One size fits all? The role of size in coalition formation and portfolio allocation after the local elections of 2006 in the Flemish region in Belgium

2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 901-931
Author(s):  
Ellen Olislagers ◽  
Kristof Steyvers

This paper focuses on the role of size in coalition formation in the Flemish region in Belgium after the local elections of 2006. A quantitative analysis already showed that size matters at the local level. In this paper, portfolio allocation is considered as an important part of coalition formation. This paper illustrates that combining research methods can enhance our knowledge about the role of size in the coalition formation process. The results demonstrate that parties consider a minimal winning and minimum parties coalition as a starting point for the negotiations and other factors influence the final coalition outcome. In portfolio allocation proportionality rules, but parties also prefer competences related to their policy profile. Intra-party and personal characteristics play an important role in selecting the executive mandates.

Author(s):  
Rumyana Kolarova ◽  
Maria Spirova

Democracy in Bulgaria came as a result of a pact that preserved the role of the communist successor party to a larger degree than in many other post-communist countries in Central Eastern Europe (CEE). That had an impact on the nature of coalition government as well as an important but rarely noted aspect of the legacy of the successor party, the Bulgarian Socialist party (BSP). Because of the dominant position of the BSP, its personalized and centralized vision and practice of governing have remained characteristic of the political system. Coalition government is the dominant pattern in Bulgarian democratic politics: of the eleven party-based cabinets since 1990, only four were single-party ones. There are several major features of coalition government in Bulgaria: one is that party-building and coalition-making have been deeply intertwined over the entire period. Further, coalitions have been based on the understanding that parties divide the power and accompanying privileges, rather than that they share responsibility for government. Thus, in contrast to some longer-standing democracies the coalition formation process rarely involves detailed agreements on policy, and has mostly revolved around personalities and portfolios. As a result, coalition agreements have been minimal and the periods of coalition bargaining have been relatively short. Conflict resolution mechanisms are centralized and personalized, and coalitions have broken down because of narrow party political interests rather than because of principled conflicts over public policy.


Author(s):  
E. Tsedilina

The local elections held in Ukraine were far from being of local significance. They showed the real balance of political forces in the country: significant reduction in ranking of the “Servant of the People” and strengthening of the parliamentary opposition represented by the “Opposition Platform – For Life” and “European Solidarity”. These three parties each received approximately the same number of votes. This shows that the President’s political force has been unable to fulfill the role of a unifying center for the country. Ukraine has returned to a state of polarization, when the population votes for diametrically opposed political projects. However, despite the obvious loss of confidence of many voters, Zelensky’s party still retains a leading position. And what is especially important for the “Servant of the People”, as a result of the vote, it received representation at the local level thus making the President power vertical finally completed. The elections also showed a significant increase in the role of regional elites, who became the main winners of the vote. The strengthening of local authorities against the backdrop of a weakening center threatens to regionalize the country – splitting it not only politically, but also geographically.


Author(s):  
Jochen Franzke

This chapter analyses basic long-term trends in local governance in Germany in their functional, political, territorial and administrative dimensions. The traditions and legal framework of German local self-government form the starting point of the chapter. Subsequently, the role of the local level in the German federal system and the level of its autonomy are analysed. After that, the most important political-administrative actors in local governance examines, such as councilors, mayors, local administration, local branches of political parties and free voters associations. In describing the long-term trends and challenges in German local politics, special attention is paid to local public management, local democracy and citizen participation. Finally, the chapter ends with a summary of the most important aspects of the development of the municipalities and districts in Germany and with a view towards further reform.


2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 599-600
Author(s):  
J. Eric Oliver

Like most fields of knowledge, political science tends to progress incrementally. Typically, a political scientist develops a model about a prominent institution or common behavior and that model becomes the starting point for understanding all its other permutations. This is especially the case in studies of American state and local government, which tend to follow theories of national politics. Scholars of state legislatures typically begin their analysis by using studies of the U.S. Congress, analysts of local elections start with presidential vote models, and so on. But, as Elaine Sharp reminds us in Does Local Government Matter?, we should not be so quick to assume that models or theories about national-level politics translate easily to the local level. In fact, local politics may operate under logics all their own.


2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjan Brezovšek ◽  
Lea Smerkolj

The fundamental principle of the modern local self-government system is the transfer of decision-making on public matters to the lowest possible level, enabling citizens to identify themselves with the local political environment as much as possible. Local government is considered democratic if its performance is decisively and directly or indirectly influenced (through elected representatives that are entrusted with local-level tasks) by the citizens themselves. Local elections are frequently compared to national elections, even though data show that local elections have their own peculiarities that cannot be applied to the national level. This is especially true regarding the dominant role of non-partisan candidates, and the ever decreasing support for political parties. Without the latter, one cannot even imagine the national level of government because they represent the key actors in national democratic political systems. Regarding the degree of trust in political parties at the local level, one can identify a trend indicating that citizens have gained a greater awareness that local-level politics is not related to party adherence, and that individuals’ personalities and their alleged apolitical character is coming increasingly to the fore, which is reflected by a high number of eligible non-partisan candidates. Therefore, one can see in Slovenia that people have become frustrated over the politicisation of local-level politics by expressing an ever-greater desire to support non-partisan candidates for the leaders of their local communities. Thus, they seek the candidates whose performance is not politically marked so that they can more easily identify themselves with them. Keywords: • local democracy • local elections • parliamentary elections • political parties • non-partisan candidates • Slovenia


2020 ◽  
pp. 135406882091454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harunobu Saijo

Whereas much of the existing literature on coalition formation has focused on the disparity between Gamsonian payoffs and the outcomes of bargaining models, dangers of ministerial drift, party ideal points, issue salience/emphasis, and negotiation complexity, very little has been said on the role of the way public opinion affects political behavior via expectation of future electoral returns. Following the logic of “issue yield,” this article argues that politicians allocate ministerial portfolios according to the distribution of public opinion in the hopes of obtaining better returns in subsequent elections and find compelling evidence linking public opinion with portfolio allocation.


1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 873-890 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Laver ◽  
Kenneth A. Shepsle

The formal study of coalitions is active in Europe, whereas the formal study of political institutions preoccupies American scholars. We seek to integrate aspects of these two bodies of research. For nearly thirty years models of coalition government have focused more on coalition than on government. Thus, these theories are essentially extensions of the theory of voting in legislatures. Unlike passing a bill or “dividing a dollar,” however, forming a government is not the end of politics but the beginning. During the formation process, rational actors must entertain expectations of subsequent government behavior. We provide a model of rational expectations with an emphasis on the credibility of the policy promises of prospective government partners as determined by the allocation of portfolios in the new government. Portfolio allocation becomes the mechanism by which prospective coalitions make credible promises and so inform the expectations of rational agents in the coalition formation process.


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