scholarly journals Consumer’s Attitude Regarding Soluble Coffee Enriched with Antioxidants

Beverages ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marinês Corso ◽  
Daneysa Kalschne ◽  
Marta Benassi

Brazil is the second largest coffee consumer in the world. The development of new products related to healthy eating is one of the demands to maintain this scenario. This research aimed to investigate the role of socio-demographic, cognitive and behavioral characteristics on the acceptance of functional foods by coffee consumers. A questionnaire developed and applied in Belgium was previously translated and validated for application with Brazilian consumers. The habits of coffee consumption, knowledge and interest were investigated regarding functional soluble coffee enriched with antioxidants. The self-administered study was performed with 270 consumers. Acceptance was measured by two items: “Functional foods are all right for me as long as they taste good” and “Functional foods are all right for me even if they taste worse than their conventional counterpart foods”, obtaining a mean score of 4.03 and 2.79 (scale 1: totally disagree and 5: totally agree), respectively. The acceptance of functional foods increased with age, schooling, income, belief in the health benefits and knowledge about functional foods for both items. There was no significant correlation between price and acceptance. With regards to a functional soluble coffee product, the sensory quality was more determinant for its acceptance than price.

2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (6) ◽  
pp. 801-817 ◽  
Author(s):  
Belle Liang ◽  
Terese Lund ◽  
Angela Mousseau ◽  
Allison E. White ◽  
Renée Spencer ◽  
...  

Scholars have differentiated other-oriented (OO) purpose (i.e., a personally meaningful life aim intended to contribute to the world beyond the self) and self-oriented (SO) purpose (i.e., a personally meaningful life aim without intention to contribute beyond the self). OO purpose is associated with adolescent thriving, yet little is known about how to cultivate it. In a study of 207 adolescent girls, we examined how positive parent–adolescent relationships may contribute to developing OO versus SO purpose; we also tested whether the association between parent–adolescent relationships and OO purpose was mediated by prosocial behavior.


2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dharm P. S. Bhawuk

The epistemology of Indian Psychology (IP) is akin to that of Indian Philosophy or in general the Indian world view of knowledge, truth and belief about making sense of the self and the world. In this article, the epistemological and ontological foundations of IP are derived from a verse from the Ishopanishad and corroborated by verses from the Bhagavad-Gita. In doing so, epistemological questions like what is knowledge in IP or what knowledge (or theories) should IP develop and how (the methodology) are answered. Similarly, ontological questions like what is the being that is the focus of IP research or are biomechanical or spiritual-social-biological beings of interest to IP are addressed. The simplicity and clarity of this derivation fulfils the twin research criteria of parsimony and aesthetics. The role of epistemology and ontology in constructing cultural meaning for theory, method and practice of IP is discussed.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Ciaunica ◽  
Casper Hesp ◽  
Anil Seth ◽  
Jakub Limanowski ◽  
Karl Friston

This paper considers the phenomenology of depersonalisation disorder, in relation to predictive processing and its associated pathophysiology. To do this, we first establish a few mechanistic tenets of predictive processing that are necessary to talk about phenomenal transparency, mental action, and self as subject. We briefly review the important role of ‘predicting precision’ and how this affords mental action and the loss of phenomenal transparency. We then turn to sensory attenuation and the phenomenal consequences of (pathophysiological) failures to attenuate or modulate sensory precision. We then consider this failure in the context of depersonalisation disorder. The key idea here is that depersonalisation disorder reflects the remarkable capacity to explain perceptual engagement with the world via the hypothesis that “I am an embodied perceiver, but I am not in control of my perception”. We suggest that individuals with depersonalisation may believe that ‘another agent’ is controlling their thoughts, perceptions or actions, while maintaining full insight that the ‘another agent’ is ‘me’ (the self). Finally, we rehearse the predictions of this formal analysis, with a special focus on the psychophysical and physiological abnormalities that may underwrite the phenomenology of depersonalisation.


Author(s):  
Jan Peter Bergen ◽  
Peter-Paul Verbeek

AbstractThe theory of technological mediation aims to take technological artifacts seriously, recognizing the constitutive role they play in how we experience the world, act in it, and how we are constituted as (moral) subjects. Its quest for a compatible ethics has led it to Foucault’s “care of the self,” i.e., a transformation of the self by oneself through self-discipline. In this regard, technologies have been interpreted as power structures to which one can relate through Foucaultian “technologies of the self” or ascetic practices. However, this leaves unexplored how concrete technologies can actually support the process of self-care. This paper explores this possibility by examining one such technology: a gamified To-Do list app. Doing so, it first shows that despite the apparent straightforwardness of gamification, confrontation and shame play an important role in how the app motivates me to do better. Second, inspired by Ihde’s schema of human-technology relations, it presents different ways in which the app may confront me with myself. Subsequently, it accounts for the motivation and shame that this technologically mediated confrontation with myself invokes through a Levinasian account of ethical subjectivity. In so doing, it also shows how Levinas’ phenomenology implies a responsibility for self-care and how nonhuman, technological others may still call me to responsibility. It concludes with a reflection on the role of gamification in technologically mediated subjectivation and some implications for design.


Author(s):  
Caroline Dupont

Dans nombre de ses biographies imaginaires, parmi lesquelles Monsieur Melville (1978) et James Joyce, l’Irlande, le Québec, les mots (2006) occupent une place de choix, Victor-Lévy Beaulieu se dote d’une posture d’écrivain singulière en construisant un double fictionnel à son image, Abel Beauchemin, chargé de jouer le rôle de son créateur en poursuivant le projet intellectuel de ce dernier, celui d’une quête de l’écriture et de l’être québécois, mais aussi d’une connaissance de soi et du monde par la lecture-écriture. À la faveur d’extraits du Melville et du Joyce, ouvrages qui réfléchissent (sur) la lecture et l’écriture tout en mettant en scène leurs processus croisés, cet article se propose de cerner l’image particulière qu’Abel Beauchemin, le personnage-narrateur, construit de lui-même dans son discours, afin de montrer en quoi la représentation de soi que constitue l’ethos oratoire participe d’une stratégie de persuasion quelque peu détournée, grâce à laquelle il s’agit en quelque sorte, selon l’expression d’Aaron Kibédi-Varga, de « diriger les passions ».AbstractIn several of his imaginary biographies, among which Monsieur Melville (1978) and James Joyce, l’Irlande, le Québec, les mots (2006) are particularly important, Victor-Lévy Beaulieu adopts a singular writer’s posture by constructing a fictional double, Abel Beauchemin, who plays the role of his creator carrying out his intellectual quest for writing and for the Québécois soul, as well as for a knowledge of self and of the world through reading/writing. By way of excerpts from Melville and from Joyce, works that reflect on reading and writing and on the intricate relationship between the two, this article aims to define the image that Abel Beauchemin, the narrator, proposes of himself. In so doing, we intend to demonstrate that the representation of the self through the discourse ethos is part of an indirect strategy of persuasion whose function is, as Aaron Kibédi-Varga’s would say, to “steer the reader’s passions”.


Open Theology ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 278-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olga Louchakova-Schwartz

Abstract This paper presents a phenomenological analysis of the argument in The First Discourse of Part 2 of Suhrawardī’s Philosophy of Illumination. Specifically, this argument is considered with regard to temporal extension of its logos, i.e., the succession of logical steps. Contrary to traditional views of Suhrawardī as a Neoplatonizing proponent of the primacy of essence over existence, the steps of his argument convey a much more nuanced picture in which ligh t emerges as the main metaphysical principle. First, Suhra wardī explicates full evidentiality in visible light (which is the most patent, ’aẓhar, from the Arabic root ẓ-h-r = ‘to appear, be [made] manifest’): this light gives us the world as “this-there”; and second, as self-evidentiality (ẓuhūru-hu, ‘being obvious to itself by itself’) in the first-person consciousness of the knower. Suhrawardī accesses these modes by reduction(s) which liberate the transcendental character of light. The correlation in the evidential mode of light between the knower and the objects serves as a ground for the claims of transcendental unity of the self and the world, and as a condition of possibility for knowledge. A juxtaposition of this approach with phenomenological philosophy suggests that in Suhrawardī’s analysis, the evidentiality of visual light plays a role of a new universal a priori. I show that under the phenomenological reduction, this a priori participates in constitution of ontological validities; and within the transcendental empiricism of the physics of light, this a priori underlies the construction of causality. Thereby, the Philosophy of Illumination suggests a new horizon of entry into transcendental phenomenological philosophy. The paper also contains a justification of a phenomenological reading of Suhrawardī’s work, including explanation of the historical reduction.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Durt

Abstract While it seems obvious that the embodied self is both a subject of experience and an object in the world, it is not clear how, or even whether, both of these senses of self can refer to the same self. According to Husserl, the relation between these two senses of self is beset by the “paradox of human subjectivity.” Following Husserl’s lead, scholars have attempted to resolve the paradox of subjectivity. This paper categorizes the different formulations of the paradox according to the dimension each pertains to and considers the prospects of each proposed resolution. It will be shown that, contrary to the claims of the respective authors, their attempted resolutions do not really resolve the paradox, but instead rephrase it or push it to the next dimension. This suggests that there is something deeper at work than a mere misunderstanding. This paper does not aim to resolve the paradox but instead initiates a new approach to it. Instead of seeing the paradox as a misapprehension that needs to be removed, I dig deeper to reveal its roots in ordinary consciousness. Investigating the proposed resolutions will reveal the fundamental role of the natural attitude, and I will argue that already the general thesis of the natural attitude makes the decisive cut that leads to what Sartre calls a “fissure” in pre-reflective self-awareness. The phenomenological reduction deepens the cut into what Husserl calls the “split of the self,” which in turn engenders the paradox of subjectivity. The paradox’s roots in the structure of ordinary consciousness not only constitute a reason for its persistence, but also suggest a new way to further investigate the embodied self.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 595-605
Author(s):  
Aleksey O. Bezzubikov

The article provides the analysis of mytho­logical dimension of the film “Ilych’s Gate” (Zastava Ilycha) by M.M. Khutsiev. The author concludes that the text of this film represents self-reflexive structure. Firstly, the plot of the film quite clearly depicts the mythological perception of reality. Secondly, the course of narration reproduces the influence of mytho­logical codes on the perception of the audience. The text of the film contains a description of its own mechanism of influence on the viewer as well as the processes taking place in the minds of the audience at the moment of viewing.The first part informs of the main principles of mytho­logical thinking and the idea of time and space in the myth, referring to the works by C. Lévi-Strauss, R. Barthes, M. Eliade, A. Losev, E. Cassirer and others. Special attention is paid to the role of myth and initiation ritual in the psychological formation of a personality, as, based on the following, this is the theme that forms the basis of the film plot.The second part deals with the methods by which the mythological dimension is manifested in the text of the film.In the third part, the researcher shows how the contrast of secular and sacral becomes the main semantic opposition promoting the motion of the plot.In the fourth part, the author proves that the reflection of reality in the characters’ minds is a referent of the images shown on the screen. The characters’ development lies in the actualization of the sacral and mythological perception of the world. In turn, the cultural codes contained in the text of the film are designed to evoke a kind of response in the minds of the audience — to actualize the same sacred modus of perception in its ideas, the achievement of which is the ultimate goal of the characters. Thus, the inner path of the characters in the film reflects the processes that excite the studied film in the perception of the audience.The relevance of the article lies in the discovery and description of the principle of self-reflection in the structure of the film “Ilych’s Gate”, which allows us to understand at a qualitatively new level its structure and place in the historical development of Russian cinematography.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 326-343
Author(s):  
Lamont Rodgers

Eric Mack defends a version of John Locke’s proviso. Mack applies his proviso to original appropriations, uses, and systems of private property. His proviso precludes severely disabling the world-interactive powers of others. Mack specifically warns against using concrete features of the natural world as a baseline for determine whether the proviso has been violated. While his proviso is plausible, I argue that he cannot. eschew employing the receptivity of the natural, unowned world to the extent that he suggests. We cannot determine whether one’s powers are disabled or diminished without knowing how receptive the world would be to those powers had a system of private property not arisen. The upshot of this paper is that the requirements of a well-formulated proviso is an empirical matter.


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