scholarly journals The concept of dignity and duties of virtue in Kant

1969 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Milene Consenso Tonetto

It can be argued that the "Formula of the End in Itself " of the Categorical Imperative has been widely accepted and analyzed by commentators of Kant. Allen Wood, for instance, mentions that the idea of human dignity, which underlies the "Formula of the End in Itself ", is the Kantian principle that perhaps has the greatest resonance in the moral conscience of our culture and also the most universal appeal because it seems to support human rights (WOOD, 1998).

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 19-26
Author(s):  
Izabela Bratiloveanu

 The Object formula („Objecktformel”) has been designed and developed in the mid century XX by Günter Dürig, starting from the second formula of Kant's categorical imperative. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany took the formula and applied it for the first time in the case of the telephone conversations of December 15, 1970. The Object formula („Objecktformel”) was taken from the German constitutional law and applied in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.


2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-98
Author(s):  
Sunday Adeniyi Fasoro

This paper explores the new frontier within Kantian scholarship which suggests that Kant places so much special importance on the value of rational nature that the supreme principle of morality and the concept of human dignity are both grounded on it. Advocates of this reading argue that the notion of autonomy and dignity should now be considered as the central claim of Kant’s ethics, rather than the universalisation of maxims. Kant’s ethics are termed as repugnant for they place a high demand on the universalisation of maxims as a universal moral principle. As a result, they argue that there is an urgent need to rescue Kant’s ethics from the controversies surrounding maxims and universalisability, and the best way to rescue his ethics is by “leaving deontology behind”. It must be left behind because the categorical imperative is not needed in order to rescue Kant’s ethics, as deontology is often overrated. Consequently, the highest duties of the human being are to ensure that his fellow human beings enjoy unhindered autonomy and receive the honour that their dignity duly deserves, as well as to look after their welfare and treat them with respect, regardless of their dispositions. I review recent literature to appraise this new frontier within Kantian scholarship. I also explore the works of philosophers, such as Herman, Korsgaard, Wood, Höffe, and, specifically, Hill, on Kant’s conception of human dignity in relation to its conception as autonomy, humanity, and the source of human rights.


Author(s):  
AC (Rinie) Steinmann

The concept of human dignity is relatively new in international and domestic constitutional law. Dignity is protected as a value or a right, or both, in international law and many domestic jurisdictions. It is difficult to define human dignity in a legal context, as the concept is not defined in the first international document which recognizes inherent human dignity and the protection thereof, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1946) and many international (and national) documents enacted thereafter. Despite dissensus regarding the widespread use of the concept, dignity has come to display three elements in constitutional adjudication post World War Two: the ontological element which entails that human beings have equal inherent human dignity that cannot be waived or diminished; the second element being the claim that inherent human dignity has to be recognised and respected; and the limited-state claim as the third element which entails that states have a positive obligation to progressively realise human dignity through the mechanism of socio-economic rights. It is widely accepted that these elements root in Kantian moral ethics which holds that man's autonomy is based upon universal dignity, as a result of which man should never be used as a means to an end, but only as a means in himself. Kant expressed this idea through formulation of a categorical imperative, namely that everyone's inherent human dignity has to be respected and protected universally. The preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1946), article 1(1) of the German Basic Law and section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 embody the elements of Kant's categorical imperative. As a result, the three elements are applied as a definitional term of human dignity in German and South African constitutional adjudication. Based on these elements, it can be argued that the current idea of universal inherent dignity, at least in German and South African law, comports with Kant's ideal that man should never be used as a means to an end.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-241
Author(s):  
Mirko Pecaric

This paper explores recent notions in public administration, which are intertwined and addressed to the administration of public affairs. On this basis it demonstrates that content of legal system is filled through the static legal principles and rules, but they receive their real content through the informal practices and conditions of the human mind. The paper concludes that discussed notions could have only one name, because they all are the synonyms of reciprocal relation between the human dignity and efficient administration.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-36
Author(s):  
Wojciech Szczerba

This article aims to examine how the concept of Imago Dei can serve as a symbol for the broadly understood idea of religious inclusion and human dignity. The article explores the concept of Imago Dei primarily from a protological perspective, analyzing its usage in biblical writings, theological tradition and modern philosophy. The substantial, relational and functional—which three usages of the concept can be found in the inclusive theology of Gregory of Nyssa—are analyzed in this article. Arguably, in the context of religious inclusion, the relational angle of Imago Dei seems to be the most important. Similarly contemporary Protestant theologian, Jürgen Moltmann states in his book, God in the Creation, that the “relational” concept of Imago Dei underscores the fundamental dignity of every person. In his book, God for Secular Society, Moltmann states that properly understood human rights should include democratic relationships between people, cooperation between societies, concern for the environment in which people live, and responsibility for future generations. From these perspectives, the concept of Imago Dei can be utilized as a symbol indicating the dignity of every person and human community, but also a symbol against any types of racism, nationalism or xenophobia.


Author(s):  
William Durch ◽  
Joris Larik ◽  
Richard Ponzio

Security and justice are both essential elements in humanity’s quest not only to survive but to thrive with dignity; neither is sustainable alone. Security is merely the appearance of order in a framework of structural violence unless tempered or leavened by concepts of justice that include human rights, human dignity, and other normative limits on the use of power. The pursuit of justice, whether at the personal, community, national, or international level can be crippled if not matched, in turn, by means to sustain security at each level. This complementarity of security and justice—despite their inherent tensions—is the core conceptual framework of the book. Achieving “just security,” we argue, is essential to the success of any global governance enterprise or architecture.


2008 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Man Yee Karen Lee

AbstractThe idea of “human dignity” is accorded a prominent status in domestic constitutions and international human rights law. Its symbolism as a universal ground of human rights sits awkwardly with the absence of a precise definition. The concept has evolved over history and has been interpreted in various ways by people holding different worldviews. The elusive nature of human dignity creates challenges when it is evaluated across cultures. Despite its common association with the concept of liberal democracy, the idea of human worthiness is not necessarily absent in Asian societies, many of which function under alternative political systems.A cross-cultural perspective requires putting aside ethnocentrism and exploring the convergence of views from different belief systems. Examples from Confucianism and Islam may provide insights on how human dignity is understood and realized in various Asian contexts.


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