Overview: The Link Between Individuals and Electoral Institutions in Five Latino Neighborhoods

This chapter argues that individual voting behaviour and the strategies chosen by political parties across multiple electoral arenas should be considered jointly. Existing literature points to the importance of an election as a major driving force in voting behaviour, but it is argued that voters and parties may differ in their assessments of the importance of elections at different levels. The chapter discusses how the effect of the importance of an electoral arena, for both voter and party behaviour, will be conditioned by electoral institutions and characteristics of parties and the party system, in addition to individual voter characteristics contributing to it.

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Taxing the Tails in a Global Economy: How Electoral, Party and Wage Bargaining Systems Interact to Determine the Taxes Paid by the Poor and Rich

British Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0007123420000861 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-20

Author(s):

Jude C. Hays

Keyword(s):

Global Economy ◽

Electoral Systems ◽

Party Systems ◽

Wage Bargaining ◽

Labor Market Institutions ◽

Electoral Institutions ◽

The Poor ◽

The Rich ◽

Consumption Taxes ◽

Empirical Implications

Abstract A prominent line of research on electoral systems and income redistribution argues that proportional representation (PR) leads to tax-and-transfer policies that benefit the poor at the expense of the rich. This is because PR produces encompassing center-left coalitions that protect the poor and middle classes. Yet countries with PR electoral systems tend to rely heavily on consumption taxes and tax profits lightly, both of which are inconsistent with this expectation. Both policies are regressive and seem to benefit the rich at the expense of the poor. This article argues that PR electoral institutions, when combined with trichotomous multipartism, are not as hostile to the rich as commonly believed, and that it is important to understand how electoral and party systems interact with labor market institutions in order to explain the puzzling pattern of taxation that is observed. The author develops a theoretical model and evaluates its empirical implications for a world in which production has become multinational.

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Domestic politics and the power to punish: The case of national human rights institutions

Conflict Management and Peace Science ◽

10.1177/0738894217704632 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 36 (4) ◽

pp. 385-404 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Ryan M. Welch

Keyword(s):

Human Rights ◽

Domestic Politics ◽

Past Research ◽

Domestic Institutions ◽

Electoral Institutions ◽

The Public ◽

Legal Punishment ◽

International Pressure ◽

National Human ◽

National Human Rights Institutions

Why do states give institutions the ability to legally punish them? While past research focuses on international pressure to delegate authority to third parties, I argue that domestic politics plays a key role. By viewing domestic politics through a principal–agent framework, I argue that the more accountable individual legislators remain to the public, the more likely it is that the legislature will delegate legal punishment authority. I focus on National Human Rights Institutions—domestic institutions tasked with protection and promotion of human rights—to build the argument. Electoral institutions that decrease monitoring of legislator agents, or institutional makeup that allows the executive to displace the public as the principal lead to National Human Rights Institutions without punishment power. Using Bayesian logistic analyses I test four hypotheses, all of which are in agreement with the argument.

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Designing Electoral Institutions: STV Systems and Their Consequences

Political Studies ◽

10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00755.x ◽

1996 ◽

Vol 44 (1) ◽

pp. 24-43 ◽

Cited By ~ 19

Author(s):

David M. Farrell ◽

Malcolm Mackerras ◽

Ian McAllister

Keyword(s):

Regression Analysis ◽

Party System ◽

Proportional Representation ◽

The Political ◽

Political Systems ◽

Electoral Institutions ◽

Generic Type ◽

Single Transferable Vote ◽

Party Strategies

Although championed by advocates of proportional representation, the single transferable vote form of PR has been used consistently in only a small number of countries – principally Australia, Ireland and Malta. This paper examines the origins and development of STV and its implications for the political systems that use it. The results show that STV varies so widely in its form and application, differing on no less than five major characteristics, that it is impossible to identify any single generic type. These differences are also reflected in the party strategies that are used to maximize the vote under STV. A regression analysis of the various types of STV shows that Malta is the most proportional system, followed by Ireland and Tasmania. Ireland has the largest party system among the countries that use STV, net of other factors.

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Google Politics: The Political Determinants of Internet Censorship in Democracies

Political Science Research and Methods ◽

10.1017/psrm.2017.1 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 6 (2) ◽

pp. 245-263 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Stephen A. Meserve ◽

Daniel Pemstein

Keyword(s):

Intellectual Property ◽

Relative Influence ◽

Digital Content ◽

The Political ◽

Information Flows ◽

Electoral Institutions ◽

Political Determinants ◽

Country Characteristics ◽

User Data ◽

Internet Censorship

The expansion of digital interconnectivity has simultaneously increased individuals’ access to media and presented governments with new opportunities to regulate information flows. As a result, even highly democratic countries now issue frequent censorship and user data requests to digital content providers. We argue that government internet censorship occurs, in part, for political reasons, and seek to identify the conditions under which states censor. We leverage new, cross-nationally comparable, censorship request data, provided by Google, to examine how country characteristics co-vary with governments’ digital censorship activity. Within democracies, we show that governments engage in more digital censorship when internal dissent is present and when their economies produce substantial intellectual property. But these demand mechanisms are modulated by the relative influence that democratic institutions provide to narrow and diffuse interests; in particular, states with proportional electoral institutions censor less.

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Autocratization Verity: Insights from Democratic Setbacks in Africa

The African Review ◽

10.1163/1821889x-12340051 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-32

Author(s):

Uchenna C. Obiagu ◽

Ifeanyichukwu Michael Abada ◽

Peter Oluchukwu Mbah

Keyword(s):

Political Violence ◽

Electoral Institutions ◽

Political Opportunity ◽

Modern Democracy ◽

Research Institutes ◽

Democratic Principle ◽

Group Control ◽

Ruling Elites ◽

Acquisition Strategy ◽

Political Groups

Abstract This study builds on extant literature on autocratization by critically analyzing democratic setbacks, arising from widespread incidents of electoral and political violence in democratic processes in Africa. The study leverages on frustration-aggression propositions to analyze the politico-electoral dynamics in autocratization trends in climes where the incentives to use violence as power acquisition strategy have become a dominant norm either by the ruling elites who seek to remain in power (sometimes by all means – both legal and, mostly, illegal) or by the opposition groups seeking to dislodge the former. As a qualitative research, the study squarely relies on available documented textual materials and rich datasets developed by reputable international research institutes. The analysis of data reveals that autocratization is real, gradual and subtle in Africa, and it is fostered by weak electoral institutions that are helpless in checkmating the use of violent strategies to win an election, which is the most visible element of modern democracy. Based on these findings, deliberate efforts should be made to build and/or strengthen electoral institutions that will rise above group interests and group control and ensure equal playing ground for all political groups in the contestation for state power. This will guarantee stable democratic growth within the context of the democratic principle of equal political opportunity premised on one man, one vote in Africa.

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