scholarly journals COVID-19: A Political Virus? VOX’s Populist Discourse in Times of Crisis

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Javier Olivas Osuna ◽  
José Rama

Spain has been one of the hardest hit countries by the COVID-19 pandemic, and this crisis presented a window of opportunity for VOX, as it has for other far right parties, to raise its visibility as opposition force. This paper investigates whether the discourse of VOX has evolved during the pandemic and affected the political dynamics in Spain. This article proposes a new multidimensional strategy to measure the degree of populism in political communications, via quantitative and qualitative content analysis. It dissects the parliamentary speeches of the leader of VOX, Santiago Abascal, in the debates for the approval and extension of the “state of alarm” to fight against COVID-19 between March and June 2020. In order to assess the changes and relative intensity of populist features in Abascal’s parliamentary speeches we compared them with his speech during Pedro Sánchez’s investiture session as the Spanish President of the Government, in January 2020, and VOX’s latest political manifestos—2019 European and Spanish General Elections—, as well as with speeches of the representatives of the five main parties and coalitions during the COVID-19 debates in the Spanish Congress.Our paper shows that populists’ discourses are context-dependent and that their performances are not only shaped by crisis but also constitutive of crisis. The density of populist references in Abascal’s speeches grew steadily during the period analysed. Morality and antagonism overshadowed sovereignty and society as key populist attributes, and the tone of the discourse became increasingly hyperbolic. Moreover, Abascal’s discursive performances had a sort of contagion effect in other parties in the parliamentary sessions studied. People’s Party (Partido Popular–PP) leader Pablo Casado chose to follow VOX and harshly criticized the government, meanwhile the discourses of the speakers of Together We Can (Unidas Podemos–UP) and Catalan Republican Left (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya–ERC), adopted a demonizing rhetoric against VOX and PP also grounded on a populist logic of articulation. This polarizing dynamic between competing Manichean discourses contributed to reinforce the sense of crisis by adding a political dimension to the already existing health and economic problems.

2021 ◽  
pp. 45-63
Author(s):  
Marin Pop ◽  

"This study aims to highlight the activity of the Cluj County Branch of the Romanian National Party (hereafter abbreviated as RNP) in the spring of 1920, covering the events from the fall of the government led by Alexandru Vaida–Voevod until the end of the parliamentary elections of May–June 1920. After the Great Union, the city of Cluj became the political capital of Transylvania, especially after the Ruling Council, which was the provisional executive body of Transylvania, moved its headquarters from Sibiu to Cluj. Iuliu Maniu, the President of the Ruling Council and of the R.N.P, who was elected at the Sibiu Conference of 9–10 August 1919, had settled in Cluj as well. Moreover, at the head of Cluj County Branch of the RNP were personalities with a rich history of struggle for the cause of National Liberation of the Romanians in Transylvania: Iuliu Coroianu, Emil Hațieganu, Aurel Socol, Sever Dan, Alexandru Rusu, Ioan Giurgiu, the Archpriest Ioan Pop of Morlaca, and the Priest‑Martyr Aurel Muntean from Huedin. After the dismissal of the Vaida government, the Central Executive Committee of the RNP convened a party congress for 24 April 1920, in Alba Iulia. Just before the congress, the Cluj County organization had started the election campaign. Meetings were organized in every town and village, aiming to elect representatives for the Congress in Alba Iulia. On 21 April 1920, a large assembly was held in Cluj, during which the deputies of Cluj presented their work in Parliament. Simultaneously, delegates were elected for the Congress of Alba Iulia. The RNP Congress adopted a draft resolution and the governing bodies were elected. Iuliu Maniu was re‑elected as President. Based on the decisions adopted at the Great National Assembly of Alba Iulia on 1 December 1918, he adopted a working program, which was summarized in thirteen chapters. During the electoral campaign of 1920 two major political groups became polar opposites: the one around the People’s Party, which was in power, and the parties that formed the Parliamentary Bloc and had governed before. On the list of candidates of the Cluj County Branch of the RNP we can mostly find the former MPs of the party, as well as those who had filled various leadership positions within the Ruling Council. Following the electoral process, despite all the efforts of the People’s Party, in power at that time – especially those of Octavian Goga – to dispel the propaganda conducted by the RNP, the latter party managed to obtain 27 seats in the House and 14 in the Senate. This placed the RNP in second place among Romania’s political parties. The Cluj County Branch of the RNP was able to win two of the five electoral districts in the Chamber, as well as two in the Senate, out of the three allocated to the county. Another conclusion would be that, starting from these parliamentary elections, more and more parties from the Old Kingdom penetrated into Transylvania and Banat. They would achieve some success with the voters only when they came to hold power in the state and organize elections. Still, the RNP remained the party with the largest grip on the electorate of Transylvania and Banat, and Cluj became the political capital of Transylvania."


Significance The new government will have only 34 of the 179 seats, because policy differences among the right-wing parties, and the political strategy of the electorally strengthened anti-immigration, Euro-sceptic Danish People's Party (DF), mean DF will remain outside. Policy-making will be difficult. The government will be more economically liberal and pro-EU than it would have been with DF, but to make policy it will rely on partners across the political spectrum, especially the ousted Social Democrats -- who remain the largest party -- and DF. Impacts If DF is seen as a welfarist protector of ordinary citizens, it is more likely to repeat, at least, its 22% vote in the next election. The much-tighter immigration regime which is in prospect could taint Denmark's image and make it less attractive to foreign investment. The new government is likely to be an ally for much of UK Prime Minister David Cameron's EU reform agenda.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-16
Author(s):  
Zhang Yanbing ◽  
Zeng Zhimin

Abstract This paper argues that the Wukan Incident reflects the common difficulties faced at the state-society level by contemporary China as the country finds itself experiencing both an important strategic chapter in its development, and a period during which social problems are coming to the fore. As such, the task of developing an understanding of the Wukan Incident offers the chance to draw crucial lessons about China’s future political and economic development. Firstly, the modernization development model, according to which economic growth and development take precedence above all else, has already led to a building up of serious social problems. China’s future development efforts must draw on and put into practice the theories of the Scientific Outlook on Development. Secondly, the demands made by the villagers of Wukan could feasibly become political and economic problems common throughout the whole country. This includes issues such as how state-owned assets and land are dealt with; transparency of public finances; and safeguards for the democratic rights and interests of Chinese citizens. The government must face these difficulties and use reforms to tackle each of them. Should it fail to do so, these issues could spark a serious social crisis or even affect the stability of the political order. Thirdly, the current mechanisms by which the Party and the government respond to the public’s interest-related claims require urgent improvement. Finally, there is no magic pill to solve the political and economic problems faced in China today. Elections are certainly not a magic solution.


Significance In the final run-off round that took place on May 22, Van der Bellen won 50.3% of the votes. His opponent Norbert Hofer, candidate of the populist far-right Freedom Party (FPOe), was narrowly defeated after postal ballots were counted, with 49.7%. Impacts Despite Hofer's defeat, the election was a success for the FPOe and will cement its position in the political mainstream. The success of the FPOe is likely to serve as inspiration for like-minded parties in France and Germany. Unless the government initiates overdue reforms to end political and economic stagnation, the FPOe may continue to grow in popularity.


Significance Despite stepping down, Kurz will remain leader of the centre-right Austrian People’s Party (OVP) and the party’s parliamentary group leader. The Greens, which had threatened to bring down the government under Kurz, now appear placated and ready to work with Schallenberg. Impacts Declining support for Kurz and the OVP would likely benefit the far-right Freedom Party. Kurz's resignation will lead to pressure for more regulation on political campaign advertisements. The electoral defeat of Germany’s CDU and Kurz’s resignation will weaken the influence of the centre-right European People’s Party.


2017 ◽  
pp. 7-14
Author(s):  
A. A. Orlov

Basque radical nationalist organization, which used methods of terror and violence for achievement of the political goals consisting in creation of the independent Basque state, has declared its disarmament. Though ETA didn’t declare self-dissolution and intends to continue the activity in new conditions, its disarmament gives the grounds to hope that the era of the Basque nationalist terrorism in Spain proceeding half a century, has come to an end. Process of disarmament of ETA has been organized in the style,inherent for this group, combining elements of political public relations and a theatrical performance. Coordinates of the last eight caches which were in the French territory, where ETA stored weapons and explosives, have been transferred to the French authorities through intermediary volunteers. All political parties of the Basque Country, except for the People’s party ruling in Spain, have signed the manifesto in support of disarmament of ETA. The government of Spain has declared that the disarmament of ETA is a victory of the Spanish democracy and has urged this radical organization to dissolve itself. The future of ETA, however, remains not clear. It is declared «the internal discussion» about further prospects of the group. The vast majority of political forces of Spain of di erent orientation supports self-dissolution of ETA, considering it as an important condition of restoration of the peace and stability in the Basque Country.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-40
Author(s):  
Luiza-Maria Filimon

The Nordic states had an active radical right presence long before the economic and refugee crises that swept the shores of the European Union (EU) left in their wake a reinvigorated right-wing contingent. The radical right parties (RRPs) have not only registered various degrees of electoral success, but have also made inroads into the political mainstream. The three defining characteristics that set these parties apart from the more traditional far-right ones are: 1) the repudiation of hardcore extremism; 2) the search for political viability; and 3) the acquisition of mainstream recognition. The present article argues that as these parties compete for legitimacy, they are forced to alter their discriminatory rhetoric by switching tonal registers. One of the political strategies that enables them to put the outright “overt” in the “covert” is the recourse to dog whistle politics. How well can they overcome the stigma associated with their more extreme reflexes depends on a case by case basis. This article examines whether the four most prominent examples of Nordic radicalism (the Danish People’s Party, Finns Party, Sweden Democrats, and Norway’s Progress Party) have integrated dog whistles in their political messaging and tracks how these coded appeals change from one country to another. In analyzing the response to the 2015 refugee crisis, the study finds that to a certain extent, the rhetoric utilized falls into the coded register or at the very least purposefully attempts to veer away from the radical excesses which are marginalizing and self-exclusionary.


Significance Vox has gathered support by staunchly opposing Catalan independence, promoting a nationalist agenda and championing conservative values. The strength of its electoral appeal is already having a significant impact on the centre-right People’s Party (PP). Impacts The PP’s leadership at the national level will be more cautious of being perceived as too close to Vox. Deepening inequality after COVID-19 could undermine Spain’s Socialist government and push more younger people to support Vox. Concerns about Vox and rising support for Spanish nationalists in general may force the government to take a tougher stance on immigration.


Significance His new government, which took a record 271 days to form, is a reiteration of the previous four-party coalition involving Rutte's centre-right People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), the centrist liberals of Democrats 66 (D66) and two Christian democratic parties, the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the more conservative Christian Union (CU). The coalition deal promises a significant shift away from the austerity policies of previous governments. Impacts The collective rise of the far-right vote means the far right will continue to worry centrist parties and thus influence government policy. Higher structural spending in education should improve medium-to-long-term productivity development and output. The government promises to strengthen cyber capabilities in order to crack down on intellectual property theft.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 024-035
Author(s):  
Elena Garbuzarova

Since gaining independence in 1991, the Central Asian countries have embarked on state building with regard for the experience of developed countries. During the political modernization process, the countries of Central Asia heeded great attention to the constitution. The political elites in power have enshrined the separation of powers between the government branches in the basic law. At the same time, the institution of the president retained a special status in the state power system. This fact reflected the specifics of the development of new states, where the legislative body was absent or played an insignificant role for a prolonged time period. The president plays a major role in the political systems of the regional states (with the exception of Kyrgyzstan), which was manifested in his special status. As a result, a patron-client model has developed in the regional states, where the president acquires and maintains the loyalty of political elites through material incentives. Meanwhile, the regional countries were undergoing continuous constitutional reforms. The amendments to the fundamental law have been and are being used by the presidents of the Central Asian countries to maintain and reinforce their legitimacy. The need to solve this problem has increased in the context of a decline in economic growth and accumulated internal socio-economic problems. In 2020-2021, the coronavirus pandemic produced a negative impact. These challenges posed the task of implementing a new democratic transformation strategy for the executive authorities of the regional states, in particular, the expansion of powers in the legislative branch of government. At the present stage, a new balance of forces has emerged in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which involves a higher responsibility of the parliament and government for the implementation of socio-economic reforms. This afforded greater stability to the political regimes in these countries. In Tajikistan, a power centralization tendency has developed, and the position of the incumbent is being solidified. Hopes for carrying out structural economic reforms are pinned on the president. Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated a desire to develop parliamentarianism in order to prevent the development of authoritarian tendencies. However, the introduction of a parliamentary form of government did not lead to the solution of the country’s internal problems, primarily due to the continued enormous influence of informal institutions on the authorities. Major socio-economic problems faced by the Kyrgyz authorities in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic triggered another round of political tension in the country and ultimately led to a change of power and a transition to a presidential form of government. The changes introduced to the constitutions of the regional states create the appearance of the implementation of democratic principles and the use of procedures to improve the efficiency of the government. At the same time, institutional changes undermine socio-political stability, creating problems for further national development.


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