Cyber Threat Ransomware and Marketing to Networked Consumers

Author(s):  
Usman Javed Butt ◽  
Maysam F. Abbod ◽  
Arvind Kumar

Marketing is a process of creating, capturing, and exchanging ‘value' for the mutual benefits of marketers, customers, intermediaries, and other stakeholders. Such a transaction requires trust as it might be facing a range of online cyber risks. Modern cybercrimes have exponentially grown over the last decade. Ransomware is one of the types of malware which is the result of a sophisticated attempt to compromise the modern computer systems. The businesses, governments, and large corporations are investing heavily to combat this cyber threat against their critical infrastructure. New technological shifts help to improve marketing and business productivity and keep the company's global competitiveness in an overflowing competitive market. However, the businesses and the systems involved need security measures to protect integrity and availability which will help avoid any malfunctioning to their operations due to the cyber-attacks. There have been several cyber-attack incidents on several businesses such as healthcare, pharmaceutical, water cleaning, and energy sector.

Author(s):  
Claudia ARAUJO MACEDO ◽  
Jos MENTING

Cybersecurity in industrial control system environments has become a significant concern and is even more relevant in the context of critical infrastructures where control system disruption could have a profound impact on health, safety and the environment. This makes this type of system a major target for malicious activities. Notwithstanding an organization’s interest in protecting its industrial control systems against cyber-attacks, the implementation of security measures, whether technical, organizational or human, still faces resistance and is often seen as a constraint. Using the best technology to protect industrial control systems makes no sense if persons with access do not act attentively and protectively. Technical and human cybersecurity measures are intrinsically linked, and it is essential that all persons with access to these systems are fully aware of the inherent cyber risks. Organizations must also act so that staff receive appropriate training on how to keep systems continuously protected against cyber-attack when carrying out their daily tasks. These educational processes can contribute to building an effective cybersecurity culture fully reflective of management and staff attitudes, so that the availability, integrity and confidentiality of information in industrial control systems can be assured.


Author(s):  
Ana Kovacevic ◽  
Dragana Nikolic

We are facing the expansion of cyber incidents, and they are becoming more severe. This results in the necessity to improve security, especially in the vulnerable field of critical infrastructure. One of the problems in the security of critical infrastructures is the level of awareness related to the effect of cyberattacks. The threat to critical infrastructure is real, so it is necessary to be aware of it and anticipate, predict, and prepare against a cyber attack. The main reason for the escalation of cyberattacks in the field of Critical Infrastructure (CI) may be that most control systems used for CI do not utilise propriety protocols and software anymore; they instead utilise standard solutions. As a result, critical infrastructure systems are more than ever before becoming vulnerable and exposed to cyber threats. It is important to get an insight into what attack types occur, as this may help direct cyber security efforts. In this chapter, the authors present vulnerabilities of SCADA systems against cyber attack, analyse and classify existing cyber attacks, and give future directions to achieve better security of SCADA systems.


Author(s):  
Ana Kovacevic ◽  
Dragana Nikolic

We are facing the expansion of cyber incidents, and they are becoming more severe. This results in the necessity to improve security, especially in the vulnerable field of critical infrastructure. One of the problems in the security of critical infrastructures is the level of awareness related to the effect of cyberattacks. The threat to critical infrastructure is real, so it is necessary to be aware of it and anticipate, predict, and prepare against a cyber attack. The main reason for the escalation of cyberattacks in the field of Critical Infrastructure (CI) may be that most control systems used for CI do not utilise propriety protocols and software anymore; they instead utilise standard solutions. As a result, critical infrastructure systems are more than ever before becoming vulnerable and exposed to cyber threats. It is important to get an insight into what attack types occur, as this may help direct cyber security efforts. In this chapter, the authors present vulnerabilities of SCADA systems against cyber attack, analyse and classify existing cyber attacks, and give future directions to achieve better security of SCADA systems.


Author(s):  
Merve Şener

Critical infrastructures ensure that activities that are vital and important for individuals can be safely delivered to the society uninterruptedly. The damage on these critical infrastructures caused by cyber-attacks whose control is carried out through computers and network systems is very large. Cyber-attacks directly or indirectly affect companies, institutions, and organizations economically and cause great financial losses. In this chapter, two different categories, energy and finance sector, which are described as critical infrastructure, are discussed; cyber-attacks carried out on these sectors, cyber-attack weapons, and economic losses caused by these attacks are examined.


2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 185-208
Author(s):  
Barbara Hewitt ◽  
Garry White

Organizations expect their employees to connect securely to the organization's computer systems. Often these employees use their personal computers to access the organization's networks. This research explores whether these same employees apply protective security measures to their personal computers. Perhaps these employees behave riskily based on their optimistic bias. Results indicate that while cyber optimistic bias and perceived vulnerability influence individuals to apply more protective security measures, the users still experienced security incidents. Thus, organization are vulnerable to cyber-attacks if they are allowing employees to use personal computers to access these databases.


2021 ◽  
pp. 12-25
Author(s):  
Sergey Makarenko ◽  
◽  
Gleb Smirnov ◽  

Relevance. Security issues of information systems in critical infrastructure objects become important now. However, current tasks of information security audit of critical infrastructure objects are mainly limited to checking them for compliance with requirements of standards and documents. With this approach to the audit, security of these objects from real attacks by hackers remains unclear. Therefore, objects are subjected to a testing procedure, namely, penetration testing, in order to objectively verify their security. An analysis of publications in this area shows that there is not mathematical approaches to selection of test cyber attacks for penetration testing set. The goals of the paper is to form the selection method of test cyber attacks that ensure the rational completeness of the security audit of a critical information infrastructure object. Research methods. Methods of probability theory and mathematical statistics, methods of graph theory and set theory are used in the paper to achieve the research goals. Results. The Select Method of test cyber attacks for security audit of a critical information infrastructure object with rational completeness is presented in the paper. This method formalizes the selection process in the form of a two-stage procedure. At the first stage, based on the topological model of the object testing, a set of testing paths is formed, and these paths are ordered by the degree of weight increase. The path weight is the efficiency/cost indicator that takes in account the test resource for realized of a test cyber attack, the vulnerability of an object element, and the level of damage caused to the element by this test cyber attack. At the second stage of the method, from an ordered set of test paths are selected of such, which would ensure the maximization of the whole absolute cost of the detected damage, within the limits on the resource making of test cyber attacks. It is using of this method in audit practice will allow us to justify the most effective test cyber attacks according to the “efficiency/cost” criterion, as well as to form test sets that will ensure the rational completeness of the audit of the critical infrastructure object.


Author(s):  
Mariya Shafat Kirmani ◽  
Mohammad Tariq Banday

The pervasive nature of IoT, envisioned with the characteristics of diversity, heterogeneity, and complexity, is diluting the boundaries between the physical and digital worlds. IoT being widely distributed qualifies it as the breeding ground for cyber-attacks. Although remarkable work is being done to ensure security in IoT infrastructure, security vulnerabilities persist. The IoT infrastructure can either be used as a direct target in a cyber-attack or exploited as a tool to carry a cyber-attack. In either case, the security measures in IoT infrastructure is compromised. The enormous IoT data is sensitive that can act as a gold mine to both the criminals for illicit exploitation or investigators to act as digital witness. IoT forensics help the investigators to acquire intelligence from this smart infrastructure to reconstruct the historical events occurred. However, due to sophisticated IoT architecture, the digital investigators face myriad challenges in IoT-related investigations using existing investigation methodologies and, hence, demand a separate dedicated forensic framework.


Author(s):  
Stephen Moskal ◽  
Shanchieh Jay Yang ◽  
Michael E Kuhl

Existing research on cyber threat assessment focuses on analyzing the network vulnerabilities and producing possible attack graphs. Cyber attacks in real-world enterprise networks, however, vary significantly due to not only network and system configurations, but also the attacker’s strategies. This work proposes a cyber-based attacker behavior model (ABM) in conjunction with the Cyber Attack Scenario and Network Defense Simulator to model the interaction between the network and the attackers. The ABM leverages a knowledge-based design and factors in the capability, opportunity, intent, preference, and Cyber Attack Kill Chain integration to model various types of attackers. By varying the types of attackers and the network configurations, and simulating their interactions, we present a method to measure the overall network security against cyber attackers under different scenarios. Simulation results based on four attacker types on two network configurations are shown to demonstrate how different attacker behaviors may lead to different ways to penetrate a network, and how a single misconfiguration may impact network security.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivana Cesarec

States, organizations and individuals are becoming targets of both individual and state-sponsored cyber-attacks, by those who recognize the impact of disrupting security systems and effect to people and governments. The energy sector is seen as one of the main targets of cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure, but transport, public sector services, telecommunications and critical (manufacturing) industries are also very vulnerable. One of most used example of cyber-attack is the Ukraine power grid attack in 2015 that left 230,000 people without power for up to 6 hours. Another most high profile example of a cyber-attack against critical infrastructure is the Stuxnet computer virus (first used on Iranian nuclear facility) which could be adapted to attack the SCADA systems (industrial control systems) used by many critical infrastructures in Europe.Wide range of critical infrastructure sectors are reliant on industrial control systems for monitoring processes and controlling physical devices (sensors, pumps, etc.) and for that reason, physical connected devices that support industrial processes are becoming more vulnerable. Not all critical infrastructure operators in all sectors are adequately prepared to manage protection (and raise resilience) effectively across both cyber and physical environments. Additionally there are few challenges in implementation of protection measures, such as lack of collaboration between private and public sector and low levels of awareness on existence of national key legislation.From supranational aspect, in relation to this papers topic, the European Union has took first step in defense to cyber threats in 2016 with „Directive on security of network and information systems“ (NIS Directive) by prescribing member states to adopt more rigid cyber-security standards. The aim of directive is to improve the deterrent and increase the EU’s defenses and reactions to cyber attacks by expanding the cyber security capacity, increasing collaboration at an EU level and introducing measures to prevent risk and handle cyber incidents. There are lot of other „supporting tools“ for Member States countries, such as European Union Agency for Network and Information Security – ENISA (which organize regular cyber security exercises at an EU level, including a large and comprehensive exercise every two years, raising preparedness of EU states); Network of National Coordination Centers and the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre; and Coordinated response to major cyber security incidents and crises (Blueprint) with aim to ensure a rapid and coordinated response to large-scale cyber attacks by setting out suitable processes within the EU.Yet, not all Member States share the same capacities for achieving the highest level of cyber-security. They need to continuously work on enhancing the capability of defense against cyber threats as increased risk to state institutions information and communication systems but also the critical infrastructure objects. In Southeast Europe there are few additional challenges – some countries even don't have designated critical infrastructures (lower level of protection; lack of „clear vision“ of criticality) and critical infrastructures are only perceived through physical prism; non-EU countries are not obligated to follow requirements of European Union and its legislation, and there are interdependencies and transboundary cross-sector effects that needs to be taken in consideration. Critical infrastructure Protection (CIP) is the primary area of action, and for some of SEE countries (like the Republic of Croatia) the implementation of cyber security provisions just complements comprehensive activities which are focused on physical protection.This paper will analyze few segments of how SEE countries cope with new security challenges and on which level are they prepared for cyber-attacks and threats: 1. Which security mechanisms they use; 2. The existing legislation (Acts, Strategies, Plan of Action, etc.) related to cyber threats in correlation with strategic critical infrastructure protection documents. Analysis will have two perspectives: from EU member states and from non-EU member states point of view. Additionally, for EU member states it will be analyzed if there were any cyber security legislation before NIS directive that meets same aims. The aim of research is to have an overall picture of efforts in region regarding cyber-security as possibility for improvement thorough cooperation, organizational measures, etc. providing also some recommendations to reduce the gap in the level of cyber-security development with other regions of EU.


2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 49
Author(s):  
Jason R. Barrett, PhD Candidate ◽  
P. Edward French, PhD

The events of September 11, 2001, increased and intensified domestic preparedness efforts in the United States against terrorism and other threats. The heightened focus on protecting this nation’s critical infrastructure included legislation requiring implementation of extensive new security measures to better defend water supply systems against physical, chemical/ biological, and cyber attacks. In response, municipal officials have implemented numerous safeguards to reduce the vulnerability of these systems to purposeful intrusions including ongoing vulnerability assessments, extensive personnel training, and highly detailed emergency response and communication plans. This study evaluates fiscal year 2010 annual compliance assessments of public water systems with security measures that were implemented by Mississippi’s Department of Health as a response to federal requirements to address these potential terrorist threats to water distribution systems. The results show that 20 percent of the water systems in this state had at least one security violation on their 2010 Capacity Development Assessment, and continued perseverance from local governments is needed to enhance the resiliency and robustness of these systems against physical threats.


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