An Oil and Gas Pipeline Accident Model Based on Failure of Generalized Management

2014 ◽  
Vol 635-637 ◽  
pp. 478-483
Author(s):  
Shu Jiang ◽  
Li Jing Zhang ◽  
Gang Tao ◽  
Zhong Yu Wang

With the arrival of China's oil and gas pipeline network era, the security of oil and gas pipelines confront great challenges. Scientific pipeline safety management methods and concepts are needed. In this paper the SHEM model which is composed of hardware, software, environment and management is put forward to explain the cause of oil and gas pipeline accident. According to the control system of management failure, the oil and gas pipeline accident model based on failure of generalized management is established to provide effective methods for accident prevention and construction of safety management system for oil and gas pipeline.

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Syed Muhammad Mujtaba ◽  
Tamiru Alemu Lemma ◽  
Seshu Kumar Vandrangi

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiaqiang Jing ◽  
Wenlu Wang ◽  
Dongrong Wu ◽  
Jinhua Luo ◽  
Shuang Zeng ◽  
...  

Abstract When the operation benefit of an oil and gas pipeline is not enough to cover its operation cost, and the pipeline is no alternative use, seriously damaged, aged or the operation risk exceeds the acceptable range, it is bound to cause serious safety and environmental hazards along the pipeline, especially for the over age pipeline in service, therefore its scientific abandonment and reasonable disposal is particularly important and urgent. Focused on the methods for judging abandonment, retirement modes, cleaning and environmental management of oil and gas pipelines, the characteristics of existing methods for predicting the remaining life of the pipelines and their application in abandonment and disposal are compared and analyzed, and the basis and adaptability of oil and gas pipelines retirement are illuminated. According to the actual situation and environment of the discarded pipelines, the selection basis and applicable conditions of the pipeline and facility disposal methods such as demolition, in-situ shelving and their combination are expounded. It is found that North America has rich experience and mature technology in oil and gas pipeline abandonment and disposal, but many countries, including China, seriously lack scientific and systematic evaluation standards, practical experience, related theoretical and technical investigations. This study has important reference and practical significance for promoting the development of abandonment and disposal technology of an aging oil and gas pipeline, and ensuring the personal safety and ecological environmental protection along the abandoned pipeline. This paper presents the status quo of over age service and abandonment decision-making of oil and gas pipelines in the world, draws lessons from the experience of safety and environmental protection disposal of the global abandoned pipelines, and puts forward the principle and method of abandonment judgment and scientific disposal of the aging pipelines based on residual life evaluation. This method has sufficient basis, strong adaptability and wide application.


Author(s):  
Karen Collins ◽  
Michelle Unger ◽  
Amanda Dainis

Abstract Standards and regulations are clear: all staff who work on pipelines need to be both “competent” and “qualified.” Standards such as API 1173 are clear about competence within a safety management system: “The pipeline operator shall ensure that personnel whose responsibilities fall within the scope of the PSMS [Pipeline Safety Management System] have an appropriate level of competence in terms of education, training, knowledge, and experience.” The burden of defining and specifying competence falls on pipeline operators, but they have little guidance regarding the required skills, knowledge and levels of competency. Additionally, we are all biased — different operators will have different ideas and emphases on competencies, which will affect their decision-making. The only way to avoid these cognitive biases is to use consensus standards supported by rigorous surveys that capture the required competencies. This paper explores some of the more common biases that can affect decisions and presents the results of a controlled, independent, survey aimed at both specifying and quantifying the necessary competencies needed by a specific engineer working within a PSMS: a pipeline integrity engineer. The paper identifies and ranks these necessary competences. The survey was completed by 100 pipeline integrity engineers from 25 different countries. Its specific objective was to investigate the key skills and knowledge requirements needed in a junior engineering position (i.e., a pipeline engineer with less than three years of relevant experience) working under supervision to be ‘competent’. It listed eight core competencies (identified by subject matter experts) considered essential for a pipeline integrity engineer. Each of these core competencies contained a set of skills. Respondents were first asked to rank the eight core competences, and then rank the skills within the competency. An analysis of the data provides insights into how 100 pipeline integrity engineers view the key skills required to be “competent.” The results of the survey can assist pipeline companies in setting objective competency requirements for their engineering personnel, developing learning programs to address any gaps, and improve the overall safety of their pipeline system.


2019 ◽  
Vol 121 ◽  
pp. 05005
Author(s):  
Agatha Swierczynski

Corrosion is still responsible for large economic losses in many and very different industry sectors like e.g. marine, refinery and petrochemistry, oil and gas pipelines or of drinking water and appearing by hot gases and combustion products in steel and concrete constructions. There are only some examples chosen. The corrosion phenomena are still a huge astonishment because of some costly repair processes and because of large production losses. The corrosion control systems existing by now help to avoid or to minimize these losses but the question still is, if the existing control system can be working better or longer. If yes, what a key can optimize the corrosion protection depending on the sector’s requirements.


Author(s):  
Megan Weichel

As many pipeline operators embark on the journey of developing a Pipeline Safety Management System (PSMS), the first question is typically, “Where do we begin?” Management systems can be intimidating, and the thought of taking on the task of developing one can seem overwhelming. Companies want to know if it is necessary to start from scratch, if they can use existing processes or programs, and which step to take first for a successful PSMS. There are many ways to begin, but one of the most effective ways is to first ask two questions, “What do we already have?” and “What are our biggest problems?” Armed with these answers, a path forward can be developed, and the foundation for the management system can begin to take shape. One effective way to choose where to begin when developing the PSMS is to determine which elements have been related to the root causes of incidents and near misses in the past. Likewise, continuing to determine and monitor the causes of incidents after the implementation of the PSMS will provide guidance for continual improvement of the management system. Using the elements and sub-elements of existing management system standards or practices, such as API RP 1173, Pipeline Safety Management System Requirements [1], as a starting point for determining root causes is a good way to break down, categorize, and trend the causes of each incident. Combining these with a gap analysis of both the undocumented and documented processes and procedures will provide a basis for determining the priorities for development and implementation of each management system element.


2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (03) ◽  
pp. 53-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Espen Hauge ◽  
Ole Morten Aamo ◽  
John-Morten Godhavn

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