The Process of Westernization of the Balkans after WWII: The Cases of Greece and Bulgaria

Author(s):  
Alla Kondrasheva ◽  
Stavris Parastatov

The high significance of the Balkan geopolitical knot was clearly expressed in the bipolar era when the main frontier between the two warring blocks passed through the Balkans. Due to the secret ‘Percentages Agreement’ between Great Britain and the USSR in 1944, the Balkans were divided into spheres of influence of the two great powers. Subsequently, London ceded the role of the main source of Western influence in the region to Washington.Of particular interest are the cases of Greece and Bulgaria as border countries that found themselves in different ‘worlds’ and, given the geostrategic importance of their territories, which were the main ideological instruments and conductors of ideas in the Cold war of the hegemons that stood behind. The Truman Doctrine in 1947 and NATO membership in 1952 strengthened and institutionalized Western influence in Greece. Westernization of Greek society in the form of liberalization and democratiza-tion of social relations and consequently its political system proceeded rapidly with a relatively short interval of the military dictatorship.Greece was assigned the role of a model for the rapid and successful develop-ment of a western country, a bridgehead for the dissemination of anti–communist ide-as in other countries of the Balkan region, primarily Bulgaria. Besides, due to the establishment of a strict pro–Soviet regime in Sofia, the westernization of Bulgarian society was carried out including through intelligence agencies, and after a certain thaw in relations through economic cooperation.

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 193-212
Author(s):  
Jędrzej Paszkiewicz

The aim of the article is to show the role of the Balkan states within the Greek foreign policy during the period 1918–1923, on the base of diplomatic correspondence and historiography. The consequences of the military conflict with Turkey (1918–1922) and the internal problems, constantly harassing the socio-political life of Greece, seriously weakened its ability to impact effectively on particular geopolitical problems in the Balkan region. The Greek regional policy could be achieved, completely or partially, only with close cooperation with the powers from outside. It was connected with such cases as the delimitation of the Albanian frontier or the solution of the Western Thrace question in 1920. On the other hand, the proceedings of the Greek diplomats were determined by the belief that due to the unresolved territorial and national controversies, especially in the issue of the Macedonian and Thracian lands, the particular Balkan states were dependent on each other on the international arena. That is why the Greek diplomacy started apply the tactics of balance of power in the region, aiming at the creation of less or more stable bilateral political constructions with the Kingdom SCS (Yugoslavia) and Romania. Their aim was to ensure the advantage over the competitors on the Balkan arena, especially over Bulgarian and Turkish revisionist agendas. 


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 203-236
Author(s):  
Yu Jung Lee

Abstract This article considers the proliferation of Korean native camp shows and the roles of Korean women entertainers at the military service clubs of the Eighth United States Army in Korea in the 1950s and the 1960s. The role of the “American sweethearts” in USO camp shows—to create a “home away from home” and boost the morale of the American troops during wartime—was carried out by female Korean entertainers in the occupied zone at a critical moment in US-ROK relations during the Cold War. The article argues that Korean entertainers at military clubs were meant to perform the entertainment of “home” and evoke nostalgia for American soldiers by imitating well-known American singers and songs. However, what they performed as America was not simply the reproduction of American entertainment but often a manifestation of their imagination; they were constructing their own version of the American home. Their hybrid styles of American performance were indicative of how the discourse of the American home itself was constructed around ambivalence, the very site where women entertainers were enabled to exceed the rigid boundaries of race and gender, transcend their roles as imitators, and exercise their agency by productively negotiating this ambivalence.


2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 62-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kostis Karpozilos

In the fall of 1949, after the end of the Greek Civil War, the bulk of the defeated Greek Communist (KKE) fighters were covertly transported from Albania to Soviet Uzbekistan. This article addresses the covert relocation project, organized by the Soviet Communist Party, and the social engineering program intended to create a prototype Greek People’s Democracy in Tashkent. Drawing on Soviet and Greek Communist Party records, the article raises three major issues: first, the contingencies of postwar transition in the Balkans and the precarious status of the Albanian regime; second, the international Communist response to the military defeat of the KKE in 1949 and the competing visions of the Greek, Soviet, and Albanian parties regarding the future of the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG); third, the intentions of the KKE to establish military bases in Albania and the party’s ensuing effort to transform the agrarian fighters of the DAG into revolutionary cadres for a future victorious repatriation in Greece. Drawing these elements together, the article elucidates the relocation operation of 1949, positions the Greek political refugee experience within the postwar “battle of refugees,” and challenges the widespread historiographical assumption that the KKE immediately abandoned the prospect of a renewed armed confrontation.


Author(s):  
N. Belukhin

Under the Cold War Denmark successfully employed the UN peacemaking operations to increase its own international status and strengthen relations with the key Western allies. The Nordic model of peacemaking was later considered as an example to be followed by other European states in the 1990s. As the role of the UN gradually declined during the 1990s and the UN peacemaking operations led to major failures, most notably the Srebrenica massacre and the Rwandan genocide, NATO, as well as the EU, started expanding their own activities in the sphere of peacemaking and peace enforcement. As a consequence, Denmark stopped considering the UN peacemaking as the main framework for international activism and started getting increasingly engaged in coalition operations and NATO operations as a means to win the favor of the key ally — the USA. Another factor that significantly contributed to Denmark’s growing atlanticism was the so-called "defense clause" which prevented Denmark from participating in the military dimension of the emerging CFSP within the EU and later CSDP. The Danish international activism acquired therefore a tangible military element which on the one hand enabled Denmark to punch above its weight, but at the same time became contradictory to the very ideas and goals which made international activism attractive for the Danish public in the first place. The initial value- and identity-driven UN peacemaking eventually became reduced to a means of accomplishing limited goals of status-seeking and ensuring the country’s place as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. It is thus becoming increasingly difficult for Denmark to reconcile the adherence to humanitarian diplomacy and Nordic "Peace Brand" with aggressive military activism.


2021 ◽  
pp. 249-272
Author(s):  
Evan Smith

In the post-war period, several world events, such as the installation of the so-called People’s Democracies in Eastern Europe, the victory of the Chinese Communist Party and the beginnings of decolonisation across Africa, Asia and the Middle East, led the international communist movement to foresee a period of socialist advance, frustrated by the outbreak of the Cold War. As the Party at the centre of the largest empire at the time, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) had become a conduit between anti-colonialists across the empire and Moscow. While a number of scholars have focused on the role of communists in national liberation movements in the colonies, this chapter focuses on how links with these movements and broader anti-colonial rhetoric was developed by the Communist Parties in the settler colonies, particularly South Africa and Australia. These Communist Parties acted as local representatives of the international communist movement within their spheres of influence, assisting in the anti-colonial struggle in surrounding areas. From the late 1940s until the 1960s, the CPGB, alongside the CPSA and the CPA, were greatly involved in building solidarity with anti-colonial movements across the British Empire. This chapter seeks to uncover the transnational links created by these parties in the era of decolonisation and the ways in which the Communist Parties in the Dominions worked with fraternal organisations in the colonial sphere.


2014 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-37
Author(s):  
Costis J. Ailianos

Abstract Relations between Greece and Austria-Hungary had never been particularly cordial, despite some brief periods of a certain rapprochement, and Vienna displayed a total lack of consideration for the interests of Athens also during the Balkan Wars. Greek ‘dreams’ were only marginally ‘tangent’ to Vienna’s interests and the Ballhausplatz did not envisage any point of convergence of their political goals. The cooperation, let alone the alliance, between Greece and Serbia proved to be a thorn in the Greco-Austrian relations. All issues of Greek interest met with Vienna’s strong opposition: the drawing of the southern/southeastern borders of Albania; the fate of Thessaloniki and Kavalla; the future of the East Aegean islands. While Austria was aiming at bringing Bulgaria in her sphere of influence, Germany wanted to attract Athens closer to the Triple Alliance, which led to serious misunderstandings between the two empires. Ultimately, this divergence of policy worked in favour of Greece that obtained Thessaloniki and its hinterland, Kavalla, a large part of Epirus, safeguarded her titles on the Aegean islands and secured a common Greco-Serbian borderline. However, the issue of Northern Epirus was left in abeyance until after the First World War. Finally, the Ballhausplatz, re-evaluating the new geopolitical realities in the Balkans, started looking constructively to the future role of Greece in the region.


2014 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-37
Author(s):  
Costis J. Ailianos

AbstractRelations between Greece and Austria-Hungary had never been particularly cordial, despite some brief periods of a certain rapprochement, and Vienna displayed a total lack of consideration for the interests of Athens also during the Balkan Wars. Greek ‘dreams’ were only marginally ‘tangent’ to Vienna’s interests and the Ballhausplatz did not envisage any point of convergence of their political goals. The cooperation, let alone the alliance, between Greece and Serbia proved to be a thorn in the Greco-Austrian relations. All issues of Greek interest met with Vienna’s strong opposition: the drawing of the southern/southeastern borders of Albania; the fate of Thessaloniki and Kavalla; the future of the East Aegean islands. While Austria was aiming at bringing Bulgaria in her sphere of influence, Germany wanted to attract Athens closer to the Triple Alliance, which led to serious misunderstandings between the two empires. Ultimately, this divergence of policy worked in favour of Greece that obtained Thessaloniki and its hinterland, Kavalla, a large part of Epirus, safeguarded her titles on the Aegean islands and secured a common Greco-Serbian borderline. However, the issue of Northern Epirus was left in abeyance until after the First World War. Finally, the Ballhausplatz, re-evaluating the new geopolitical realities in the Balkans, started looking constructively to the future role of Greece in the region.


2003 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim Headley

This article analyses the Russian reaction to the Sarajevo crisis of February 1994 when NATO threatened air strikes in response to the market-place mortar explosion. I argue that Russia's shift to a realist great-power policy led to a crisis with the West as Russia sought to demonstrate its great power credentials, protect what it saw as specific Russian interests in the Balkans, and limit the role of NATO in conflict resolution, while Western leaders aimed to demonstrate NATO credibility and its new post-Cold War role as peace-keeper/peace-maker. This was the first major East-West crisis since the end of the Cold War, and Russian responses and actions foreshadowed its reactions to the Kosovo crisis.


2021 ◽  
pp. 360-373
Author(s):  
Anna K. Aleksandrova ◽  

Since the mid-twentieth century, Greece has been trying, with varying degrees of success in different periods, to act as a primary agent of unification for the Balkan region. Political and economic shifts in the Balkans and in Greece itself allow us to divide the Balkan integration process into three stages. During the first stage, from the end of World War Two to the collapse of the Eastern bloc, Greece was for the most part isolated from the rest of the Balkans. The shift towards democracy and a market economy in the early 1990s marked the second stage, and this determined the growing political and economic influence of Greece in the Balkans. Greece became the primary outpost of European integration among the Balkan countries. The situation changed dramatically in 2009, after the onset of the financial and economic crisis, and represents the beginning of the third stage. The debt issues Greece faced adversely impacted the other countries and caused euroskeptic ideas to spread throughout the Balkans. The chapter thoroughly examines the integrative role of Greece in the Balkan region in each of the aforementioned stages.


Author(s):  
Ingo Trauschweizer

In 1984 officials in Washington debated reforming the defense establishment and who should advise presidents on strategy in times of crisis. Maxwell Taylor, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), John F. Kennedy White House insider, and one of the architects of America’s war in Vietnam, told members of Congress that the JCS were divided by service interests and had never fulfilled their role as strategy advisors. He concluded the system should not be reformed—it should be torn down. The Goldwater-Nichols Act that resulted in October 1986 did not quite meet Taylor’s radical proposal of a complete restructuring even though it enhanced the powers of the JCS chairman. This book considers what shaped Taylor’s thinking. Through his career in the Cold War we can investigate critical questions from the vantage points of the military and the executive branch: What is the role of the armed services in national and international security strategies? Where do service interests and national interest intersect and what happens when there is less-than-complete overlap? What is the role of the JCS and their chairman? And how could the armed services prepare for vastly different challenges, ranging from nuclear war to conventional battle, counterinsurgency, and nation building?...


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