scholarly journals Mediation and termination of the lease agreement of the land share in case of its allocation in kind on the ground

Author(s):  
Diana Busuiok

The article states that the legal regulation of land turnover requires their individualization. Therefore, in practice there is allocationof land shares (units) in kind on the ground. In this regard, the question still arises as to what happens to the land lease agreementin the case of allocation of land share - is it subject to termination or re-conclusion?It is noted that such disputes should be resolved not only in court, but also out of court – the order of mediation. Mediation shouldnot only take into account the interests of the parties to the land dispute and their needs, but also rely on current legislation on the issueand the practice of resolving such disputes by the Supreme Court. There is a need to determine the legislation on this issue and possibleapproaches to resolving such disputes through mediation.Determinants in the introduction of land share are the Decree of the President of Ukraine “On urgent measures to accelerate landreform in the field of agricultural production” of November 10, 1994 № 666/94 and the Decree of the President of Ukraine “On thedist ribution of land transferred to collective ownership of agricultural enterprises and organizations” of August 8, 1995 № 720 / 95.Despite the generally accepted fact in the theory of law that the object of turnover can only be individually identified property inthe transitional provisions of the Law of Ukraine “Land Lease” of October 6, 1998 № 161-XIV contains provisions according to whichcitizens – holders of certificates for the right to land share before allocating them in kind (on the ground) land have the right to enterinto lease agreements for agricultural land, the location of which is determined taking into account the requirements of rational orga -nization territory and compactness of land use, in accordance with these certificates in compliance with the Law of Ukraine “LandLease”.After allocating land in kind (on the ground) to the owners of land shares (units), the land lease agreement is renegotiated inaccordance with the state act on land ownership on the same terms as previously concluded, and may be changed only by agreementof the parties. Termination of the lease agreement is allowed only in cases specified by the Law of Ukraine “Land Lease”.The list of grounds for termination of the land lease agreement is not exhaustive. Cases of termination of the land lease agreement(share) may be provided by another law. However, the allocation of land on the basis of land share in kind on the ground as a basis fortermination of obligations of the parties is not provided by law, but in the order of the State Committee of Ukraine for Land Resources“Approval of the Standard Lease Agreement share” dated January 17, 2000 № 5.This inconsistency between these two acts, so different in their legal force, in practice leads to disputes over the grounds for terminationof the lease of land share in the event of its allocation.In this regard, in the Resolution of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court of September 1, 2020, case № 233/3676/19, a correspondingposition was expressed.Examining the above acts, we identified certain shortcomings in determining the grounds for termination of the lease of land(shares). Such uncertainty provokes land disputes. In order to improve the legal regulation of leased land relations, it is necessary to harmonize the legal requirements of differentlegal acts and enshrine in the Law of Ukraine “Land Lease” such grounds for termination of land lease as the allocation of land sharein kind on the ground.In order to effectively mediate land disputes, this inconsistency should be kept in mind in the following cases:1) when conducting contractual mediation, which will consist in concluding a land lease agreement (share) and agreeing on thegrounds for termination of this agreement. Such mediation will be aimed at preventing disputes over the grounds for termination ofsuch an agreement in the future;2) during the mediation of a dispute regarding the termination of the land lease agreement (share) in the case of its allocation inkind on the ground.

Author(s):  
Ari Wibowo ◽  
Michael Hagana Bangun

The provision of legal aid is one way to realize access to law and justice for the poor people provided by the state on the mandate of the constitution. Several regulations regarding legal aid have been issued by the state through the Act and its implementing regulations as well as from the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court through the Supreme Court Regulations and the Constitutional Court's decisions. Legal aid is the constitutional right of every citizen to guarantee legal protection and guarantee equality before the law stipulated in Law Number 16 of 2011, the State is responsible for recognizing and protecting the human rights of every individual without differing backgrounds so that everyone has the right to be treated equally before the law is contained in Article 28D of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. For the poor who experience legal problems in the form of injustice, they can request legal assistance from legal aid institutions that are regulated in legislation. The purpose of providing legal aid is to guarantee and fulfill the right for Legal Aid Recipients to gain access to justice, to realize the constitutional rights of all citizens in accordance with the principle of equality in law, to ensure the certainty that the implementation of Legal Aid is carried out equally across the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. , and to create an effective, efficient and accountable court.


Author(s):  
Barbara Zielińska-Rapacz

The doctrine of habeas corpus is that no one should be imprisoned contrary to the law of the land. The habeas corpus review is used as a form of inquiry issued to test whether a conviction or restraint is lawful. However, before having a chance to present their case before a federal forum, state prisoners have to fulfill the state’s gatekeeping requirements, such as the exhaustion of all available state remedies, requirements of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and the absence of procedural default. Procedural default arises when the state court declines to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner failed to meet a state procedural requirement. To overcome the procedural default the petitioner has to satisfy the “cause-and-prejudice test.” In many cases the fulfillment of the “cause” element is often based on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. To prove the ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner has to satisfy the test consisting of two prongs: establishing the deficient performance of counsel and demonstrating that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. In federal proceedings the rule is to raise the claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel in the collateral review. However, the right to a counsel does not extend to collateral attacks upon conviction, including a post-conviction appeal. Moreover, the counsel’s deficient performance does not constitute a basis for a procedural default reversal in the post-conviction claim. The abovementioned assertation may pose a question: what happens when the defendant is eligible to raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claim only in the collateral proceeding and the counsel representing the defendant in such a proceeding does not raise the claim?The Supreme Court resolved this matter in the decision from the Martinez v. Ryan case. The Court allowed for treating inefficient assistance of post-conviction counsel as a cause that could reverse procedural default. Taking into consideration the amount of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in habeas corpus review, the Martinez v. Ryan case may influence a fair amount of individuals seeking their constitutional rights and give them their last chance to contest unfair conviction.Nieefektywna pomoc obrońcy jako przesłanka wniosku o habeas corpus w postępowaniu po skazaniu Wniosek o habeas corpus jest środkiem, który umożliwia osobie pozbawionej wolności zbadanie przez sąd legalności jej skazania. Przed skorzystaniem z tej możliwości skazany powinien wyczerpać wszelkie możliwe środki służące ponownemu zbadaniu legalności skazania, przysługujące mu na podstawie prawa stanowego. Ponadto wnioskodawca powinien uczynić zadość wszelkim stanowym przepisom proceduralnym. W wypadku niezadośćuczynienia temu obowiązkowi sąd stanowy nie rozpozna wniosku, chyba że wnioskodawca udowodni, iż nie mógł spełnić wymogów proceduralnych z powodów, na które nie miał wpływu. Wnioskodawcy w takiej sytuacji bardzo często powołują się na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy. Zasadą jest, iż na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy w postępowaniu przed sądem federalnym można powołać się poza postępowaniem głównym obejmującym rozpoznanie sprawy w I i II instancji. Prawo do obrony zagwarantowane w szóstej poprawce do Konstytucji Stanów Zjednoczonych nie rozciąga się jednak na postępowania poza postępowaniem głównym. Skazani nie mogą zatem powołać się na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy, aby odwrócić stan niezadośćuczynienia obowiązkom proceduralnym wynikającym z prawa stanowego. Taki stan rzeczy budził wiele wątpliwości. W wypadku gdy pełnomocnik wnioskodawcy w postępowaniu poza postępowaniem głównym nie powoła się na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy, który reprezentował skazanego w postępowaniu w I lub II instancji, wnioskodawca nie będzie mógł później wnosić o habeas corpus na tejże podstawie, gdyż wymagania proceduralne prawa stanowego nie zostały spełnione.Do tego problemu odniósł się Sąd Najwyższy w orzeczeniu w sprawie Martinez v. Ryan. Sąd dopuścił możliwość powołania się przez wnioskodawcę na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy w postępowaniu poza postępowaniem głównym jako przesłankę niemożności zaspokojenia wymogów proceduralnych postępowania przed sądem stanowym. Biorąc pod uwagę, iż w ponad połowie postępowań związanych z wnioskiem o habeas corpus wnioskodawcy powołują się na nieefektywną pomoc obrońców, orzeczenie to ma ogromny wpływ na doktrynę habeas corpus.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-121
Author(s):  
Shamier Ebrahim

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Budi Suhariyanto

Diskresi sebagai wewenang bebas, keberadaannya rentan akan disalahgunakan. Penyalahgunaan diskresi yang berimplikasi merugikan keuangan negara dapat dituntutkan pertanggungjawabannya secara hukum administrasi maupun hukum pidana. Mengingat selama ini peraturan perundang-undangan tentang pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi tidak merumuskan secara rinci yang dimaksudkan unsur menyalahgunakan kewenangan maka para hakim menggunakan konsep penyalahgunaan wewenang dari hukum administrasi. Problema muncul saat diberlakukannya Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2014 dimana telah memicu persinggungan dalam hal kewenangan mengadili penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) antara Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara dengan Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Pada perkembangannya, persinggungan kewenangan mengadili tersebut ditegaskan oleh Peraturan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 4 Tahun 2015 bahwa PTUN berwenang menerima, memeriksa, dan memutus permohonan penilaian ada atau tidak ada penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) dalam Keputusan dan/atau Tindakan Pejabat Pemerintahan sebelum adanya proses pidana. Sehubungan tidak dijelaskan tentang definisi dan batasan proses pidana yang dimaksud, maka timbul penafsiran yang berbeda. Perlu diadakan kesepakatan bersama dan dituangkan dalam regulasi tentang tapal batas persinggungan yang jelas tanpa meniadakan kewenangan pengujian penyalahgunaan wewenang diskresi pada Pengadilan TUN.Discretion as free authority is vulnerable to being misused. The abuse of discretion implicating the state finance may be prosecuted by both administrative and criminal law. In view of the fact that the law on corruption eradication does not formulate in detail the intended element of authority abuse, the judges use the concept of authority abuse from administrative law. Problems arise when the enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 triggered an interception in terms of justice/ adjudicate authority on authority abuse (including discretion) between the Administrative Court and Corruption Court. In its development, the interception of justice authority is affirmed by Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 4 of 2015 that the Administrative Court has the authority to receive, examine and decide upon the appeal there is or there is no misuse of authority in the Decision and / or Action of Government Officials prior to the criminal process. That is, shortly before the commencement of the criminal process then that's when the authority of PTUN decides to judge the misuse of authority over the case. In this context, Perma No. 4 of 2015 has imposed restrictions on the authority of the TUN Court in prosecuting the abuse of discretionary authority.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1288
Author(s):  
Arief Hidayat ◽  
Ahmad Redi

The State of Indonesia is a State of Law. But, in fact the ideals of the idea of the State of Law that was built by developing the legal tool itself as a system that is functional and just to achieve community welfare and social justice has not been optimally done. This is reflected in the new Environmental Permit issued by Central Java Governor Ganjar Pranowo (No. 660.1 / 6 of 2017 on Environmental Permit for Mining and Construction Activities of PT Semen Indonesia Plant) is considered to have injured the ideals of the law itself. The new Environmental Permit is contradictory to the content of the Review Judgment issued by the Supreme Court (Supreme Court Verdict Decision Number 99 PK / Tun 2016), because in the ruling it ordered that the Governor Replace the old Environmental Permit, which was issued in 2012 and did not issue New Environmental Permit. The verdict contains the basis of judges' consideration in deciding cases that have reflected fairness and legal certainty. The result of the research on the validity of the Environmental Permit Decree on the Review Judgment issued by the Supreme Court concluded that the decree should be invalid because it is not in line with the decision of the court which has permanent legal force.


Author(s):  
Vitalii Urkevych

Land is the most important object of the environment. It is an indispensable means of production in agriculture, the territorial basis for the location of various objects. It is argued that the proper functioning of land lease relations is a guarantee of sustainable economic circulation, a guarantee of the exercise of rights and performance of duties by both the lessor and the lessee of the land. The issue of renewal of the land lease agreement after its expiration is debatable. The purpose of the study is to outline the existing theoretical and law enforcement problems regarding the renewal of the land lease agreement, to make proposals to eliminate the latter. To achieve this purpose, a system-structural method of scientific knowledge was used, which helped analyse the prescriptions of the legislation on renewal of the land lease agreement, their relations and interaction were highlighted. The study proves that the lessee's pre-emptive right exists to renew the land lease agreement only for the same period and on the same terms and in the absence of objections to such renewal by the lessor. If the lessee tries to change the essential terms of the land lease agreement and in the absence of the lessor's consent to such changes, the lessee's pre-emptive right to enter into a land lease agreement for a new term is terminated. It is emphasised that in each dispute it is necessary to establish the good faith of the lessor’s actions to refuse to renew the land lease agreement with one person (lessee) and the subsequent conclusion of the agreement with the new lessee. The use of the category of "less protected" party in land lease legal relations appears debatable, because depending on the subject composition of the parties to these legal relations, such a party can be both a lessee and a lessor. It is concluded that the Supreme Court should unify the practice of applying the provisions of the law on the renewal of the land lease agreement (only in combination with other regulations or autonomously, with the use of the principle of "tacit consent"). The possibility of autonomous application of such instructions is indicated by the provisions of the Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Concerning Counteraction to Raiding”. The revealed shortcomings of the legal regulation of the renewal of the land lease agreement after its expiration indicate the directions of improvement of the legislation in land lease, which has practical significance


Author(s):  
Dickson Brice

This chapter considers the performance of the Irish Supreme Court during the life of the Irish Free State (1922–37). It charts the way in which the right to appeal from the Supreme Court to the Privy Council was abolished (comparing the position in other Dominions) and shows that, despite the rhetoric of Irish politicians at the time, the judges were keen to uphold the British approach to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. The chapter then describes some of the emergency legislation enacted in the Free State to combat republican violence and examines how it was viewed by the Supreme Court, most notably in the very deferential (albeit split) decision in The State (Ryan) v Lennon. The chapter sums up the Court’s performance during the existence of the Irish Free State as disappointing and uninspiring.


Author(s):  
Akhileshwar Pathak

The case discusses the issues related to Zee Tele Films Limited's claims that the Board of Cricket Control of India was “state” and could act arbitrarily in the award of telecasting rights. The “state” as defined in Article 12 includes “other authorities”, and these are subject to the constitutional limitations. The right to equality requires them to not act arbitrarily. A body which is an instrumentality or agency of the government is “other authority”. The term has been subject to judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court, by a majority judgement, in the Zee Tele Films Case ruled that the Board is not “other authorities” within Article 12 of the Constitution.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.


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