scholarly journals A Review of Theoretical Studies on Indirect Reciprocity

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isamu Okada
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Complete Solution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Theoretical Studies ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Social ◽  
Look Back

Despite the accumulation of research on indirect reciprocity over the past 30 years and the publication of over 100,000 related papers, there are still many issues to be addressed. Here, we look back on the research that has been done on indirect reciprocity and identify the issues that have been resolved and the ones that remain to be resolved. This manuscript introduces indirect reciprocity in the context of the evolution of cooperation, basic models of social dilemma situations, the path taken in the elaboration of mathematical analysis using evolutionary game theory, the discovery of image scoring norms, and the breakthroughs brought about by the analysis of the evolutionary instability of the norms. Moreover, it presents key results obtained by refining the assessment function, resolving the punishment dilemma, and presenting a complete solution to the social dilemma problem. Finally, it discusses the application of indirect reciprocity in various disciplines.

scholarly journals Two ways to overcome the three social dilemmas of indirect reciprocity

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Isamu Okada
Keyword(s):  
Complete Solution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
The Social ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Positive Score ◽  
New Type

Abstract Indirect reciprocity is one of the main principles of evolving cooperation in a social dilemma situation. In reciprocity, a positive score is given to cooperative behaviour while a negative score is given to non-cooperative behaviour, and the dilemma is resolved by selectively cooperating only with those with positive scores. However, many studies have shown that non-cooperation with those who have not cooperated also downgrades one's reputation; they have called this situation the scoring dilemma. To address this dilemma, the notion of justified punishments has been considered. The notion of justified punishment allows good individuals who defect against bad co-players to keep their standing. Despite numerous studies on justified punishment, it is unknown whether this solution leads to a new type of dilemma because reputations may be downgraded when the intent of punishment is not correctly communicated. The dilemma of punishment has so far been rarely analysed, and thus, the complete solution of the mechanism for evolving cooperation using the principle of indirect reciprocity has not been found yet. Here, we identify sufficient conditions to overcome each of the three dilemmas including the dilemma of punishment to maintain stable cooperation by using the framework of evolutionary game theory. This condition includes the principle of detecting free riders, which resolves the social dilemma, the principle of justification, which resolves the scoring dilemma, and the principle of generosity, which resolves the dilemma of punishment. A norm that satisfies these principles can stably maintain social cooperation. Our insights may offer a general assessment principle that applies to a wide range of subjects, from individual actions to national decisions.

scholarly journals Evolution of Cooperation with Peer Punishment under Prospect Theory

Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Satoshi Uchida ◽  
Hitoshi Yamamoto ◽  
Isamu Okada ◽  
Tatsuya Sasaki
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Cognitive Distortion ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Parameter Values

Social dilemmas are among the most puzzling issues in the biological and social sciences. Extensive theoretical efforts have been made in various realms such as economics, biology, mathematics, and even physics to figure out solution mechanisms to the dilemma in recent decades. Although punishment is thought to be a key mechanism, evolutionary game theory has revealed that the simplest form of punishment called peer punishment is useless to solve the dilemma, since peer punishment itself is costly. In the literature, more complex types of punishment, such as pool punishment or institutional punishment, have been exploited as effective mechanisms. So far, mechanisms that enable peer punishment to function as a solution to the social dilemma remain unclear. In this paper, we propose a theoretical way for peer punishment to work as a solution mechanism for the dilemma by incorporating prospect theory into evolutionary game theory. Prospect theory models human beings as agents that estimate small probabilities and loss of profit as greater than they actually are; thus, those agents feel that punishments are more frequent and harsher than they really are. We show that this kind of cognitive distortion makes players decide to cooperate to avoid being punished and that the cooperative state achieved by this mechanism is globally stable as well as evolutionarily stable in a wide range of parameter values.

Insights into the Impact of Social Networks on Evolutionary Games

2008 ◽  
pp. 306-323
Author(s):  
Katia Sycara ◽  
Paul Scerri ◽  
Anton Chechetka
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Networks ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Information Diffusion ◽  
Large Population ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Impact

In this chapter, we explore the use of evolutionary game theory (EGT) (Weibull, 1995; Taylor & Jonker, 1978; Nowak & May, 1993) to model the dynamics of adaptive opponent strategies for large population of players. In particular, we explore effects of information propagation through social networks in Evolutionary Games. The key underlying phenomenon that the information diffusion aims to capture is that reasoning about the experiences of acquaintances can dramatically impact the dynamics of a society. We present experimental results from agent-based simulations that show the impact of diffusion through social networks on the player strategies of an evolutionary game and the sensitivity of the dynamics to features of the social network.

scholarly journals Hybrid Assessment Scheme Based on the Stern- Judging Rule for Maintaining Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isamu Okada ◽  
Hitoshi Yamamoto ◽  
Satoshi Uchida
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Assessment System ◽  
Threshold Probability ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Assessment Systems ◽  
Notice Board ◽  
Expected Payoffs

Intensive studies on indirect reciprocity have explored rational assessment rules for maintaining cooperation and several have demonstrated the effects of the stern-judging rule. Uchida and Sasaki demonstrated that the stern-judging rule is not suitable for maintaining cooperative regimes in private assessment conditions while a public assessment system has been assumed in most studies. Although both assessment systems are oversimplified and society is most accurately represented by a mixture of these systems, little analysis has been reported on their mixture. Here, we investigated how much weight on the use of information originating from a public source is needed to maintain cooperative regimes for players adopting the stern-judging rule when players get information from both public and private sources. We did this by considering a hybrid-assessment scheme in which players use both assessment systems and by using evolutionary game theory. We calculated replicator equations using the expected payoffs of three strategies: unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, and stern-judging rule adoption. Our analysis shows that the use of the rule helps to maintain cooperation if reputation information from a unique public notice board is used with more than a threshold probability. This hybrid-assessment scheme can be applied to other rules, including the simple-standing rule and the staying rule.

DIRECT RECIPROCITY-BASED COOPERATION IN MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (02) ◽  
pp. 501-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARCIN SEREDYNSKI ◽  
PASCAL BOUVRY
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Mobile Ad Hoc Network ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretical Approach ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Mobile Ad Hoc ◽  
Hoc Networks

A distributed nature of a wireless mobile ad hoc network, lack of a single authority, and limited battery resources of participating devices may lead its users to be reluctant to packet relaying duties. This paper investigates potential networking conditions that could lead to a direct reciprocity-based cooperation on packet relaying. Simulation of behaviour of the network is carried out using an evolutionary game-theoretical approach. A game-based model of nodes' interactions coupled with a genetic algorithm is used to find successful relaying strategies for various networking conditions. Computational experiments demonstrate that the reciprocity-based packet relaying is an efficient way to overcome the social dilemma present in such a network. However, in the presence of a large number of unconditionally cooperatives nodes a selfish permanent defection strategy is more efficient than a reciprocal tit-for-tat strategy. Nevertheless the switch from cooperative to selfish behaviour among some users does not change significantly the overall performance of the network as the negative consequences of the switch are compensated by the generous packet relaying contribution of unconditionally cooperative nodes.

scholarly journals Community Annotation and the Evolution of Cooperation: How Patience Matters

2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atin Basuchoudhary ◽  
Vahan Simoyan ◽  
Raja Mazumder
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Initial Distribution ◽  
Scientific Output ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Biological Databases ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Or Organization ◽  
Community Annotation

We investigate why biologists fail to contribute to biological databases although almost all of them use these databases for research. We find, using evolutionary game theory and computer simulations, that (a) the initial distribution of contributors who are patient determines whether a culture of contribution will prevail or not (b) institutions (where institution means “a significant practice, relationship, or organization in a society or culture”) that incentivize patience and therefore limit free riding make contribution more likely and, (c) a stable institution, whether it incentivizes patience or not, will increase contribution. As a result we suggest there is a trade-off between the benefits of changing institutions to incentivize patience and the costs of the change itself. Moreover, even if it is possible to create institutions that incentivize patience among scientists such institutions may nevertheless fail. We create a computer simulation of a population of biologists based on our theory. These simulations suggest that institutions should focus more on rewards rather than penalties to incentivize a culture of contribution. Our approach therefore provides a methodology for developing a practical blueprint for organizing scientists to encourage cooperation and maximizing scientific output.

Insights into the Impact of Social Networks on Evolutionary Games

2010 ◽  
pp. 150-159
Author(s):  
Katia Sycara ◽  
Paul Scerri ◽  
Anton Chechetka
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Networks ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Information Diffusion ◽  
Large Population ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Impact

The chapter explores the use of evolutionary game theory (EGT) to model the dynamics of adaptive opponent strategies for a large population of players. In particular, it explores effects of information propagation through social networks in evolutionary games. The key underlying phenomenon that the information diffusion aims to capture is that reasoning about the experiences of acquaintances can dramatically impact the dynamics of a society. The chapter presents experimental results from agent-based simulations that show the impact of diffusion through social networks on the player strategies of an evolutionary game and the sensitivity of the dynamics to features of the social network.

Insights into the Impact of Social Networks on Evolutionary Games

2009 ◽  
pp. 1477-1488
Author(s):  
Katia Sycara ◽  
Paul Scerri ◽  
Anton Chechetka
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Networks ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Information Diffusion ◽  
Large Population ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Impact

In this chapter, we explore the use of evolutionary game theory (EGT) (Nowak & May, 1993; Taylor & Jonker, 1978; Weibull, 1995) to model the dynamics of adaptive opponent strategies for a large population of players. In particular, we explore effects of information propagation through social networks in evolutionary games. The key underlying phenomenon that the information diffusion aims to capture is that reasoning about the experiences of acquaintances can dramatically impact the dynamics of a society. We present experimental results from agent-based simulations that show the impact of diffusion through social networks on the player strategies of an evolutionary game and the sensitivity of the dynamics to features of the social network.

Determinants of international cooperation : reciprocity, opportunity, and cooperative norms

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Jeremy Bowling
Keyword(s):  
Social Construction ◽  
International Relations ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
University Of Missouri ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
The Social ◽  
The University

[ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AT AUTHOR'S REQUEST.] This dissertation examines few of the determinants and effects of international cooperation. There are three broad themes that run throughout this dissertation, which are the ideas of reciprocity, opportunity, and cooperative norms. Reciprocity is a large part of the development of cooperation theory, particularly in the study of the evolution of cooperation. While it is mentioned across international relations scholarship, empirical testing of its existence in international politics is scarce. Opportunity is a ubiquitous concept across social science. The concept is used in this dissertation as a challenge to the notion that cooperation reduces the likelihood of conflict, which pervades the study of international conflict, particularly from those that study conflict from the theory of liberalism. Lastly, an exploratory analysis of cooperative norms is examined. Studying the social construction of cooperative norms is important for the broader study of international cooperation. I find that direct and indirect reciprocity are important indicators of cooperation, cooperation will increase the likelihood and severity of dyadic conflict unless both states are highly cooperative with each other, and domestic political institutions may be important for the development of cooperative norms that extend to the international level. Overall, international relations scholars should reexamine how cooperation in viewed and studied, particularly in relation to conflict.

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