Cultural Differences in Children’s Recommended Punishment of Moral Transgressions

The purpose of this research was to examine the severity of punishment recommended by children for moral transgressions. Using Hofstede’s (1980) distinction between individualism and collectivism, we examined the severity of punishment recommended by eight to twelve year old children for moral transgressions that violated a cultural value. Participants were children of various nationalities enrolled in a summer camp on the island of Mallorca, Spain. The children were classified as either individualist or collectivist using the Children’s Self-Construal Scale (Lewis et al. 2000). Each child reacted to nine moral transgressions, two of which were universal and seven of which reflected transgressions of either individualist or collectivist values. The results indicated that children classified as collectivists recommended harsher punishments for transgressions of collectivist values, whereas individualists did not vary in their recommended level of punishment for transgressions against both collectivist and individualist values. Keywords: individualism, collectivism, moral judgments, cultural orientation, moral transgressions

Frequency of enforcement is more important than the severity of punishment in reducing violation behaviors

External enforcement policies aimed to reduce violations differ on two key components: the probability of inspection and the severity of the punishment. Different lines of research offer different insights regarding the relative importance of each component. In four studies, students and Prolific crowdsourcing participants (Ntotal = 816) repeatedly faced temptations to commit violations under two enforcement policies. Controlling for expected value, we found that a policy combining a high probability of inspection with a low severity of fines (HILS) was more effective than an economically equivalent policy that combined a low probability of inspection with a high severity of fines (LIHS). The advantage of prioritizing inspection frequency over punishment severity (HILS over LIHS) was greater for participants who, in the absence of enforcement, started out with a higher violation rate. Consistent with studies of decisions from experience, frequent enforcement with small fines was more effective than rare severe fines even when we announced the severity of the fine in advance to boost deterrence. In addition, in line with the phenomenon of underweighting of rare events, the effect was stronger when the probability of inspection was rarer (as in most real-life inspection probabilities) and was eliminated under moderate inspection probabilities. We thus recommend that policymakers looking to effectively reduce recurring violations among noncriminal populations should consider increasing inspection rates rather than punishment severity.

Deterrence of Punitive Measures on Collusive Bidding in the Construction Sector

Collusive bidding has been a deep-seated issue in the construction market for a long time. The strategies implemented by bid riggers are deliberate, interactive, and complex, suggesting that antitrust authorities have difficulty preventing collusive behaviors. Based on game payoff matrixes, this study proposes a system dynamics (SD) model to present the deterrence of punitive measures, namely the certainty of punishment (CoP) and the severity of punishment (SoP), on regular bidders’ to-collude decision-making. Data were collected from the Chinese construction industry to test the proposed SD model. While the model was supported, the results indicate that the CoP has a greater impact than the SoP on deterring regular bidders from making to-collude decisions. Furthermore, these two punitive measures cannot be replaced by each other, given the same deterrence effects. Thus, the study demonstrates the usefulness of deterrence theory to inhibit collusive bidding in the construction sector. It also sheds some light on the formulation of competition policy from the perspective of deterrence.

5. Crimes of strict liability

Offences of strict liability are those crimes that do not require mens rea or even negligence as to one or more elements in the actus reus. Where an offence is interpreted to be one of strict liability, the accused will be criminally liable even if he could not have avoided the prescribed harm despite attempting to do so. Where someone is accused of strict liability, it is not necessary for the prosecution to tender evidence of mens rea as to the matter of strict liability. This chapter discusses strict liability and its distinction from ‘absolute’ liability, crimes of strict liability in common law and statutes, strict liability and the presumption of innocence, the presumption of mens rea, the severity of punishment for strict liability, arguments for and against strict liability, the imposition of liability for negligence and statutory due diligence defences.

Teori Hukum Pidana Minimalis dari Douglas Husak: Urgensi dan Relevansi

Douglas Husak has been widely known, especially in the United States and Europe, as a leading theorist who combines the disciplines of legal philosophy and criminal law. Most of his writings were directed at the use of the coercive means of the state through criminal law as minimum as possible. The minimalist theory of criminal law that he coined was motivated by the phenomenon of the increasing number of acts criminalized in the United States Federal State Law in which the majority related to offenses of risk prevention causing overcriminalization. To prevent this, criminal law must be placed as a last resort. The state’s decision to criminalize an act must pay attention to internal and external constraints. The first includes the nontrivial harm or evil constraint, the culpability of the actor, and the proportionality of punishment, while the second is related to the substantiality of the state’s authority to punish. The thought is relevant to be adopted in the criminalization policy in Indonesia, especially regarding the principle of the blameworthiness of conduct, the severity of punishment must weigh the dangerousness of the (actor) offenses, and criminalization should not be taken if other means are equally effective or even more effective to achieve the goal. Abstrak Douglas Husak dikenal luas terutama di Amerika Serikat dan Eropa sebagai teoretisi terkemuka yang menggabungkan antara disiplin filsafat hukum dan hukum pidana. Tulisan-tulisan Husak kebanyakan diarahkan pada penggunaan sarana koersif negara melalui hukum pidana seminimal mungkin. Teori hukum pidana minimalis yang dicetuskannya dilatarbelakangi fenomena semakin banyaknya perbuatan-perbuatan yang dikriminalisasi dalam undang-undang Negara Federal Amerika dan mayoritas terkait offenses of risk prevention sehingga menimbulkan kelebihan kriminalisasi. Untuk mencegahnya, hukum pidana harus ditempatkan sebagai sarana terakhir. Keputusan negara untuk mengkriminalisasi suatu perbuatan harus memperhatikan pembatas internal dan pembatas eksternal. Yang pertama meliputi sifat jahat dan dampak kerugian/kerusakan yang begitu serius dari dilakukannya suatu tindak pidana, kesalahan pembuat, dan proporsionalitas pidana; sedangkan yang kedua terkait substansialitas kewenangan negara untuk memidana. Pemikiran Husak relevan untuk diadopsi dalam kebijakan kriminalisasi di Indonesia terutama menyangkut prinsip ketercelaan suatu perbuatan, penetapan beratnya ancaman pidana mengacu pada seriusitas delik dan kesalahan pembuat, dan kriminalisasi tidak boleh ditempuh jika cara-cara lain sama efektif atau bahkan lebih efektif untuk mencapai tujuan.

Enforcement policies: Frequency of inspection is more important than the severity of punishment

External enforcement policies aimed to reduce violations differ on two key components: the probability of inspection and the severity of punishments. Different lines of research offer competing predictions regarding the relative importance of each component. In three incentive compatible studies, students and Prolific crowdsourcing participants (Ntotal=430) repeatedly faced temptations to commit violations under two enforcement policies. Controlling for expected value, the results indicated that a policy combining High probability of Inspection with Low Severity of fine (HILS) was more effective than a policy combining Low probability of Inspection with High Severity of fine (LIHS). Consistent with the prediction of Decisions from Experience research, this finding held even when the severity of the fine was stated in advance to boost deterrence. In addition, the advantage of HILS over LIHS was greater as participants’ baseline rate of violation (without enforcement) was higher, implying that HILS is more effective among frequent offenders.

http://habibiaislamicus.com/index.php/hirj/article/view/170

Tax violation in Pakistan is very high that has led to deteriorated economic situation and lack of public service delivery. The four variables of tax morale are; feelings of guilt and shame; lack of trust on government; perception about other citizens paying taxes; and level of penalties- as determinants of tax evasion in Pakistan. The perception about utilization of money, elements of shame, perception about other citizens’ compliance behavior and level of penalties effect tax violation. However, variables of guilt and perception about corruption do not have significant impact on evasion behavior. Some policy interventions have been suggested to curb the menace of tax violation. These policies include motivating tax payers through methods like hypothecation, imposition of fines and penalties and publishing names of defaulters through media and tax department website. Tax violation is a crime in almost all developed countries, and the guilty party is liable to fines and/or imprisonment. In Pakistan, many acts that would amount to criminal tax violation in other countries are treated as civil matters. Dishonestly misreporting income in a tax return is not necessarily considered a crime. Such matters are handled in the tax courts, not the criminal courts. In Pakistan, however, some tax misconduct (such as the deliberate falsification of records) is criminal. Moreover, civil tax transgressions may give rise to penalties. It is often considered that the extent of violation depends on the severity of punishment for violation.

Perceived Organizational Injustice and Corrupt Tendencies in Public Sector Employees: Mediating Role of Life Satisfaction

Studies have shown that corruption may adversely affect the functionality of the law and institutions; and may frustrate socio-economic development. Most developing countries focus the fight against corruption on the deterrence perspective, which emphasizes the promptness and severity of punishment as a way of preventing and discouraging corrupt behaviors. Punishment may not adequately deter corruption, especially when employees are less satisfied with life or feel unjustly treated and may, therefore, engage in corruption as a justice-restoring act. This study, therefore, adopted a justice-focused approach to investigate the extent to which perception of organizational injustice and life satisfaction correlated with corrupt tendencies in public sector employees. The participants were 285 public sector employees (188 males; 97 females), whose ages averaged 39.09 years (SD = 8.40) with a range of 20 to 58 years. They were selected across large sections of two public sector organizations in Nigeria. Results of the 3-step hierarchical regression showed that perception of organizational injustice was significantly related with increased level of corrupt tendencies. As the participants’ level of life satisfaction increased, their tendencies of engaging in corruption reduced. Results of the mediation tests showed that, despite an increased perception of organizational injustice, life satisfaction was significantly related with low tendencies of engaging in corruption among employees. In order to reduce corrupt tendencies, organizations should efficiently handle perceived wrongdoing among employees and institute programmes that promote employees’ happiness and well-being.

New Technologies and Deterrence: Artificial Intelligence and Adversarial Behaviour

Offering a critical synthesis of extant insights into technological developments in AI and their potential ramifications for international relations and deterrence postures, this chapter argues that AI risks influencing military deterrence and coercion in unique ways: it may alter cost-benefit calculations by removing the fog of war, by superficially imposing rationality on political decisions, and by diminishing the human cost of military engagement. It may recalibrate the balance between offensive and defensive measures, tipping the scales in favour of pre-emption, and undermine existing assumptions imbedded in both conventional and nuclear deterrence. AI might altogether remove human emotions and eliminate other biological limitations from the practice of coercion. It may provide users the ability to collect, synthesize, and act upon real-time intelligence from several disparate sources, augmenting the certainty and severity of punishment strategies, both in theatre and online, compressing the distance between intelligence, political decisions, and coercive action. As a result, AI may quicken the overall pace of action across all domains of coercion, in conflict, crisis, and war, and within the related subfields of national security, counterterrorism, counter-crime, and counter-espionage.

The forms of penalization of socially dangerous acts

В статье рассматривается вопрос о формах выражения пенализации общественно опасных деяний. Приводятся виды этих форм в Общей и Особенной части УК РФ - «смысловая», «содержательная», «перечневая», «видовая», «системная», «санкционная», а также их содержание, последовательность, отличия и основания. Автор предлагает изменить подход к «вертикальному» восприятию перечня уголовных наказаний как построенного от менее сурового к более суровому наказанию, в связи с тем, что он не соответствует действительности и малоэффективен, на «горизонтальный», построенный по принципу группировки наказаний в зависимости от категорий преступлений. The article examines the issue of the forms of expressing penalization for the socially dangerous acts. The kinds of these forms are given in the General and Special sections of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - “semantical,” “substantive,” “enumerative,” “modal,” “systemic,” “sanctioned,” as well as their contents, sequence, differences, and causes. Due to the fact that it is ineffective and not true, the author proposes to change the perception of the criminal penalties list from “vertical” - based on the increase in the severity of punishment, to “horizontal,” in which the punishments are grouped depending on the categories of the crimes.