scholarly journals Confucian Post-Liberalism

Asian Studies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-165
Author(s):  
Robert Anthony Carleo III

This paper reviews parallel attacks on the ethical basis of liberal principles from within and without that tradition, one the Confucian-Kantian perspective of contemporary philosopher Li Zehou 李澤厚 and the other the un-Kantian “post-liberalism” of John Gray. Both reject foundational claims regarding the universality of liberal values and principles while still affirming the universal value of those principles via their practical function in fostering for human flourishing. I point out that Gray’s anti-foundationalist liberalism not only aligns with the Confucian elements of Li Zehou’s theory, but may even be enriched by them.

Philosophy ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 79 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-162

Of course, we are not all Straussians, even now, and not just because Leo Strauss is virtually unknown outside the small circle of his followers. (Leo Strauss's name does not even appear in the first five works of philosophical reference we consulted.) Ignorance aside, many readers of Philosophy, along with many other intellectuals, academics, teachers and students, would in any case be appalled to learn that they have any beliefs in common with what is known to-day as neo-Conservatism. But neo-Conservatism is undoubtedly influential in contemporary American foreign policy, and its philosophical roots are Straussian in the very direct sense that many of those driving that policy would regard themselves as having been influenced by Strauss. And only the other day we heard an eminent member of the Conservative Shadow Cabinet in Britain declare that modern conservatism had just two options: to go backwards with Michael Oakeshott's inimitable brand of clubbable nostalgia or brightly forward into the twenty-first century with the neo-Conservatism of Leo Strauss.To describe Leo Strauss as a neo-Conservative is itself an irony Strauss may have been appreciated. For Strauss was neither neo nor a conservative. He was not neo because he believed that the only way to understand our situation was to go back to the ancients, and to understand them on their own terms. We had to read Plato and Aristotle, and to understand them we had to read the Greek historians, Xenophon above all; to understand modernity we had to read Machiavelli, the first modern, and to understand him we had to read Livy, and so on and so on. And he was not conservative, if by conservative one means having an over-weening commitment to some local history or tradition or being nostalgic for an imaginary past. Strauss believed, as did the ancients, in a universal human nature, and he believed that from this nature followed certain things about the conditions necessary for human flourishing, now and in the future.Strauss was born in Germany in 1899, into orthodox Jewry. His studies in Germany included a year in Freibourg as a colleague of both Husserl and Heidegger. He left Germany in 1932, and for most of the rest of his life he was a teacher in American universities, notably in Chicago and St John's College Annapolis. What the ancients and his own experience further taught Strauss was this: ‘Liberal democracy is the only decent and just alternative available to modern man. But he also knew that liberal democracy is exposed to, not to say beleagured by threats, both practical and theoretical. Among those threats is the aspect of modern philosophy that makes it impossible to give rational credence to the principles of the American regime, thereby eroding conviction of the justice of its cause.’ The words are those of Allan Bloom, Strauss's pupil, taken from his obituary of Strauss in 1974, and in Strauss's view as well as in Bloom's the sources of that erosion included as well as Heidegger, Rousseau and Nietzsche.Strauss himself had a horror of anything except thought. In Bloom's words he ‘was active in no organization, served in no position of authority, and had no ambitions other than to understand and help others who might also be able to do so.’Nevertheless, despite Strauss's own reticence and his almost complete neglect in the academic world, some of those he helped, and some of their pupils are now influential in the highest political circles in the USA. They too believe in a universal human nature and that it is to be found in Africa and Asia and everywhere else in the world, as much as in the West. They believe that if you have the power to afford the benefits of liberal democracy in places where people have for decades suffered under tyranny or are locked into cycles of ethnic strife and slaughter, you should not turn your head away and pass on the other side of the road, as in different ways old Conservatives and modern cultural relativists might be inclined to do. You should actually intervene, even at cost to yourself.These beliefs may be wrong, but they could well seem attractive to those seeking a better future for the world as a whole. They are not self-evidently absurd or wicked. They, and their best sources, deserve thought and study. It is time for the writings of Leo Strauss to appear on syllabuses of political philosophy.


1997 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Singer

There are three major ethical approaches to issues affecting nonhuman animals and the natural environment: an anthropocentric ethic, an ethic of concern for all sentient beings, and a biocentric approach. The ethic of concern for all sentient beings is the most defensible basis for resolving conflicts between the interests of humans and wild animals. There is no ethical basis for discounting the suffering of an animal simply because that being is a member of a different species. On the other hand, it is certainly true that human and nonhuman animals differ in their capacities, and this does make a difference to the ethics of what we may do to them, including rendering them infertile. Since ethics is not a matter of adhering to absolute rules, but rather of doing what will have best consequences, given the constraints under which we act, the ethics of using a specific method of fertility control for feral animals will depend on what other methods are being used, or will be used, if the given method is not available. It will also depend on the consequences of not using any method of controlling the population of the animals.


Author(s):  
Marissa Silverman ◽  
David Elliott

This chapter raises questions about the intersections between community music and citizenship and poses the fundamental question: ‘Artistic citizenship for what?’ Our chapter proceeds as follows. First, in addition to providing a concept of community music as/for artistic citizenship, we seek to relate central themes of community music to ‘living sites’ of artistic citizenship. Second, because our approach is dominantly philosophical, we probe the concepts of artistry and citizenship separately and in combination. In doing so, we hope to provide community musicians/facilitators with a theoretical framework for thinking about and acting in relation to the ethical natures, potentials, and pragmatic realities of artistic citizenship for human flourishing through music and the other arts.


Politeia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 68-81
Author(s):  
Ioannis Alysandratos ◽  
Dimitra Balla ◽  
Despina Konstantinidi ◽  
Panagiotis Thanassas ◽  

Wonder is undoubtedly a term that floats around in today’s academic discussion both on ancient philosophy and on philosophy of education. Back in the 4th century B.C., Aristotle underlined the fact that philosophy begins in wonder (θαυμάζειν), without being very specific about the conditions and the effects of its emergence. He focused a great deal on children’s education, emphasizing its fundamental role in human beings’ moral fulfillment, though he never provided a systematic account of children’s moral status. The aim of this paper is to examine, on the one hand, if, to what extent, and under what conditions, Aristotle allows for philosophical wonder to emerge in children’s souls, and, on the other hand, how his approach to education may shed light to the link between wonder and the ultimate moral end, i.e. human flourishing. We will, thus, 1) try to offer a unified outlook of the philosopher’s views on children’s special cognitive and moral state, and 2) illustrate how wonder contributes in overcoming their imperfect state of being.


2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-57
Author(s):  
Gregory S. Alexander

Abstract Under the human flourishing theory of property, owners have obligations, positive as well as negative, that they owe to members of the various communities to which they belong. But are the members of those communities limited to living persons, or do they include non-living persons as well, i.e., future persons and the dead? This Article argues that owners owe two sorts of obligation to non-living members of our generational communities, one general, the other specific. The general obligation is to provide future generations with the basic material background conditions that are necessary for them to be able to carry out what I call life-transcending projects that their forebears have transmitted to them. The specific obligation is project-specific; that is, its purpose is to enable successive generational community members to whom particular life-transcending projects have been forwarded to be carried out in their way. The future generational members to whom the project is transferred must also be given whatever resources or goods are necessary to carry the project forward in its intended way. I argue further that each generational community owes its predecessors the obligation to accept life-transcending projects transmitted to them by their forebears and make reasonable efforts to carry those projects forward into the future. The obligation is based on the past generational community members’ dependency on their successors for the projects to continue into the future, a matter that is constitutive of the project creators’ flourishing. This obligation is defeasible, rather than absolute, however.


Author(s):  
Matthew H. Kramer

During the past several decades, political philosophers have frequently debated whether governments are morally required to remain neutral among reasonable conceptions of excellence and human flourishing. Whereas the numerous followers of John Rawls (and kindred philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin) have maintained that a requirement of neutrality is indeed incumbent on every system of governance, other philosophers—often designated as “perfectionists”—have argued against such a requirement. Liberalism with Excellence enters these debates not by plighting itself unequivocally to one side or the other, but instead by reconceiving each of the sides and thus by redirecting the disputes between them. On the one hand, the book rejects the requirement of neutrality by contending that certain governmental subsidies for the promotion of excellence in sundry areas of human endeavor can be proper and vital. Advocating such departures from the constraint of neutrality, the book presents a version of liberalism that can rightly be classified as “perfectionist.” On the other hand, the species of perfectionism espoused in Liberalism with Excellence diverges markedly from the theories that have usually been so classified. Indeed, much of the book assails various aspects of those theories. What is more, the aspirational perfectionism elaborated in the closing chapters of the volume is reconcilable in most key respects with a suitably amplified version of Rawlsianism. Hence, by reconceiving both the perfectionist side and the neutralist side of the prevailing disputation, Liberalism with Excellence combines and transforms their respective insights.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Burdett ◽  
Victoria Lorrimar

The human enhancement debate is fundamentally based on divergent ideals of human flourishing. Using the complementary, though often contrasting, foci of creaturehood and deification as fundamental to the good life, we examine these visions of human flourishing inherent in transhumanist, secular humanist and critical posthumanist positions on human enhancement. We argue that the theological anthropologies that respond to human enhancement and these other ideologies tend to emphasise either creaturehood or deification to the neglect or detriment of the other. We propose in response that understanding humans as creatures bound for glory integrates both dimensions of the human being into the one grand vision of flourishing God has for humanity.


2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim R. Edwards ◽  
Rod A. Martin

In positive psychology, humor has been identified as one of 24 character strengths considered ubiquitously important for human flourishing. Unlike the other strengths, humor was a late addition to this classification system and its status as a strength continues to be somewhat controversial. Therefore, the first purpose of this study was to explore the associations between humor and several outcome variables of relevance to positive psychology (happiness, routes to happiness, resilience, and morality). The second purpose was to explore how best to conceptualize and measure humor as a character strength by comparing the Values in Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS) Humor Scale with the Humor Styles Questionnaire (HSQ) in their ability to predict the outcome variables. A sample of 176 participants completed questionnaires assessing the humor and positive psychology constructs. The results indicated that the humor measures significantly predicted most of the outcome variables, supporting the importance of humor in positive psychology. Furthermore, although the VIA-IS Humor scale and positive humor styles on the HSQ showed considerable overlap, the negative humor styles added significantly to the prediction of outcome variables beyond these positive humor measures, supporting the importance of assessing maladaptive as well as adaptive uses of humor in research on positive psychology. These findings suggest that the HSQ may be a more useful measure than the VIA-IS Humor scale in future research in this field.


Author(s):  
Raissa A. von Doetinchem de Rande

Abstract This article examines the question of whether the created human nature, or fiṭra, is portrayed as mutable in Shāh Walī Allāh's (d. 1762) Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bāligha. I argue that Walī Allāh uses the fiṭra — or the perfection of four qualities that make for human flourishing — to anchor a unified concept of human perfection that can fit different ages without essentially changing. Walī Allāh accomplishes this by affirming the particularity of divine laws and the efficacy of local customs in realising the eternal demands of the human form. More specifically, he posits that established practices can become second nature to a community, enter the divine system of requital, and thus help a people develop the necessary qualities through highly contingent means, all without violating the Qur'anic and traditional claim that the original nature itself never changes. With recourse to some of his other works and potential influences, I conclude that Walī Allāh's conception of the fiṭra accommodates traditional theological assertions regarding the singularity of human perfection, on the one hand, and the possibility of reformed norms, on the other.


Author(s):  
Chris Klassen ◽  
Amanda J. Baugh

This chapter brings together work on environmental thought in Neo-paganism, Unitarian Universalism, and Islam in an exploration of the complexities and nuances of the subjects’ relationship to flourishing and technology. Human flourishing, for Pagans, would require the flourishing of other life as well, and those interviewed brought varied and sometimes competing views of technology and flourishing. The Unitarian gardeners viewed technology with some degree of suspicion as well. Members of the green mosque, on the other hand, seemed more interested in using technology to help improve their environmental practices to align with a larger earth flourishing. Despite some similarities, among the groups, the chapter points out the very real impediments to interfaith dialogue and collaborative work between monotheist and polytheist groups.


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