scholarly journals Evaluating the Minor Coarse Cereals Product Crowdfunding Platform through Evolutionary Game Analysis

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 1299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Yu ◽  
Muhammad Hafeez ◽  
Lihan Liu ◽  
Muhammad Tariq Mahmood ◽  
Hong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Relative Price ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Price Difference ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Advance Payment ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
The Social ◽  
Sowing Period ◽  
Modern Era

In the modern era, the minor coarse cereals (MCC) are particularly popular among consumers. Price fluctuations cause misperceptions for growers, but also bring about complications for processing enterprises and consumers. To solve this problem, a multi-grain product crowdfunding platform is proposed. To this end, an evolutionary game model is constructed to investigate the game equilibrium between growers and crowdfunders. The analysis determines that evolutionary game equilibrium is related to the relative price difference between the sowing period and the harvest period, and to the social/logistical cost. Under normal circumstances, the crowdfunder may default when the sowing-period price is greater than the harvest-period price. The grower may default if the sowing-period price is less than the harvest-period price. Therefore, in the design of a crowdfunding system for MCC products, a certain percentage of advance payment (30%) and certain default deposits should be collected from crowdfunders and growers, respectively.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

An evolutionary game analysis of user-pay public–private partnership projects

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Danrong Song ◽  
Jinbo Song ◽  
Hehui Yuan ◽  
Yu Fan
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Public

PurposeWith the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.Design/methodology/approachAn evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.FindingsFirst, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.Originality/valueIn this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game analysis of Chinese cross border logistics enterprises adopting blockchain technology in supply chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 275 ◽  
pp. 03078
Author(s):  
KunYang Liu ◽  
Yong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Technological Revolution ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Technical Ability ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Logistics Enterprises ◽  
Mathematical Derivation

Blockchain technology is considered to be the representative technology of the fourth technological revolution, and logistics and supply chain field has been considered as the main application direction in the next step by industry and academia. In order to study the behavior and intention of Chinese cross-border logistics enterprises to introduce blockchain into internal supply chain, this paper constructs a model of cross-border logistics enterprises adopting blockchain technology on the basis of bounded rationality based on the game model, this paper attempts to find out the factors that affect the introduction of blockchain into the internal supply chain through mathematical derivation and numerical analysis. The game results show that the willingness of cross-border logistics enterprises to adopt blockchain is closely related to the technical ability of blockchain, the incremental performance after the introduction of blockchain, the conversion cost of blockchain technology, and other factors. Enterprises should coordinate various factors and choose to adopt blockchain technology according to their own situation.

scholarly journals Impact of Emotional Perceived Value on the Uncertain Evolution of the Housing Bubble

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (13) ◽  
pp. 1543
Author(s):  
Yang Tang ◽  
Kairong Hong ◽  
Yucheng Zou ◽  
Yanwei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Real Estate ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Perceived Value ◽  
Housing Bubble ◽  
Analysis Framework ◽  
Policy Environment ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
Game Equilibrium

In China, the housing bubble is not only an economic issue but also an important social and political issue. According to game theory, the housing bubble is an equilibrium result of the interaction between policy environment and participants’ behavior. In this process, due to the interaction between speculation, regulation, and emotions, the development and evolution of the housing bubble are faced with uncertainty. Different from traditional econometric analysis, this article adopts the evolutionary game analysis method in order to establish a multi-stage evolutionary game analysis framework for the housing bubble. Firstly, by analyzing the emotional perceived value of related subjects under optimism, pessimism, and uncertainty, this article explores the mechanism of emotional perceived value on the housing bubble under the condition of inconsistent policy objectives. Secondly, it introduces emotional perceived value into the evolutionary game analysis framework of housing bubbles and analyzes the strategic combination and game equilibrium between investors and local governments under different emotions. Finally, taking Hainan province as an example, it conducts a MATLAB numerical simulation on the uncertain evolution of the housing bubble and proposes a staged strategy combination to deal with the housing bubble. The results show that: (1) emotional perceived value is affected by policy environment; (2) changes in the strength of policy effects make emotional perceived value change, which has different incentive effects on investors’ speculation and local governments’ regulation; (3) there are differences in emotional perceived value in different stages, which improves the uncertainty of the game equilibrium result between investors and local governments; and (4) considering the evolutionary characteristics of the housing bubble in different stages, its countermeasures should not only prevent insufficient regulation but also avoid excessive regulation. The above conclusions can provide theoretical and practical references for predicting the behavior of real estate investors, identifying the evolution mechanisms and rules of real estate bubbles and formulating relevant regulatory policies.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Capital-Constrained Supplier’s and Manufacturer’s Financing Schemes

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Suyong Zhang ◽  
Panos. M. Pardalos ◽  
Xiaodan Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Financial Risk ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Interaction Mechanism ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Strategy Selection ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Purchase Order ◽  
Financing Strategy ◽  
Theoretical Results ◽  
Financing Schemes

Purchase order financing (POF) and buyer direct financing (BDF) are both innovative financing schemes aiming to help financial constrained suppliers secure financing for production. In this paper, we investigate the interaction mechanism between suppliers’ financing strategy selection and manufacturers’ loans offering strategy adoption under two innovative financing schemes. We developed an evolutionary game model to effectively investigate the interaction mechanism between suppliers and manufacturers and analyzed the evolutionary stable strategies of the game model. Then we used system dynamics to present the performance of the evolutionary game model and took a sensitivity analysis to verify the theoretical results. The main conclusions are as follows: in the supply chain, to deal with the noncooperation among suppliers and manufacturers on innovative financing schemes, the revenue of manufacturers, the rate of manufacturer loan, and the proper financial risk factor should be relatively high.

The Game Analysis for Financial Fraud Behavior of CPAs under the Shareholder Selecting Pattern

2014 ◽  
Vol 926-930 ◽  
pp. 4032-4036
Author(s):  
Ping Chen ◽  
Shuang Liang Tian
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Financial Fraud ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Audit Independence

CPAs enjoy higher audit independence under the shareholders selecting pattern, which is widely used in developed countries. According to the characteristics of shareholders selecting pattern, as well as that of listing companies’ managers and CPAs, we established asymmetric evolutionary game model between managers and CPAs, and researched the paths and the mechanism which two players’ behavior evolved respectively. Based on this, we discussed the forming conditions of financial fraud.

The Application of MATLAB Simulation Technology on Evolutionary Game Analysis

2014 ◽  
Vol 687-691 ◽  
pp. 1619-1621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Te Zhu ◽  
Cheng Hao Liu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The United States ◽  
Simulation Software ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Engineering Analysis ◽  
Matlab Simulation ◽  
Simulation Technology ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Analysis And Design ◽  
Logistics Enterprises

System simulation software MATLAB is developed by the United States Mays Walker Corporation (Mathwork) for the study of engineering analysis and design process. On the basis of discussion on MATLAB simulation software, this paper introduces the evolutionary game model, and take the evolutionary game model between logistics enterprises and SMEs as an example , Showing the application of MATLAB simulation technology on evolutionary game.

scholarly journals Complex Dynamic Analysis for Game Model under Different Regulatory Levels in China’s Housing Rental Market

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Lingling Mu ◽  
Xiangyu Qin ◽  
Yuan Li ◽  
Ping Liu
Keyword(s):  
Real Estate ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Public ◽  
Rental Market ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Cost

In this paper, we construct an evolutionary game model of government and real estate operators (long-term apartment rental companies) in the housing rental market in the context of financial institutions and public participation in regulation and analyze the effects of different regulatory levels of financial institutions and the public on the evolutionary results through model solving and numerical simulation. The results show that, under five different levels of supervision, financial institutions and the public have different evolutionary and stable strategies; financial institutions’ participation in supervision can effectively reduce the cost of government supervision and promote the government’s evolution towards strict supervision. It is difficult for real estate operators to evolve naturally towards keeping their promises when the probability of the social public or financial institutions participating in regulation is low. Only when the probability of social public and financial institutions participating in regulation reaches a certain level will real estate operators be inclined to keep their promises.

scholarly journals The evolutionary game analysis of cross-regional ecological compensation - based on the perspective of the main functional area

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 04043
Author(s):  
PAN He-si ◽  
LIU Hong-zhi
Keyword(s):  
Carrying Capacity ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Ecological Environment ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Functional Area ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Root Cause ◽  
Upper Limit

Under the new normal, the carrying capacity of ecological environment in China has reached or approached the upper limit. The root cause is the lack of an endogenous mechanism for the protection and compensation of forest resources. Therefore, clarifying the game relationship between stakeholders can help to break through the dilemma. An evolutionary game model between beneficiary regions and the protected regions was constructed, based on the “restraint-encouragement” mechanism of the central government.The results show that in cross-regional ecological compensation, the optimal strategy of “ protectioncompensation” depend on the net profits of local governments and the central government's fines.

A Novel Two-Stage Game Model for Pricing Cloud/Fog Computing Resource in Blockchain Systems

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinmian Chen ◽  
Yukun Cheng ◽  
Zhiqi Xu
Keyword(s):  
Fog Computing ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stage Ii ◽  
Game Model ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Dynamic Interactions ◽  
Computing Resource ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Stage Game

Cloud/fog computing resource pricing is a new paradigm in the blockchain mining scheme, as the participants would like to purchase the cloud/fog computing resource to speed up their mining processes. In this paper, we propose a novel two-stage game to study the optimal price-based cloud/fog computing resource management, in which the cloud/fog computing resource provider (CFP) is the leader, setting the resource price in Stage I, and the mining pools act as the followers to decide their demands of the resource in Stage II. Since mining pools are bounded rational in practice, we model the dynamic interactions among them by an evolutionary game in Stage II, in which each pool pursues its evolutionary stable demand based on the observed price, through continuous learning and adjustments. Backward induction method is applied to analyze the sub-game equilibrium in each stage. Specifically in Stage II, we first build a general study framework for the evolutionary game model, and then provide a detailed theoretical analysis for a two-pool case to characterize the conditions for the existence of different evolutionary stable solutions. Referring to the real world, we conduct a series of numerical experiments, whose results validate our theoretical findings for the case of two mining pools. Additionally, the impacts from the size of mining block, the unit transaction fee and the price of token on the decision makings of participants are also discussed.

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