Introduction
In 1984 officials in Washington debated reforming the defense establishment and who should advise presidents on strategy in times of crisis. Maxwell Taylor, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), John F. Kennedy White House insider, and one of the architects of America’s war in Vietnam, told members of Congress that the JCS were divided by service interests and had never fulfilled their role as strategy advisors. He concluded the system should not be reformed—it should be torn down. The Goldwater-Nichols Act that resulted in October 1986 did not quite meet Taylor’s radical proposal of a complete restructuring even though it enhanced the powers of the JCS chairman. This book considers what shaped Taylor’s thinking. Through his career in the Cold War we can investigate critical questions from the vantage points of the military and the executive branch: What is the role of the armed services in national and international security strategies? Where do service interests and national interest intersect and what happens when there is less-than-complete overlap? What is the role of the JCS and their chairman? And how could the armed services prepare for vastly different challenges, ranging from nuclear war to conventional battle, counterinsurgency, and nation building?...