Analysis of Enterprise Credit Behavior with Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 411-414 ◽  
pp. 2406-2409
Author(s):  
Hong Yan Lv ◽  
Yu Hong Dong
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Equilibrium Solution ◽  
Social Economy ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Enterprise Credit

Modern market economy is credit economy, but discreditable behavior took place frequently which has restricted the sound development of social economy. This text analyzed the discreditable behavior between enterprises and enterprises with game theory model mainly. According to the methods of economics, it built a model with the supposed premise. On this basis, it analyzed a game and repeated game model, and got the equilibrium solution. Take advantage of the equilibrium solution, it get the conclusion from mathematical deduction, and it gave a feasible strategy based on this conclusion. These are reducing the interests from discredit, raising the probability of successful recovering, and raising the compensation from discredit.

A Countermeasure Model about Food Safety Regulatory

2013 ◽  
Vol 781-784 ◽  
pp. 1546-1549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Xia Cao ◽  
Wei Wen Chai
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Food Safety ◽  
Equilibrium Solution ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Regulatory Strategy ◽  
The Status ◽  
Strategy Nash Equilibrium

By studying the status of the food safety regulatory, this paper points out the drawbacks of existing researches, that is, lack of operability; Relying on the equilibrium theory of game theory, this paper establishes a practical and effective regulatory game model, gives the models mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution and a food safety regulatory strategy. Finally, to illustrate the effectiveness and feasibility of the model, an illustrative example is shown.

Corporate environmental claims: a game theory model with empirical results

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis H. Amato ◽  
Arthur Zillante ◽  
Christie H Amato
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Least Squares Regression ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Environmental Practice ◽  
North American Data ◽  
Good Nature

Purpose – This paper aims to examines whether firms’ eco-friendly advertising claims are supported by environmentally friendly behavior. Design/methodology/approach – The paper develops a game theory model to determine the circumstances under which firms’ environmental claims will be supported by the adoption of best environmental practice. Least squares regression is used to test major theoretical implications. Findings – The theoretical model suggests that the credence good nature of un-monitored environmental claims prohibits consumer validation; firms have an incentive to advertise green but no incentive to adopt best environmental practice. Third-party monitoring transforms the game, making eco-friendly outcomes possible. Empirical models based on North American data suggest that firm profit rates are related to verifiable environmental claims and to easily accessible external ratings of environmental performance. Originality/value – Unlike previous game theoretical models for similar goods, the eco-friendly outcome does not require a repeated game. The importance of the single period game is that continued patronage is not required for the firm to produce goods containing the desired attributes.

scholarly journals Four-king chess with dice is neither unrealistic nor messed up

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-59
Author(s):  
Harald Wiese
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Close Relationship

Abstract Kauṭilya’s maṇḍala model has intrigued indologists and political scientists for some time. It deals with friendship and enmity between countries that are direct or indirect neighbours. (Ghosh; 1936) suggests a close relationship between this model and Indian four-king chess. We try to corroborate his claim by presenting a stylized game-theory model of both Indian four-king chess and Kauṭilya’s maṇḍala theory. Within that game model, we can deal with Kauṭilya’s conjecture according to which an enemy’s enemy is likely to be one’s friend. Arguably, this conjecture is reflected in the ally structure of four-king chess. We also comment on the widespread disapproval of dice in (four-king) chess.

Game Analysis between Principal and Agent under Principal-Agency Relationship

2011 ◽  
Vol 55-57 ◽  
pp. 1898-1904
Author(s):  
Fan Sheng Meng ◽  
Xin Sui ◽  
Yan Li Xu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Equilibrium Solution ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Induction Method ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Agency Relationship ◽  
Mathematical Game ◽  
Monitoring Behavior

The problem that principal can effectively supervise the agent has not been solved. Based on principal-agent relationship, mathematical game model is constructed and backward induction method in game theory is used to obtain the equilibrium between the principal and agent. Discussion of the equilibrium solution will reveal some features of the principals about monitoring behavior. The supervision of the principal will be increased with the strength of institutional constraints. When the institutional constraints are complete, principal will choose complete supervision to the agent. But when the institutional constraints are not fully complete, the principal's supervision is not entirely complete. The principal and agent tend to choose collusion to some extent. Therefore, certain measures should be taken to improve the supervision motive from principal and reduce the degree of collusion.

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

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