Is the fiṭra mutable? A reformist conception of human perfection in Shāh Walī Allāh's Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bāligha

Author(s):  
Raissa A. von Doetinchem de Rande

Abstract This article examines the question of whether the created human nature, or fiṭra, is portrayed as mutable in Shāh Walī Allāh's (d. 1762) Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bāligha. I argue that Walī Allāh uses the fiṭra — or the perfection of four qualities that make for human flourishing — to anchor a unified concept of human perfection that can fit different ages without essentially changing. Walī Allāh accomplishes this by affirming the particularity of divine laws and the efficacy of local customs in realising the eternal demands of the human form. More specifically, he posits that established practices can become second nature to a community, enter the divine system of requital, and thus help a people develop the necessary qualities through highly contingent means, all without violating the Qur'anic and traditional claim that the original nature itself never changes. With recourse to some of his other works and potential influences, I conclude that Walī Allāh's conception of the fiṭra accommodates traditional theological assertions regarding the singularity of human perfection, on the one hand, and the possibility of reformed norms, on the other.

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg W. Bertram

AbstractThe concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future.


1969 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-198
Author(s):  
Robert B. Duke

To study the function of personality variables in the perception of other people, 52 undergraduate males were administered the Philosophies of Human Nature Scale and the Embedded-figures Test. Relatively low but significant positive correlations were found between field independence and trustworthiness, altruism, and the positive view of human nature. There was no significant correlation between field independence and strength of will, independence, complexity, and variability. Apparently, the personality of the one perceiving is relevant to what is perceived in the other person.


PMLA ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 81 (5) ◽  
pp. 381-388
Author(s):  
William Park

But the Discovery [of when to laugh and when to cry] was reserved for this Age, and there are two Authors now living in this Metropolis, who have found out the Art, and both brother Biographers, the one of Tom Jones, and the other of Clarissa.author of Charlotte SummersRather than discuss the differences which separate Fielding and Richardson, I propose to survey the common ground which they share with each other and with other novelists of the 1740's and 50's. In other words I am suggesting that these two masters, their contemporaries, and followers have made use of the same materials and that as a result the English novels of the mid-eighteenth century may be regarded as a distinct historic version of a general type of literature. Most readers, it seems to me, do not make this distinction. They either think that the novel is always the same, or they believe that one particular group of novels, such as those written in the early twentieth century, is the form itself. In my opinion, however, we should think of the novel as we do of the drama. No one kind of drama, such as Elizabethan comedy or Restoration comedy, is the drama itself; instead, each is a particular manifestation of the general type. Each kind bears some relationship to the others, but at the same time each has its own identity, which we usually call its conventions. By conventions I mean not only stock characters, situations, and themes, but also notions and assumptions about the novel, human nature, society, and the cosmos itself. If we compare one kind of novel to another without first considering the conventions of each, we are likely to make the same mistake that Thomas Rymer did when he blamed Shakespeare for not conforming to the canons of classical French drama.


2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDRA HUNEEUS

AbstractThis article argues that human rights law – which mediates between claims about universal human nature, on the one hand, and hard-fought political battles, on the other – is in particular need of a richer exchange between jurisprudential approaches and social science theory and methods. Using the example of the Inter-American Human Rights System, the article calls for more human rights scholarship with a new realist sensibility. It demonstrates in what ways legal and social science scholarship on human rights law both stand to improve through sustained, thoughtful exchange.


2018 ◽  
pp. 761-769
Author(s):  
Olga A. Ginatulina ◽  

The article analyzes the phenomenon of document as assessed in the study of value. To begin with, it poses a problem of contradictory axiological status of document in modern society. On the one hand, document is objectively important, as it completes certain practical tasks, and yet, on the other hand, documents and document management are receive a negative assessment in public consciousness. In order to understand this situation, the article analyzes the concept of ‘value’ and concludes that certain objects of the material world receive this status, if they are included in public practice and promote progress of society or human development. Although this abstract step towards a better understanding of values does not provide a comprehensive answer to the question of axiological nature of document, it however indicates a trend in development of thought towards analysis of the development of human nature. The document is an artifact that objectifies and reifies a certain side of human nature. Human nature is a heterogeneous phenomenon and exists on two levels. The first abstract level is represented by the human race and embodies the full range of universal features of humanity. The second level is the specific embodiment of generic universal human nature in specific historical type of individuals. Between these two levels there is a contradiction. On the one hand, man by nature tends toward universality, on the other hand, realization of his nature is limited by the frameworks of historical era and contributes to the development of only one side of the race. Accordingly, document has value only within a certain historical stage and conflicts with the trend of universal development of human nature, and thus receives a negative evaluation. However, emergence of a new type of work (general scientific work) will help to overcome this alienation between generic and limited individual human being, and therefore will make a great impact on the nature of document, making it more ‘human,’ thus increasing its value in the eyes of society.


Philosophy ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 79 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-162

Of course, we are not all Straussians, even now, and not just because Leo Strauss is virtually unknown outside the small circle of his followers. (Leo Strauss's name does not even appear in the first five works of philosophical reference we consulted.) Ignorance aside, many readers of Philosophy, along with many other intellectuals, academics, teachers and students, would in any case be appalled to learn that they have any beliefs in common with what is known to-day as neo-Conservatism. But neo-Conservatism is undoubtedly influential in contemporary American foreign policy, and its philosophical roots are Straussian in the very direct sense that many of those driving that policy would regard themselves as having been influenced by Strauss. And only the other day we heard an eminent member of the Conservative Shadow Cabinet in Britain declare that modern conservatism had just two options: to go backwards with Michael Oakeshott's inimitable brand of clubbable nostalgia or brightly forward into the twenty-first century with the neo-Conservatism of Leo Strauss.To describe Leo Strauss as a neo-Conservative is itself an irony Strauss may have been appreciated. For Strauss was neither neo nor a conservative. He was not neo because he believed that the only way to understand our situation was to go back to the ancients, and to understand them on their own terms. We had to read Plato and Aristotle, and to understand them we had to read the Greek historians, Xenophon above all; to understand modernity we had to read Machiavelli, the first modern, and to understand him we had to read Livy, and so on and so on. And he was not conservative, if by conservative one means having an over-weening commitment to some local history or tradition or being nostalgic for an imaginary past. Strauss believed, as did the ancients, in a universal human nature, and he believed that from this nature followed certain things about the conditions necessary for human flourishing, now and in the future.Strauss was born in Germany in 1899, into orthodox Jewry. His studies in Germany included a year in Freibourg as a colleague of both Husserl and Heidegger. He left Germany in 1932, and for most of the rest of his life he was a teacher in American universities, notably in Chicago and St John's College Annapolis. What the ancients and his own experience further taught Strauss was this: ‘Liberal democracy is the only decent and just alternative available to modern man. But he also knew that liberal democracy is exposed to, not to say beleagured by threats, both practical and theoretical. Among those threats is the aspect of modern philosophy that makes it impossible to give rational credence to the principles of the American regime, thereby eroding conviction of the justice of its cause.’ The words are those of Allan Bloom, Strauss's pupil, taken from his obituary of Strauss in 1974, and in Strauss's view as well as in Bloom's the sources of that erosion included as well as Heidegger, Rousseau and Nietzsche.Strauss himself had a horror of anything except thought. In Bloom's words he ‘was active in no organization, served in no position of authority, and had no ambitions other than to understand and help others who might also be able to do so.’Nevertheless, despite Strauss's own reticence and his almost complete neglect in the academic world, some of those he helped, and some of their pupils are now influential in the highest political circles in the USA. They too believe in a universal human nature and that it is to be found in Africa and Asia and everywhere else in the world, as much as in the West. They believe that if you have the power to afford the benefits of liberal democracy in places where people have for decades suffered under tyranny or are locked into cycles of ethnic strife and slaughter, you should not turn your head away and pass on the other side of the road, as in different ways old Conservatives and modern cultural relativists might be inclined to do. You should actually intervene, even at cost to yourself.These beliefs may be wrong, but they could well seem attractive to those seeking a better future for the world as a whole. They are not self-evidently absurd or wicked. They, and their best sources, deserve thought and study. It is time for the writings of Leo Strauss to appear on syllabuses of political philosophy.


1920 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 362-389
Author(s):  
Herbert L. Stewart

The widespread reaction towards the Church of Rome by which the first half of the last century was marked, has been subjected to a multitude of more or less intelligent explanations. It was to be expected from poor human nature that each critic should explain in accordance with that law of human development which he had himself embraced, and in illustration of that moral which he deemed it most salutary to draw. In this field the disciple of Bossuet will be forever at issue with the disciple of Comte. From the one we hear how the eyes of Europe had been providentially opened by long years of anarchy and bloodshed, how the spirit of schism had been at length unmasked, how the exhausted nations were taught once more to value a unified spiritual control, and how amid the wreck of thrones and the desolation of kingdoms the very dullest of mankind must have been awed by the spectacle of the Chair of Peter standing fast, an authentic token of the Mighty Hand and the Outstretched Arm. From the other side we listen to the cold comment that world disasters are apt to drive back the less robust sort of mind to the solace of old superstition, that mental progress like all things human has its ebb and flow, and that we need not be surprised if a season of shivering credulity alternates with a season of fearless rationalism. The philosophic historian may well be left to wear himself out in this profitless debate with the brethren of his own craft. Non nostri est tantas componere lites.


Politeia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 68-81
Author(s):  
Ioannis Alysandratos ◽  
Dimitra Balla ◽  
Despina Konstantinidi ◽  
Panagiotis Thanassas ◽  

Wonder is undoubtedly a term that floats around in today’s academic discussion both on ancient philosophy and on philosophy of education. Back in the 4th century B.C., Aristotle underlined the fact that philosophy begins in wonder (θαυμάζειν), without being very specific about the conditions and the effects of its emergence. He focused a great deal on children’s education, emphasizing its fundamental role in human beings’ moral fulfillment, though he never provided a systematic account of children’s moral status. The aim of this paper is to examine, on the one hand, if, to what extent, and under what conditions, Aristotle allows for philosophical wonder to emerge in children’s souls, and, on the other hand, how his approach to education may shed light to the link between wonder and the ultimate moral end, i.e. human flourishing. We will, thus, 1) try to offer a unified outlook of the philosopher’s views on children’s special cognitive and moral state, and 2) illustrate how wonder contributes in overcoming their imperfect state of being.


The Geologist ◽  
1864 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 165-166
Author(s):  
David Leslie

The “Irish Elk” has been hitherto only found in the shell-marl underlying extensive turbaries. It is a true deer, intermediate between the fallow and rein-deer. In England it has been found in lacustrine beds, brick-earth, and ossiferous caves (Owen). The subject of the present paper is a dorsal vertebra belonging to a skeleton quite as large, if not larger than the specimen in the College of Surgeons Museum, London, with which it was compared. It was found on the Shirly property, in a bed of gypsum, county of Monaghan, Ireland. This gypsum-bed is very extensive, being many square miles in extent, underlying the glacial drift, embedded in and. sometimes alternating with a fine ferruginous clay. The subjacent rock is the older or lower coal sandstone, which lies unconformably on the mountain limestone, which reposes on the Silurian, the latter forming hills of 500 or 600 feet elevation in the immediate neighbourhood. The surface-soil is formed of ancient drifts of different ages, the one containing enormous blocks of mountain limestone, the other, the older, more compact, and containing small fragments, very rare, of a limestone, which, from comparison, is supposed to have been brought from the counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh, by a current that denuded all the western aspects of the Greywacke ranges of hills, producing very markedly the phenomena of “crag and tail,” which are there to be seen in endless examples.


Author(s):  
Михаил Асмус

Второй раздел статьи посвящён анализу образного мира Леонтия как одному из факторов, подтверждающих принадлежность текстов одному автору, а также выявляющих уровень риторической подготовки и мастерства проповедника. Анализ символических образов Леонтия (Церковь и Её священнодействия, Агнец Божий, Хлеб Небесный, царская власть Христа) демонстрирует, с одной стороны, его приверженность евхаристическому реализму и цельной экклезиологии, объединяющей тайносовершительную и социальную функции Церкви, с другой стороны - выявляет некоторую размытость границ между символом и передаваемой им реальностью, увлечение художественной завершённостью образа, которое иногда приводит проповедника к отступлению от отстаиваемых им же богословских положений. Сдержанность Леонтия в развитии идеи царской власти Христа по человечеству хорошо объясняется его дохалкидонским христологическим мышлением, а также тем, что проповедник находился под свежим впечатлением от ересей конца IV в. (Маркелл Анкирский) и их осуждения на II Вселенском Соборе. Последнее позволяет более уверенно датировать леонтиевский корпус концом IV - началом V в. Analysis of the symbolic images of Leontius (the Church and her sacraments, the Lamb of God, the Bread of Heaven, the royal power of Christ) demonstrates, on the one hand, Leontius’ commitment to Eucharistic realism and integral ecclesiology, uniting the sacramental and social functions of the Church, on the other hand, reveals some blurring of the boundaries between the symbol and the reality, and the fascination with the literary completeness of the image, which sometimes leads the preacher to deviate from the theological positions defended by him. The restraint of Leontius in the development of the idea of the royal power of Christ by His human nature is well explained by his pre-Chalcedonian Christology, as well as by the fact that the preacher was under a fresh impression of the heresies of the late 4th century (Marcellus of Anсyra) and their condemnation at the II Ecumenical Council. The latter makes it possible to more confidently date the Corpus Leontianum of the late 4th - early 5th centuries.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document