scholarly journals Our remaining options for preventing a nuclear Iran

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 92-98
Author(s):  
Thomas MacDonald ◽  
Peter Roemer ◽  
Ethan Klein
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
Economic Sanctions ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Agreement ◽  
Policy Options ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Comprehensive Plan

Fifty years ago the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), an international agreement that seeks to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, went into effect. Under the NPT, all countries party to the treaty are permitted to develop nuclear technologies for peaceful activities, but countries without nuclear weapons are not permitted to divert those technologies to manufacture nuclear weapons. In 2003, it was determined that Iran had pursued nuclear weapons under the guise of its civilian nuclear program, violating its NPT commitments. Unified international economic sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table, resulting in the Iran Deal, formally termed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015. The Iran deal placed additional limits beyond NPT restrictions, on materials and activities that could be diverted to developing a nuclear weapon, extending the time needed for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon from a few months to roughly a year. This changed when the United States unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018 and Iran announced the following year that it would no longer be bound by the terms of the deal. Lacking the added restrictions of the Iran deal, Iran has begun ramping up domestic nuclear activities, raising fears that they may pursue development of a nuclear weapon. The United States has several policy options available in seeking to forestall such an outcome. This article discusses the advantages and disadvantages of several of these options, including economic sanctions, counterproliferation military action, or return to the JCPOA or a similar diplomatic agreement. The return to a cooperative agreement such as the Iran deal, though made challenging by mutual distrust, is assessed to provide the best chance to prevent Iran from resuming a nuclear weapons program.

The Iranian Nuclear Program (1974–2015)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Iranian Revolution ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Comprehensive Plan ◽  
Credible Threat

This chapter analyzes US efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons from the 1970s until the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. Iran initially began exploring nuclear weapons when it was an American client in the 1970s, prior to the development of a US sanctions policy. Once the United States strengthened its nonproliferation policy, a credible threat of sanctions helped convince Iran to scale back its nuclear plans. After the Iranian Revolution led to a complete break in relations with the United States, Iran again began seeking nuclear weapons, undeterred by the threat of sanctions due to its low dependence on the United States. After two decades of unilateral US pressure failed to alter Iran’s plans, stringent multilateral sanctions led Iran to agree to strict limits on its nuclear program.

CONSEQUENCES OF IRAN’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NUCLEAR DEAL FOR EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Atomic Bomb ◽  
Economic Sanctions ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Uranium Enrichment ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Comprehensive Plan ◽  
The Us ◽  
Near Future

The circumstances of Iran’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was signed between Iran and the six great powers in 2015, were considered. It is indicated that the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and US economic sanctions against Iran were the main reasons for Tehran’s phased withdrawal from the nuclear deal. It was noted that the assassinations of two well-known Iranian figures at the beginning and at the end of 2020 – General Qasem Soleimani and nuclear physicist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh provoked Iran to completely abandon the provisions of the JCPOA and to radicalize its nuclear policy. The implications of Iran’s gradual withdrawal from the nuclear deal for the security of Euro-Atlantic structures are analyzed. It has been proven that the risks associated with the development of the Iranian nuclear program were relatively insignificant during 2019. However, these risks began to increase in 2020 and especially at the beginning of 2021. The circumstances of Iran’s decision on possible increasing the uranium enrichment level to 20% and on the probable limiting the access to Iranian nuclear facilities for international inspectors were considered. It is analyzed whether such a decision of Iran can bring this country closer to obtaining nuclear weapons. It is concluded that, most likely, despite the technical capabilities, Iran will not make a political decision to produce an atomic bomb in the near future to avoid its complete isolation. Therefore, the potential nuclear conflict with Iran does not yet threaten to Euro-Atlantic security. Differences in attitudes towards the Iranian nuclear program between the United States and its European NATO allies during Donald Trump’s presidency are traced. The prospects for a change in the American position toward Iran during Joseph Biden’s presidency are assessed. The article analyzes the difficulties that the United States and its allies may face in the course of negotiations with Iran during the presidency of J. Biden. It is indicated that the influential conservative elements in Iran may delay Iran’s return to the nuclear deal in order to bargain for better conditions. It is concluded that the United States and its allies should respond to possible Iranian provocations by economic sanctions rather than by forceful actions, which could lead to an escalation that is dangerous for the Euro-Atlantic security.

Iraq's Chemical Weapons Legacy: What Others Might Learn from Saddam

2005 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-208
Author(s):  
Richard L. Russell
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
The United States ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Nation States

Iraq's experience with chemical weapons provides ample lessons for nation-states looking to redress their conventional military shortcomings. Nation-states are likely to learn from Saddam that chemical weapons are useful for waging war against nation-states ill-prepared to fight on a chemical battlefield as well as against internal insurgents and rebellious civilians. Most significantly, nation-states studying Iraq's experience are likely to conclude that chemical weapons are not a “poor man's nuclear weapon” and that only nuclear weapons can deter potential adversaries including the United States.

The Pakistani Nuclear Program (1972–1987)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Soviet Invasion

This chapter examines US nonproliferation efforts vis-à-vis Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s. Although Pakistan started its nuclear weapons program prior to the development of a US sanctions policy, and thus underestimated the odds of facing sanctions, it nevertheless went on to acquire nuclear weapons. The United States was unable to halt the Pakistani program for two reasons. First, when it initially threatened and imposed sanctions on Pakistan in the late 1970s, Pakistan was not highly dependent on the United States and therefore had little to lose. Second, once Pakistan became dependent on the United States in the 1980s due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and increased need for aid, the United States undermined the credibility of its nonproliferation policy by waiving sanctions and only credibly threatening to cut off aid in response to a nuclear test.

Conflict and Chaos on the Korean Peninsula: Can China's Military Help Secure North Korea's Nuclear Weapons?

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 84-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Korean Peninsula ◽  
Gain Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Regional Security ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
Security Training

Is China likely to intervene if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, and if so, does Beijing have the willingness and capabilities to deal safely with North Korea's nuclear program? Securing and destroying Pyongyang's nuclear weapons would be the United States’ top priority in a Korean contingency, but scholars and policymakers have not adequately accounted for the Chinese military's role in this mission. China's concerns about nuclear security and refugee flows, its expanding military capabilities to intervene, and its geopolitical competition with the United States all suggest that China is likely to intervene militarily and extensively on the Korean Peninsula if conflict erupted. In this scenario, Chinese forces would seek to gain control of North Korea's nuclear facilities and matériel. For the most part, China has the capabilities to secure, identify, and characterize North Korean nuclear facilities, though it exhibits weaknesses in weapons dismantlement and nonproliferation practices. On aggregate, however, Chinese troops on the peninsula would be beneficial for U.S. interests and regional security. Nevertheless, to mitigate the risks, the United States should work with China to coordinate their movements in potential areas of operation, share intelligence, and conduct combined nuclear security training.

North Korea

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick McEachern
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
South Korea ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
The United States ◽  
Pop Music ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Foreign Service ◽  
The North ◽  
American President

After a year of trading colorful barbs with the American president and significant achievements in North Korea’s decades-long nuclear and missile development programs, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared mission accomplished in November 2017. Though Kim's pronouncement appears premature, North Korea is on the verge of being able to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. South Korea has long been in the North Korean crosshairs but worries whether the United States would defend it if North Korea holds the American homeland at risk. The largely ceremonial summit between US president Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the unpredictability of both parties, has not quelled these concerns and leaves more questions than answers for the two sides' negotiators to work out. The Korean Peninsula’s security situation is an intractable conflict, raising the question, “How did we get here?” In this book, former North Korea lead foreign service officer at the US embassy in Seoul Patrick McEachern unpacks the contentious and tangled relationship between the Koreas in an approachable question-and-answer format. While North Korea is famous for its militarism and nuclear program, South Korea is best known for its economic miracle, familiar to consumers as the producer of Samsung smartphones, Hyundai cars, and even K-pop music and K-beauty. Why have the two Koreas developed politically and economically in such radically different ways? What are the origins of a divided Korean Peninsula? Who rules the two Koreas? How have three generations of the authoritarian Kim dictatorship shaped North Korea? What is the history of North-South relations? Why does the North Korean government develop nuclear weapons? How do powers such as Japan, China, and Russia fit into the mix? What is it like to live in North and South Korea? This book tackles these broad topics and many more to explain what everyone needs to know about South and North Korea.

scholarly journals The Revival of Nuclear Competition in an Altered Geopolitical Context: A Chinese Perspective

Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 56-68
Author(s):  
Li Bin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
The United States ◽  
Strategic Objectives ◽  
Chinese Perspective ◽  
The Future ◽  
Near Future ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. government considers “power competition” to be the nature of the relations among big powers, and that it will have an impact on the evolving nuclear order in the near future. When big powers worry about power challenges from their rivals, they may use the influence of nuclear weapons to defend their own power and therefore intensify the danger of nuclear confrontation. We need to manage the nuclear relations among nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-armed states to avoid the risk of nuclear escalation. The fact is that big powers including the United States have neither the interest nor the capability to expand their power, and understanding this might cause big powers to lose their interest in power competition. If we promote dialogue among nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-armed states on their strategic objectives, it is possible to reduce the power competition that results from misperceptions and overreactions. Some other factors, for example, non- nuclear technologies and multinuclear players, could complicate the future nuclear order. We therefore need to manage these factors as well and develop international cooperation to mitigate nuclear competition.

Trump Administration Maintains Nuclear Deal with Iran, Despite Persistent Skepticism

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (3) ◽  
pp. 776-781
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Immediate Release ◽  
The United States ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Comprehensive Plan ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The World ◽  
Trump Administration

Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the European Union agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to limit the scope and content of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from various nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the other signatories. Throughout his campaign, President Donald Trump denounced the JCPOA. He said that, if elected, he would “renegotiate with Iran—right after … enabl[ing] the immediate release of our American prisoners and ask[ing] Congress to impose new sanctions that stop Iran from having the ability to sponsor terrorism around the world.” So far, however, the Trump administration has kept the agreement in place. The United States has continued to acknowledge Iran's compliance with the terms of the JCPOA and has waived various sanctions against Iran in compliance with its own obligations thereunder. Iran, by contrast, has charged the United States with failing to live up to its own JCPOA commitments.

scholarly journals AGREEMENT ON THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION (JCPOA) BETWEEN IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 183
Author(s):  
Mohamad Amine El Khalfi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Uranium Enrichment ◽  
The West ◽  
Western Countries ◽  
Comprehensive Plan ◽  
Nuclear Development ◽  
Trump Administration

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is the result of diplomatic negotiations reached by the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, Germany and Iran in 2015 regarding the Iran Nuclear Agreement. The emergence of this agreement was due to Iran's actions abusing its nuclear development to serve as a weapon of mass destruction in 2011. In response to this, Western countries imposed economic sanctions on Iran in the hope of weakening Iran's position so that it does not have the ability to continue its nuclear weapons program. In fact, these sanctions succeeded in weakening the Iranian economy but were not politically effective enough because the Iranian government remained strong, this led to Iran being still involved in various conflicts in the region and still insisting on developing its uranium enrichment. Iran's tough stance made Western countries choose to bring Iran into the negotiations by making offers that could attract Iran's attention. During the Obama administration, the United States succeeded in bringing Iran into the negotiations. An achievement when the United States together with Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany succeeded in getting Iran to agree to stop developing its nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of sanctions from the West. However, when the Donald Trump administration tensions began to re-emerge with the assassination of one of Iran's war generals that took place in 2020. The United States succeeded in bringing Iran into the talks. An achievement when the United States together with Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany succeeded in getting Iran to agree to stop developing its nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of sanctions from the West. However, when the Donald Trump administration tensions began to re-emerge with the assassination of one of Iran's war generals that took place in 2020. The United States succeeded in bringing Iran into the negotiations. An achievement when the United States together with Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany succeeded in getting Iran to agree to stop developing its nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of sanctions from the West. However, when the Donald Trump administration tensions began to re-emerge with the assassination of one of Iran's war generals that took place in 2020.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1969 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 711-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edwin Brown Firmage
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Senate ◽  
International Agreement ◽  
The North ◽  
Nuclear Age ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Nuclear Arms

On March 13, 1969, the United States Senate by a vote of 83 to 15 consented to the ratification of a treaty described as “the most important international agreement brought before the U. S. Senate since the North Atlantic Pact” and “the most important international agreement limiting nuclear arms since the nuclear age began.” Assuming a timely entry into force, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons may delay incarnation of the specter which “haunted” John F. Kennedy:I see the possibility in the 1970's of the President of the United States having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these [nuclear] weapons. I regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document