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Author(s):  
Anna Longhini ◽  
Erin Zimmerman

Abstract The term regional security dialogue brings to mind state-organised conferences and events; however, an under-appreciated subset of such dialogues are organised by non-state actors that have unique formal aspects. These quasi-formal dialogues operate alongside, and sometimes in competition to, state-sanctioned processes. Why do some of these forums appear to be more effective at fostering regional dialogue than strictly formal or informal processes with the same goals? Drawing from heterogenous discourse approaches, we address this question by identifying and expanding the concept of the quality of discursive space, as a key feature for the success of security dialogues. We then apply this concept to two of the most successful so-called Track 1.5 security dialogues: the Munich Security Conference (MSC) in Europe and the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in Asia. We analyse these cases using a mix of interviews with participants and organisers, participant observation, and public outputs with the aim of improving the understanding of the role and impact of Track 1.5 diplomacy in the practice of international security. Our findings highlight that it is what we call the quality of discursive space, as a mix of different components in this space, which differentiates effective dialogues from mere policy ‘talk shops’.


Author(s):  
Natalia Barebina ◽  
Galina Kostyushkina ◽  
Zhiyong Fang

The article presents an attempt to analyze the argumentative constants and variations in the analytical genre of a political media discourse from the point of view of focusing on the formation of different opinions of the audience. This task is solved by using the concept of strategic maneuvering. This concept contains a theoretical tool that allows you to identify violations of dialectical standards of argumentation in the form of rhetorical goals in the author's reasoning. Using the method of random selection, a corpus of examples was formed as fragments of speeches of political leaders. Examples were taken from the website of the Munich Security Conference 2016-2020. An evaluative-critical analysis of theoretical literature has revealed the main characteristics of the political media discourse. It was found that this social practice presupposes an argumentative way of organizing a discourse. The article states that any forms of the analytical genre of the political media discourse presuppose a certain standard of rationality in terms of its logical presentation and the quality of arguments. Using the method of pragma-dialectical reconstruction of the text, the authors illustrate the rational goal of argumentation realized by the speaker. However, the specificity of the genre inevitably leads to the desire of the addressees to present arguments in their favor. This is manifested in the rhetorical analogue of the logical dimension of the text-reasoning. It is concluded that the norm and violations in argumentation show how the language system functions in the formation of vectors of audience attitude.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 31-53
Author(s):  
Iryna Boginska

W artykule przeanalizowano konflikt o koncepcję misji pokojowej ONZ na wschodzie Ukrainy między Ukrainąa Federacją Rosyjską. Analiza konfliktu opiera się na krytycznym podejściu do oficjalnych narracji zawierających odniesienia do sił pokojowych ONZ w latach 2015‑2021. Stwierdzono, że po raz pierwszy koncepcja misji pokojowej ONZ pojawiła się w ukraińskim dyskursie politycznym zaraz po podpisaniu drugiej części porozumień mińskich (Mińsk‑2). W centrum dyskursu międzynarodowego znalazła się ona po tym, jak prezydent Rosji W. Putin zainicjował wniesienie projektu rezolucji do Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ. Rosyjskie podejście do misji pokojowej było formułowane w ścisłym związku z realizacją porozumień mińskich i nie pozwalało na ich interpretację. Zasadniczo podejście Federacji Rosyjskiej („koncepcja defensywna”) i Ukrainy („szeroki mandat”) rozwijają i dostosowują koncepcję nowoczesnego utrzymania pokoju do interesów stron konfliktu. Narracje rosyjsko‑ukraińskie są podstawą do szczegółowego zrozumienia natury konfliktu i możliwych sposobów jego rozwiązania. Wykorzystanie narzędzi propagandowych w celu promowania wielokierunkowego podejścia do sił pokojowych ONZ przeniosło konflikt na wyższy poziom. Analiza komunikatów misji pokojowej obejmuje formaty negocjacyjne, na których omawiano tę kwestię. Takimi platformami negocjacyjnymi były: format normandzki, Monachijska Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa, Zgromadzenie Ogólne ONZ, spotkania Surkowa‑Volkera itd. Rada Bezpieczeństwa ONZ nie przekształciła się w dodatkowy kanał komunikacji, ponieważ nie udało się skoordynować i połączyć stanowisk Ukrainy i Federacji Rosyjskiej. Próby uzgodnienia misji pokojowej w ramach realizacji porozumień mińskich doprowadziły do impasu negocjacyjnego i wykluczenia tego punktu z agendy negocjacji międzynarodowych. Artykuł dotyczy kwestii kształtowania się poparcia społecznego dla scenariusza rozwiązania konfliktu w oparciu o działania ONZ. Zagadnienie to zostało zbadane na podstawie badań opinii publicznej oraz arbitralnie dobranych przykładów, które stanowią bazę dowodową do oceny wpływu społeczeństwa obywatelskiego na podejmowanie decyzji na Ukrainie. Jednocześnie pokazano aspekty humanitarne, które mogłyby potencjalnie wpłynąć na procesy rozwiązywania konfliktu w Donbasie. Communication of the peacekeeping mission in eastern Ukraine The article examines the conflict over the idea UN peacekeeping mission in eastern Ukraine between Ukraine and Russian Federation. The analysis of the conflict is based on a critical approach to the official narratives which is containing references to the UN peacekeepers in 2015‑2021. It was established that the first time the idea UN peacekeeping mission appeared in the Ukrainian political discourse immediately after the signing of the second part of the Minsk agreements (Minsk‑2). It found itself in the center of international discourse after Russian President V. Putin initiated the submission of the draft resolution to the UN Security Council. The Russian approach to the peacekeeping mission was formulated in a strict connection with the implementation of the Minsk agreements and did not allow their interpretation. Generally, the Russians’ Federation („defensive concept”) and Ukraines’ („broad mandate”) approaches are developing and adapting the concept of modern peacekeeping to the interests of the conflict parties. Russian‑Ukrainian narratives are the basis for an in‑depth understanding of the conflict nature and possible ways to resolving. The using of propaganda tools to promote multidirectional approaches to UN peacekeepers has taken the conflict to a higher level. The analysis of the communications the peacekeeping mission includes negotiation formats which the issue was discussed. Such negotiating platforms were the Normandy format, the Munich Security Conference, the UN General Assembly, the Surkov‑Volker track etc. The UN Security Council did not become an additional channel of communication, because it was not possible to coordinate and bring together the Ukraine’s position and the Russians’ Federation ones. Attempts to agree on a peacekeeping mission within the framework of the implementation of the Minsk agreements created a negotiation deadlock and the exclusion of this item from the agenda of international negotiations. The article focuses on the factor of formation the public support for the scenario of conflict settlement which is based on the UN. The issue was investigated on opinion polls and an arbitrary selection of plots, which are formed the evidence base for assessing the influence the civil society in decision‑making in Ukraine. At the same time, it shows the humanitarian aspects that would have the potential to influence the conflict settlement processes in Donbass.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (5) ◽  
pp. 117-127
Author(s):  
P. Cherkasov

Received 21.08.2020. The author of the article believes the beginning of the “Putin’s era” – the first two terms of his presidency (2000–2008) – to be generally successful for Russia. In eight years, the bases of the state shaken in the 1990s were strengthened, the threat of an intensive political struggle, which, however, lost much of its outdoor competitive nature, decreased, the economy became stronger, the living conditions of the population improved, the activity and influence of Russia in international affairs increased. This was largely due to the favorable global economic environment for Russia and, above all, high prices for energy resources, which were the main item of Russian exports. No less obvious were the personal achievements of President Putin, who managed to consolidate the unbalanced state, put an end to the pressure of oligarchs on authorities, restore the Kremlin’s control over regional elites, and extinguish hotbeds of separatism in Russia. He has built the very “vertical of power” for which his political opponents, both inside the country and abroad, will consistently criticize him. Having inherited Boris Yeltsin’s policy of developing cooperation with the West, Vladimir Putin at first continued to follow this path, but gradually became disillusioned with the sincerity of Western partners towards Russia. He was most concerned about the eastward expansion of NATO’s military infrastructure, its approach to Russian borders, and the West’s general reluctance to consider Russian interests. Putin openly expressed the accumulated claims against the United States and NATO in February 2007 at the Munich Security Conference. 2007 was a turning point in Putin’s foreign policy towards the West. Since then, the focus has been shifted to protecting Russia’s national interests. Within the country, for eight years, Putin had failed to create a modern, self-regulating and multi-level system of government. The destructive chaos of the 1990s was replaced by centralized “manual control” from the Kremlin, but it also worked with constant failures. The state apparatus, especially at the regional level, did not work effectively enough, and regional authorities often did not follow the orders of the President. The lessons of the first stage of the Putin’s era were: the reasonably required consolidation of the state, building the “vertical of power” often occurred at the expense of the civil society’s interests, the interests of consolidating and expanding democracy in Russia.


Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3(66)) ◽  
pp. 133-144
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Kruk

European Union’s International Role in Statements of Javier Solana, Catherine Ashton and Frederica Mogherini during the Munich Security Conferences in the Years 2009 until 2019 The aim of the article is an analysis of statements of the European union’s foreign affairs and security policy high representatives during the Munich Security Conference in years 2009 until 2019. The diplomats’ activities resulted from their roles as high representatives, which are programming, initiating action and representing the European Union outside. The Munich Security Conferences were a platform to present activities and stand points concerning contemporary challenges in the field of international security. The conferences contributed to the extension of contacts of the EU from Javier Solana’s, Catherine Ashton’s and Federica Mogherini’s points of view.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-107
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Eggenschwiler

Purpose Against the background of two decades of debates about responsible behaviour in cyberspace, this paper aims to examine the contributions of non-state actors to processes of cybersecurity norm-making. Specifically, it intends to dissect and critically appraise the work of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC), a multistakeholder consortium composed of 28 regionally-diverse scholars, CEOs and (former) policymakers. Inaugurated at the margins of the 2017 Munich Security Conference, the GCSC has been fairly active with regard to developing proposals for norms and policies to enhance international security and stability and guiding responsible conduct in the virtual realm. Design/methodology/approach With a view to engaging in a differentiated analysis of the Commission’s activities, this paper asks: How do non-state actors such as the GCSC contribute to processes of cybersecurity norm-making, i.e. what are their roles and responsibilities, and how effective is their engagement? Since the end of the Cold War, non- state actors have become an issue of great interest to scholars of International Relations and International Law. However, in the context of cybersecurity, their normative engagement has not been scrutinised extensively. This paper seeks to address this gap. Findings Based on a review of secondary literature and case materials, this paper finds that, within a relatively short period of time, the GCSC has managed to exert discernible discursive and political influence over discussions on responsible behaviour in cyberspace and deserves recognition as a shaper of transnational cybersecurity governance. However, while fairly successful across the dimensions of output and outcome, the Commission has struggled to effect far-reaching systemic change (impact). Originality/value In light of significant contestation and fleeting governmental appetite for enacting red lines in the virtual realm, this paper seeks to critically appraise the contributions of non-state actors to processes of cybersecurity norm-making. The motivation to do so stems from two sources: empirical observations that non-state protagonists have become more involved in issues concerning responsible conduct in cyberspace, and realisations that, so far, academic research has offered little examination of their ideational engagement. Exploring the case of the GCSC, this paper argues that non-state actors have to be taken seriously as normative change agents in cybersecurity governance-related contexts.


Subject Implications of US sanctions against Nord Stream 2. Significance US Energy Secretary Dan Brouillette said in a February 15 interview at the Munich Security Conference that he was confident Russia would not be able to complete the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. He reiterated US opposition to the project, which would have likely been operational by now if Swiss pipelaying firm Allseas had not pulled out in December because of US legislation threatening sanctions for involvement in pipeline construction. Impacts The recent transit deal with Ukraine gives Gazprom capacity in the event of a Nord Stream 2 delay. Russia plans to reduce use of the Ukrainian route; whether (and when) it will abandon it altogether is unclear. Europe will remain dependent on Russian gas, whichever route it travels by; Azerbaijan and others can add only marginal capacity.


Politeja ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (5(62)) ◽  
pp. 161-174
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Bryc

Russia attempts to revise a Western-led liberal world order. However, challenging the West seems to be a strategy aimed at improving Russia’s international standing. This strategy is undoubtedly ambiguous as Russia challenges the West, particularity the United States, and looks for a rapprochement at the same time.The Russian Federation abandoned the West in 2014 as a result of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula what constituted breaking international law, andengagement into the war in the East Ukraine. Nevertheless, the milestone was not 2014, but 2008 when Russia had decided for the first time to use its militar yforce against Georgia and indirectly against the growing Western military and political presence in this post-Soviet republic. This game changer was hardly a surprise, because several signals of a desire to challenge the Western-led world order had appeared in the past at least twice in president Putin’s speeches in 2007 at Munich Security Conference and in 2014 during Valdai Club session in Sochi. This article seeks to provide a take in the discussion about the way Russia has been trying to reshape the post-Cold War order. This paper probes the notion that Russia has become a revisionist state trying to shape a post-Western world order. Besides, there are a few questions to be answered, first of all whether anti-Westernism is in fact its goal or rather an instrument in regaining more effective impact on international politics and how it may influence the post-ColdWar order despite its reduced political and economic potential.


2018 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 299-315
Author(s):  
Oleg V. Morozov

This article presents the results of the author's reflections on the theoretical principles, legal basis and practice of the international activities of the Federal Assembly – the Parliament of the Russian Federation, - in connection with the 25th anniversary of parliamentarism of new Russia. The author analyzes the country network of relations, forms of bilateral inter-parliamentary cooperation, shows the experience of cooperation with European inter-parliamentary structures and associations. Special attention is paid to parliamentary cooperation within the framework of the Union of Belarus and Russia, the collective security Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of independent States and the Eurasian economic community. He also shows the demand for inter-parliamentary cooperation with BRICS countries and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. On the basis of the Concept of foreign policy of Russian Federation (dd. November 30, 2016, N 640), the speech of Minister of foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Lavrov at the Munich security conference February 16, 2019 and the message of the President of Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to Federal Assembly February 20, 2019 the author presents the list of directions, topics and geography of international cooperation of Russian Parliament for the medium term future.


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