THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT TAKES ON THE CHALLENGE OF A NEW COMMUNICATION MEDIUM

2006 ◽  
pp. 179-200
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Communication Medium ◽  
The U.S

The Moral Core of U.S. Constitutional Bans on Hate Speech Codes

1998 ◽  
pp. 33-37
Author(s):  
Norman Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Hate Speech ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Speech Code ◽  
Stanford University ◽  
Speech Codes ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
The U.S

The striking down of the Stanford University Hate Speech Code on February 27, 1995 demonstrated the strong animus in U.S. First Amendment decisions against such codes. Judge Peter Stone, applying the U.S. Supreme Court decision in R.A.V. ruled, first, that the Stanford Code was too broad, and second, that the state cannot censor content by picking out some "fighting words" to prohibit. I argue that the moral basis for banning overbroad codes combines a nonconsequential emphasis on the value of liberty with a consequentialist analysis of what happens when liberty that should be protected is entangled in codes reflecting liberty that should not be protected. In contrast, the moral basis for content neutrality does not depend on consequentialist thinking, but shows that the very search for a moral basis for banning the purest acts of hateful speech logically makes the speech protected by elevating it to a viewpoint.

Legally Enforceable Reporter-Source Agreements: Chilling News Gathering at the Source?

1993 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 939-946 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew D. Bunker ◽  
Sigman L. Splichal
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Ethical Obligation ◽  
The Press ◽  
Media Organizations ◽  
The U.S

The promise of confidentiality between a reporter and source has long been considered a vital ethical obligation of the press. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., has recast that promise as one which state courts may enforce under contract law. The Court's opinion, which downplayed important First Amendment considerations, may have created a dangerous new ground of liability for media organizations.

scholarly journals Elonis v. United States: The Doctrine of True Threats: Protecting Our Ever-Shrinking First Amendment Rights in the New Era of Communication

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-223
Author(s):  
Mary Margaret Roark
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
The United States ◽  
New Era ◽  
The Public ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The U.S

The First Amendment protects one of our most precious rights as citizens of the United States—the freedom of speech. Such protection has withstood the test of time, even safeguarding speech that much of the population would find distasteful. There is one form of speech which cannot be protected: the true threat. However, the definition of what constitutes a "true threat" has expanded since its inception. In the new era of communication—where most users post first and edit later—the First Amendment protection we once possessed has been eroded as more and more speech is considered proscribable as a "true threat." In order to adequately protect both the public at large and our individual right to free speech, courts should analyze a speaker’s subjective intent before labeling speech a "true threat." Though many courts have adopted an objective, reasonable listener test, the U.S. Supreme Court now has the opportunity, in deciding Elonis v. United States, to take a monumental step in protecting the First Amendment right to free speech. By holding that the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten is necessary for a true threat conviction, the Court will restore the broad protection afforded by the First Amendment and repair years of erosion caused by an objective approach.

Defining Government Speech: Recent Approaches and the Germaneness Principle

2005 ◽  
Vol 82 (2) ◽  
pp. 398-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward L. Carter
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Social Issues ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
Private Speech ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Government ◽  
The U.S

In the last decade, the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts have fashioned the -principle that the First Amendment does not limit the government's ability to determine the content of its own messages. Yet the Supreme Court has not defined what is meant by “government speech.” Defined broadly, it may encompass viewpoint-based messages on controversial social issues, privately funded advocacy on behalf of certain industries, and official endorsement of certain ideologies. In the face of this uncertainty, and confronted with numerous recent cases in which the government asserts its right to expression, the U.S. courts of appeal have devised three major approaches to distinguishing government speech from private speech. The Supreme Court touched on aspects of these approaches in an important 2005 opinion, yet significant questions remain about the definitional contours of the Court's developing government speech doctrine.

Does the Hyde Amendment Violate Religious Freedom? Harris v. McRae and the First Amendment

1980 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-372
Author(s):  
Jay Alexander Gold
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Religious Freedom ◽  
Recent Case ◽  
Free Exercise ◽  
Exercise Challenge ◽  
First Time ◽  
The U.S

AbstractIn Harris v. McRae, the recent case in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, the Court for the first time was asked to consider whether antiabortion legislation respects the establishment of religion or violates the free exercise thereof. The Court held that the Amendment did not effect an establishment of religion, and found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to raise the free exercise argument.The writer explores the questions raised, agreeing with the Court's disposal of the establishment argument. He does find considerable.validity in the free exercise challenge, but concludes that the Court as presently constituted is unlikely to accept it. In addition, he believes that the Court, in its treatment of both arguments, either ignored or improperly dis tinguished earlier cases that supported the plaintiffs.

How Ontology Saved Free Speech in Cyberspace

1998 ◽  
pp. 64-69
Author(s):  
Julie Van Camp
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Physical World ◽  
The Internet ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
The Supreme Court

Reno v. ACLU, the 1997 landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court providing sweeping protection to speech on the Internet, is usually discussed in terms of familiar First Amendment issues. Little noticed in the decision is the significance of the ontological assumptions of the justices in their first visit to cyberspace. I analyze the apparent awareness of the Supreme Court of ontological issues and problems with their approaches. I also argue that their current ontological assumptions have left open the door to future suppression of free speech as the technology progresses. Ontology is significant because zoning in the physical world has long been recognized as a way to segregate "adult" entertainment from minors. So far, at least, the justices seem to agree that such zoning is not possible in cyberspace, and therefore that adult zones for certain forms of expression are not possible. But this conclusion is far from settled. The degree of free speech on the Internet in the future will depend on whether or not our ontological understanding of cyberspace supports such zoning or renders it incoherent or impossible.

scholarly journals The Holmes Truth: Toward a Pragmatic, Holmes-Influenced Conceptualization of the Nature of Truth

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-203
Author(s):  
Jared Schroeder
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
First Amendment ◽  
William James ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Complex Relationship ◽  
Oliver Wendell Holmes ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Traditional Approaches ◽  
The U.S

Abstract Truth as a fundamental ingredient within the flow of discourse and the application of freedom of expression in democratic society has historically received considerable attention from the U.S. Supreme Court. Many of the Court’s central precedents regarding First Amendment concerns have been determined by how justices have understood truth and how they have conceptualized the complex relationship truth and falsity share. Despite the attention truth has received, however, the Court has not provided a consistent understanding of its meaning. For these reasons, this article examines how the Supreme Court has conceptualized truth in freedom-of-expression cases, ultimately drawing upon the results of that analysis, as well as pragmatic approaches to philosophy, the so called “pragmatic method” put forth by American philosopher William James, to propose a unifying conceptualization of truth that could be employed to help the Court provide consistency within its precedents regarding the meaning of a concept that has been central to the Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment since, in many ways, another pragmatist and friend of James’s, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, substantially addressed truth in his dissent in Abrams v. United States. The article concludes by proposing that the courts conceptualize the nature of truth via three substantially related understandings: that truth is a process, that it is experience-funded, and that it is not absolute and is best approached without prejudice. Each of the three ingredients relates, at least to some extent, with thematic understandings put forth by the Court in previous freedom-of-expression cases, and therefore does not represent a significant departure from justices’ traditional approaches to truth. The model, most ideally, does seek, with the help of pragmatic thought and ideas put forth by Justice Holmes, to encourage consistent recognition of certain principles regarding truth as justices go about considering its nature in First Amendment cases.

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