scholarly journals Meditation on the Body in Chapter 7 of Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra

Religions ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Kritzer

Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra is an Indian Buddhist sutra dating to the first half of the first millennium. Chapter 7 of the sutra consists of a very long meditation on the body, unusual in Buddhist literature for its anatomical, especially osteological, detail. The meditation also includes extensive descriptions of many internal worms as well as the internal winds that destroy the worms at the moment of death. The sutra has several elements not found in other Buddhist texts. For example, the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra meditation on the body includes extensive descriptions of things in the external world (e.g., rivers, mountains, flowers) and designates them as the “external body”. Most strikingly, the meditation on the body found in Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra differs from the general scholarly perception of Buddhist meditations on the body in that it does not emphasize impurity or generate repulsion. Instead, the sutra guides the meditator through a dispassionate and “scientific” observation of the body and the world.

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-54
Author(s):  
Jörg Zimmer

In classical philosophy of time, present time mainly has been considered in its fleetingness: it is transition, in the Platonic meaning of the sudden or in the Aristotelian sense of discreet moment and isolated intensity that escapes possible perception. Through the idea of subjective constitution of time, Husserl’s phenomenology tries to spread the moment. He transcends the idea of linear and empty time in modern philosophy. Phenomenological description of time experience analyses the filled character of the moment that can be detained in the performance of consciousness. As a consequence of the temporality of consciousness, he nevertheless remains in the temporal conception of presence. The phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, however, is able to grasp the spacial meaning of presence. In his perspective of a phenomenology of perception, presence can be understood as a space surrounding the body, as a field of present things given in perception. Merleau-Ponty recovers the ancient sense of ‘praesentia’ as a fundamental concept of being in the world.


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1957 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 916-922
Author(s):  
Iago Galdston

IT IS PROVERBIAL that a fool can ask more questions than a wise man can answer. It is not proverbial that for the question-asking fool there is some hope and for the others, none. Now it is my intention on this occasion to play the fool awhile, to ask a great number of questions, and I cordially invite you to join me in this game. I want to inquire into The World of the Rheumatic Child, into his internal as well as into his external world, or, as Claude Bernard has phrased it, into his milieu interieur and into his milieu exterieur. Now there is some method to my folly, and it amounts to this. We know a great deal about the disease rheumatic fever and about its devastating effects within the body of its victim. But we do not know a great deal, indeed only a very little, about the victim within whose body the disease effects its devastations. I said—we know a great deal about the disease itself. In preparation for this talk I "re-surveyed the literature" and I found it, as I have known it to be, not only enormous in quantity but most impressive in quality. It is literally studded with masterpieces of etiologic research, of clinical surveys, of pathologic studies, of follow-up surveys, of epidemiologic analyses, and of therapeutic enterprises. In my review of the literature I came upon some old and esteemed friends whose works I had witnessed "in the making," the studies, for example, of Wyckoff, and those of Alfred Cohn; Claire Ling's penetrating statistical analyses, Pearl Raymond's biologic speculations, May Wilson's classical and encyclopedic résumé of knowledge—and upon a host of others, too numerous, really, to catalogue.


Author(s):  
Ion Marian CROITORU ◽  

Although scientific research is in full bloom regarding, for instance, the environment, the fact of creation cannot be ignored either, even if some scientists deny it, while others ascertain it, albeit from perspectives, however, foreign to the patristic vision specific of the Orthodoxy. Consequently, the limits of cosmology are structured as well by Christian theology, which shows that the study of the world, guided by laws of physics in a limited framework, is carried out inside the creation affected by the consequences of the primordial sin, so that the reality of the world before sin is known only to those who reach spiritual perfection and holiness, therefore, from an eschatological perspective, since they, too, go through the moment of separation of the soul from the body, waiting for the general resurrection. Therefore, a new way of being is affirmed in the Orthodox Church, by the personal experience of each believer, which is a transformation on the personal and cosmic level, according to Jesus Christ’s resurrected body, which means the reality of a new physics, which concerns both the beginning of the universe, but also its new dimension, at the Lord’s Second Coming, when heaven and earth will be renewed by transfiguration. Regarding the existence of the universe, the differences are given by the perceptions of two cosmologies. Thus, the theonomous cosmology highlights man’s purpose on earth, the necessity of moral and spiritual life, and the transfiguration of creation, explaining God’s presence in His creation, but also His work in it, namely the transcendence and the immanence in relation to the creation. The autonomous cosmology engenders the evolutionist theory, which leads to secularism and, consequently, to the gap between the contemporary man’s technological progress, and his spiritual and moral regress. Today, more scientists are turning their attention also to the data of the divine Revelation, the way it makes itself known by its organs, the Holy Scripture and the Holy Tradition, in the one Church, which will mean a deepening of the dialogue between science and theology in favour of the man from everywhere and from the times to come.


2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 162-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erin Manning

Turning to the moment when phenomenology (Maurice Merleau-Ponty) meets process philosophy (Alfred North Whitehead), this article turns around three questions: (a) How does movement produce a body? (b) What kind of subject is introduced in the thought of Merleau-Ponty and how does this subject engage with or interfere with the activity here considered as ‘body’? (c) What happens when phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty) meets process philosophy (Alfred North Whitehead)? and builds around three propositions (a) There is never a body as such: what we know are edgings and contourings, forces and intensities: a body is its movement (b) Movement is not to be reduced to displacement (c) A philosophy of the body never begins with the body: it bodies.


Author(s):  
Gr.G. Khubulava

Relevance. Movement surrounds and accompanies us everywhere: planets move, time, river waters, the life of cities is accompanied by traffic along highways. Our own life is also inseparable from the phenomenon of movement, both at the micro and macro levels: whether it be the movement and division of atoms of matter and cells of the body, the movement and interaction of our bodies in space, or the movement of a person towards a specific goal, conditioned by intention and expressed in actions, which in themselves are also a movement of the will. Purpose: to describe and evaluate the nature of the phenomenon of movement both in the history of philosophy (from Zeno to Descartes and Bergson) and in the history of medicine (from Aristotle and Celsus to modern mechanisms that give a person a chance to return the possibility of movement as an aspect of full life). Methods: the research method is not only the analysis of the development of the phenomenon of movement in the history of philosophy and science, but also the analysis of the influence of modern technologies on the very understanding of the nature of movement not as a physiological, but as an ontological phenomenon. Results. The ancient idea of movement as a deception of the senses, describing the closed on itself the existence of an objectively motionless space or being the source and cause of eternally arising and disintegrating existence, was an attempt by thinkers to “catch the mind on being”, not just creating a picture of a single cosmos, but also comprehending him as part of the human world. The bodily movement and structure of a person was understood as part of the visible and speculative structure of being. The thought of the Middle Ages, which understood movement as the path of the world and man to God, perceived the phenomenon of movement as an expression of free will and, at the same time, the desire of the world to its completion, which is at the same time the moment of its transformation. The Renaissance epoch, which proclaimed man as an end in itself for existence, closely links the physical movement of man with the movement of the cosmos, and considers the visible nature to be the source of knowledge of the Divine Will. The New Time, which theoretically separated the mechanics of the bodily and the impulses of the soul and mind and declared man a “biological machine”, in fact does not break the relationship between the movement of the soul and the body, but, demonstrating the difference in the nature of these movements, anticipated the discovery of psychosomatics. Finally, modern times not only created a classification of “body techniques” inherent in various stages of human life and groups of people, describing the socio-cultural aspect of corporeality, but also perceived movement as an act of our existence and involvement in the existence of the world. Conclusion. Movement cannot be understood as a purely physiological act. In the process of growth, becoming, having barely learned to walk, we are faced with the need to perform actions, to “behave”, to be like a personal I and as a part of the moving world that collided with us. A world in which every step is an event and deed capable of defining “the landscape of our personal and universal being”.


2014 ◽  
Vol 61 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-290
Author(s):  
Nigel Spivey

Whatever Luca Giuliani writes is usually worth reading. Image and Myth, a translation and revision of his Bild und Mythos (Munich, 2003), is no exception. This monograph engages with a topic germane to the origins and development of classical archaeology – the relation of art to text. Giuliani begins, rather ponderously, with an exposition of G. E. Lessing's 1766 essay Laokoon, ‘on the limits of painting and poetry’. Lessing, a dramatist, predictably considered poetry the more effective medium for conveying a story. A picture, in his eyes, encapsulates the vision of a moment – likewise a statue. The Laocoon group, then, is a past perfect moment. A poet can provide the beginning, middle, and end of a story; the artist, only the representation of a fleeting appearance. Giuliani shows that this distinction does not necessarily hold – works of art can be synoptic, disobedient of Aristotelian laws about unity of place and time (and scale). Yet he extracts from Lessing's essay a basic dichotomy between the narrative and the descriptive. This dichotomy dictates the course of a study that is most illuminating when its author is being neither narrative nor descriptive but analytical – explaining, with commendable care for detail, what we see in an ancient work of art. But is the distinction between narrative and descriptive as useful as Giuliani wants it to be? One intellectual predecessor, Carl Robert, is scarcely acknowledged, and a former mentor, Karl Schefold, is openly repudiated; both of these leave-takings are consequent from the effort on Giuliani's part to avoid seeking (and finding) ‘Homeric’ imagery in early Greek art. The iconography of Geometric vases, he maintains, ‘is devoid of narrative intention: it refers to what can be expected to take place in the world’ (37). In this period, we should not be asking whether an image is ‘compatible’ with a story, but rather whether it is incomprehensible without a story. If the answer is ‘no’, then the image is descriptive, not narrative. Thus the well-known oinochoe in Munich, clearly showing a shipwreck, and arguably intending to represent a single figure astride an overturned keel, need not be read as a visual allusion to Odyssey 12.403–25, or some version of the tale of Odysseus surviving a shipwreck. It is just one of those things that happens in the world. Well, we may be thinking – let us be glad that it happens less frequently these days, but double our travel insurance nevertheless. As Giuliani commits himself to this approach, he is forced to concede that certain Geometric scenes evoke the ‘heroic lifestyle’ – but, since we cannot admit Homer's heroes, we must accept the existence of the ‘everyman aristocrat’ (or aristocratic everyman: either way, risking oxymoron). Readers may wonder if Lessing's insistence on separating the descriptive from the narrative works at all well for Homer as an author: for does not Homer's particular gift lie in adding graphic, descriptive detail to his narrative? And have we not learned (from Barthes and others) that ‘descriptions’, semiotically analysed, carry narrative implications – implications for what precedes and follows the ‘moment’ described? So the early part of Giuliani's argument is not persuasive. His conviction, and convincing quality, grows as artists become literate, and play a ‘new game’ ‘in the context of aristocratic conviviality’ (87) – that of adding names to figures (as on the François Vase). Some might say this was simply a literate version of the old game: in any case, it also includes the possibility of ‘artistic licence’. So when Giuliani notes, ‘again we find an element here that is difficult to reconcile with the epic narrative’ (149), this does not, thankfully, oblige him to dismiss the link between art and text, or art and myth (canonical or not). Evidently a painter such as Kleitias could heed the Muses, or aspire to be inspired; a painter might also enjoy teasing his patrons with ‘tweaks’ and corrigenda to a poet's work. (The latter must have been the motive of Euphronios, when representing the salvage of the body of Sarpedon as overseen by Hermes, rather than by Apollo, divergent from the Homeric text.) Eventually there will be ‘pictures for readers’, and a ‘pull of text’ that is overt in Hellenistic relief-moulded bowls, allowing Giuliani to talk of ‘illustrations’ – images that ‘have surrendered their autonomy’ (252).


Author(s):  
Gr.G. Khubulava

Relevance. Movement surrounds and accompanies us everywhere: planets move, time, river waters, the life of cities is accompanied by traffic along highways. Our own life is also inseparable from the phenomenon of movement, both at the micro and macro levels: whether it be the movement and division of atoms of matter and cells of the body, the movement and interaction of our bodies in space, or the movement of a person towards a specific goal, conditioned by intention and expressed in actions, which in themselves are also a movement of the will. Purpose: to describe and evaluate the nature of the phenomenon of movement both in the history of philosophy (from Zeno to Descartes and Bergson) and in the history of medicine (from Aristotle and Celsus to modern mechanisms that give a person a chance to return the possibility of movement as an aspect of full life). Methods: the research method is not only the analysis of the development of the phenomenon of movement in the history of philosophy and science, but also the analysis of the influence of modern technologies on the very understanding of the nature of movement not as a physiological, but as an ontological phenomenon. Results. The ancient idea of movement as a deception of the senses, describing the closed on itself the existence of an objectively motionless space or being the source and cause of eternally arising and disintegrating existence, was an attempt by thinkers to “catch the mind on being”, not just creating a picture of a single cosmos, but also comprehending him as part of the human world. The bodily movement and structure of a person was understood as part of the visible and speculative structure of being. The thought of the Middle Ages, which understood movement as the path of the world and man to God, perceived the phenomenon of movement as an expression of free will and, at the same time, the desire of the world to its completion, which is at the same time the moment of its transformation. The Renaissance epoch, which proclaimed man as an end in itself for existence, closely links the physical movement of man with the movement of the cosmos, and considers the visible nature to be the source of knowledge of the Divine Will. The New Time, which theoretically separated the mechanics of the bodily and the impulses of the soul and mind and declared man a “biological machine”, in fact does not break the relationship between the movement of the soul and the body, but, demonstrating the difference in the nature of these movements, anticipated the discovery of psychosomatics. Finally, modern times not only created a classification of “body techniques” inherent in various stages of human life and groups of people, describing the socio-cultural aspect of corporeality, but also perceived movement as an act of our existence and involvement in the existence of the world. Conclusion. Movement cannot be understood as a purely physiological act. In the process of growth, becoming, having barely learned to walk, we are faced with the need to perform actions, to “behave”, to be like a personal I and as a part of the moving world that collided with us. A world in which every step is an event and deed capable of defining “the landscape of our personal and universal being”.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Waterworth ◽  
Ingvar Tjostheim

We selected four fragments from the world of presence theory for particular attention. These are: presence as a perceptual illusion, as a pretence, as attending to an external world, and as pretending the virtual is real. We reflect on and try to unite these fragments into a fairly coherent and perhaps more general view of the nature of presence, one that may help integrate insights into both ‘natural’ and mediated presence. One conclusion from this work is that when we feel present, we believe that what is happening is real, in the moment, whether it is in the physical world or in a virtual reality (VR). In other words, when we feel really present in an environment it is real for us. If presence in VR is an illusion, so is presence in the physical world. Presence in VR requires imagination and belief (though not make-believe), and so does presence in the physical world.


2021 ◽  
Vol 118 (4) ◽  
pp. 169-187
Author(s):  
Frédérique de Vignemont ◽  

In this paper, I give an account of a hitherto neglected kind of ‘here’, which does not work as an intentional indexical. Instead, it automatically refers to the immediate perceptual environment of the subject’s body, which is known as peripersonal space. In between the self and the external world, there is something like a buffer zone, a place in which objects and events have a unique immediate significance for the subject because they may soon be in contact with her. I argue that seeing objects as being here in a minimal sense means seeing them in the place in which the perceptual system expects the world and the body to collide. I further argue that this minimal notion of here-content gives rise to a tactile sense of presence. It provides a unique experiential access to the reality of the seen object by making us aware of its ability to have an effect on us.


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-347
Author(s):  
Nathalie Barbosa de la CADENA

In this article I intend to highlight how the relationship between psychic subject and spiritual subject is fundamental for the understanding of intersubjectivity and the life world (Lebenswelt). In Ideas II, Husserl explains how, from the self, subject and object are constituted in the world: nature, soul and spirit. These three strata of the being are known from the theoretical attitude and the spiritual attitude and, in the process, the self is explicit. In a theoretical attitude we have nature's constitution, for which the body (Körper / Leib) is fundamental. Then the constitution of objects of animic nature, human or animal, including self-perception. Assuming the spiritual attitude, the other is perceived (Urpräsenz) initially as a body together with things, and beside this perception there is an apprehension (Appräsenz) of co-given horizons. There is an identity between the body of others and mine, it is the moment of empathy (Einfühlung). The world constituted from a naturalistic or theoretical attitude is a reduction of the surrounding world (Umwelt), but the everyday world of the personalistic or spiritual attitude precedes it, the life-world (Lebenswelt). It is therefore through the personalistic or spiritual attitude that a community of spiritual subjects is constituted. Palavras-chave : Husserl; Soul; Spirit; Intersubjectivity; Life-world.


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