Incentive and Penalty Mechanism for Power Allocation in Cooperative D2D-Cellular Transmissions
In cellular communication systems, the introduction of device-to-device (D2D) communications provides a reasonable solution to facilitate high data rate services in short-range communication. However, it faces a challenging issue of interference management, where the cross-tier interference from D2D users to licensed cellular users (CUs) degrades their quality-of-service (QoS) requirements. D2D communications can also assist in offloading some nearby CUs to enhance the cellular operator’s benefit. To encourage the D2D transmitters (D2DT) to provide service to CUs in the dead zone, the cellular base station (CBS) needs to incentivize it with some monetary benefits. In this paper, a Stackelberg game-based joint pricing framework for interference management and data offloading is presented to illustrate the effects of cooperation between the D2D user and CBS. Specifically, a singular price is used to incentivize the D2DT to share its resources with the far-off CUs along with penalizing them for interference created at CBS. Simulation results illustrate the performance of the proposed technique in terms of the utilities of CUs and D2D users for varying distances of D2DT.