Scientific realism and antirealism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Fine
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Empirical Adequacy ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Dual Character ◽  
Objects Of Knowledge ◽  
The One ◽  
Independent Existence

Traditionally, scientific realism asserts that the objects of scientific knowledge exist independently of the minds or acts of scientists and that scientific theories are true of that objective (mind-independent) world. The reference to knowledge points to the dual character of scientific realism. On the one hand it is a metaphysical (specifically, an ontological) doctrine, claiming the independent existence of certain entities. On the other hand it is an epistemological doctrine asserting that we can know what individuals exist and that we can find out the truth of the theories or laws that govern them. Opposed to scientific realism (hereafter just ‘realism’) are a variety of antirealisms, including phenomenalism and empiricism. Recently two others, instrumentalism and constructivism, have posed special challenges to realism. Instrumentalism regards the objects of knowledge pragmatically, as tools for various human purposes, and so takes reliability (or empirical adequacy) rather than truth as scientifically central. A version of this, fictionalism, contests the existence of many of the objects favoured by the realist and regards them as merely expedient means to useful ends. Constructivism maintains that scientific knowledge is socially constituted, that ‘facts’ are made by us. Thus it challenges the objectivity of knowledge, as the realist understands objectivity, and the independent existence that realism is after. Conventionalism, holding that the truths of science ultimately rest on man-made conventions, is allied to constructivism. Realism and antirealism propose competing interpretations of science as a whole. They even differ over what requires explanation, with realism demanding that more be explained and antirealism less.

scholarly journals A Dilemma for the Scientific Realist

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
Howard Sankey
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Evidential Basis ◽  
Apparent Conflict

This note poses a dilemma for scientific realism which stems from the apparent conflict between science and common sense. On the one hand, we may accept scientific realism and agree that there is a conflict between science and common sense. If we do this, we remove the evidential basis for science and have no reason to accept science in the first place. On the other hand, we may accept scientific realism and endorse common sense. If we do this, we must reject the conflict between science and common sense. The dilemma is to be resolved by distinguishing between basic common sense and widely held beliefs. Basic common sense survives the advance of science and may serve as the evidential basis for science.

Aristotelianism, Newtonianism and the Physics of the Layman

Perception ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benny Shanon
Keyword(s):  
Physical World ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Philosophy Of Nature ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
The One

Written and visual surveys were administered in order to assess people's models of the physical world. A comparison was made between scientific theories and the layman's philosophy of nature on the one hand, and between people's conceptions and perceptions on the other hand. The findings suggest that there are discrepancies on both levels: people do not conceive the world as physicists do, and their conceptions are different from their perceptions.

Frederick II of Hohenstaufen and Arabic Science

2001 ◽  
Vol 14 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 289-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Schramm
Keyword(s):  
Biological Sciences ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Practice ◽  
Unique Role ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Court Life ◽  
The One ◽  
And Diffusion ◽  
Contemporary Approach

The article argues that Frederick II of Hohenstaufen and his court played a unique role in the transfer and diffusion of Arabic science (with its Greek, Hebrew and Christian elements). Scientists at the court translated and elaborated upon it. Moreover, there existed a two-way traffic of scientific knowledge between Frederick and his court scholars, on the one hand, and several oriental courts and their scientists on the other hand. Thus the reader gains a view of Frederick's scientific activities from the Arab perspective, too.Frederick's contribution to the existing biological sciences of his time was his “Book of Falconry”, which was exceptional in the then contemporary approach and methods employed in those fields. Even in this treatise on falconry, Frederick drew upon the fund of knowledge of Arab practitioners. This chain of arguments concerning Arabic science is situated within the setup of Frederick's oriental political practice and sumptuous court life.

Particulars

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Bigelow
Keyword(s):  
Distinctive Feature ◽  
The Other ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Independent Existence

Particulars are to be understood by contrasting them with universals, that term being used to comprise both properties and relations. Often the term ‘individuals’ is used interchangeably with ‘particulars’, though some restrict the term ‘individuals’ to those particulars whose existence has more than momentary duration. It is sometimes taken as a distinctive feature of particulars that they cannot be in more than one place at a time, whereas universals are capable of being wholly present in more than one place at a given time: if you have a white thing here and a white thing there, then you have two particulars but only one property. This way of distinguishing between particulars and universals may help us to focus on apt paradigm cases of each, but arguably this does not get us to the heart of the matter. On the one hand, some think it is possible, at least in principle, for a magician, or Pythagoras, or a time traveller, or a subatomic particle to be in two places at once, even though each is a particular. On the other hand, some think that there are properties which could not possibly be manifested in two different places at the same time, and yet which nonetheless are universals: think, for instance, of the divine property of absolute perfection, or of the conjunction of all intrinsic properties of a Leibnizian monad (or possible world); or of Judas’ property of simply being Judas. Particulars are things which have properties and which stand in relations – particulars ‘instantiate’ properties and relations. By itself, however, this does not distinguish particulars from universals since universals, too, are naturally thought to have properties and to stand in relations. What distinguishes particulars is the fact that, while a particular instantiates properties and relations, nothing instantiates a particular. Universals both ‘have’ (properties and relations) and are ‘had’; particulars ‘have’ but are not ‘had’. Since a particular is not instantiated by another thing, it is sometimes said to exist ‘in itself’, whereas a universal exists ‘in’ something else. For this reason, the term ‘particular’ is related to the term ‘substance’, which is traditionally used to mean something capable of independent existence.

Les aspects philosophiques de la théologie selon Jean Duns Scot

1970 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 429-446
Author(s):  
Michal Chabada
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Greek Philosophy ◽  
Practical Science ◽  
Knowledge Based ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Franciscan Spirituality ◽  
The One

Theologians of the 14th C. agreed that theology is scientific knowledge based upon the truths of revelation. But the very introduction of Aristotle's and aristotelian philosophy into theology turned out to be problematic. Above all, it was questionable to integrate theology—as a science based on revelation—within the aristotelian framework of sciences. This problem is difficult for Scotus in two ways. On the one hand, he uses the concepts elaborated in greek philosophy, but, on the other hand, his franciscan spirituality compels him towards the opposite solution. Scotus only has the Aristotle's division of theoretical and practical sciences at his disposal to determine the character of theology, and he chooses to classify theology as practical science. Scotus is pouring “new wine” of Christian revelation into “old wineskins” of greek philosophy, the fact causing noticeable problems when interpreting many Scotus' ideas and views.

scholarly journals THE PHENOMENON “BETWEEN”: PARA-SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AS A TRANSITIONAL TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE

2020 ◽  
pp. 23-26
Author(s):  
N.I. Martishina
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Basic Type ◽  
The Other ◽  
Hybrid Type ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Cognitive Space ◽  
Transitional Type ◽  
The One ◽  
Forms Of Knowledge

The article considers the phenomenon of the transitional type of knowledge arising at the junction of the main types of cognition. It is shown that forms of knowledge naturally arise in the cognitive space, in which, on the one hand, the level of compliance with the standards of the basic type of cognition for them is reduced and, on the other hand, signs of a different type of cognition are shown. This is an intermediate, hybrid type of knowledge, belonging to which the concepts form a kind of transitional zones between all fields of knowledge. The composition and features of this transitional type of knowledge are considered on the example of para-scientific knowledge.

scholarly journals Consensual nature of scientific knowledge as generalization of its conventionality

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-12
Author(s):  
SERGEY LEBEDEV
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
Scientific Cognition ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The One

The article provides the theoretical reconstruction of the content and philosophical foundations of the consensual and the conventionalist concepts of scientific cognition. It is shown that the consensual concept generalizes the rational aspects of the conventionalist concept on the one hand and rejects it on the other hand. The latter refers to a) the interpretation of the subject of scientific cognition and b) understanding the criterion of the truth of scientific knowledge.

scholarly journals LE IDEE SCIENTIFICHE COME PROTESI DELLA MENTE

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Mazzarello
Keyword(s):  
Nature Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Psychology ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
The One ◽  
Collective Enterprise

The reflection on the nature of science and the investigation concerning the modalities of its development in a society, are at the center of the volume of Carlo Cattaneo Psicologia delle menti associate (Psychology of the associated minds). Introduced by Carlo Lacaita and organized by Barbara Boneschi, the work derivesabove all from the mosaic of lectures, linked by a unitary vision, held by the author atthe Istituto Lombardo between 1859 and 1866. This series of readings were an important moment of his intellectual elaboration, a space of investigation that went to theheart of his cultural interests, the scientific knowledge that involved all his voraciouscognitive tension. In this comment, particular emphasis will be given to two particularaspects of Cattaneo’s scientific psychology. On the one hand, the idea of scientificknowledge as a collective enterprise, therefore as a collaborative synthesis of several associated minds; on the other hand, the concept of science as a cognitive device thatmakes it possible to amplify the possibility of exploration and perception of the world.

scholarly journals REALISMO SCIENTIFICO SENZA SCIENTISMO: LA PROPOSTA DI HILARY PUTNAM

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Lizzadri
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Activity ◽  
The Other ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Logical Empiricist ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Actual Nature ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Physical Quantities

The reflection of Hilary Putnam over the scientific realism endured frequent distortions inside the contemporary epistemologic debate. Just recently, in fact, in Philosophy in an Age of Science (2012), Putnam himself wanted to explicitly denounce the undeserved identification of his originary scientific realism with the scientism, as well as the illegitimacy of the resulting criticism of incoherence considering the new appreciation of metaphysics of the Nineties. On the other hand, in Mathematics, matter and method (1975), Putnam has already led a fierce criticism against the logical empiricist scientism and its deceptive and non realistic concept of science. The paper intents to present this criticism starting with the analysis of some essays from the first volume of the Philosophical Papers, in order to bring to the “backlight” surface the actual nature of his scientific realism. The scientific realism will, first of all, show itself like the attitude of the phylosopher, or rather of the scientist, in front of the scientific activity: differently from the non-realistic “deductivism” which prior imposes its own methodological rules as an essential warrancy of truth, the scientific realism refuses such “feticism” of the method, sure that the scientific activity works by itself in the sphere of truth, as in inside the space defined by the relationship between a subject and something else. Such polarity will be verified through Putnam’s criticism against the geo-chronometric conventionalism of Adolf Grünbaum (An Examination of Grünbaum’s Philosophy of Geometry, 1963), in terms of “existential relevance” of scientific theories, even when recognising conventional elements in the definition with reference to physical quantities.

Conventionalism, Truth, and Cosmological Furniture

1975 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-457
Author(s):  
J. O. Wisdom
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
The One

The problem to be discussed here concerns ontology so far as it may not be formed by scientific theory. In brief terms, the problem arises in the following way. On the one hand, the world surely consists of whatever is there, irrespective of whether human beings are around or not, and irrespective especially of whether human beings have constructed any scientific theories depicting the nature of the world; on the other hand, scientific theories are subject to the limitation that we can never verify them or prove them to be true, so that the ontology prescribed by scientific theory is not firmly established but is only what is attributed to the world by a fallible scientific theory at any given time. The problem could also be put in terms of ‘conceptual networks’ or in terms of language-systems.

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