7 CASE NOTING It is at this point that a case note can be made. The case note has to contain all of the information that enables the case to be used. One of the most important tasks of a law student or, indeed, a legal professional is the ability to read a case and make a usable record of it. The cases that are reported are invariably important as non-important cases remain as court transcripts. The case note must note all of the important issues for the application of precedent, such as: • date of court and formal citation; • hierarchy of court, judges; • facts; • issues before the trial court; • identification of applicable legal rules; • issues, if different before appellate court(s); • procedural history of the case (in what other courts has the matter been heard); • judicial reasoning as to: why those rules applied to those facts in that way. A case note cannot be used if it only records the facts and not the rationale for the outcome as everything in law depends upon the legal reasoning. A case can only be properly used in legal argument when the reasoning of the court is both known and understood. Many students misunderstand the purpose of case noting and think that it is sufficient to have the facts of the case and know the rules concerned. This is a little like having the ingredients for a cake and knowing that, when heated, something changes, but not knowing what to do with the ingredients. It is often not even necessary to rehearse the facts of a case in an argument in which the case is used. What is important is to know points of similarity and difference in facts so that adjustments can be made to the reasoning processes in applying the earlier case to the later situation. If strenuous efforts have been made to understand a law report thoroughly, the following benefits will be achieved: (1) the case note will contain all the ingredients to enable it to be competently applied to any problem question or incorporated into any relevant essay; (2) understanding of the topic and arguing techniques will be increased; (3) competent execution of assessments and examinations (if your analysis of the questions asked is not wrong!)

2012 ◽  
pp. 114-114

school hours. Mr Mandla reported the matter to the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) who took up the case. The CRE alleged that the son had been unlawfully discriminated against, either directly or indirectly, on racial grounds, in that he had been denied a place at the school because of his custom of wearing a turban. 4.8.3 The meaning of the word ‘ethnic’ in s 3 of the Race Relations Act 1976 The case raised a number of issues. The first issue, which was of tremendous importance to the Sikh community, was whether the Race Relations Act was the relevant statute to take action under. The Race Relations Act states that it is unlawful to discriminate against another on racial grounds in the areas covered by the Act. One of these areas is education. To bring an action, it had to be proved that Sikhs were a racial group. Section 3 of the Act defines racial grounds as: …a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins. The main argument centred around whether Sikhs fitted into the word ‘ethnic’ as other words and phrases in the list in s 3 were accepted as not applicable. The trial court found that Sikhs were not a racial group and the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal and came before Lord Denning. The Court of Appeal had two choices. It could take the teleological approach—looking at the wider context—considering the history behind the legislation, the mischief that it was designed to rectify; or it could choose a formalist approach, considering the text, the word or words, and their possible meanings in a more literal sense. Lord Denning had always, in essence, taken a teleological approach. He had, for much of his legal career as a senior judge, fought against blind literalism. He had always fought for the right to ‘fill in the gaps’ left in legislation. Indeed, his career was often based on the right to take the broader teleological view rather than the narrow, literalist view. Surprisingly, he chose, in this case, to take the formalist approach, to stand by the literal meaning of the words. He discussed the history of the word ‘ethnic’ (its etymology). Certainly, the etymology of the word is fascinating; however, why did the legislators put in the word ‘ethnic’? Did they do so after scanning its etymology? Of course, it is not known. Yet, an interpretation based on the history of a word obviously presumes that, yes, the legislators did consider the etymology of the word. Otherwise, there is no point in the court doing so. When constructing legal rules in fixed verbal form, language is of the utmost importance. Thought is given to the best words to be used to ‘fix’ or ‘stick’ the rule, so that contrary interpretations cannot be reached by courts; and so that the mischief to be tackled is tackled. However, as noted in Chapter 2, the flexibility of language will not allow it to be permanently fixed. The choice of words is often determined by: (1) a desire to make it impossible for judges to change the meaning; (2) a desire to make a major policy change as uncontentious as possible;

2012 ◽  
pp. 119-119

Author(s):  
Martin Loughlin

This chapter examines the history of political-legal reasoning. It suggests that this history begins in the Renaissance with the emergence of a doctrine of ‘reason of state’, a doctrine which was widely debated between the late-sixteenth and early-eighteenth centuries but remained contentious throughout. It argues that reason of state continued to exert an influence in the modern political world, but that that influence is complicated by changes in the nature and forms of government. Most importantly, the modern state presents itself as a constitutional state and once the constitution is established as ‘fundamental law’, whatever remains of reason of state discourse is subsumed under the idea of ‘constitutional legality’. Consequently, those elements of the doctrine that live on in contemporary practice no longer fall into a distinct category of reason of state; they have become a facet of the emergence of the modern ‘state of reason’.


1665 ◽  
Vol 1 (18) ◽  
pp. 315-316 ◽  

The publisher of these tracts, knowing that the Honorable Robert Boyle had not left unconsidered the natural history of the sea, of which subject the late, and these present papers, have entertained the reader as to the observables of its flux and reflux; He was on this occasion instant, with that gentleman to impart to him, for publication, these heads of inquiries, he had drawn up, touching that subject: which having obtained (though the author desires, they may be lookt upon as unfinisht) he thus subjoyns.


Stroke ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (Suppl_1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Chen ◽  
Dawn Meyer ◽  
Brett Meyer

Background: Isolated mental status changes as presenting sign (EoSC+), are not uncommon stroke code triggers. As stroke alerts, they still require the same intensive resources be applied. We previously showed that EoSC+ strokes (EoSC+CVA+) account for 8-9% of EoSC+ codes but only 0.1-0.2% of all codes. Whether these result in thrombolytic treatment (rt-PA), and the characteristics/ risk factor profiles of EoSC+CVA+ patients, have not been reported. Methods: Retrospective analysis of stroke codes from an IRB approved registry, from 2004 to 2018, was performed. EoSC+ definition used was consistent with prior publications (NIHSS>0 for Q1a, 1b, or 1c with remaining elements scored 0). Other definitions were also assessed. Characteristics and risk factors were compared for EoSC+, EoSC+CVA+, and rt-PA (EoSC+ CVA+TPA+) patients. Results: EoSC+ occurred in 59/2982 (1.98%) of all stroke codes. EoSC+CVA+ occurred in 8/59 (13.56%) of EoSC+ codes and 8/2982 (0.27%) of all stroke codes. 6/8 (75%) of EoSC+CVA+ scored NIHSS=1. Hispanic ethnicity (p=0.009), HTN (p=0.02), and history of stroke/TIA (p=0.002) were less common in EoSC+. No demographic/ risk factor differences were noted for [EoSC+CVA+ vs. EoSC+CVA-]. No cases of rt-PA eligibility/ treatment were noted. In EoSC+CVA+ analysis, imaging positive stroke/intracranial hemorrhage was noted on only 3 cases (3/2982=0.10% of all stroke codes) and none were posterior stroke. Conclusions: EoSC+ is not an uncommon reason to activate stroke codes, but rarely results in stroke/TIA (0.27%) or stroke (0.10%), and in our analysis never (0%) resulted in rt-PA. Sub-analysis did not show missed rt-PA or posterior strokes. This adds information for application of limited acute stroke code resources. Though stroke codes must still to be activated, understanding characteristics, and knowing that EoSC+CVA+ patients are unlikely to receive rt-PA, may help triage stroke resources. Further investigation is warranted.


Author(s):  
Kimberly M. Welch

Black plaintiffs in civil suits remain a little known aspect of the legal history of the slave South. African Americans were not only observers of trials, informal participants, defendants, or objects of regulation: trial court records reveal them to be prolific litigators as well. They were parties to civil suits in their own interests and directly active in legal proceedings. They sued other black people, certainly, but they also sued white people. What is more, they often won. This is a phenomenon that has largely been overlooked by historians. But it ought not to be, because it speaks to the heart of the ways we understand the operation of power, of law, and of racial hierarchies in the slave South. The black legal experience in America cannot be reduced to white regulation and black criminality. Examining African Americans’ involvement in private law reveals a different picture. Black people appealed to the courts to protect their interests. They exploited the language of rights and property, thus including themselves within an American narrative of citizenship and privilege in advance of formal emancipation. When black litigants made such claims at law, they expected the courts to validate and execute those claims. Indeed, they sought accountability. Thus, seemingly mundane civil actions like debt recovery suits complicate our notions about the sources of rights and their relationship to civic inclusion.


However, before previous cases can be considered as potential ratios, they need to be located according to whether or not they are similar to the present case. Sometimes, counsel for the litigants will strenuously argue that previous cases are not precedents because they can be distinguished on their facts. In other words, they are not similar; the court may agree out of persuasion or policy. In this way extremely subtle ‘differences’ are found between two cases. It is difficult if not impossible to come up with a clear formula that will always work for ascertaining the ratio of a case. But a reasonable idea of the difficulties in ascertaining the ratio is a necessary and revealing step for any interpreter engaged in the search for a ratio. Appreciation of the difficulties prevents simplistic case analysis which will ultimately lead to simplistic and inadequate construction of legal arguments. If an argument is being made on weak, tenuous or stretched grounds, it is better to know than be ignorant as to the basis of the case one is constructing. One of the major difficulties involved concerns the different types of information and skills that have to be utilised in deciding whether a case is a precedent. To provide some light relief, work through the questions in the chart in Figure 4.6, below. It is an over-simplistic chart asking some of the necessary questions to decide if a previous case constitutes a precedent to be followed in a current case. As mentioned above, the law tends to work through generalised rules which have to be applied to specific circumstances. This is why lawyers spend so much time comparing, contrasting and differentiating situations, for they are constructing arguments based upon similarity and difference. Legal rules are, by convention and necessity, expressed as general rules. Lawyers have to reason from the generality of the rule to the specificity of the situation. At times, lawyers have to research previous cases meticulously to assist in predicting the outcome of the current case. After all, there is no point in going to court if the exact point the client wishes to make has already come before a court and been determined to his detriment. Part of the lawyer’s particular expertise is knowing how to look quickly through past cases to find relevant decisions either supporting or opposing a client’s case. The location of materials is relatively easy given the range of on-line databases available. Unfortunately, students often do not have unlimited access to training in how to use such databases. So, there is a need to rely on one of the citators to locate relevant cases. Searches can be made, first, to pinpoint cases dealing with specific legal rules; secondly, a range of cases with similar facts can be located through analysing the first trawl of data. These cases then need to be carefully read and analysed. The lawyer has to construct an argument and predict the opponent’s arguments. This is done by, initially, checking relevant cases. It must be evident by now that the ability to locate and subsequently analyse law reports is extremely important. After careful reading, the lawyer has to construct detailed arguments concerning similarities with other cases that help the client’s position, and arguments need to be constructed demolishing the potential precedential value of cases not helping the client. This latter skill is called distinguishing, and it is a particularly important skill for those who wish to ensure that a precedent is not followed.

2012 ◽  
pp. 85-86

2021 ◽  
pp. 17-25
Author(s):  
Mohammad Hashim Kamali

In addition to a concise review of the meaning and definition of shariah, the chapter introduces the sources of shariah, including the two main types of revealed and rational sources and their subdivisions. The history of shariah (“the way to the watering place,” or “the path to correct guidance, salvation, and relief”) is occupied with scholastic developments and the embodiment of what became known as fiqh, which consists mainly of the practical rules of Islamic law that regulate the daily lives of Muslims. Shariah is a broad concept that is not confined to legal rules but comprises the totality of guidance that God Most High has revealed to humankind, pertaining to the dogma of Islam, its moral values, and its practical legal rules.


Anxiety ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 133-174
Author(s):  
Bettina Bergo

Initially influenced by Schelling’s lectures on positive philosophy (1841–1842), Kierkegaard ultimately withdrew from his lectures, devoting his attention exclusively to the redaction of Either/Or. The Concept of Anxiety was written in the shadow of that work under a uniquely anonymous pseudonym. Of course, anxiety in his deformalization of late idealism was not a concept; it belonged and did not belong to the understanding. Indeed, it precedes human actions under the sign of inherited “sinfulness” and as sheer possibility. If Kierkegaard aligned freedom with a leap, then anxiety was the affect precursive to it. Anxiety was the prethetic knowing that we are able to do. . . X. Tracing the “spiritual” history of the human race which carries the sins of the fathers even as it freely enacts sin, Kierkegaard urged that the more spiritual the culture, the more anxious it was. No longer the adjuvant of reason as in Hegel, anxiety belonged to the irreducible condition of a living subject. Over the five years that separated the Concept of Anxiety from Sickness onto Death, Kierkegaard’s mood of “Angest” will intensify as it is approached from his new perspective of Coram Deo (“before God”). Within the new perspective, the status and the meaning of the self is altered, showing a clearer relation to infinity. For the task of Kierkegaard’s philosophy—learning to become the nothing that one is—had attained a new stage in his existential dialectic. His arguments influenced Heidegger’s recourse to anxiety as a passage toward the question of being.


Author(s):  
Joseph Sheridan Le Fanu

My dear friend—You have asked me to furnish you with a detail of the strange events which marked my early history, and I have, without hesitation, applied myself to the task, knowing that while I live, a kind consideration for my feelings will prevent...


1994 ◽  
Vol 161 ◽  
pp. 37-41
Author(s):  
C. Pollas

The name of Zwicky is attached to the first photographic Palomar Survey and to the History of SNe study. An exciting study resumed by the striking image (M = −19) of a transient source appearing at extragalactic distance, as bright as the total magnitude of its parent galaxy. Expected to explode once a century, such an event is rare. But the more galaxies are checked the more SNe are found. That is why the wide-field is a good tool. The Palomar team SNe activity was followed by a quiet period of the whole SNe discovery (Fig. 1); from those the Cero El Robles search emerged in the early eighties. Several important patrols continued with Schmidt telescopes of size about 0.5 m (Bern, Hungary, Urss…) in spite of the low level of SNe found. Important because knowing that no SN exploded in a galaxy (especially in the sample of nearby galaxies) is the basis of the statistics. The SNe production increased in the late eighties. At the same time, the closest modern SN (1987A) led for the first time to the use of a number of instruments complementing each other to increase our understanding of SNe. But more important than the production of new SNe, is the increase of their spectroscopic classification which is necessary to the SNe work.


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