scholarly journals US Government and American Muslims Engage to Define Islamophobia

2007 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 150-153
Author(s):  
M. A. Muqtedar Khan

On 4 December 2006, the American Muslims’ national leadership met withkey senior American government officials to discuss Islamophobia in thecountry and American-Muslim relations. The conference, organized by theBridging the Divide Initiative of the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution,was co-sponsored by the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding(ISPU) and the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS).As conference chair, I had to bring together two parties that did not seeeye-to-eye on this issue. While American Muslim leaders and participantsargued that Islamophobia was not only a reality but also a rapidly growingphenomenon in the United States, the government’s position was that whilethere have been increased incidences of anti-Muslim episodes in the country,the word Islamophobia deepens the divide between the two sides. Other government representatives also suggested that the fear to which Muslimswere referring was not that of Islam, but rather that of Muslim terrorism, asmanifested on 11 September 2001.Stephen Grand (director, United States-Islamic World program) welcomedall participants and launched the conference. The government wasrepresented by the Department of State, the Department of HomelandSecurity, and associated agencies. The morning keynote address was deliveredby Alina Romanowski (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State forProfessional and Cultural Affairs). She was introduced by AmbassadorMartin Indyk (director, the Saban Center), who proclaimed the importanceof such dialogues at a time when the gap between the United States and theMuslim world appears to be widening ...

2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 11-20
Author(s):  
John L. Esposito

The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? JLE: Our human tendency is to define what is normal or moderate in terms of someone just like “us.” The American government, as well as many western and Muslim governments and experts, define moderate by searching for reflections of themselves. Thus, Irshad Manji or “secular” Muslims are singled out as self-critical moderate Muslims by such diverse commentators as Thomas Friedman or Daniel Pipes. In an America that is politicized by the “right,” the Republican and religious right, and post-9/11 by the threat of global terrorism and the association of Islam with global terrorism, defining a moderate Muslim becomes even more problematic. Look at the situations not only in this country but also in Europe, especially France. Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts integration, or must it be assimilation? Is a moderate Muslim secular, as in laic (which is really anti-religious)? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts secularism, as in the separation of church and state, so that no religion is privileged and the rights of all (believer and nonbeliever) are protected? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts a particular notion of gender relations, not simply the equality of women and men but a position against wearing hijab? (Of course let’s not forget that we have an analogous problem with many Muslims whose definition of being a Muslim, or of being a “good” Muslim woman, is as narrowly defined.) In today’s climate, defining who is a moderate Muslim depends on the politics or religious positions of the individuals making the judgment: Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, Gilles Kepel, Stephen Schwartz, Pat Robertson, and Tom DeLay. The extent to which things have gotten out of hand is seen in attempts to define moderate Islam or what it means to be a good European or American Muslim. France has defined the relationship of Islam to being French, sought to influence mosques, and legislated against wearing hijab in schools. In the United States, non-Muslim individuals and organizations, as well as the government, establish or fund organizations that define or promote “moderate Islam,” Islamic pluralism, and so on, as well as monitor mainstream mosques and organizations. The influence of foreign policy plays a critical role. For some, if not many, the litmus test for a moderate Muslim is tied to foreign policy issues, for example, how critical one is of American or French policy or one’s position in regard to Palestine/Israel, Algeria, Kashmir, and Iraq. Like many Muslim regimes, many experts and ideologues, as well as publications like The Weekly Standard, National Review, The Atlantic, The New York Sun and media like Fox Television, portray all Islamists as being the same. Mainstream and extremist (they deny any distinction between the two) and indeed all Muslims who do not completely accept their notion of secularism, the absolute separation of religion and the state, are regarded as a threat. Mainstream Islamists or other Islamically oriented voices are dismissed as “wolves in sheep’s clothing.” What is important here is to emphasize that it is not simply that these individuals, as individual personalities, have influence and an impact, but that their ideas have taken on a life of their own and become part of popular culture. In a post-9/11 climate, they reinforce the worst fears of the uninformed in our populace. The term moderate is in many ways deceptive. It can be used in juxtaposition to extremist and can imply that you have to be a liberal reformer or a progressive in order to pass the moderate test, thus excluding more conservative or traditionalist positions. Moderates in Islam, as in all faiths, are the majority or mainstream in Islam. We assume this in regard to such other faiths as Judaism and Christianity. The Muslim mainstream itself represents a multitude of religious and socioeconomic positions. Minimally, moderate Muslims are those who live and work “within” societies, seek change from below, reject religious extremism, and consider violence and terrorism to be illegitimate. Often, in differing ways, they interpret and reinterpret Islam to respond more effectively to the religious, social, and political realities of their societies and to international affairs. Some seek to Islamize their societies but eschew political Islam; others do not. Politically, moderate Muslims constitute a broad spectrum that includes individuals ranging from those who wish to see more Islamically oriented states to “Muslim Democrats,” comparable to Europe’s Christian Democrats. The point here is, as in other faiths, the moderate mainstream is a very diverse and disparate group of people who can, in religious and political terms, span the spectrum from conservatives to liberal reformers. They may disagree or agree on many matters. Moderate Jews and Christians can hold positions ranging from reform to ultraorthodox and fundamentalist and, at times, can bitterly disagree on theological and social policies (e.g., gay rights, abortion, the ordination of women, American foreign and domestic policies). So can moderate Muslims.


2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 11-20
Author(s):  
John L. Esposito

The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? JLE: Our human tendency is to define what is normal or moderate in terms of someone just like “us.” The American government, as well as many western and Muslim governments and experts, define moderate by searching for reflections of themselves. Thus, Irshad Manji or “secular” Muslims are singled out as self-critical moderate Muslims by such diverse commentators as Thomas Friedman or Daniel Pipes. In an America that is politicized by the “right,” the Republican and religious right, and post-9/11 by the threat of global terrorism and the association of Islam with global terrorism, defining a moderate Muslim becomes even more problematic. Look at the situations not only in this country but also in Europe, especially France. Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts integration, or must it be assimilation? Is a moderate Muslim secular, as in laic (which is really anti-religious)? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts secularism, as in the separation of church and state, so that no religion is privileged and the rights of all (believer and nonbeliever) are protected? Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts a particular notion of gender relations, not simply the equality of women and men but a position against wearing hijab? (Of course let’s not forget that we have an analogous problem with many Muslims whose definition of being a Muslim, or of being a “good” Muslim woman, is as narrowly defined.) In today’s climate, defining who is a moderate Muslim depends on the politics or religious positions of the individuals making the judgment: Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, Gilles Kepel, Stephen Schwartz, Pat Robertson, and Tom DeLay. The extent to which things have gotten out of hand is seen in attempts to define moderate Islam or what it means to be a good European or American Muslim. France has defined the relationship of Islam to being French, sought to influence mosques, and legislated against wearing hijab in schools. In the United States, non-Muslim individuals and organizations, as well as the government, establish or fund organizations that define or promote “moderate Islam,” Islamic pluralism, and so on, as well as monitor mainstream mosques and organizations. The influence of foreign policy plays a critical role. For some, if not many, the litmus test for a moderate Muslim is tied to foreign policy issues, for example, how critical one is of American or French policy or one’s position in regard to Palestine/Israel, Algeria, Kashmir, and Iraq. Like many Muslim regimes, many experts and ideologues, as well as publications like The Weekly Standard, National Review, The Atlantic, The New York Sun and media like Fox Television, portray all Islamists as being the same. Mainstream and extremist (they deny any distinction between the two) and indeed all Muslims who do not completely accept their notion of secularism, the absolute separation of religion and the state, are regarded as a threat. Mainstream Islamists or other Islamically oriented voices are dismissed as “wolves in sheep’s clothing.” What is important here is to emphasize that it is not simply that these individuals, as individual personalities, have influence and an impact, but that their ideas have taken on a life of their own and become part of popular culture. In a post-9/11 climate, they reinforce the worst fears of the uninformed in our populace. The term moderate is in many ways deceptive. It can be used in juxtaposition to extremist and can imply that you have to be a liberal reformer or a progressive in order to pass the moderate test, thus excluding more conservative or traditionalist positions. Moderates in Islam, as in all faiths, are the majority or mainstream in Islam. We assume this in regard to such other faiths as Judaism and Christianity. The Muslim mainstream itself represents a multitude of religious and socioeconomic positions. Minimally, moderate Muslims are those who live and work “within” societies, seek change from below, reject religious extremism, and consider violence and terrorism to be illegitimate. Often, in differing ways, they interpret and reinterpret Islam to respond more effectively to the religious, social, and political realities of their societies and to international affairs. Some seek to Islamize their societies but eschew political Islam; others do not. Politically, moderate Muslims constitute a broad spectrum that includes individuals ranging from those who wish to see more Islamically oriented states to “Muslim Democrats,” comparable to Europe’s Christian Democrats. The point here is, as in other faiths, the moderate mainstream is a very diverse and disparate group of people who can, in religious and political terms, span the spectrum from conservatives to liberal reformers. They may disagree or agree on many matters. Moderate Jews and Christians can hold positions ranging from reform to ultraorthodox and fundamentalist and, at times, can bitterly disagree on theological and social policies (e.g., gay rights, abortion, the ordination of women, American foreign and domestic policies). So can moderate Muslims.


2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-156
Author(s):  
PAUL S. REICHLER

AbstractThe Nicaragua case demonstrates the Court's competence in receiving and interpreting evidence, and in making reasoned findings of fact, even in the most complicated evidentiary context, as is often presented in cases involving use of force and armed conflict. The Court applied well-established standards for evaluating the conflicting evidence presented to it. In particular, the Court determined that greater weight should be given to statements against interest made by high-level government officials than to a state's self-serving declarations. The Court also determined that statements by disinterested witnesses with first-hand knowledge should receive greater weight than mere statements of opinion or press reports. In applying these guidelines, the Court found, correctly, that (i) the United States had used military and paramilitary force against Nicaragua both directly and indirectly, by organizing, financing, arming, and training the Contra guerrillas to attack Nicaragua; (ii) the evidence did not support a finding that the United States exercised direct control over the Contras’ day-to-day operations; and (iii) there was no evidence that Nicaragua supplied arms to guerrillas fighting against the government of El Salvador during the relevant period, or carried out an armed attack against that state. While Judge Schwebel's dissent criticized the last of these findings, in fact, the evidence fully supported the Court's conclusion. In subsequent decisions during the past 25 years, the Court has continued to rely on the approach to evidence first elaborated in the Nicaragua case and has continued to demonstrate its competence as a finder of fact, including in cases involving armed conflict (Bosnia Genocide) and complex scientific and technical issues (Pulp Mills).


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  

Americans typically view the United States as a democracy and are rightly proud of that. Of course, as those of a more precise nature, along with smug college students enrolled in introductory American government classes, are quick to point out, the United States is technically a republic. This is a bit too clever by half since James Madison, in The Federalist Papers, defined a republic the way most people think of a democracy—a system of representative government with elections: “[The]… difference between a Democracy and a Republic are, first the delegation of the Government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest.” What the framers thought of as democracy is today referred to as direct democracy, the belief that citizens should have more direct control over governing. The Athenian assembly was what the framers, Madison in particular, saw as the paragon of direct democracy—and as quite dangerous. While direct democracy has its champions, most Americans equate democracy with electing officials to do the business of government.


1911 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 414-432
Author(s):  
Gaillard Hunt

Having considered in former numbers of this Journal the sometime and occasional duties of the Department, including among them certain contingent duties which it has never been called upon to perform, we may now advance to a consideration of its habitual functions.The organic act of the Department prescribed that the Secretary of State should keep “ the seal of the United States.” It is the mark of the supreme authority of the United States, and before the government went into operation under the Constitution, was in the custody of the Secretary of Congress, being used to verify all important acts, whether executive or legislative; but the debate on executive departments in the first constitutional congress indicated that Congress did not contemplate keeping the seal any longer, and thought it would necessarily pass to the custody of the Executive. The President did, in fact, take it under his control as soon as he assumed office and before legal provision had been made for it.


Author(s):  
Johannes Bubeck ◽  
Kai Jäger ◽  
Nikolay Marinov ◽  
Federico Nanni

Abstract Why do states intervene in elections abroad? This article argues that outsiders intervene when the main domestic contenders for office adopt policy positions that differ from the point of view of the outside power. It refers to the split between the government's and opposition's positions as policy polarization. Polarization between domestic political forces, rather than the degree of unfriendliness of the government in office, attracts two types of interventions: process (for or against democracy) and candidate (for or against the government) interventions. The study uses a novel, original data set to track local contenders’ policy positions. It shows that the new policy polarization measurement outperforms a number of available alternatives when it comes to explaining process and candidate interventions. The authors use this measurement to explain the behavior of the United States as an intervener in elections from 1945 to 2012. The United States is more likely to support the opposition, and the democratic process abroad, if a pro-US opposition is facing an anti-US government. It is more likely to support the government, and undermine the democratic process abroad, if a pro-US government is facing an anti-US opposition. The article also presents the results for all interveners, confirming the results from the US case.


1977 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adolf Sprudzs

Among the many old and new actors on the international stage of nations the United States is one of the most active and most important. The U.S. is a member of most existing intergovernmental organizations, participates in hundreds upon hundreds of international conferences and meetings every year and, in conducting her bilateral and multilateral relations with the other members of the community of nations, contributes very substantially to the development of contemporary international law. The Government of the United States has a policy of promptly informing the public about developments in its relations with other countries through a number of documentary publication, issued by the Department of State


1954 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-113
Author(s):  
David Fellman

There was no change in the personnel of the Supreme Court during the 1952 Term. But following the close of the Term, on September 8, 1953, Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, who had been appointed to the Court by President Truman in 1946, died unexpectedly at the age of 63. To replace him President Eisenhower gave a recess appointment to Governor Earl Warren of California on October 2. The new Chief Justice was sworn in on October 5.Two important developments in the constitutional law field during the period under review occurred outside the Court. One was the publication by the Government Printing Office, in 1953, of a newly revised annotatedConstitution of the United States, prepared by the Legislative Reference Service under the editorship of Edward S. Corwin. The annotations come down to June 30, 1952. The last annotated Constitution was published in 1938 under the editorship of W. C. Gilbert. The new work, an ample book of about 1400 large pages, is indispensable for students of American government.Noteworthy also was the appearance of the first two volumes of William Winslow Crosskey's monumental study of the American Constitution, under the title ofPolitics and the Constitution in the History of the United States.


2008 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-571 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Tyrrell

The article compares attitudes towards and laws regulating the use of alcohol and opium in the United States (US) colonial possession of the Philippines. Forces within the United States and missionary groups in the field in the Philippines fought to have the supply of alcohol to American troops restricted by abolition of the military canteen system, and to eliminate use of alcohol among the indigenous population. To achieve these aims, they developed highly skilled networks of political lobbying led by Wilbur Craft's International Reform Bureau. Temperance, church and missionary groups differed among themselves over the relative seriousness of the two drugs’ impact in the Philippines, but skillfully adapted their tactics in the light of experience in the colony to focus on opium. They developed a tacit coalition with the US government, using the Philippines opium policy to distinguish the United States as a morally superior colonial ruler. By lobbying the government to oppose opium use in the East Asia region, they served to promote an American regional hegemony, and provided an important departure point for modern US drug poalicies.


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