Metacognition and the effect of incentive motivation in two compulsive disorders: gambling disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder

Compulsivity is a common phenotype amongst various psychiatric disorders, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and gambling disorder (GD). Deficiencies in metacognition, such as the inability to properly estimates ones' own performance via well-calibrated confidence judgments could contribute to pathological decision-making in these psychiatric disorders. Earlier research has indeed suggested that OCD and GD patients reside at opposite ends of the confidence spectrum, with OCD patients exhibiting underconfidence, and GD patients exhibiting overconfidence. Recently, several studies established that motivational states (e.g. monetary incentives) influence metacognition, with gain (respectively loss) prospects increasing (respectively decreasing) confidence judgments. Here, we reasoned that the OCD and GD symptomatology might correspond to an exacerbation of this interaction between metacognition and motivational states. We hypothesized GD's overconfidence to be exaggerated during gain prospects, while OCD's underconfidence to be worsened in loss context, which we expected to see represented in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) activity. We tested those hypotheses in a task-based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) design. Our initial analyses showed increased confidence levels for GD versus OCD patients, that could partly be explained by sex and IQ. Although our primary analyses did not support the hypothesized interaction between incentive motivation and groups, exploratory analyses did show increased confidence in GD patients specifically in gain context. fMRI analyses confirmed a central role for VMPFC in the processing of confidence and incentive motivation, but with no differences between the clinical samples.

Intertemporal choice reflects value comparison rather than self-control: insights from confidence judgments

Intertemporal decision-making has long been assumed to measure self-control, with prominent theories treating choices of smaller, sooner rewards as failed attempts to override immediate temptation. If this view is correct, people should be more confident in their intertemporal decisions when they “successfully” delay gratification than when they do not. In two pre- registered experiments with built-in replication, adult participants (n=117) made monetary intertemporal choices and rated their confidence in having made the right decisions. Contrary to assumptions of the self-control account, confidence was not higher when participants chose delayed rewards. Rather, participants were more confident in their decisions when possible rewards were further apart in time-discounted subjective value, closer to the present, and larger in magnitude. Demonstrating metacognitive insight, participants were more confident in decisions that better aligned with their independent valuation of possible rewards. Decisions made with less confidence were more prone to changes-of-mind and more susceptible to a patience-enhancing manipulation. Together, our results establish that confidence in intertemporal choice tracks uncertainty in estimating and comparing the value of possible rewards – just as it does in decisions unrelated to self-control. Our findings challenge self- control views and instead cast intertemporal choice as a form of value-based decision-making about future possibilities.

A shared brain system forming confidence judgment across cognitive domains

Confidence is typically defined as a subjective judgment about whether a decision is right. Decisions are based on sources of information that come from various cognitive domains and are processed in different brain systems. An unsettled question is whether the brain computes confidence in a similar manner whatever the domain or in a manner that would be idiosyncratic to each domain. To address this issue, human participants of both sexes performed a new paradigm probing confidence in decisions made about the same material (history and geography statements), but based on different cognitive processes: semantic memory for deciding whether the statement was true or false, and duration perception for deciding whether the statement display was long or short. At the behavioral level, we found that the same factors (difficulty, accuracy, response time and confidence in the preceding decision) predicted confidence judgments in both tasks. At the neural level, we observed using fMRI that confidence judgments in both tasks were associated to activity in the same brain regions: positively in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and negatively in a prefronto-parietal network. Together, these findings suggest the existence of a shared brain system that generates confidence judgments in a similar manner across cognitive domains.

Moderators of relative confidence calibration: A meta-analysis of the across-subject relationship between confidence and accuracy

If one friend confidently tells us to buy product A while another friend thinks that product B is better but is not confident, we may go with the advice of our confident friend. Should we? The relationship between people’s confidence and accuracy has been of great interest in many fields, especially in the context of high-stakes situations like eye-witness testimony, but there is still little consensus about how much we should trust someone’s overall level of confidence. Here we examine the across-subject relationship between average accuracy and average confidence in 214 unique datasets from the Confidence Database. This approach allows us to empirically address this issue with unprecedented statistical power and check for the presence of various moderators. We find that the across-subject correlation between average accuracy and average confidence in this sample is R = .22. Importantly, this relationship is much stronger for memory than for perception tasks, as well as for confidence scales with fewer points. These results show that we should take one’s confidence seriously (and perhaps buy product A) and suggest several factors that moderate the relative consistency of how people make confidence judgments.

Neural activity tracking identity and confidence in social information

Humans learn about the environment either directly by interacting with it or indirectly by seeking information about it from social sources such as conspecifics. The degree of confidence in the information obtained through either route should determine the impact that it has on adapting and changing behaviour. We examined whether and how behavioural and neural computations differ during non-social learning as opposed to learning from social sources. Trial-wise confidence judgments about non-social and social information sources offered a window into this learning process. Despite matching exactly the statistical features of social and non-social conditions, confidence judgments were more accurate and less changeable when they were made about social as opposed to non-social information sources. In addition to subjective reports of confidence, differences were also apparent in the Bayesian estimates of participants' subjective beliefs. Univariate activity in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and posterior temporo-parietal junction (pTPJ) more closely tracked confidence about social as opposed to non-social information sources. In addition, the multivariate patterns of activity in the same areas encoded identities of social information sources compared to non-social information sources.