Corporate environmental claims: a game theory model with empirical results

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis H. Amato ◽  
Arthur Zillante ◽  
Christie H Amato
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Least Squares Regression ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Environmental Practice ◽  
North American Data ◽  
Good Nature

Purpose – This paper aims to examines whether firms’ eco-friendly advertising claims are supported by environmentally friendly behavior. Design/methodology/approach – The paper develops a game theory model to determine the circumstances under which firms’ environmental claims will be supported by the adoption of best environmental practice. Least squares regression is used to test major theoretical implications. Findings – The theoretical model suggests that the credence good nature of un-monitored environmental claims prohibits consumer validation; firms have an incentive to advertise green but no incentive to adopt best environmental practice. Third-party monitoring transforms the game, making eco-friendly outcomes possible. Empirical models based on North American data suggest that firm profit rates are related to verifiable environmental claims and to easily accessible external ratings of environmental performance. Originality/value – Unlike previous game theoretical models for similar goods, the eco-friendly outcome does not require a repeated game. The importance of the single period game is that continued patronage is not required for the firm to produce goods containing the desired attributes.

A Theory of Migration and Municipal Politics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael S. Danielson
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Political Engagement ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Municipal Politics ◽  
Dynamic Algorithm ◽  
Basic Assumptions ◽  
Political Group ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter develops a series of theoretical models of migrant hometown political engagement and municipal politics in Mexico. The models seek to represent the relationship between the dominant political group in the community and emerging migrant actors. The chapter begins by outlining a set of basic assumptions about the characteristics and goals of the key actors in a stylized municipality, before and after the emergence of migrants as an important group. After establishing this context, the model is simplified to focus on the strategic interactions between migrants and prevailing authorities, first with a dynamic algorithm and then as a game theory model. Both migrants and prevailing authorities can choose conforming or fighting strategies; and depending on what each chooses, four outcomes are possible. Game-theory methods are then used to predict actor choices under different conditions and several limits to these models are discussed.

A game-theoretic strategic mechanism to control brand counterfeiting

2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (5) ◽  
pp. 585-600 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hashim Zameer ◽  
Ying Wang ◽  
Humaira Yasmeen ◽  
Amirhossein Akhavan Mofrad ◽  
Rashid Saeed
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Global Market ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Dynamic Game Theory

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to design a game theory based model that not only provide theoretical basis to control brand counterfeiting, but it also provide a mechanism to enhance brand revenue. Design/methodology/approach This study used the dynamic game theory of incomplete information to understand and encounter the brand counterfeiting issues. The study analyzed the economic relationship of legitimate brand, counterfeiter and consumers using mixed strategy of the dynamic game theory of incomplete information. Findings The results have indicated that brands those take countermeasures to reduce counterfeiting earn maximum revenue, even when the legitimate brands and consumers are unaware from the actions of counterfeiting firms, the legitimate brands should take countermeasures to reduce counterfeiting to earn maximum revenue, and there exists optimal anti-counterfeiting cost for the legitimate brand. Further, this study provides theoretical basis where brand managers can decide to adopt or not to adopt anti-counterfeiting strategy, and also indicate the consequences of each decision. Practical implications Based upon the findings, the study put forward valuable managerial implications. The study revealed that the legitimate brand must emphasize on the significance of taking countermeasures against counterfeiter and also, brand managers should focus on making product traceable, empowering the consumer and ensuring coordination with government officials to control the counterfeiting issues. Originality/value This paper incorporates the role of legitimate brand, counterfeiter and a consumer to establish the dynamic game theory model using mixed strategy to understand and address the counterfeiting issues in the global market.

Are smart contracts too smart for Supply Chain 4.0? A blockchain framework to mitigate challenges

2022 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Grida ◽  
Noha A. Mostafa
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Knowledge Work ◽  
Scenario Planning ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Smart Contracts ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Smart Systems ◽  
The Game Theory

PurposeSmart contracts are self-executing computer programmes that have the potential to be used in several applications instead of traditional written contracts. With the recent rise of smart systems (e.g. Internet of things) and digital platforms (e.g. blockchain), smart contracts are gaining high interest in both business and academia. In this work, a framework for smart contracts was proposed with using reputation as the system currency, and conducts currency mining through fulfilling the physical commitments that are agreed upon.Design/methodology/approachA game theory model is developed to represent the proposed system, and then a system dynamics simulator is used to check the response of the blockchain with different sizes.FindingsThe numerical results showed that the proposed system could identify the takeover attacks and protect the blockchain from being controlled by an outsider. Another important finding is that careful setting of the maximum currency amount can improve the scalability of the blockchain and prevent the currency inflation.Research limitations/implicationsThis work is proposed as a conceptual framework for supply chain 4.0. Future work will be dedicated to implement and experiment the proposed framework for other characteristics that may be encountered in the context of supply chain 4.0, such as different suppliers' tiers, different customer typologies and smart logistics applications, which may reveal other challenges and provide additional interesting insights.Practical implicationsBy using the proposed framework, smart contracts and blockchains can be implemented to handle many issues in the context of operations and supply chain 4.0, especially in times of turbulence such as the COVID-19 global pandemic crisis.Originality/valueThis work emphasizes that smart contracts are not too smart to be applied in the context of supply chain 4.0. The proposed framework of smart contracts is expected to serve supply chain 4.0 by automating the knowledge work and enabling scenario planning through the game theory model. It will also improve online transparency and order processing in real-time through secured multitier connectivity. This can be applied in global supply chain functions backed with digitization, notably during the time of the pandemic, in which e-commerce and online shopping have changed the rules of the game.

Analysis of Enterprise Credit Behavior with Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 411-414 ◽  
pp. 2406-2409
Author(s):  
Hong Yan Lv ◽  
Yu Hong Dong
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Equilibrium Solution ◽  
Social Economy ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Enterprise Credit

Modern market economy is credit economy, but discreditable behavior took place frequently which has restricted the sound development of social economy. This text analyzed the discreditable behavior between enterprises and enterprises with game theory model mainly. According to the methods of economics, it built a model with the supposed premise. On this basis, it analyzed a game and repeated game model, and got the equilibrium solution. Take advantage of the equilibrium solution, it get the conclusion from mathematical deduction, and it gave a feasible strategy based on this conclusion. These are reducing the interests from discredit, raising the probability of successful recovering, and raising the compensation from discredit.

scholarly journals Post-implementation analysis: dependence and trust in VMI context

2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (7) ◽  
pp. 724-740 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mehmet G. Yalcin ◽  
Koray Özpolat ◽  
Dara G. Schniederjans
Keyword(s):  
Inventory Management ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Least Squares Regression ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Relational Factors ◽  
Analytical Approaches

Purpose More than two decades long technological improvements in information sharing have not yet ensured a flawless execution of vendor managed inventory (VMI) and left interested parties wondering about the reasons of poor results. Although VMI is a collaborative tool, the relational factors in a VMI setting have not received enough attention due to challenges in obtaining relational buyer-supplier data in addition to extant focus on analytical approaches. The purpose of this paper is to investigate post-implementation relational factors in order to extract relevant insights. Design/methodology/approach Accounting for the duration of the VMI relationship, the authors focus on two dimensions of VMI often ignored post-implementation: dependence of the buyer on the VMI-supplier and trust of the buyer in the VMI-supplier. Cross-sectional data were collected using a survey collected from distributors mostly in auto and electrical supply industries, which have their inventories managed by manufacturers through VMI arrangements. The sample was obtained from a leading third-party VMI-platform service provider that serves thousands of distributor-manufacturer locations with billions of dollars in sales orders. Multiple ordinary least squares regression has been used to test the hypotheses. Findings This paper provides empirical support that in the post-implementation stage, longer VMI relationships are associated with higher distributor dependence on the manufacturer. In addition, too much dependence could actually hurt the distributor’s trust in the manufacturer. Practical implications The authors propose that distributors maintain some of the purchasing and inventory management skills in house to limit their dependencies on the manufacturers. Manufacturers should also invest in trust-building activities, such as regular communications with distributors. Originality/value This is the first study providing empirical evidence on the positive association between length of VMI relationship and buyer dependence on the supplier, and curvilinear dependence-trust link in a post-implementation VMI context.

Reputation and Gossip in Game Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 213-229
Author(s):  
Charles Roddie
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Past ◽  
Past Behavior ◽  
Future Behavior ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Shed Light

When interacting with others, it is often important for you to know what they have done in similar situations in the past: to know their reputation. One reason is that their past behavior may be a guide to their future behavior. A second reason is that their past behavior may have qualified them for reward and cooperation, or for punishment and revenge. The fact that you respond positively or negatively to the reputation of others then generates incentives for them to maintain good reputations. This article surveys the game theory literature which analyses the mechanisms and incentives involved in reputation. It also discusses how experiments have shed light on strategic behavior involved in maintaining reputations, and the adequacy of unreliable and third party information (gossip) for maintaining incentives for cooperation.

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