Expecting the Unexpected: Disaster Risks and Conflict

2020 ◽  
pp. 106591292091120
Author(s):  
Muhammet A. Bas ◽  
Elena V. McLean
Keyword(s):  
Rational Expectations ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Interstate Conflict ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
Future Events ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Commitment Problems

This study examines the relationship between disaster risks and interstate conflict. We argue that in disaster-prone areas actors’ rational expectations about the likelihood and magnitude of potential future disasters can make conflict more likely. The relationship emerges when future disasters are viewed as shocks that are expected to shift the relative power balance among states. If large enough, such expected shifts can generate commitment problems and cause conflict even before any disasters take place. Our approach represents a shift of focus from previous research, which investigates the effect of actual disasters and ignores rational expectations regarding future events. We use a simple game-theoretic model to highlight the commitment problem caused by disaster risks. We then discuss and apply an empirical strategy enabling us to disentangle effects of disaster proneness from effects of actual disaster events. Our results indicate that greater disaster risks are indeed associated with a higher likelihood of interstate conflict.

The Problem of Clean Hands

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-113
Author(s):  
Eric Barnes ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Simple Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Incentive Structure ◽  
Dirty Hands ◽  
Political Candidates ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Debates ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Democratic Elections

The problem of dirty hands concerns the apparently inevitable need for effective politicians to do what is ethically wrong. This essay discusses a related problem in democratic elections of politicians being unwilling to commit themselves to precise positions on controversial policy issues. Given certain plausible assumptions, I demonstrate using a simple game theoretic model that there is an incentive structure for political candidates that is damaging to the public good. I contrast this problem with the classic prisoner’s dilemma and then go on to discuss some possible strategies for overcoming this problem by an improved system of political debates.

Accessing the state: Executive constraints and credible commitment in dictatorship

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 568-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Meng
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
State Power ◽  
The State ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
The Future ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Distribution Of Power ◽  
Commitment Problems

When do executive constraints provide credible commitment power in dictatorships, and under what conditions do leaders establish such constraints? This article argues that institutions successfully constrain autocrats only when elites are given real access to state power, such as appointments to key governmental positions. I present a game theoretic model in which an autocratic leader decides whether to establish binding constraints at the start of her rule. Doing so shifts the future distribution of power in favor of elites, alleviating commitment problems in bargaining. I show that leaders are likely to place constraints on their own authority when they enter power especially weak, and these initial decisions shape the rest of their rule. Even if a leader enters power in a uniquely weak position vis-á-vis other elites, and is on average, quite strong, the need to alleviate commitment problems in the first period swamps expectations about the future distribution of power. I illustrate the model’s findings through case studies of Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire.

Alliances and the High Politics of International Trade

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-611
Author(s):  
Scott Wolford ◽  
Moonhawk Kim
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Trade Barriers ◽  
Security Cooperation ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Dyadic Data ◽  
Military Alliances ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Relationship

What is the role of trade policy in military alliances? We analyze and test a game-theoretic model of economic and security cooperation in which allies hold different interests across the security and commercial aspects of the relationship. In equilibrium, allies with little market power who are valuable politically to larger states engage in sociallysuboptimal protectionism, as their allies’ threats of retaliation are incredible. Stable cooperation emerges in the form of unretaliated protection rather than mutually low trade barriers. We test the model’s implications against a dyadic data set of antidumping petitions from 1980 to 2013 and find that larger allies are more likely to tolerate protectionism by smaller allies by denying domestic petitions to retaliate against dumping measures by the latter.

Collective Action and Constraints on Repression at the Endgame

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (8) ◽  
pp. 1042-1073 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiberiu Dragu ◽  
Yonatan Lupu
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

How can human rights abuses be prevented or reduced? Using a simple game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that repression can become a coordination game when the potential for abuses is greatest: when dissent against a regime has grown sufficiently powerful. In such scenarios, repression depends on how the leader’s agents coordinate on implementing a repression order. If and to the extent agents believe other agents will not comply with an order to repress, leaders can expect agents to disobey orders and will be less likely to order repression. This logic of expectations constitutes a third mechanism for constraining repression, in addition to sanctioning (i.e., the logic of consequences) and normative mechanisms (i.e., the logic of appropriateness). We formally explore how the logic of expectations can constrain the implementation of repression and also show that the logic of expectations has the greatest potential to constrain repression in middle regimes or “anocracies.” In turn, this has broader implications for the strategies human rights advocates use in such regimes, how leaders structure their security forces, and for the study of why legal rules might be especially effective in such regimes.

Corporate communication in the emerging network economy

2004 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolai J. Foss ◽  
Tore Kristensen ◽  
Ricky Wilke
Keyword(s):  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Corporate Communication ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Network Economy ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Knowledge Requirements ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Common ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

This paper draws on ideas in economics and game theory to develop a new theory of marketing in the emerging network economy. The paper argues that in a network economy, firms and consumers will confront “coordination problems”. With the emerging network economy all this becomes urgent because the availability and cost of information decreases. Also, timing issues become urgent as millions of people get access to the same information simultaneously. That explains why events where masses of viewers simultaneously participate in the same events become so important. The paper introduces a simple game theoretic model and discusses marketing applications and possible strategies. These strategies imply considerable use of communication resources in order to fulfil the common knowledge requirements.

scholarly journals TRUST AS A BOOSTER

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon REIERSEN
Keyword(s):  
Simple Game ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mutual Trust ◽  
Exchange Relationships ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Insight Into

In his book Trust. The Evolutionary Game of Mind and Society, social psychologist Toshio Yamagishi (2011) states that trust can be viewed as a “booster rocket” that provides the necessary push for the take-off from the secure ground of committed relations. This article formalizes this idea with the help of a simple game theoretic model. The article looks at a situation where networks of personalized exchange relationships provide assurance against untrustworthy behaviour but reduce the opportunity to profit from trade in larger markets. Assuming that the anonymous market contains both trustworthy and untrustworthy types, it is demonstrated that mutual trust relations can emerge, even when there is a clear danger of opportunism and the possibility of repeated interaction is ruled out. From a more practical perspective, the model provides an insight into the role trust plays for the decision to transact in networks or markets. It is also demonstrated that networks appear as mixed blessings. Networks reduce the problems arising from incomplete contracts and behavioural risk, but they also restrict individuals’ possibility to reap potential gains produced in larger markets.

Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory

1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (4) ◽  
pp. 1303-1320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Powell
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
International Relations Theory ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Relative Gains ◽  
Neoliberal Institutionalism

The problem of absolute and relative gains divides neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism. The former assumes states focus primarily on their absolute gains and emphasizes the prospects for cooperation. The latter supposes states are largely concerned with relative gains and emphasizes the prospects for conflict. Existing work in international relations theory generally traces the differences between these two theories to different assumptions about states' preferences. Using a simple game-theoretic model, this essay offers a reformulation of the problem of absolute and relative gains that links changes in the states' behavior, the feasibility of cooperation, and especially the states' concern for relative versus absolute gains explicitly to changes in the constraints facing the states. Many of the differences between neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism appear as special cases of the model.

A Formal Game-Theoretic Model for Rational Exchange Protocol

2011 ◽  
Vol 204-210 ◽  
pp. 2033-2040
Author(s):  
Xiu Ting Tao ◽  
Yong Gen Gu ◽  
Guo Qiang Li
Keyword(s):  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Formal Definition ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Game Tree ◽  
Extensive Game ◽  
Formal Framework ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Relationship

A rational exchange protocol is a useful protocol in which two (or more) strange parties exchange their items successfully in a way that every rational party has enough reasons to follow the protocol faithfully rather than deviate from it. This means neither parties of the protocol can gain an advantage by deviating from the protocol, but he may bring a disadvantage to the other party even if who is correctly behaving party. We introduce game theory as a formal framework in this paper. We give a formal definition for the rational exchange related to the concept of the subgame perfect equilibrium of an extensive game. We use our model to analyze the Syverson protocol by the game tree and show the relationship with Buttyan's Model.

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