Control Research of Engineering Safety Supervision Based on Rent-Seeking and Game Theory

2011 ◽  
Vol 243-249 ◽  
pp. 1416-1420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lu Jia ◽  
Xian Zhi Liu

In order to further discussing the problem of the construction engineering safety supervision, this paper analyzed the cost and benefit on the rent-seeking behavior of engineering safety supervision using rent-seeking theory. Two game models of engineering safety supervision rent-seeking was established and some suggestions were given.

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (S6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alva Presbitero ◽  
Emiliano Mancini ◽  
Filippo Castiglione ◽  
Valeria V. Krzhizhanovskaya ◽  
Rick Quax

Abstract Background Neutrophils are one of the key players in the human innate immune system (HIIS). In the event of an insult where the body is exposed to inflammation triggering moieties (ITMs), neutrophils are mobilized towards the site of insult and antagonize the inflammation. If the inflammation is cleared, neutrophils go into a programmed death called apoptosis. However, if the insult is intense or persistent, neutrophils take on a violent death pathway called necrosis, which involves the rupture of their cytoplasmic content into the surrounding tissue that causes local tissue damage, thus further aggravating inflammation. This seemingly paradoxical phenomenon fuels the inflammatory process by triggering the recruitment of additional neutrophils to the site of inflammation, aimed to contribute to the complete neutralization of severe inflammation. This delicate balance between the cost and benefit of the neutrophils’ choice of death pathway has been optimized during the evolution of the innate immune system. The goal of our work is to understand how the tradeoff between the cost and benefit of the different death pathways of neutrophils, in response to various levels of insults, has been optimized over evolutionary time by using the concepts of evolutionary game theory. Results We show that by using evolutionary game theory, we are able to formulate a game that predicts the percentage of necrosis and apoptosis when exposed to various levels of insults. Conclusion By adopting an evolutionary perspective, we identify the driving mechanisms leading to the delicate balance between apoptosis and necrosis in neutrophils’ cell death in response to different insults. Using our simple model, we verify that indeed, the global cost of remaining ITMs is the driving mechanism that reproduces the percentage of necrosis and apoptosis observed in data and neutrophils need sufficient information of the overall inflammation to be able to pick a death pathway that presumably increases the survival of the organism.


2013 ◽  
Vol 405-408 ◽  
pp. 3473-3476
Author(s):  
Cheng Zhi Li ◽  
Feng Peng

Project quality is affected by many factors,of which the rent-seeking behavior of the contractor is an important one.In this paper,the contractor’s rent-seeking behavior in various stage of construction projects and its effect to social welfare is analyzed based on the game theory and rent-seeking theory.After building a game model among the owner,contractor and supervisor,some suggestions are propounded to forestall such behavior from the point of equilibrium solutions.


INTEGRITAS ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 24
Author(s):  
Jimmy Daniel Berlianto Oley ◽  
Yerikho Setyo Adi

This article aims to explain the vulnerabilities of Indonesia’s extractive industry governance to the illicit financial flows. Earlier studies figured out that the company in extractive industry has been found to be one of the prominent actors of illicit financial flows.  In the case of Indonesia during the period of 2004-2013, the data of Global Financial Integrity (GFI) illustrated that Indonesia is among the top 10 developing countries – which have the highest value of illicit financial flows. This article seeks to explain the nature of illicit financial flows on extractive industry, the causation of why Indonesia’s extractive industry is prone to the illicit financial flows, and finally the recommendation in addressing the issue. In doing so, the researchers conduct the qualitative desk research on explanatory methodology. The result explains that at least there are two natures of illicit financial flows on extractive industry, the behavior of rent-seeking and the dynamics of commodity prices. This article also found out that there are three main sources of regulatory vulnerability which may accommodate the rent-seeking behavior – which directly and indirectly influence the illicit financial flow, which are the different sets of revenue data, arm’s length measurement within the vulnerable enforcement, and regarding the cost recovery scheme. Other than that, the multi-level governance context shown by the decentralization policy of natural resources in Indonesia widens the loopholes of Indonesia’s extractive industry illicit financial flows.


Public Choice ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Corcoran ◽  
Gordon V. Karels

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luyun Xu ◽  
Dong Liang ◽  
Zhenjie Duan ◽  
Xu Xiao

R&D outsourcing becomes the often-adopted strategy for firms to innovate. However, R&D cooperation often ends up with failure because of its inherent quality of instability. One of the main reasons for cooperation failure is the opportunistic behavior. As the R&D contract between firms is inherently incomplete, opportunistic behavior always cannot be avoided in the collaborative process. R&D cooperation has been divided into horizontal and vertical types. This paper utilizes game theory to study opportunistic behavior in the vertical R&D cooperation and analyzes the equilibrium of the cooperation. Based on the equilibrium and numerical results, it is found that the vertical R&D cooperation is inherently unstable, and the downstream firm is more likely to break the agreement. The level of knowledge spillovers and the cost of R&D efforts have different effects on firms’ payoffs. When the level of knowledge spillover is low or the cost of R&D efforts is high, mechanisms such as punishment for opportunism may be more effective to guarantee the stability of cooperation.


Author(s):  
Ze Li ◽  
Li Li Wang ◽  
Subin Subin Li ◽  
Xinjing Xinjing Zhang ◽  
Guosen Zhou

With the rapid development of China's overall economy, the construction engineering industry is gradually improving. Architectural engineering is an important environment for people to live, and its quality and safety are directly related to people's life and property. The most important part of the construction project is the mechanical and electrical installation, to realize the cost control of the project is the key point of the project. This article mainly explains the mechanical and electrical installation engineering in building engineering, and introduces the installation and construction technology in mechanical and electrical installation engineering in detail, and analyzes the control difficulties. It provides an important reference for the management of mechanical and electrical installation technology in the future.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document