽  
Supratim Sengupta
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Social Ties ◽  
Learning Model ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Learning Efficiency ◽  
Public Resource ◽  
Aspiration Levels

We analyze a cooperative decision-making model that is based on individual aspiration levels using the framework of a public goods game in static and dynamic networks. Sensitivity to differences in payoff and dynamic aspiration levels modulate individual satisfaction and affects subsequent behavior. The collective outcome of such strategy changes depends on the efficiency with which aspiration levels are updated. Below a threshold learning efficiency, cooperators dominate despite short-term fluctuations in strategy fractions. Categorizing players based on their satisfaction level and the resulting strategy reveal periodic cycling between the different categories. We explain the distinct dynamics in the two phases in terms of differences in the dominant cyclic transitions between different categories of cooperators and defectors. Allowing even a small fraction of nodes to restructure their connections can promote cooperation across almost the entire range of values of learning efficiency. Our work reinforces the usefulness of an internal criterion for strategy updates, together with network restructuring, in ensuring the dominance of altruistic strategies over long time-scales.Maintaining a public resource requires sustained cooperation through contributions by community members who benefit from it. Yet, a selfish individual who refuses to contribute can enjoy the benefits without paying the cost of sustaining the public good. If however, too many members of the community act selfishly, the public resource collapses to the detriment of all. The public goods game highlights such a social dilemma and provides a framework for exploring different mechanisms of strategic decision-making that allow cooperation and consequently the public good to be sustained. Among many mechanisms, the reorganization of social ties has been shown to be effective in promoting cooperation in PGG. However, the efficacy of most mechanisms in sustaining cooperation rely on individuals updating their strategy on the basis of information about the contributions of other members of the community. Often such information is either not forthcoming or cannot be effectively utilized. An alternative low-information model of behavioral updating relies on a comparison between the actual benefit received and the benefit aspired for. Individuals tend to retain their strategy if they are satisfied with the benefit received and change their strategy if they are unsatisfied. We show that such a simple reinforcement learning model along with modest restructuring of social ties over time can allow cooperation to be sustained. Our work shows that a low-information strategy-update model can be very effective in ensuring dominance of cooperators in social dilemmas.

scholarly journals Renegotiating the public good: Responding to the first wave of COVID-19 in England, Germany and Italy

2021 ◽  
pp. 147490412110300
Author(s):  
Peter Kelly ◽  
Susann Hofbauer ◽  
Barbara Gross
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Good ◽  
News Media ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
National Education ◽  
The Public ◽  
Policy Responses ◽  
National Education Policy ◽  
Media Reports ◽  
Inform Decision Making

We compare national education policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in England, Germany and Italy to explore negotiations about the public good and identify the role that research has played in framing, legitimating and rendering trustworthy the settlements reached. National data, comprising news media reports and publically available documents, are analysed and compared to identify debates about the public good and their consequences within and across national contexts. Our analysis contrasts policy contexts on three dimensions: (a) the range of interests included in debates; (b) the form and locus of decision-making; and (c) public acceptance of policy during implementation. These are related to processes of depoliticising debate and politicising research evidence in each context, as factions position themselves as trustworthy. We suggest that the way research is seen to inform decision-making during crises such as the current COVID-19 pandemic has enduring consequences for public trust in research, the politicians who employ it to justify their decisions and the schools tasked with putting these decisions into practice.

Positional Commitments and the Public Good: Perceptions of a Defecting Group Leader

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark E. Sibicky ◽  
Cortney B. Richardson ◽  
Anna M. Gruntz ◽  
Timothy J. Binegar ◽  
David A. Schroeder ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Group Leader ◽  
The Public

Radiological safety and assessment of the performance of X-ray systems in veterinary facilities

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Economides ◽  
C.J. Hourdakis ◽  
C. Pafilis ◽  
G. Simantirakis ◽  
P. Tritakis ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Radiation Protection ◽  
Atomic Energy Commission ◽  
Atomic Energy ◽  
Regulatory Control ◽  
Continuous Training ◽  
X Ray ◽  
The Public ◽  
Radiological Safety ◽  
High Level

This paper concerns an analysis regarding the performance of X-ray equipment as well as the radiological safety in veterinary facilities. Data were collected from 380 X-ray veterinary facilities countrywide during the on-site regulatory inspections carried out by the Greek Atomic Energy Commission. The analysis of the results shows that the majority of the veterinary radiographic systems perform within the acceptable limits; moreover, the design and shielding of X-ray rooms as well as the applied procedures ensure a high level of radiological safety for the practitioners, operators and the members of the public. An issue that requires specific attention in the optimization process for the proper implementation of veterinary radiology practices in terms of radiological safety is the continuous training of the personnel. The above findings and the regulatory experience gained were valuable decision-making elements regarding the type of the regulatory control of veterinary radiology practices in the new radiation protection framework.

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