scholarly journals Russian–Japanese Relations at the Turn of the Century: Patterns, Routes, Leaders

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-129
Author(s):  
O. G. Paramonov

This article analyzes why, during the post-Cold War period, Tokyo became aware of the need to reconsider its hard-line relations with Moscow, which had been developed in previous decades. Even in the period preceding the collapse of the USSR, Tokyo did not conceal its intentions to use the difficult socio-economic situation in the USSR and then in Russia to obtain territorial concessions. Even then, however, the Russian side mostly determined the agenda of the Russian-Japanese dialogue, which was largely due to serious mistakes made by Japanese politicians. After Russia emerged from the economic and political turbulence that began unexpectedly for the West and Japan in the 2000s, Tokyo’s new hopes were connected with concessions on the “territorial case” because of Russia’s interest in Japanese investments and technological cooperation, especially for the development of the Far East and adjacent areas. Nevertheless, even here Tokyo faced a fiasco. Before the arrival of the Abe era in late 2012, Japan’s foreign policy toward Russia became increasingly “reactive,” and even later Tokyo’s high-profile initiatives related to the Russian-Japanese agenda often turned out to be old proposals from Moscow that had been made during the time of Michael Gorbachev, and favorable moments for their implementation were largely missed.

2018 ◽  
Vol 236 ◽  
pp. 1197-1205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcin Kaczmarski

A decade ago, Beijing's relations with Moscow were of marginal interest to China scholars. Topics such as growing Sino-American interdependence-cum-rivalry, engagement with East Asia or relations with the developing world overshadowed China's relationship with its northern neighbour. Scholars preoccupied with Russia's foreign policy did not pay much attention either, regarding the Kremlin's policy towards China as part and parcel of Russia's grand strategy directed towards the West. The main dividing line among those few who took a closer look ran between sceptics and alarmists. The former interpreted the post-Cold War rapprochement as superficial and envisioned an imminent clash of interests between the two states. The latter, a minority, saw the prospect of an anti-Western alliance.


Author(s):  
John Watkins

This concluding chapter reflects on marriage in the contemporary West, noting that it has become an affective arrangement. In Britain and the northern European countries that still retain a constitutional form of monarchy, twenty-first-century royalty now prefer their own subjects as marriage partners, even if it means marrying a commoner like Kate Middleton. To the extent that these marriages to indigenous commoners have any bearing on foreign policy, they reaffirm the nationalist sentiments of the post-Westphalian state. The chapter argues that, despite all the legal rationality, global peace remains as elusive now as it was when Europeans tried to settle their quarrels through interdynastic marriage. It suggests that the opposition between the West and its post-Cold War enemies has brought the matter of gender and the place of women once more to the center of international relations.


2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrei P. Tsygankov

This paper addresses the question of world order by considering how Western military actions in Yugoslavia were perceived from a different cultural perspective. It traces how the NATO-led bombing campaign during March–June of 1999 affected various visions of world order that had existed in Russia before the campaign and describes the discursive change this campaign produced. The argument is made that Russia's foreign policy elites, from Westernizers to Neo-Communists and Expansionists, perceived Western goals in Yugoslavia differently from their counterparts in the West. However, they differed in their recommendations regarding Russia's response and lessons to be drawn from the Kosovo crisis. The paper also identifies several points where the different perspectives can converge. More specifically, all Russian schools of thought viewed the NATO campaign as a dangerous precedent potentially destabilizing the existing world order. They also shared the conviction that Russia should play a larger role in world affairs and that without Russia's involvement there could be no peace and stability in the Balkans and in Europe. They point to the United Nations as the only forum for debating the legitimacy of military interventions and for preventing interventions carried out without the approval of the UN.


2006 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Andrew White

Fin-de-siècle Russia was a culture replete with interest in the occult, spiritualism, and the religions of the Far East. Curiosity about the mystical infused all tiers of society. Among those influenced by the spiritual was none other than Konstantin Stanislavsky himself, who experienced a personal crisis in which he began to doubt his own ability as an actor. In 1906, he took his now-famous trip to Finland, where he sequestered himself for the summer, examined his artistic life, and began to reconsider seriously his process as an actor. While reflecting on his past artistic work, he began to organize years of notes on acting; and several notions drawn from Eastern mysticism in general and Yoga in particular found their way into his “system.” Although a handful of articles that examine Stanislavsky's use of Yoga have been published in the West, over the past century scholars and teachers have paid little attention to the spiritual facets of Stanislavsky's thinking, focusing instead on the psychological aspects of his work. Given, however, the presence of important Yogic elements in the system at its very inception, a full understanding of Stanislavsky's technique is impossible without knowledge of the intersections between his system and Yoga. Borrowing from Yoga, Stanislavsky offers actors much more than theories about how to be more believable or psychologically realistic in their roles. He adapts specific Yogic exercises in order to help actors transcend the limitations of the physical senses and tap into higher levels of creative consciousness.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 259-262
Author(s):  
Valery Vladimirovich Suvorov

S.N. Syromyatnikov, whose views are commonly referred to as orientalism, repeatedly dwelled on historical tasks, the mission of Russia in the Far East. The most important direction of Russias foreign policy in this region was to become rapprochement with Asia, since by uniting with the Far Eastern countries, it could successfully resist Europe. China had to be at the center of Russias eastern policy, and Russias main task was to play the role of patroness and cultural counselor, protecting the eastern neighbor from European countries and Japan. The attitude towards the East and the understanding of Russias tasks in Asia was largely determined through the rejection of everything from the West. A special task was assigned to the Russian population of the eastern borderlands, in which S.N. Syromyatnikov saw a special potential for the development of Russia and strengthening of its position in Asia. The East was perceived by S.N. Syromyatnikov as a germ of a new Russia, to which he found a lot of evidence in the relationship between Russian and indigenous eastern peoples. Therefore, in S.N. Syromyatnikovs point of view, to ensure the historical future of Russia it was necessary to concentrate the main efforts in the East.


2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-81
Author(s):  
Regina Helle

Despite continued weak economic performance, Russia displays high determination to increase its global influence. On the one hand, hard power and the use of violence play a much greater role as foreign policy tools than a few years ago. On the other hand, Russia seems to be pursuing the goal of overthrowing the liberal international order, thereby also accepting long-term distortions of relations especially with the West. What are the links between Russia’s conflict-laden, aggressive foreign policy and the liberal international order? In this article, the conflictual dynamics between Russia and the West are primarily understood as conflicts over social status. An emotion-focused analysis of official Russian speech between 1994 and 2015 shows how the subjective status expectations of Russian decision-makers have affected their attitudes and policies towards the West and the post-Cold War liberal order.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-60
Author(s):  
N. N. Neklyudov

The study of Russia’s foreign policy poses something of a paradox. On the one hand, Russia’s actions are viewed as aimed at revising the existing rules-based order built by the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, on numerous occasions, one pinpoints that Russia has devised a language similar to the Western nations to justify its foreign policy. I call the phenomenon that explains this paradox the game of interpretation. The article illustrates how Russia is engaged in the game of interpretation with the West in the post-Cold War order by Russia’s appliance to the norm of humanitarian interventions. By analyzing the Russian discourse during the Russo-Georgian War (2008), I demonstrate how the Russian foreign policy leadership reproduces similar narrative patterns used by the West during the Kosovo War (1999). Exemplifying the game of interpretation by humanitarian interventionism is not accidental. Humanitarian interventionism is studied in the literature as being characteristic of the Western ‘ethical foreign policy’ originated by the end of the Cold War, with Russia being depicted as either skeptical or as an unequivocal opponent of such an approach in world politics. Methodologically, the work builds on quantitative and qualitative analysis of selected texts compiled from the archives of NATO and the US State Department, as well as the website “Kremlin.ru” and the website of the Russian Foreign Ministry.


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