scholarly journals Heritage of (non-)existing cities – on the Polish examples of medieval Świecie and Renaissance Krasiczyn

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 65-92
Author(s):  
Karolina Zimna-Kawecka ◽  
Dominika Kuśnierz-Krupa ◽  
Michał Krupa

This article analyses the urban heritage protection and spatial development policies of two model historical urban centres in Poland, whose spatial layout has been erased: medieval Świecie nad Wisłą (the Pomeranian region) and Renaissance Krasiczyn (the Subcarpathian region). Their urban layouts had a significant compositional factor (a town and castle complex in axial plan). The second element important in terms of landscape protection and spatial planning is their history: at the end of the eighteenth century and during the nineteenth century they had to be relocated. The analysis covers the spatial form during the period of their founding, the reasons for transformation, their present-day state of preservation, and the current spatial conservation and development policy. General conservation conclusions have also been formulated.

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeannie Van Wyk

Our spatial environment is one of the most important determinants of our well-being and life chances. It relates to schools, opportunities, businesses, recreation and access to public services. Spatial injustice results where discrimination determines that spatial environment. Since Apartheid in South Africa epitomised the notion of spatial injustice, tools and instruments are required to transform spatial injustice into spatial justice. One of these is the employment of principles of spatial justice. While the National Development Plan (NDP) recognised that all spatial development should conform to certain normative principles and should explicitly indicate how the requirements of these should be met, the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013 (SPLUMA) contains a more concrete principle of spatial justice. It echoes aspects of both the South African land reform programme and global principles of spatial justice. Essentially section 7(a) of SPLUMA entails three components: (1) redressing past spatial imbalances and exclusions; (2) including people and areas previously excluded and (3) upgrading informal areas and settlements. SPLUMA directs municipalities to apply the principle in its spatial development frameworks, land use schemes and, most importantly, in decision-making on development applications. The aim of this article is to determine whether the application of this principle in practice can move beyond the confines of spatial planning and land use management to address the housing issue in South Africa. Central to housing is section 26 of the Constitution, that has received the extensive attention of the Constitutional Court. The court has not hesitated to criticize the continuing existence of spatial injustice, thus contributing to the transformation of spatial injustice to spatial justice. Since planning, housing and land reform are all intertwined not only the role of SPLUMA, but also the NDP and the myriad other policies, programmes and legislation that are attempting to address the situation are examined and tested against the components of the principle of spatial justice in SPLUMA.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rakhmat Bowo Suharto

The spatial development can be supported by sustainable development, efforts are needed to divert space through the imposition of sanctions on administration in the spatial field. In the context of a legal state, sanctions must be taken while ensuring their legality in order to provide legal protection for citizens. The problem is, the construction of administrative regulations in Law No. 26 of 2007 and PP No. 15 of 2010 contains several weaknesses so that it is not enough to provide clear arrangements for administrative officials who impose sanctions. For this reason, an administration is required which requires administrative officials to request administrative approval in the spatial planning sector. The success of the regulation requires that it is the foundation of the welfare state principle which demands the government to activate people's welfare. 15 of 2010, the main things that need to be regulated therein should include (1) the mechanism of imposing sanctions: (2) determination of the type and burden of sanctions; and (3) legal protection and supervision by the region.


Transfers ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan E. Bell ◽  
Kathy Davis

Translocation – Transformation is an ambitious contribution to the subject of mobility. Materially, it interlinks seemingly disparate objects into a surprisingly unified exhibition on mobile histories and heritages: twelve bronze zodiac heads, silk and bamboo creatures, worn life vests, pressed Pu-erh tea, thousands of broken antique teapot spouts, and an ancestral wooden temple from the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) used by a tea-trading family. Historically and politically, the exhibition engages Chinese stories from the third century BCE, empires in eighteenth-century Austria and China, the Second Opium War in the nineteenth century, the Chinese Cultural Revolution of the mid-twentieth century, and today’s global refugee crisis.


2011 ◽  
pp. 15-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Galley ◽  
Eilidh Garrett ◽  
Ros Davies ◽  
Alice Reid

This article examines the extent to which living siblings were given identical first names. Whilst the practice of sibling name-sharing appeared to have died out in England during the eighteenth century, in northern Scotland it persisted at least until the end of the nineteenth century. Previously it has not been possible to provide quantitative evidence of this phenomenon, but an analysis of the rich census and vital registration data for the Isle of Skye reveals that this practice was widespread, with over a third of eligible families recording same-name siblings. Our results suggest that further research should focus on regional variations in sibling name-sharing and the extent to which this northern pattern occurred in other parts of Britain.


Author(s):  
Mitch Kachun

Chapter 1 introduces the broad context of the eighteenth-century Atlantic world in which Crispus Attucks lived, describes the events of the Boston Massacre, and assesses what we know about Attucks’s life. It also addresses some of the most widely known speculations and unsupported stories about Attucks’s life, experiences, and family. Much of what is assumed about Attucks today is drawn from a fictionalized juvenile biography from 1965, which was based largely on research in nineteenth-century sources. Attucks’s characterization as an unsavory outsider and a threat to the social order emerged during the soldiers’ trial. Subsequently, American Revolutionaries in Boston began the construction of a heroic Attucks as they used the memory of the massacre and all its victims to serve their own political agendas during the Revolution by portraying the victims as respectable, innocent citizens struck down by a tyrannical military power.


Author(s):  
Linford D. Fisher

Although racial lines eventually hardened on both sides, in the opening decades of colonization European and native ideas about differences between themselves and the other were fluid and dynamic, changing on the ground in response to local developments and experiences. Over time, perceived differences were understood to be rooted in more than just environment and culture. In the eighteenth century, bodily differences became the basis for a wider range of deeper, more innate distinctions that, by the nineteenth century, hardened into what we might now understand to be racialized differences in the modern sense. Despite several centuries of dispossession, disease, warfare, and enslavement at the hands of Europeans, native peoples in the Americans almost universally believed the opposite to be true. The more indigenous Americans were exposed to Europeans, the more they believed in the vitality and superiority of their own cultures.


Author(s):  
William Weber

This chapter shows how selections from English operas composed between the 1730s and the 1790s—chiefly by Thomas Arne, Charles Dibdin, William Shield, and Stephen Storace—became standard repertory in concerts throughout the nineteenth century. Such pieces were performed at benefit concerts organized by individual musicians and at events given by local ensembles that blended songs with virtuoso pieces and orchestral numbers. Critical commentary on such songs justified their aesthetic legitimacy as groups separate from pieces deemed part of classical music. By 1900, songs by Arne, Storace, and even Dibdin were often sung in recitals along with German lieder and pieces from seventeenth- or eighteenth-century Italy or France. The solidity of this tradition contributed to the revival of the operas themselves from the 1920s, most often Arne’s Artaxerxes (1762). This chapter is paired with Rutger Helmers’s “National and international canons of opera in tsarist Russia.”


Author(s):  
Katharine Ellis

This chapter starts by revisiting a now-familiar text: James H. Johnson’s book Listening in Paris (1995). On the basis of concert and opera reviews, images, and the paratexts of concert programs, Ellis reframes Johnson’s question “When did audiences fall silent?” as “Where and why did audiences fail to fall silent?” Multilayered answers show how (1) many of the noisier phenomena of the eighteenth century resurfaced in new guises from the 1850s onward; (2) the democratization of art music took place in contexts that could not always impose “religious” listening; and (3) there was a resurgent demand, possibly concomitant, for music as pure entertainment in venues where silence was neither required nor expected. The chapter argues that although attentive listening was a gold standard during the latter two-thirds of the nineteenth century in Paris, practice rarely lived up to such expectations, and it was in effect a niche activity.


Author(s):  
Mark Migotti

In this chapter, the author attempts to establish what is philosophically living and what is philosophically dead in Schopenhauer’s pessimism. Against the background of the intriguing the history of the terms “optimism” and “pessimism”—in debates about Leibniz’s theodicy in the early eighteenth century and the popularity of Schopenhauer in the late nineteenth century, respectively—the author points up the distinction between affirming life, which all living beings do naturally, and subscribing to philosophical optimism (or pessimism), which is possible only for reflective beings like us. Next, the author notes the significance of Schopenhauer’s claim that optimism is a necessary condition of theism and explains its bearing on his pessimistic argument for the moral unacceptability of suicide. The chapter concludes that Schopenhauer’s case for pessimism is not conclusive, but instructive; his dim view of the prospects for leading a truly rewarding, worthwhile human life draws vivid attention to important questions about how and to what degree an atheistic world can nevertheless be conducive to human flourishing.


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