Animal Liberation or Animal Rights?

Animal Rights ◽  
2017 ◽  
pp. 165-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Singer
Author(s):  
Robert Garner ◽  
Yewande Okuleye

This chapter describes the subsequent lives and careers of the group of ethical vegetarians who met at Oxford. More analytically, it seeks to consider how influential their crusade for animal rights has been, focusing on the impact of Singer’s Animal Liberation. In short, it is difficult to quantify the contribution made by the Oxford Group, and Singer’s work in particular, to the revitalization of the animal protection movement since the 1970s. Clearly, Animal Liberation has had a considerable influence, for some acting as a catalyst for the way they see the world, and for others reinforcing, and giving structure to, their already existing disquiet at the way animals are treated. It is extremely likely, however, that the considerable strides made by the animal protection movement (documented in this chapter) would have happened anyway even if the Oxford Group, and Singer’s work on animal ethics, had not existed.


2015 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 175
Author(s):  
Michael L. Nelson

Animal Rights and Welfare: A Documentary and Reference Guide is a collection of fifty-one primary source documents relating to the topics of animal rights and animal welfare. The preface states that these are separate and distinct philosophies: animal rights advocates such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals and the Animal Liberation Front hold that humans and animals have the same rights (thereby precluding their use even as pets or assistive animals), whereas animal welfare adherents like the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and the American Humane Society endorse the use of animals for agriculture, work, biomedical research, etc., but in a manner that minimizes pain and suffering.


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-339
Author(s):  
Saul M. Olyan

Abstract Much has been written about animal rights in the four decades since the appearance of Peter Singer’s classic monograph Animal Liberation (1975) and not a few studies consider – often in passing – what biblical texts have to contribute to debates about animal rights. These studies are, however, almost exclusively the work of non-specialists. I begin to address this dearth of professional scholarship on this topic by exploring what four biblical laws – Exod. 23:10-11, 12; Lev. 25:2-7 and Deut. 5:12-15 – might suggest about the legal standing of animals. As legal scholar Gary L. Francione states, “[W]e normally use [the term “rights”] to describe a type of protection that does not evaporate in the face of consequential considerations.” In this article, I consider whether the four biblical laws in question meet this standard.


Philosophy ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 66 (255) ◽  
pp. 25-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Harrison

In an oft-quoted passage fromThe Principles of Morals and Legislation(1789), Jeremy Bentham addresses the issue of our treatment of animals with the following words: ‘the question is not, Can theyreason? nor, can theytalk? but, Can theysuffer?’ The point is well taken, for surely if animals suffer, they are legitimate objects of our moral concern. It is curious therefore, given the current interest in the moral status of animals, that Bentham's question has been assumed to be merely rhetorical. No-one has seriously examined the claim, central to arguments for animal liberation and animal rights, that animals actually feel pain. Peter Singer'sAnimal Liberationis perhaps typical in this regard. His treatment of the issue covers a scant seven pages, after which he summarily announces that ‘there are no good reasons, scientific or philosophical, for denying that animals feel pain’. In this paper I shall suggest that the issue of animal pain is not so easily dispensed with, and that the evidence brought forward to demonstrate that animals feel pain is far from conclusive.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Hamilton

Political Science has tended not to problematize human domination over nonhuman animals. Political scientists have been engaged intellectually and politically with other struggles for justice and citizenship leading one to question the apparent indifference to the issue of ‘animal rights’. This paper accounts for the absence of animals in political science research and suggests that recent scholarship has begun to take animal liberation seriously. The paper then looks at the options for the broader animal liberation movement and suggests that incremental change is the best and only option for animal advocates in contemporary liberal democracies.


2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 293-299
Author(s):  
Corinne Painter ◽  

1999 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lyle Munro

AbstractThis article addresses a countermovement to the animal liberation movement and its campaigns against vivisection, factory farming, and recreational hunting in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. As moderate welfarists, pragmatic animal liberationists (Singer 1975), and radical abolitionists who advocate animal rights, animal protectionists campaign for animals. The countermovement defends acts that animal protectionists decry. Meanwhile, sociologists accord little study to interplay between the movements (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). In Buechler's and Cylke's collection of 34 papers on social movements (1997), only one paper focused on countermovements, describing the connection between social movement and countermovement as "a continuous dialect of social change" (Mottl, 1980). Although extensive writings exist on the main campaigns of the animal liberation movement, little scholarly material exists on the defenses mounted by the countermovement. This article examines key elements of a values war, a struggle over moral capital waged by animal protectionists and their countermovement opponents.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rainer Ebert

Do you remember Harambe, the 17-year-old silverback who was shot dead after a boy fell into the gorilla enclosure at the Cincinnati Zoo, Cecil, the lion who was shot with an arrow by an American dentist in Zimbabwe, and Marius, the giraffe who was killed and fed to other animals at the Copenhagen Zoo?Every once in a while, a news story about the human-caused death of an animal sparks global outrage, briefly lights up the comments sections on the internet, and reminds us of the inconsistency in how think about non-human animals. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, we kill approximately two thousand animals for food per second, not including fish and other marine animals. All of these animals have rich emotional lives that matter to them, and what we do to them is as bad, and often much worse, than what was done to Harambe, Cecil, and Marius. Most farm animals are raised in filthy and unnatural conditions, and are subject to routine mutilations and other mistreatment. They are transported in ways that are at best unpleasant and at worst horrific, and they die violent deaths. Yet, most of us – while expressing our moral indignation about the treatment of Harambe, Cecil, and Marius – rarely spare a thought for the animals we eat.Morally speaking, there does not seem to be much of a difference between what happened in Cincinnati, Zimbabwe, and Denmark and what happens in factory farms and slaughterhouses in every part of the world, every day. If anything, there was a better reason to kill Harambe – namely, to avert danger from a child – than there is to kill animals for food. We do not need to consume animal products to live a healthy and fulfilled life. In fact, careful studies have found that a well-balanced plant-based diet decreases the chances of suffering from diseases such as diabetes, heart disease, stroke, and some cancers, and benefits the environment.The way we think about and treat non-human animals is deeply confused, and scholars are in a unique position to provide some clarity. The Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics hence decided to dedicate two special issues to the relationship between human beings and other animals, and asked me to be the guest editor. This is the second of the two special issues, and contains the following five articles:The number of fish killed annually by the fishing industry, even on the most conservative estimate, is more than ten times larger than the number of terrestrial animals killed annually for food, and yet animal advocates largely focus on the latter in their efforts to reduce animal suffering. Bob Fischer (“Wild Fish and Expected Utility”) does the math and argues that considerations of expected utility call that focus into question. He concludes that animal advocacy organizations owe an explanation of why they are not directing more of their resources to fish.Akande Michael Aina and Ofuasia Emmanuel (“The Chicken Fallacy and the Ethics of Cruelty to Non-Human Animals”) challenge the common view that non-human animals are mere resources that we can use as we please, and ask whether Peter Singer’s ethics of animal liberation is a plausible alternative. They think it is not, in part because it denies moral status to non-sentient life, and take another approach that draws from Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. They argue that cruelty to non-human animals, with whom they claim we are on an equal moral footing, betrays our trusting and neighborly relationship with them.Iván Ortega Rodríguez (“Animal Citizenship, Phenomenology, and Ontology: Some reflections on Donaldson’s & Kymlicka’s Zoopolis”) provides a brief summary of the position Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka defend in their ground-breaking book Zoopolis, and argues that they are mistaken in failing to consider an important metaphysical difference between human beings and other animals. While human and non-human animals share a common environment, only human interaction constitutes what he calls a “world.” That difference, however, does not undermine the case for animal rights but rather strengthens it.Rhyddhi Chakraborty (“Animal Ethics and India: Understanding the Connection through the Capabilities Approach”) takes a critical look at a wide range of legal provisions in Indian law designed to protect non-human animals. She argues that, despite such provisions, nonhuman animals continue to suffer greatly at the hands of human beings in India, which is partly due to the lack of a comprehensive ethical vision. She suggests that the capabilities approach can provide such a vision, and concludes by making a number of policy recommendations to improve animal welfare in India.Robin Attfield and Rebekah Humphreys (“Justice and Non-Human Animals”) complete their argument for the claim that our treatment of non-human animals is a matter of justice, the first part of which can be found in the previous issue of this journal.I thank the contributors for choosing this journal to share their exciting ideas, and the reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions. I am also indebted to Professor Shamima Parvin Lasker and Ms. Tahera Ahmed for their cooperation and trust.If you, dear reader, are new to the academic debate over the moral status of non-human animals, and if the two Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics special issues on animal ethics have made you curious, as I hope they did, I would like to recommend to you two classics of the animal ethics literature: Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: New York Review/Random House, 1975); and Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983).I hope you will enjoy reading through this issue, and I am sending you my warm regards.Rainer Ebert Guest Editor, Bangladesh Journal of BioethicsDepartment of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg, South AfricaEmail: [email protected] Webpage: http://www.rainerebert.com


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