scholarly journals Idealizations and ideal policing

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jake Monaghan

Political philosophy often focuses on “major institutions” that make up the “basic structure” of society. These include political, economic, and social institutions. In this paper I argue first that policing plays a substantial role in generating the kinds of inequalities and problems that are concerns of social or structural justice, and therefore that police agencies qualify as a major institution. When we abandon full compliance or similar idealizations, it is clear that policing is not a concern secondary to, e.g., the electoral system or the scheme of property rights in a society. Nor, I argue, does maintaining full compliance or moral character idealizations obviate an active enforcement role. Eliminating that role from an idealized model society requires engaging in a methodologically and substantively unattractive amount of abstraction. The result is that an active enforcement role is at the core of a complete theory of justice rather than something that is significant only “downstream” from more fundamental issues.

2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Gaus

AbstractThe “welcome return” to “substantive political philosophy” that Rawls's A Theory of Justice was said to herald has resulted in forty years of proposals seeking to show that philosophical reflection leads to the demonstrable truth of almost every and any conceivable view of the justice of property rights. Select any view—from the justice of unregulated capitalist markets to the most extreme forms of egalitarianism—and one will find that some philosophers have proclaimed that rational reflection uniquely leads to its justice. This is, I believe, a sort of ideological thinking masquerading as philosophizing. In this paper, using some tools from game theory as well as experimental findings, I seek to sketch a non-ideological approach to the question of the justification of property rights. On this approach the aim of political philosophy is, first and foremost, to reflect on whether our social rules of property are within the “optimal eligible set” of rules acceptable to all.


Taxation ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Martin O’Neill ◽  
Shepley Orr

This chapter situates philosophical discussions of taxation with reference to the strongly contrasting approaches to tax, property, and justice embodied in Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia, and John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. The twelve chapters of the book are situated against the opposing philosophical poles provided by the libertarian and Rawlsian approaches to tax, and we describe in particular the further development of the Rawlsian view by Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel in their book The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice, which is a focal point for a number of the following chapters. We explain why and how taxation should be seen as central to political philosophy, given the importance of tax policy for both domestic and global justice, and given the close connections that taxation has to issues of property rights, democracy, public justification, state neutrality, stability, political psychology, and a range of other issues.


Hypatia ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-163
Author(s):  
Birgit Christensen ◽  
Andrew F. Smith

The processes associated with globalization have reinforced and even increased prevailing conditions of inequality among human beings with respect to their political, economic, cultural, and social opportunities. Yet—or perhaps precisely because of this trend—there has been, within political philosophy, an observable tendency to question whether equality in fact should be treated a as central value within a theory of justice. In response, I examine a number of nonegalitarian positions to try to show that the concept of equality cannot be dispensed with in any adequate consideration of justice.


1996 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 147-161
Author(s):  
Attracta Ingram

Some of us were introduced to political philosophy as an activity of identifying, criticising, and revising the moral basis of existing social institutions. We asked questions about the nature of the good or the just society, and some few of us thought that once we knew and advocated the truth, it would win out. We, or some appropriate revolutionary or reforming group or class, would with reason, truth, and history on our side, bring about the society of our ideals. When we first read John Rawls's A Theory of Justice we read it as continuing the traditional tasks of political philosophy. Justice as Fairness was a moral theory which addressed a political subject matter. From the moral point of view it told us what any just society aiming to realise the values of liberty and equality would be like. This comported nicely with liberal cosmopolitanism, and also with more widely shared philosophical views that the task of political philosophy is to construct a vision of an ideal society, perhaps more sensitive to justice in implementation than would be required in pre-modern, pre-democratic societies, but nevertheless an ideal which in the long run we would hope to see all societies converge on. That kind of liberalism gave those of us who think that Rawlsian justice is the right or true justice a license to go on the offensive in promoting liberal ideals and practices in our own society, and, at the very least, a critical vantage point from which to judge other societies.


1981 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Koller

AbstractNozick’s entitlement theory of justice is, besides Rawls’s theory, one of the most widely discussed and intellectually most attractive conceptions within the field of contemporary political philosophy. Nozick’s theory uses Locke's conception of the state of nature and of natural rights, and tries, starting from this point of view, to deliver a comprehensive systematisation of libertarian political ideals. This essay deals mainly with Nozick’s conception of property rights. The argument is put forward that the concept of exclusive and unrestrictable ownership of which Nozick makes use, doesn’t find any acceptable justification on the basis of his theory.


2015 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abraham Singer

ABSTRACT:The major aim of this article is to show that John Rawls’s theory of justice cannot be applied effectively to questions of business ethics and corporate governance. I begin with a reading of Rawls that emphasizes both the critical and pragmatic nature of his theory. In the second section I look more closely at the notion of society’s “basic structure” and its place within Rawls’s theory. In the third section, I argue that “the corporation” cannot be understood as part of this basic structure and is not, therefore, a subject of justice for Rawls or his interpreters. Finally, I show that Rawls’s inability to speak to the corporation is a weakness, regardless of one’s particular view on the corporation. I conclude by considering what Rawls’s theory helps us to understand about the problems involved in integrating corporate governance, business ethics, and political philosophy.


Author(s):  
Carl-Henric Grenholm

The purpose of this article is to examine the contributions that might be given by Lutheran political theology to the discourse on global justice. The article offers a critical examination of three different theories of global justice within political philosophy. Contractarian theories are criticized, and a thesis is that it is plausible to argue that justice can be understood as liberation from oppression. From this perspective the article gives an analysis of an influential theory of justice within Lutheran ethics. According to this theory justice is not an equal distribution but an arrangement where the subordinate respect the authority of those in power. This theory is related to a sharp distinction between law and gospel. The main thesis of the article is that Lutheran political theology should take a different approach if it aims to give a constructive contribution to theories of justice. This means that Lutheran ethics should not be based on Creation and reason alone – it should also be based on Christology and Eschatology.


Author(s):  
David Estlund

Throughout the history of political philosophy and politics, there has been continual debate about the roles of idealism versus realism. For contemporary political philosophy, this debate manifests in notions of ideal theory versus nonideal theory. Nonideal thinkers shift their focus from theorizing about full social justice, asking instead which feasible institutional and political changes would make a society more just. Ideal thinkers, on the other hand, question whether full justice is a standard that any society is likely ever to satisfy. And, if social justice is unrealistic, are attempts to understand it without value or importance, and merely utopian? This book argues against thinking that justice must be realistic, or that understanding justice is only valuable if it can be realized. The book does not offer a particular theory of justice, nor does it assert that justice is indeed unrealizable—only that it could be, and this possibility upsets common ways of proceeding in political thought. The book's author engages critically with important strands in traditional and contemporary political philosophy that assume a sound theory of justice has the overriding, defining task of contributing practical guidance toward greater social justice. Along the way, it counters several tempting perspectives, including the view that inquiry in political philosophy could have significant value only as a guide to practical political action, and that understanding true justice would necessarily have practical value, at least as an ideal arrangement to be approximated. Demonstrating that unrealistic standards of justice can be both sound and valuable to understand, the book stands as a trenchant defense of ideal theory in political philosophy.


Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

Rawls says that there are two sources for the primacy assigned to the basic structure: the profound effects of basic social institutions on persons and their future prospects, and the need to maintain background justice. This chapter discusses the main reasons behind Rawls’s position that the basic structure of society is the primary subject of justice, and that the political constitution, property, and the economic system are the first subject to which principles of justice apply. First, the primacy of the basic structure is necessary for the freedom, equality, and independence of moral persons. Second, the basic structure’s priority is a condition of economic reciprocity and the just distribution of income and wealth. Third, the primacy of the basic structure is required by moral pluralism and the plurality of values and reasonable conceptions of the good among free and equal persons.


Author(s):  
Kevin Thompson

This chapter examines systematicity as a form of normative justification. Thompson’s contention is that the Hegelian commitment to fundamental presuppositionlessness and hence to methodological immanence, from which his distinctive conception of systematicity flows, is at the core of the unique form of normative justification that he employs in his political philosophy and that this is the only form of such justification that can successfully meet the skeptic’s challenge. Central to Thompson’s account is the distinction between systematicity and representation and the way in which this frames Hegel’s relationship to the traditional forms of justification and the creation of his own distinctive kind of normative argumentation.


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