The Determinants of Defence Policy for a Medium Military Power

2020 ◽  
pp. 281-285
Author(s):  
Admiral Anthony Synnot
1969 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Preston

If anyone could be claimed the father of the school for the scientific study of Indian defence policy it would undoubtedly be Sir Charles Metcalfe MacGregor. With the re-opening of the Central Asian Question in the early 1860s, it became MacGregor's mission in life completely to recast the Indian defence structure and it counter-insurrectionary role to enable it to undertake large-scale offensive operations against a major European military power. Almost single-handedly, he began to create the machinery within the Indian Army establishment—the special departments, professional institutes, journals and literature—to stimulate a greater awareness of the special and peculiar nature of Indian defence problems that this new role involved, and to encourage an iconoclastic re-examination of prevailing defence assumptions. From MacGregor's groundwork there was logically bound to arise a sense of Indian Army professionalism separate and distinct from that of Great Britain, and the beginnings of the belief that obligations of national defence are inseparable from nationhood. It was MacGregor who first appreciated on the basis of systematic and scientific study that India constituted a vast manpower reservoir, greater than that of Ireland and Egypt together, upon which Britain relied for the prosecution of her imperial, military and foreign policies in the East; that the North-West Frontier presented the only strategic boundary that Britain had to defend; and that the geo-strategic and demographic facts of her existence had made India potentially a great military power bound to adopt a ‵Continental′ military policy and defence structure in many respects parallel to those of the major European military powers.


Subject China-UK relations post-Brexit. Significance Controversy over whether to allow Chinese telecoms firm Huawei to participate in constructing the United Kingdom’s 5G telecommunications infrastructure has put relations with China back under the spotlight. The United Kingdom since 2015 has made determined efforts to strengthen relations with China, with exports and investment the major goals. This became harder as Brexit consumed the government’s attention. Impacts As Chinese firms move into high-quality and high-tech goods and services, they will compete with UK firms across more markets. Post-Brexit trade agreements with China and the United States could become an arena of competition. Cybersecurity, espionage and ‘interference’ will be the main areas where London shares Washington’s security concerns vis-a-vis China. As China becomes a global military power it could eventually feature more prominently in UK defence policy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 362-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marijn Hoijtink ◽  
Hanna L Muehlenhoff

Against the background of a sense of crisis in the European Union and in international politics, European Union Member States have since 2016 increased their cooperation within the Common Security and Defence Policy, for example, establishing the European Defence Fund. Scholars have long pointed out that the European Union lacks the necessary ‘hard’ military power to influence international politics, subscribing to and constituting an image of the European Union as not masculine enough. We are critical of these accounts and develop a different argument. First, building on insights from feminist security and critical military studies, we argue that the European Union is a military power constituted by multiple masculinities. We consider the European Union to be a masculine military power, not only because it uses and aims to develop military instruments, but also because of how militarism and military masculinities permeate discourses, practices and policies within Common Security and Defence Policy and the European Union more broadly. We argue, second, that the crisis narrative allows the European Union to strengthen Common Security and Defence Policy and exhibit more aggressive military masculinities based on combat, which exist alongside entrepreneurial and protector masculinities. These developments do not indicate a clear militarisation of Common Security and Defence Policy, but, rather, an advancement and normalisation of militarism and the militarised masculinities associated with it.


2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (139) ◽  
pp. 301-306
Author(s):  
Tobias Pflüger

The EU-Constitution, as it looks now, includes not only an orientation on neoliberal policies, an essential part is also the “common defence policy”, pressing the EU members to spend more money for military purposes and preparing the EU for being a strong military power, which can intervene worldwide.


2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 801-816
Author(s):  
Matthew Uttley ◽  
Benedict Wilkinson ◽  
Armida van Rij

Abstract This article explores how the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence's (MoD) institutional vision of the potential future character of conflict is reflected in current defence policy decision-making and future force development planning. On the face of it, institutional arrangements in the MoD suggest that the results of ‘horizon-scanning’ and ‘futures’ analysis guide long-term defence planning in the design and development of the UK's future military roles and force structure. Our analysis points to the opposite. It suggests that it is the unchallenged assumption that the UK will remain a ‘Tier One’ defence power capable of deploying military power on a global scale and the MoD's long-term planning cycle that shape long-range forecasts of the future operating environment, rather than the other way round. Our explanation for this inversion is derived from the ‘New Institutionalism’ approach to public policy analysis. In taking this approach, we suggest that the outcomes of UK defence policy formation are strongly influenced by path dependency in the form of baked-in institutional ideas about the ‘appropriate’ role of Britain as a military power (‘what should be done’), along with historical capability investments underpinning UK defence that are costly to reverse (‘what can be changed’). By extension, we argue that if these embedded path dependencies explain the development of previous and current UK defence policy, then it should come as no surprise that the current ends, ways and means in UK defence are projected forward in the MoD's institutional view of potential future operating environments, resulting in limited change within established paths.


Author(s):  
Artyom A. Garin ◽  

Australia is the leading country in the South Pacific and sees it as part of a natural sphere of influence. For most of Australian history, a remote and isolated geographical location has worked to the benefit of the Fifth Continent and has ensured the security of Australia and its Oceania frontiers. Nowadays, the strategic environment in Asia-Pacific has undergone significant changes. Australia is concerned that during the intensive growth of the military power of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA), Beijing may be more interested in the South Pacific, in particular, in gaining naval bases in Oceania.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-215
Author(s):  
Hyun-Seok Song ◽  
Min-Ho Son ◽  
Sung-Ju Yoo ◽  
Do-Hyun Jung ◽  
Boo-Hee Park

Author(s):  
Mauricio Drelichman ◽  
Hans-Joachim Voth

This epilogue argues that Castile was solvent throughout Philip II's reign. A complex web of contractual obligations designed to ensure repayment governed the relationship between the king and his bankers. The same contracts allowed great flexibility for both the Crown and bankers when liquidity was tight. The risk of potential defaults was not a surprise; their likelihood was priced into the loan contracts. As a consequence, virtually every banking family turned a profit over the long term, while the king benefited from their services to run the largest empire that had yet existed. The epilogue then looks at the economic history version of Spain's Black Legend. The economic history version of the Black Legend emerged from a combination of two narratives: a rich historical tradition analyzing the decline of Spain as an economic and military power from the seventeenth century onward, combined with new institutional analysis highlighting the unconstrained power of the monarch.


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