The Council, European Council and member states

2021 ◽  
pp. 75-92
Author(s):  
Rüdiger K.W. Wurzel
Author(s):  
Petr YAKOVLEV

The decision on Britain’s secession from the European Union, taken by the British Parliament and agreed by London and Brussels, divided the Union history into “before” and “after”. Not only will the remaining member states have to “digest” the political, commercial, economic and mental consequences of parting with one of the largest partners. They will also have to create a substantially new algorithm for the functioning of United Europe. On this path, the EU is confronted with many geopolitical and geo-economic challenges, which should be answered by the new leaders of the European Commission, European Council, and European Parliament.


Author(s):  
Vivien A. Schmidt

Chapter 5 discusses the pathway to legitimacy of the European Council (and the Council), with a special focus on Germany’s predominance through “one size fits one” rules. The chapter begins with an analysis of the Council’s particular sources of power and grounds for throughput legitimacy in Eurozone governance. It questions member-state leaders’ assumptions about their representativeness (input legitimacy), then asks if they meet the requirements of deliberative mutual accountability (throughput legitimacy) or even whether Germany fits the criteria expected of a benevolent hegemon. Next the chapter discusses the Janus-faced public perceptions of Council crisis governance. These are divided between views of the Council as an unaccountable (German) dictatorship or as a mutually accountable deliberative body (in the shadow of Germany). This part first presents the Council as an unaccountable dictatorship by detailing the ways in which Germany was predominant on its own and/or in tandem with a weaker France. It then counters with a discussion of the Council as a mutually accountable deliberative body, by charting not only the many instances in which member states agreed with German preferences but also where Germany acquiesced to those of other member states. The chapter ends with an examination of the actions of the Council (in particular the Eurogroup of Finance Ministers) and the Troika (IMF, Commission, and ECB) with regard to the program countries. This can be seen as two sides of the same coin: harsh dictatorship (especially the third Greek bailout) or deliberative authoritarianism (eg, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus and Greece in the second bailout).


Author(s):  
Wolfgang Bogensberger

In the absence of unanimity in the Council, a group of at least nine Member States may request that the draft regulation be referred to the European Council. In that case, the procedure in the Council shall be suspended. After discussion, and in case of a consensus, the European Council shall, within four months of this suspension, refer the draft back to the Council for adoption.


theoretically achieved back in the 1960s, meant the abolition of all barriers. In practice, the latter had remained a pious aspiration so long as a whole host of technical, fiscal and other barriers existed. Early in 1985 the Commission produced a white paper on establishing a single market. This, together with the report by the Dooge Committee, established at Fontainebleau to examine institutional issues, formed the major agenda when the European Council met in Milan in late June 1985 and took the crucial decisions which were to lead to the negotiation and signature of SEA. The Milan European Council was an early demonstration of the new Franco-German axis. Analysis of these events should properly focus on three critical features. First, the European Council confirmed its assumption of direct responsibility for all major decisions. In 1984 this involved enlargement and the budget. In 1985 it embraced ‘completion’ of the Community itself in the shape of the single market. Second, the actual decision to hold an inter-governmental conference (IGC), which would give a treaty base to foreign policy co-operation and revise some of the institutional arrangements, was taken by a majority despite opposition from Britain, Denmark and Greece. Italian Prime Minister Craxi as President of the European Council played a key role in this. Third, despite objections to developing European structures and institutions, Britain attached sufficient importance to the single market to accept a majority decision on the IGC. The lead up to the IGC had been long and tortuous, but the actual negotiation of the SEA was relatively simple. The IGC met in September, and by January an agreed text had emerged. The treaty itself is analysed in the next chapter. Its main features were agreement to implement the single market by the end of 1992, the establishment of a legal basis for Political Co-operation and a number of institutional reforms. Whilst not formally repudiating the Luxembourg compromise with its apparent extension of the national veto, member states seemed to have reached some understanding that in future the spirit of the original treaties would apply. The point is underlined by the fact that virtually all the provisions relating to the single market would be implemented by majority vote. In the immediate aftermath of the ratification of the SEA, some observers drew attention to the gap between aspirations expressed by Parliament in its Draft Treaty and the actual achievement. Although true, such comments are wide of the mark. In the negotiating process Parliament was little more than a bystander with the right to be heard. The member states were anxious to achieve a relaunching of the move towards unification after a period of apparent

2006 ◽  
pp. 84-84

IG ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-100
Author(s):  
Nicolai von Ondarza

The Brexit negotiations constituted unchartered political and institutional territory for the European Union (EU). This analysis shows how a new institutional approach enabled the EU-27 to present an unusually united front. The “Barnier method” is characterised by five elements: a strong political mandate from the European Council, a single EU negotiator based in the European Commission in the person of Michel Barnier, very close coordination with the Member States and the European Parliament, and a high degree of transparency. Lessons can also be drawn from this for the next phase of the Brexit negotiations and the EU’s relations with other third countries.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-55
Author(s):  
Peter Ludlow

The present paper resumes where the previous paper in this series concluded. At its video conference on 23 April the European Council mandated the Commission to draft a Recovery Plan, and on 21 July, at the end of a fve-day meeting, it signed off on a Recovery Fund and a revised MFF.<br/> The size and economic signifcance of the package are illustrated in the text and tables. It is big money which, because it is targeted primarily at the more vulnerable member states, should have a considerable economic impact, particularly in the South. Talk of a crossing of the Rubicon is nonetheless misplaced. Firstly because, though large, it is still much smaller than member states' Covid-related spending. Secondly, more importantly, because the politics of the agreement, which are analysed at some length in the narrative section of the paper, confrm that the leading players in Europe's Union of sovereign states have little or no appetite for the huge systemic changes which would be required to deliver on the federalists' dream.<br/> Four features of the political narrative are of particular importance.<br/> Firstly, the making of the July agreement was a success story which, in the face of widespread scepticism, confrmed that the EU can deliver. As a result, both the self-confdence of the insiders and the standing of the EU with its citizens have been boosted.<br/> Secondly, the story vindicated the Union's European Council centred system of government. Media focus on the 18 May Statement by Merkel and Macron was misleading. The story begins on 23 April and ends on 21 July with the European Council.<br/> Thirdly, individuals and institutions matter too. In institutional terms, the European Commission, the Council's rotating Presidency as well as the European Council itself have been at the heart of the process. In individual terms, Angela Merkel was once again in a league of her own, von der Leyen and Michel performed well, and the leaders of the F4, reinforced for most of the time by the Finnish prime minister, left their mark in a positive still more than a negative sense. As too did Conte and Sanchez. Macron was also important needless to say, but not as important as the French government and the international media suggested.<br/> Fourthly, the story draws attention to the limits as well as the potential of the system. Two closely related episodes since July are cited by way of illustration. In the frst, the negotiations between the German Council Presidency and the European Parliament about the budget, the parliamentary negotiators over-estimated both the powers and the signifcance of the Parliament in the system. In the second, involving the Council, the Parliament and the Hungarian and Polish governments, the latter have, as often before, challenged the shared values on which the EU system is based. On this occasion however their interlocutors have considerable leverage and, rightly in our view, appear determined to stand frm, even if, as is still possible, this puts the MFF/NGEU package at risk.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-54
Author(s):  
Peter Ludlow

The three European Council meetings which are discussed in these Notes covered a wide range of subjects and included sessions with the new US president and NATO's secretary general. They were nevertheless dominated by the pandemic and more particularly by the efforts of the EU and its member states to vaccinate their citizens as rapidly as possible. It was not an easy task and the EU rollout during the first three months of 2021 was significantly slower than that of either the UK or the US. There were many explanations, including the European Commission's failure to invest enough money early enough, inefficiencies at member state level and the production difficulties of the manufacturers in general and of AstraZeneca in particular. As the months have passed, many if not most of these difficulties seem, however, to be less consequential than they did at the time. The Commission and most of the member states learned from and made good their early failures and, AstraZeneca apart, BioNTech and the other manufacturers succeeded in delivering even more vaccines than they had promised to do. These improvements were already beginning to make themselves felt before the end of the first quarter. They were not widely acknowledged however, either inside or outside the political class. Partly because good news is always slow to drive out bad news, but still more because the debate about the vaccination rollout was driven by forces which were only loosely connected with the pandemic, including in particular the German-German debate in an election year, the British government's need to find and proclaim a post-Brexit success and the blunders of the European Commission's president. The politics of the rollout are indeed as interesting as, if not more interesting than the objective challenges which policymakers grappled with. Above all because the process highlighted once again the significance of the European Council. Despite strong countervailing pressures in the media, which continued to propagate the story of 'Europe's failure' and widespread dislike of von der Leyen's management style, the European Council maintained its commitment to an EU-wide rollout strategy and endorsed a string of initiatives, including an EU certificate, which aimed to defend the Union against the corrosive effects of the pandemic. The non-Covid business which the European Council addressed between January and March may have been overshadowed by the pandemic but it was far from unimportant, and the debates which it provoked anticipated both the concerns and the language of European Council discussions later in the year about the EU's role in a rapidly changing world order. The sessions with Jens Stoltenberg and Joe Biden in February and March respectively were reassuring rather than dramatic, but it was already apparent, particularly in the debate before and during the February meeting, that the lines between 'Atlanticists' and 'Europeans' have shifted significantly and that the buzz words of the emerging EU consensus – 'resilience', 'the reduction of dependencies' and 'a European capacity for autonomous action' – were well on the way to becoming common currency.


Author(s):  
Christopher Lord

This chapter examines the legitimacy and democratic control of the European Union's international policies. It first explains why, with whom, and by what standards the EU's international role need to be legitimate before discussing the issue of democratic control involving the European Parliament (EP) and national parliaments. More specifically, it considers the member states' mantra that the legitimacy of EU decisions is ‘founded on the principle of representative democracy’, delivered through the representation of citizens in the EP and national democracies in the European Council, the Councils, and their own national parliaments. It also emphasizes the great variety in the EU's international policy procedures and concludes by assessing how legitimacy might enable or constrain the development of the EU as an international actor.


2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 227-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Peers

Following the last update in this Quarterly,1 the European Union (EU) has been quite active in agreeing new measures relating to cross-border policing and criminal law. First of all, the Tampere European Council meeting in October 1999 agreed a list of measures to be adopted to develop the EU's ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, particularly as regards criminal procedure. Here the European Council requested the Council to agree a work programme on mutual recognition in criminal matters within a year, and to establish an EU organisation facilitating cross-border prosecutions (Eurojust) within 2 years. Following agreement in the meantime on a Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters after 5 years’ negotiations,2 the work programme was duly adopted in November 2000, setting out a list of twenty-four measures which the Council should agree in the medium-term to facilitate cross-border investigations, prosecutions, and enforcement of judgments.3 Several Member States then began to implement this plan, tabling two versions of a proposed Decision to set up Eurojust and also making proposals for ‘Framework Decisions’ to harmonise national laws as regards enforcement of other Member States’ orders to freeze assets and evidence and enforcement of judgments imposing financial penalties.4


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