Kant, Intervention and the ‘Failed State’

1998 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 91-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg Cavallar ◽  
August Reinisch

Nowadays Kant's practical philosophy (including his political philosophy) is as highly regarded as his theoretical philosophy. This is an important development since the more constructive side of Kant's philosophy is to be found in his moral and political works. The main task of the Critique of Pure Reason is to clarify its concepts and to get rid of basic errors, and thus only ‘negative’. The moral and political writings, on the other hand, try to expand the scope of reason ‘for practical purposes’ (‘in praktischer Absicht’). Establishing principles of moral and political conduct, their main objective is not negative, but constructive.

Author(s):  
M.E. Orellana Benado ◽  
Andrés Bobenrieth ◽  
Carlos Verdugo

In a famous passage, Kant claimed that controversy and the lack of agreement in metaphysics — here understood as philosophy as a whole — was a ‘scandal.’ Attempting to motivate his critique of pure reason, a project aimed at both ending the scandal and setting philosophy on the ‘secure path of science,’ Kant endorsed the view that for as long as disagreement reigned sovereign in philosophy, there would be little to be learned from it as a science. The success of philosophy begins when controversy ends and culminates when the discipline itself as it has been known disappears. On the other hand, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century, many have despaired of the very possibility of philosophy constituting the search for truth, that is to say, a cognitive human activity, and constituting thus a source of knowledge. This paper seeks to sketch a research program that is motivated by an intuition that opposes both of these views.


Author(s):  
Andrés Bobenrieth ◽  
Orellana Benado Carlos Verdugo

In a famous passage, Kant claimed that controversy and the lack of agreement in metaphysics—here understood as philosophy as a whole—was a ‘scandal.’ Attempting to motivate his critique of pure reason, a project aimed at both ending the scandal and setting philosophy on the ‘secure path of science,’ Kant endorsed the view that for as long as disagreement reigned sovereign in philosophy, there would be little to be learned from it as a science. The success of philosophy begins when controversy ends and culminates when the discipline itself as it has been known disappears. On the other hand, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century, many have despaired of the very possibility of philosophy constituting the search for truth, that is to say, a cognitive human activity, and constituting thus a source of knowledge. This paper seeks to sketch a research program that is motivated by an intuition that opposes both of these views.


2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 261-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Losch

AbstractKant was not the first in whom the ‘starry heavens’ above us inspired awe and wonder. For Kant, who was firmly convinced of the existence of inhabitants of other worlds, these heavens were inhabited. He is certain that ‘If it were possible to settle by any sort of experience whether there are inhabitants of at least some of the planets that we see, I might well bet everything that I have on it. Hence I say that it is not merely an opinion but a strong belief (on the correctness of which I would wager many advantages in life) that there are also inhabitants of other worlds.’ In this statement by Kant in no less a work than the Critique of Pure Reason one can, on the one hand, recognize a reflection of Kant's earlier convictions and expositions, on the other hand, the context of the citation and the contemporary background are, of course, relevant. Following the example of Kant, this paper investigates the meaning of such reflections about inhabitants of alien worlds, which due to advances in planetary astronomy are today again on the agenda. Consideration of this subject also represents a challenge for theology.


2006 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 55-77
Author(s):  
Robert Greenberg

The role of transcendental idealism in Kant's theory of knowledge has been both deliberately underrated1 and inadvertently exaggerated. If conceivably not necessary, its role in Kant's explanation of the possibility of a priori knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason is at least pivotal to the success of the explanation. On the other hand, though transcendental idealism depends on Kant's epistemological criterion of an existing object, or, simply, his criterion of existence, the criterion for its part is actually independent of the idealism. In fact, it may be because this independence has hardly been recognized that commentators have been unaware of the role the criterion may actually be playing in the continuing controversy over the correct interpretation of the idealism. Altogether, this article addresses both shortcomings – the underestimation and the exaggeration of the role of the idealism in Kant's epistemology. While it places the idealism at the centre of the epistemology, it also separates the criterion of existence from the idealism. In highlighting this contrast, the article explains how the criterion may actually be contributing to the persistence of the ongoing dispute over the correct interpretation of the idealism.


MANUSYA ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-37
Author(s):  
Soraj Hongladarom

Compared with the other sections of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, the Metaphysical Deduction is among the most obscure and it seems that the section has not received as much critical and interpretive attention as its cousin, the Transcendental Deduction. This is rather surprising because it is at the Metaphysical Deduction that Kant crucial in establishing his program of justifying empirical knowledge in the face of radical skepticism. It is argued in this paper that the connection between the two types of logic is as follows: the logical forms, which belong to formal logic, are the ratio cognoscendi of the Pure Concepts of Understanding, since they provide the key to knowing the latter. On the other hand, the categories are the ratio essendi of the Logical forms, for it is the former that are the condition of the possibility of the latter.


Kant-Studien ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 110 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-462
Author(s):  
Rainer Schäfer

Abstract In this paper, I focus on Kant’s doctrine of figurative synthesis. Figurative synthesis is the result of the activity of productive transcendental imagination. This is the chief problem of the so-called “second proof step” in Kant’s deduction of the categories according to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. The pure original synthetic apperception forms in the inner and outer sense - i. e. in time and space - by self-affection structures of order that make it possible to cognize empirical objects. The order of space and time through figurative syntheses (formal intuitions) must be distinguished on the one hand from space and time as forms of intuition and on the other hand from the order of the manifold given in space and time (intuition of particular contents). This clarifies the differences and relations between the constitutive noetic faculties of our knowledge apparatus.


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (139) ◽  
pp. 193
Author(s):  
Antonio Saturnino Braga

Resumo: Este artigo tem três objetivos inter-relacionados. Em primeiro lugar, defender uma interpretação compatibilista da noção de liberdade prática exposta no capítulo do Cânone da Crítica da Razão Pura. Em segundo lugar, defender a hipótese de que a noção incompatibilista de liberdade prática exposta no capítulo das Antinomias da mesma Crítica incorre em sérios problemas. Por fim, defenderemos uma hipótese mais abrangente: se por um lado, para evitar os problemas suscitados pela interpretação incompatibilista, a liberdade prática deve ser interpretada num sentido compatibilista, para ser interpretada deste modo ela precisa por outro lado ser compreendida como propriedade da atividade deliberativa da razão prática, essencialmente distinta da atividade legislativa, à qual cabe a noção incompatibilista da liberdade transcendental.Abstract: This paper has three interrelated aims. The first defends a compatibilist interpretation of the concept of practical freedom presented in the Canon chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason. The second defends the hypothesis that the incompatibilist concept of practical freedom, presented in the Antinomies chapter of the same Critique, involves serious problems. Finally, the third defends a more comprehensive hypothesis: If, to avoid the serious problems created by the incompatibilist interpretation, practical freedom must be interpreted in a compatibilist way, on the other hand, to be interpreted in this way, practical freedom must be understood as a property of the deliberative activity of practical reason. The latter being essentially distinct from legislative activity, to which the incompatibilist concept of transcendental freedom applies.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Günter ZÖLLER

The essay focuses Kant’s engagement with Plato at the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, which presents a crucial but often overlooked feature of Kant’s magnum opus. In particular, the essay examines Kant’s positive pronouncements on the “Platonic republic” (Platonische Republik) in Book One of the Transcendental Dialectic by placing them in the twofold context of the first Critique’s affirmative retake on Plato’s Forms (Ideen) and its original views on juridico-political matters. More specifically, the essay aims to show that Kant’s prime position in legal and political philosophy, as contained in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), involves a normative conception of civic life that places the societal exercise of individual freedom under universal laws. Section 1 explores the extent of affinity between Plato and Kant as arch-representatives of ancient and modern idealism. Section 2 traces the transition from Platonic dogmatism to Kantian criticism in the theory of ideas. Section 3 presents Kant’s appropriation of the idea of the “Platonic republic” for purposes of a specifically modern republican account of the rule of law under conditions of freedom.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 101-110
Author(s):  
Mateusz Falkowski

The article is devoted to the famous The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude by Étienne de La Boétie. The author considers the theoretical premises underlying the concept of “voluntary servitude”, juxtaposing them with two modern concepts of will developed by Descartes and Pascal. An important feature of La Boétie’s project is the political and therefore intersubjective – as opposed to the individualistic perspective of Descartes and Pascal – starting point. It is therefore situated against the background of, on the one hand, the historical evolution of early modern states (from feudal monarchies, through so-called Renaissance monarchies up to European absolutisms) and, on the other hand – of the political philosophy of Machiavelli and Hobbes.


Author(s):  
Nathan Widder

This chapter examines Friedrich Nietzsche's political philosophy, first by focusing on his claim that the ‘death of God’ inaugurates modern nihilism. It then explains Nietzsche's significance for political theory by situating him, on the one hand, against the Platonist and Christian traditions that dominate political philosophy and, on the other hand, with contemporary attempts to develop a new political theory of difference. The chapter also considers Nietzsche's genealogical method and proceeds by analysing the three essays of On the Genealogy of Morals, along with his views on good and bad, good and evil, slave morality, the ascetic ideal, and the nihilism of modern secularism. Finally, it reviews contemporary interpretations of Nietzsche's relation and relevance to political theory and how his philosophy has inspired a broader set of trends that has come to be known as ‘the ontological turn in political theory’.


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