Establishment of UN Cyber Peacekeeping Force: Prospects and Challenges

Author(s):  
Fahad Nabeel

With the emergence of cyberspace as the fifth domain of warfare, the prospects of cyber conflicts have increased significantly. Around 300 state-sponsored cyber operations have been conducted since 2005. The future uncertainty of cyber-warfare has prompted calls for necessary measures to regulate the actions of states in cyberspace. In this regard, cyber-peacekeeping has also emerged as a significant research area to distinctively deal with the cyber component of future conflicts. Although, a number of challenges exist regarding materialization of full fledge cyber-peacekeeping force, it can be easily integrated into the current United Nations (UN) peacekeeping organizational structure. In legal terms, operationalization of cyber-peacekeeping force will depend on the mandate of peace operations approved by the UN Security Council (UNSC). This paper discusses the challenges confronting the creation of a cyber- peacekeeping force and also offers recommendations by presenting a general framework regarding how such a force can be operationalized. Despite the fact that a dedicated cyber-peacekeeping force seems a far sighted idea in present times, a distinct cyber unit can certainly be formed and integrated into UN peace operations in near future.

Author(s):  
Sabine von Schorlemer

Intentional destruction of cultural heritage by extremist non-State actors—be it by the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL) in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, or Boko Haram in Nigeria—is on the rise. Using the destruction of cultural heritage in Mali in 2012–13 as a case study, this chapter argues that the creation of the self-proclaimed independent State of ‘Azawad’ in Mali became a ‘test case’ for the United Nations’ will and capacity to prevent further destruction of world cultural heritage, and it also analyzes the legal foundation of the 2013 French military Operation Serval in Mali. It also discusses the responsibility to protect as applied to cultural heritage, evaluates the subsequent deployment of the United Nations MINUSMA, and evaluates the mandate given by UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013), the first in UN history that included comprehensive protection of cultural and historical sites as a task of a UN peacekeeping operation. Therefore, the chapter reviews critically not only the mandate of MINUSMA, but also its potential relevance concerning future culture-embedded UN peace missions, and also contributes to the debate of the usefulness of more ‘robust’ cultural protection action by the United Nations.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul D. Williams

Abstract The United Nations (UN) Security Council is stuck in a peacekeeping trilemma. This is a situation where the Council's three strategic goals for peacekeeping operations—implementing broad mandates, minimizing peacekeeper casualties and maximizing cost-effectiveness—cannot be achieved simultaneously. This trilemma stems from longstanding competing pressures on how the Council designs UN peacekeeping operations as well as political divisions between peacekeeping's three key groups of stakeholders: the states that authorize peacekeeping mandates, those that provide most of the personnel and field capabilities, and those that pay the majority of the bill. Fortunately, the most negative consequences of the trilemma can be mitigated and perhaps even transcended altogether. Mitigation would require the Council to champion and implement four main reforms: improving peacekeeper performance, holding peacekeepers accountable for misdeeds, adopting prioritized and sequenced mandates, and strengthening the financial basis for UN peacekeeping. Transcending the trilemma would require a more fundamental reconfiguration of the key stakeholder groups in order to create much greater unity of effort behind a re-envisaged peacekeeping enterprise. This is highly unlikely in the current international political context.


Author(s):  
Hanna Bourgeois

Abstract In this article, I aim to explore the interpretation and implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council mandates authorising the protection of civilians (PoC) and, in particular, the meaning of an authorisation to use ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians. Over the past two decades, the UN Security Council has repeatedly provided UN (mandated) peace operations with an explicit mandate to protect civilians. In doing so, it has typically authorised the use of ‘all necessary means’ to achieve the aforementioned objective. This PoC language has been subject to varying interpretations and implementations in practice and is therefore often considered ambiguous. The conclusion reached in this article is that PoC language is indeed vague, but that this is not necessarily problematic. It might even be unavoidable in light of the cascade structure in which the PoC mandate is placed and whereby the PoC mandate is interpreted and implemented at the various levels of authority, command, and control. What is problematic is that there is uncertainty and discussion about the limits to the use of force in the implementation of PoC mandates. After all, the formula to use ‘all necessary means’ cannot be regarded as a ‘blank cheque’ to use any amount of force. Therefore, I identify the upper limit to what UN (mandated) peace operations may lawfully do to protect civilians when being provided with a mandate to use ‘all necessary means’. I also detect an emerging lower limit for what UN (mandated) peace operations must lawfully do to protect civilians when being provided with such a PoC mandate.


Author(s):  
Олена Скрипник

Ключові слова: ООН, Рада Безпеки, військовий конфлікт, операція з підтримки миру, війська ООН. Анотація У статті проаналізовано діяльність Ради Безпеки ООН, визначено її роль у врегулюванні військових конфліктів. Проаналізовано історичний аспект діяльності Ради Безпеки ООН у даному питанні. Висвітлено процес прийняття рішення щодо започаткування операції з підтримання миру під егідою ООН. З’ясовано які методи Рада Безпеки ООН застосовує для припинення військового конфлікту. Охарактеризовано з якими проблемами змушена боротись РБ ООН під час прийняття рішень щодо врегулювання військового конфлікту. Зроблено висновок про те, що у руслі подій які відбуваються в Україні, а саме військового конфлікту на Сході нашої держави, де прямим учасником якого виступає постійний член Ради Безпеки ООН (Російська Федерація), особливо потрібне реформування РБ. Посилання Akulov, 2005 – Akulov S. Mizhnarodni myrotvorchi operatsiyi yak politychnyy instrument vrehulyuvannya voyenno-politychnykh konfliktiv [International peacekeeping operations as a political tool for resolving military-political conflicts] // Politychnyy menedzhment. 2005. № 2. S. 165–172. [in Ukrainian] Bani-Naser Fadi, 2015 – Bani-Naser Fadi Myrotvorchi operatsiyi OON: teoriya i praktyka [UN peacekeeping operations: theory and practice] // Problems of international relations. 2015. № 10-11. S. 24–36. [in Ukrainian] Barhamon, 2017 – Barhamon N. I. Yurydychnyy analiz kompetentsiyi rady bezpeky OON shchodo pidtrymannya mizhnarodnoho myru ta bezpeky [Legal analysis of the competence of the UN Security Council to maintain international peace and security] // International law in the service of the state, society, man: materials of scientific practice. conf. (Kyiv, December 8, 2016). 2017. S. 6–11. [in Ukrainian] Hodovanyk, 2010 – Hodovanyk YE. V. Orhanizatsiyno-pravovi aspekty reformuvannya rady bezpeky OON na suchasnomu etapi [Organizational and legal aspects of reforming the UN Security Council at the present stage] // State and law. 2010. № 49. S. 648–655. [in Ukrainian] Doklad General'nogo sekretarya, predstavlyayemyy vo ispolneniye Rezolyutsii 53/53 General'noy Asamblei. Padeniye Srebrentsy [Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/53. The fall of Srebrenza]. А/54/549. 1999. URL: https://undocs.org/ru/A/54/549 [in Russian] Doklad General'nogo sekretarya o situatsii v Somali, predstavlennyy vo ispolneniye punkta 13 Rezolyutsii 954 (1994) Soveta Bezopasnosti [Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 954 (1994)]. S/1995/231. URL: https://undocs.org/ru/S/1995/231 [in Russian] Leha, 2011 – Leha A. YU. Pravovi osnovy vrehulyuvannya viysʹkovykh konfliktiv [Legal bases of settlement of military conflicts] // Istorychnyy arkhiv. 2011. № 6. S. 80–83. [in Ukrainian] Malysheva, 2016 – Malysheva YU. V. Tsilespryamovani sanktsiyi ta yikh zastosuvannya Radoyu Bezpeky OON [Targeted sanctions and their application by the UN Security Council]: dys. … kand. yuryd. nauk : 12.00.11. Kyyiv, 2016. 253 s. [in Ukrainian] Operatsii OOH po podderzhaniyu mira [UN Peacekeeping Operations] // Ofitsiynyy sayt OON. URL: https://peacekeeping.un.org/ru/role-of-security-council [in Russian] Ostapenko, 2019 – Ostapenko N. V. Reforma Rady Bezpeky OON yak zasib podolannya kryzy efektyvnosti Orhanizatsiyi [Reform of the UN Security Council as a means of overcoming the crisis of the Organization's effectiveness] // Zovnishni spravy. 2019. № 1. S. 53–55. [in Ukrainian] Rezolyutsii Soveta Bezopasnosti OON 1960 [Resolutions of the UN Security Council 1960] S/4426 (1960). URL: https://undocs.org/ru/S/RES/146(1960) [in Russian] Statut OON [United Nations Statute]. URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_010#Text. [in Ukrainian]. Fedorenko, 2011 – Fedorenko A. I. Shlyakhy ta napryamy transformatsiyi Rady Bezpeky OON [Ways and directions of transformation of the UN Security Council] // Aktualʹni problemy mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn. 2011. №. 96(2). S. 97–99 Security Council. United Nations. S/1999/1257/ 12 December 1999. URL: https://undocs.org/S/1999/1257 [in English]


China Report ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-56
Author(s):  
Christopher B. Primiano

When China joined the United Nations in 1971, it viewed UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs) as an instrument for powerful countries to exploit weaker countries. Today, under Xi Jinping, China contributes the largest number of UN peacekeeping personnel among the five permanent (P5) members of the UN Security Council. This article presents findings from a pilot study based on a survey conducted at two international universities in China in the fall of 2016, regarding how Chinese students perceive China’s UNPKO involvement. A total of 297 Chinese university students participated in this survey. Given that there has been little scholarship on how Chinese citizens view China’s UNPKO spending or involvement, this article aims to contribute to our understanding of this subject.


2013 ◽  
Vol 95 (891-892) ◽  
pp. 645-652 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katarina Grenfell

The applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) to United Nations (UN) forces has long generated discussion. When peacekeepers have become engaged in hostilities of such a nature as to trigger the application of IHL (either via acts in self-defence, or in the course of carrying out a mandate as authorised by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations), questions have arisen as to whether they should be equally subject to the rules of IHL. Such questions arise as UN peacekeeping forces act on behalf of the international community and thus have a ‘just cause’, so to speak, to use force. Despite these questions, however, it now appears well settled that the distinction between jus ad bellum (the right to use force under public international law) and jus in bello (the law governing the conduct of hostilities) should be maintained, and that IHL applies in respect of UN peacekeeping operations whenever the conditions for its application are met. That said, questions regarding the conditions for the application of IHL, as well as its scope of application, continue to be relevant, particularly at a time when the Security Council is tasking UN operations with increasingly robust mandates.


Author(s):  
Bakare Najimdeen

Few years following its creation, the United Nations (UN) with the blessing of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided to establish the UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), as a multilateral mechanism geared at fulfilling the Chapter VII of the UN Charter which empowered the Security Council to enforce measurement to maintain or restore international peace and security. Since its creation, the multilateral mechanism has recorded several successes and failures to its credit. While it is essentially not like traditional diplomacy, peacekeeping operations have evolved over the years and have emerged as a new form of diplomacy. Besides, theoretically underscoring the differences between diplomacy and foreign policy, which often appear as conflated, the paper demonstrates how diplomacy is an expression of foreign policy. Meanwhile, putting in context the change and transformation in global politics, particularly global conflict, the paper argues that traditional diplomacy has ceased to be the preoccupation and exclusive business of the foreign ministry and career diplomats, it now involves foot soldiers who are not necessarily diplomats but act as diplomats in terms of peacekeeping, negotiating between warring parties, carrying their countries’ emblems and representing the latter in resolving global conflict, and increasingly becoming the representation of their countries’ foreign policy objective, hence peacekeeping military diplomacy. The paper uses decades of Pakistan’s peacekeeping missions as a reference point to establish how a nation’s peacekeeping efforts represent and qualifies as military diplomacy. It also presented the lessons and good practices Pakistan can sell to the rest of the world vis-à-vis peacekeeping and lastly how well Pakistan can consolidate its peacekeeping diplomacy.


Author(s):  
Adekeye Adebajo

Egyptian scholar-diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s relationship with the UN Security Council was a difficult one, resulting eventually in him earning the unenviable record of being the only Secretary-General to have been denied a second term in office. Boutros-Ghali bluntly condemned the double standards of the powerful Western members of the Council—the Permanent Three (P3) of the US, Britain, and France—in selectively authorizing UN interventions in “rich men’s wars” in Europe while ignoring Africa’s “orphan conflicts.” The Council’s powerful members ignored many of his ambitious ideas, preferring instead to retain tight control of decision-making on UN peacekeeping missions. Boutros-Ghali worked with the Security Council to establish peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia.


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