essential to understand the nature of the legal issues raised at the original trial, as the appeal is a consequence of the trial! As an appeal progresses, there may be changes to the grounds of the appeal. If the developmental history of the appeal is not properly understood, important changes may even be missed. (a) Go back to the judgment of Neill LJ and show as concisely as you can on a tree diagram the following information: • Who were the applicants? • Why did the applicants appeal? • What exactly did the applicants want the court to do? • What legal rules were being relied on by the applicants? (b) Read the Court of Appeal judgment and set out as concisely as you can on a tree diagram the answers to the following questions: • Who were the appellants? • Why did the appellants appeal? • What exactly did the appellants want the court to do? • What legal rules were being relied on by the appellants? (c) Now read the House of Lords’ judgment, and again on a tree diagram set out the answers to the following questions: • Who were the appellants? • Why did the appellants appeal? • Why is there an opinion by the ECJ in this judgment?

2012 ◽  
pp. 295-296
2012 ◽  
pp. 99-99

Having defined ethnic origin, the next task was to apply that definition to Sikhs to consider whether they could be said to be ‘people defined…by reference to… ethnic origins’. Lord Denning launched into a potted and largely inaccurate history of the word ‘Sikh’ and the people who follow the teaching of Guru Nanak. Again, in a subjective and arbitrary manner, Lord Denning decided that: (a) Sikhs can only be distinguished by religion, and therefore (b) they are not defined by ‘ethnic origins’, and therefore (c) they are not a racial group, and therefore (d) it is not illegal to discriminate against Sikhs. Lord Denning’s entire reasoning process rests on dictionary definitions and homespun inaccurate conclusions. He went on to criticise the CRE for bringing the case, stating that schools should not be interfered with when they properly manage their affairs. Oliver LJ in the same court said that the dictionary shows ‘ethnic’ to be a vague word and he doubts whether only the most general assistance can be obtained from dictionaries. Can one discern a community in a loose sense among Sikhs, he asked rhetorically? Without providing evidence, he says no, customs among Sikhs are so disparate they cannot be said to be members of an ethnic group. However, the essence of the discrimination legislation is that the ‘man in the street’ is the one to discriminate. The court concluded that Sikhs were not an ethnic group. The CRE appealed to the House of Lords. The House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal, allowing the appeal. The House of Lords found that, to be an ethnic group, a group must be regarded by itself and others as a distinct community with, for instance, a shared culture, history, language, common descent or geography, customs, religion. Not all of these factors need be present. The main judgment given was by Lord Fraser. He discussed the views of Lord Denning and Oliver LJ in the Court of Appeal. He dispensed with the dictionary arguments and the suggestion that ethnic denotes race by saying, in favour of a teleological approach:

2012 ◽  
pp. 121-121

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-82
Author(s):  
Hubert Mielnik

The German occupiers abolished the Supreme Court in the General Government. In the Polish (non-German) judiciary sector, there was no court of the highest instance to ensure the unification of jurisprudence. The competence to ensure the uniformity of jurisprudence and resolve existing doubts and legal issues was transferred to the courts of appeal. The objective of the present article was to demonstrate the procedure and practice of issuing legal theses by the Court of Appeal in Kraków. The article also presents changes in the composition of the judges and the territorial jurisdiction of the Kraków Court of Appeal. Archival sources constitute the source basis of the work. We also resorted to the latest subject literature. The work is based mainly on the analysis of archival sources and legal acts, so the scientific methods typical of the history of law were applied.


school hours. Mr Mandla reported the matter to the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) who took up the case. The CRE alleged that the son had been unlawfully discriminated against, either directly or indirectly, on racial grounds, in that he had been denied a place at the school because of his custom of wearing a turban. 4.8.3 The meaning of the word ‘ethnic’ in s 3 of the Race Relations Act 1976 The case raised a number of issues. The first issue, which was of tremendous importance to the Sikh community, was whether the Race Relations Act was the relevant statute to take action under. The Race Relations Act states that it is unlawful to discriminate against another on racial grounds in the areas covered by the Act. One of these areas is education. To bring an action, it had to be proved that Sikhs were a racial group. Section 3 of the Act defines racial grounds as: …a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins. The main argument centred around whether Sikhs fitted into the word ‘ethnic’ as other words and phrases in the list in s 3 were accepted as not applicable. The trial court found that Sikhs were not a racial group and the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal and came before Lord Denning. The Court of Appeal had two choices. It could take the teleological approach—looking at the wider context—considering the history behind the legislation, the mischief that it was designed to rectify; or it could choose a formalist approach, considering the text, the word or words, and their possible meanings in a more literal sense. Lord Denning had always, in essence, taken a teleological approach. He had, for much of his legal career as a senior judge, fought against blind literalism. He had always fought for the right to ‘fill in the gaps’ left in legislation. Indeed, his career was often based on the right to take the broader teleological view rather than the narrow, literalist view. Surprisingly, he chose, in this case, to take the formalist approach, to stand by the literal meaning of the words. He discussed the history of the word ‘ethnic’ (its etymology). Certainly, the etymology of the word is fascinating; however, why did the legislators put in the word ‘ethnic’? Did they do so after scanning its etymology? Of course, it is not known. Yet, an interpretation based on the history of a word obviously presumes that, yes, the legislators did consider the etymology of the word. Otherwise, there is no point in the court doing so. When constructing legal rules in fixed verbal form, language is of the utmost importance. Thought is given to the best words to be used to ‘fix’ or ‘stick’ the rule, so that contrary interpretations cannot be reached by courts; and so that the mischief to be tackled is tackled. However, as noted in Chapter 2, the flexibility of language will not allow it to be permanently fixed. The choice of words is often determined by: (1) a desire to make it impossible for judges to change the meaning; (2) a desire to make a major policy change as uncontentious as possible;

2012 ◽  
pp. 119-119

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 198-207
Author(s):  
Margaret Ogilvie

Anyone hoping that the British Columbia Court of Appeal, in Bentley v Anglican Synod of the Diocese of New Westminster  would resolve the doctrinal and related property disputes in the Anglican Church of Canada (ACC) and even in the world-wide Anglican Communion over same-sex blessings must come away from the decision of Newbury JA for the unanimous court greatly disappointed: the court left the dispute exactly where it began – in the ACC. Conversely, anyone hoping that the court would do precisely that will be greatly relieved by this exercise of judicial self-restraint in the face of the many challenging theological and legal issues presented by the case. Stripped to its essentials, the court found that the property to which four former parishes in the diocese of New Westminster laid claim by way of a cy-près application was held by the diocese pursuant to a statutory trust for the uses of the diocese and the ACC. The court further characterised the dispute over same-sex blessings as an internal dispute among Anglicans on the basis of which a cy-près order cannot be made in favour of parishes which no longer regard the Bishop of New Westminster as their bishop. This simple, legal outcome followed an 11 day trial in the British Columbia Supreme Court, a four day appeal hearing, and two lengthy judgments, each of just under 100 pages, which ranged widely over the history of the dispute within the ACC and the larger Anglican Communion, and the Anglo-Canadian common law relating to the resolution of church property disputes since the 1813 decision of Lord Eldon in Craigdallie v Aikman, almost two centuries before.


1991 ◽  
Vol 73 (3_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1244-1246 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. A. Persinger ◽  
Katherine Makarec

28 men and 32 women were given Vingiano's Hemisphericity Questionnaire and the Coopersmith Self-esteem Inventory. People who reported the greatest numbers of right hemispheric indicators displayed the lowest self-esteem; the correlations were moderately strong ( r>.50) for both men and women. These results support the hypothesis that the sense of self is primarily a linguistic, left-hemispheric phenomenon and that a developmental history of frequent intrusion from right-hemispheric processes can infuse the self-concept with negative affect.


2010 ◽  
Vol 74 (5) ◽  
pp. 434-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cath Crosby

This article considers the basis upon which a person should be held to be criminally liable, and to do so, it is necessary to examine the leading theories of character and choice that underpin the State holding a person to be culpable of a criminal offence, i.e. the link between culpability and fault. The case of R v Kingston1 is used to examine the application of these leading theories and it is observed that choice theorists would not excuse such a defendant from criminal liability even though his capacity to make a choice to refrain from law breaking was made extremely difficult by external factors beyond his control. Only character theory could possibly offer exculpation in such circumstances on the basis that the defendant acted ‘out of character’ and his deed did not deserve the full censure and punishment of the criminal law. The Court of Appeal in R v Kingston would have been prepared to excuse, but the House of Lords, and most recently the Law Commission have adopted a pragmatic approach to the involuntarily intoxicated offender. This case serves as a reminder that while justice is the aim of the criminal justice system, it is not an absolute standard.


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