scholarly journals Коммуникация миротворческой миссии на востоке Украины

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 31-53
Author(s):  
Iryna Boginska

W artykule przeanalizowano konflikt o koncepcję misji pokojowej ONZ na wschodzie Ukrainy między Ukrainąa Federacją Rosyjską. Analiza konfliktu opiera się na krytycznym podejściu do oficjalnych narracji zawierających odniesienia do sił pokojowych ONZ w latach 2015‑2021. Stwierdzono, że po raz pierwszy koncepcja misji pokojowej ONZ pojawiła się w ukraińskim dyskursie politycznym zaraz po podpisaniu drugiej części porozumień mińskich (Mińsk‑2). W centrum dyskursu międzynarodowego znalazła się ona po tym, jak prezydent Rosji W. Putin zainicjował wniesienie projektu rezolucji do Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ. Rosyjskie podejście do misji pokojowej było formułowane w ścisłym związku z realizacją porozumień mińskich i nie pozwalało na ich interpretację. Zasadniczo podejście Federacji Rosyjskiej („koncepcja defensywna”) i Ukrainy („szeroki mandat”) rozwijają i dostosowują koncepcję nowoczesnego utrzymania pokoju do interesów stron konfliktu. Narracje rosyjsko‑ukraińskie są podstawą do szczegółowego zrozumienia natury konfliktu i możliwych sposobów jego rozwiązania. Wykorzystanie narzędzi propagandowych w celu promowania wielokierunkowego podejścia do sił pokojowych ONZ przeniosło konflikt na wyższy poziom. Analiza komunikatów misji pokojowej obejmuje formaty negocjacyjne, na których omawiano tę kwestię. Takimi platformami negocjacyjnymi były: format normandzki, Monachijska Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa, Zgromadzenie Ogólne ONZ, spotkania Surkowa‑Volkera itd. Rada Bezpieczeństwa ONZ nie przekształciła się w dodatkowy kanał komunikacji, ponieważ nie udało się skoordynować i połączyć stanowisk Ukrainy i Federacji Rosyjskiej. Próby uzgodnienia misji pokojowej w ramach realizacji porozumień mińskich doprowadziły do impasu negocjacyjnego i wykluczenia tego punktu z agendy negocjacji międzynarodowych. Artykuł dotyczy kwestii kształtowania się poparcia społecznego dla scenariusza rozwiązania konfliktu w oparciu o działania ONZ. Zagadnienie to zostało zbadane na podstawie badań opinii publicznej oraz arbitralnie dobranych przykładów, które stanowią bazę dowodową do oceny wpływu społeczeństwa obywatelskiego na podejmowanie decyzji na Ukrainie. Jednocześnie pokazano aspekty humanitarne, które mogłyby potencjalnie wpłynąć na procesy rozwiązywania konfliktu w Donbasie. Communication of the peacekeeping mission in eastern Ukraine The article examines the conflict over the idea UN peacekeeping mission in eastern Ukraine between Ukraine and Russian Federation. The analysis of the conflict is based on a critical approach to the official narratives which is containing references to the UN peacekeepers in 2015‑2021. It was established that the first time the idea UN peacekeeping mission appeared in the Ukrainian political discourse immediately after the signing of the second part of the Minsk agreements (Minsk‑2). It found itself in the center of international discourse after Russian President V. Putin initiated the submission of the draft resolution to the UN Security Council. The Russian approach to the peacekeeping mission was formulated in a strict connection with the implementation of the Minsk agreements and did not allow their interpretation. Generally, the Russians’ Federation („defensive concept”) and Ukraines’ („broad mandate”) approaches are developing and adapting the concept of modern peacekeeping to the interests of the conflict parties. Russian‑Ukrainian narratives are the basis for an in‑depth understanding of the conflict nature and possible ways to resolving. The using of propaganda tools to promote multidirectional approaches to UN peacekeepers has taken the conflict to a higher level. The analysis of the communications the peacekeeping mission includes negotiation formats which the issue was discussed. Such negotiating platforms were the Normandy format, the Munich Security Conference, the UN General Assembly, the Surkov‑Volker track etc. The UN Security Council did not become an additional channel of communication, because it was not possible to coordinate and bring together the Ukraine’s position and the Russians’ Federation ones. Attempts to agree on a peacekeeping mission within the framework of the implementation of the Minsk agreements created a negotiation deadlock and the exclusion of this item from the agenda of international negotiations. The article focuses on the factor of formation the public support for the scenario of conflict settlement which is based on the UN. The issue was investigated on opinion polls and an arbitrary selection of plots, which are formed the evidence base for assessing the influence the civil society in decision‑making in Ukraine. At the same time, it shows the humanitarian aspects that would have the potential to influence the conflict settlement processes in Donbass.

Author(s):  
Adekeye Adebajo

Egyptian scholar-diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s relationship with the UN Security Council was a difficult one, resulting eventually in him earning the unenviable record of being the only Secretary-General to have been denied a second term in office. Boutros-Ghali bluntly condemned the double standards of the powerful Western members of the Council—the Permanent Three (P3) of the US, Britain, and France—in selectively authorizing UN interventions in “rich men’s wars” in Europe while ignoring Africa’s “orphan conflicts.” The Council’s powerful members ignored many of his ambitious ideas, preferring instead to retain tight control of decision-making on UN peacekeeping missions. Boutros-Ghali worked with the Security Council to establish peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia.


Significance The assassination follows months of political turmoil and rising gang violence and comes just weeks before elections, scheduled for September 26. Interim Prime Minister Claude Joseph, who has taken charge of the country, said yesterday that measures were being taken “to guarantee the continuity of the state and to protect the nation". Impacts Further political assassinations would exacerbate unrest. The Dominican Republic has closed its border, fearing a migrant surge; the situation will bolster public support there for a border wall. The UN Security Council meets today and may authorise emergency action in Haiti; any substantial redeployment, however, would take time.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonard F. Hutabarat

<p align="justify">As peacekeeping has evolved to encompass a broader humanitarian approach, women personels have become increasingly part of the peacekeeping family. The UN has called for more deployment of female peacekeepers to enhance the overall “holistic” approach to current UN peacekeeping operations. There is clearly more work to be done to integrate more female peacekeepers into UN missions. More skilled and trained female peacekeepers can only be an asset to future peacekeeping operations. In October 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. The resolution was hailed as a landmark resolution in that for the first time, the Security Council recognised the contribution women make during and post-conflict. Since the adoption of Resolution 1325, attention to gender perspectives within the international peace agenda has ¬firmly been placed within the broader peace and security framework. This article explains the development of Indonesian female peacekeepers contribution in the period of 2009-20016 and argues why Indonesia needs to support and to consider deploying more female peacekeepers in UN peacekeeping operations.</p>


Author(s):  
Sabine von Schorlemer

Intentional destruction of cultural heritage by extremist non-State actors—be it by the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL) in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, or Boko Haram in Nigeria—is on the rise. Using the destruction of cultural heritage in Mali in 2012–13 as a case study, this chapter argues that the creation of the self-proclaimed independent State of ‘Azawad’ in Mali became a ‘test case’ for the United Nations’ will and capacity to prevent further destruction of world cultural heritage, and it also analyzes the legal foundation of the 2013 French military Operation Serval in Mali. It also discusses the responsibility to protect as applied to cultural heritage, evaluates the subsequent deployment of the United Nations MINUSMA, and evaluates the mandate given by UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013), the first in UN history that included comprehensive protection of cultural and historical sites as a task of a UN peacekeeping operation. Therefore, the chapter reviews critically not only the mandate of MINUSMA, but also its potential relevance concerning future culture-embedded UN peace missions, and also contributes to the debate of the usefulness of more ‘robust’ cultural protection action by the United Nations.


Author(s):  
Haidi Willmot ◽  
Ralph Mamiya

This chapter focuses on the conception and evolution of the UN Security Council mandate to protect civilians during peacekeeping operations from 1960 to the present. The chapter examines the normative and legal framework of the use of force to protect civilians in UN peacekeeping operations, with reference to Security Council resolutions and other bodies of international law such as humanitarian and human rights law. It considers Security Council practice between 1960 and 1999 and its emphasis on the concept of self-defence; Security Council practice from 1999 to 2007 regarding the inception and development of the explicit ‘protection of civilians’ mandate by the Council; Security Council practice from 2007 to 2011; and prioritization of the mandate in certain peacekeeping missions, specifically UNAMID (Sudan (Darfur)), MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo), UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire), and UNMISS (South Sudan). Finally, the chapter describes Security Council practice from 2011 onwards and draws conclusions on impact that the protection of civilians mandate in peacekeeping operations has had on the evolution of the legitimate use of force under the UN Charter.


Author(s):  
John Karlsrud

The usual suspects of middle power internationalism—small and middle powers such as Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden—have all contributed to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This article argues that while these and other Western countries' contributions to MINUSMA may still be characterized as investments into UN peacekeeping reform and a rule-governed world order, the liberal underpinnings of that commitment are withering. Instead, these countries seek to enhance their own status. This is done by gaining appreciation for their contributions, primarily from the US; strengthening their bids for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council; and self-interested contributions to reform UN peacekeeping by efforts to enable it to confront violent extremism and terrorism. Paradoxically, the article concludes, when moving the UN towards counterterrorism and weakening the legitimacy of the organization, Western states undermine a cornerstone of their own security.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana Kearney

Fed up with the decades-old violence plaguing the DRC, the UN Security Council broke new ground by granting peacekeepers an offensive mandate to pursue rebels rather than waiting to react in self-defence. This transformation in UN military operations alarmed several States, concerned over a perceived loss of sovereignty and a weakening of the principle of non-intervention. To allay these fears, Resolution 2098’s drafters incorporated a provision expressly assuring Member States that offensive peacekeeping tactics in the DRC would not generate precedent for future UN action. However, examining past UN practice and ‘slippery slope’ theory alike reveals that explicit disavowal of precedent cannot guarantee that offensive peacekeeping will not be used as a template for future UN action. In fact, the incorporation of such language may foster the generation of a slippery slope in UN peacekeeping, ultimately paving the way for increased scope of UN intervention in situations of gross human rights violations. The article concludes by proposing a framework for how actors can manipulate slopes to generate or slow precedent for future UN action.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 114-117
Author(s):  
Mona A. Khalil

Since 1999, in the aftermath of the tragic failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has readily and consistently entrusted UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs) with robust mandates and the authority to use force beyond self-defense for the protection of civilians. In the ensuing decades, it has also sought to provide more robust resources including vehicles, weapons, equipment, and technologies to enable UNPKOs to implement and fulfill their mandates. What is only now being addressed, however, is the need for more robust performance. This presentation describes the mindset, understanding, and attitudes that are required to achieve an effective level of performance.


Author(s):  
Fahad Nabeel

With the emergence of cyberspace as the fifth domain of warfare, the prospects of cyber conflicts have increased significantly. Around 300 state-sponsored cyber operations have been conducted since 2005. The future uncertainty of cyber-warfare has prompted calls for necessary measures to regulate the actions of states in cyberspace. In this regard, cyber-peacekeeping has also emerged as a significant research area to distinctively deal with the cyber component of future conflicts. Although, a number of challenges exist regarding materialization of full fledge cyber-peacekeeping force, it can be easily integrated into the current United Nations (UN) peacekeeping organizational structure. In legal terms, operationalization of cyber-peacekeeping force will depend on the mandate of peace operations approved by the UN Security Council (UNSC). This paper discusses the challenges confronting the creation of a cyber- peacekeeping force and also offers recommendations by presenting a general framework regarding how such a force can be operationalized. Despite the fact that a dedicated cyber-peacekeeping force seems a far sighted idea in present times, a distinct cyber unit can certainly be formed and integrated into UN peace operations in near future.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul D. Williams

Abstract The United Nations (UN) Security Council is stuck in a peacekeeping trilemma. This is a situation where the Council's three strategic goals for peacekeeping operations—implementing broad mandates, minimizing peacekeeper casualties and maximizing cost-effectiveness—cannot be achieved simultaneously. This trilemma stems from longstanding competing pressures on how the Council designs UN peacekeeping operations as well as political divisions between peacekeeping's three key groups of stakeholders: the states that authorize peacekeeping mandates, those that provide most of the personnel and field capabilities, and those that pay the majority of the bill. Fortunately, the most negative consequences of the trilemma can be mitigated and perhaps even transcended altogether. Mitigation would require the Council to champion and implement four main reforms: improving peacekeeper performance, holding peacekeepers accountable for misdeeds, adopting prioritized and sequenced mandates, and strengthening the financial basis for UN peacekeeping. Transcending the trilemma would require a more fundamental reconfiguration of the key stakeholder groups in order to create much greater unity of effort behind a re-envisaged peacekeeping enterprise. This is highly unlikely in the current international political context.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document