Untracking and cold fusion: contrasting research demands in the social and physical sciences, and the "dumbing down" of American schools

1993 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-94
Author(s):  
Ralph Scott
2012 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 298-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Alexander Bentley ◽  
Michael J. O’Brien

Abstract There is a long and rich tradition in the social sciences of using models of collective behavior in animals as jumping-off points for the study of human behavior, including collective human behavior. Here, we come at the problem in a slightly different fashion. We ask whether models of collective human behavior have anything to offer those who study animal behavior. Our brief example of tipping points, a model first developed in the physical sciences and later used in the social sciences, suggests that the analysis of human collective behavior does indeed have considerable to offer [Current Zoology 58 (2): 298–306, 2012].


Author(s):  
Lisa Fisher

Concerns about continued increases in violent behavior in American schools and schools' ability to mitigate and reduce risks abound. Psychology and criminal justice have contributed much to what we know and understand about violence in schools; however, the author argues that these dominant disciplinary perspectives also obscure some important aspects of these phenomena, namely focus on underlying cultural logics that may be impacting violence in schools. In this chapter, the author sets out to achieve two objectives. First, she provides an overview of areas of focus in current literature in psychology and criminal justice that represent the dominant framework within which school violence in the U.S. is viewed. Additionally, she examines those disciplinary perspectives in terms of specific strengths and limitations. Second, she presents and describes a series of social psychological theories and pulls those theories into a coherent framework to demonstrate the value of the social psychological lens in studies of school violence and stimulate further discussion and research on this important topic.


Author(s):  
Eugene P. Odum

During the past half century, ecology has emerged from its roots in biology to become a stand-alone discipline that interfaces organisms, the physical environment and human affairs. This is in line with the root meaning of the word ecology which is ‘the study of the household’ or the total environment in which we live. When I first came to the University of Georgia in 1940 as an instructor in the Department of Zoology, ecology was considered a rather unimportant sub-division of biology. At the end of World War II, we had a staff meeting to discuss ‘core curriculum’, or what courses every biology major should be required to take. My suggestion that ecology should be part of this core was rejected by all other members of the staff; they said ecology was just descriptive natural history with no basic principles. It was this ‘put down’, as it were, that started me thinking about a textbook that would emphasize basic principles, which eventually became the first edition of my Fundamentals of Ecology, published in 1953. In those early days ‘ecology’ was often defined as the ‘study of organisms in relation to environment’. The environment was considered a sort of inert stage in which the actors, that is the organisms, played the game of natural selection. Now we recognize that the ‘stage’ and the ‘actors’ interact with each other constantly so that not only do organisms relate to the physical environment, but they also change the environment. Thus, when the first green microbes, the cynobacteria, began putting oxygen into the atmosphere, the environment was greatly changed, making way for a whole new set of aerobic organisms. Also, when one goes from the study of structure to the study of function, then the physical sciences (including energetics, biogeochemical cycling and earth sciences in general) have to be included. And, of course, now more than ever, we have to consider humans and the social sciences as part of the environment. So we now have essentially a new discipline of ‘ecology’ that is a three-way interface.


1980 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Markham Berry

Professionals who work in the social and physical sciences and who have a serious commitment to the Bible have, in a sense, two data bases. To integrate them is a difficult task. We are pressed to bring them both into focus by the holistic thrust of the Bible as well as by the penchant of our minds to synthesize. To do this effectively we need simple but not simplistic models. Our integration must further be comprehensive, not partial, basic, not peripheral. This article describes a method of doing this kind of integrative work. Initially, four fundamental criteria are presented. In the second section the basic methodology is worked out, and in the third, some primary themes are described and illustrated around which this particular integrative system works.


1951 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 486-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela N. Wrinch

In the Soviet Union, views on all intellectual subjects—the social sciences, philosophy, and even the biological and physical sciences—are frequently regarded as expressions of political views. As a consequence, all intellectual fields are considered appropriate arenas for the struggle against “reaction” and other supposed manifestations of “bourgeois” ideology. To consider science a-political and supra-national, or to speak approvingly of “world science” or “world culture,” is to subscribe to the “bourgeois” ideology of “cosmopolitism”—an ideology which is assumed by virtue of its universalist emphasis to deprecate the contributions to culture made by individual nations.


1984 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 59-73
Author(s):  
W. Newton-Smith

A series of lectures organized in part by the Society for Applied Philosophy and entitled ‘Philosophy and Practice’ is presumably aimed at displaying the practical implications of philosophical doctrines and/or applying philosophical skills to practical questions. The topic of this paper, the role of interests in science, certainly meets the first condition. For as will be argued there are a number of theses concerning the role of interests in science which have considerable implications for how one should see the scientific enterprise in general and in particular for how one assesses the claim that science ought to be accorded its priviliged position in virtue of its results and/or methods And in view of the respect and resources accorded to science what could be of greater practical interest? It remains the case, however, that my interest may seem the inverse of that of the organizers of this series. For in looking at the role of interest in science, one is examining, so to speak, the extent to which the sphere of the practical determines what goes on in science. One is exploring ways in which the non-scientific impinges on the scientific. While my primary focus will be on the physical sciences, it will be argued that there is a significant difference between them and the social sciences; a difference which renders the social sciences intrinsically liable to penetration from outside. As will be seen, some of the particular arguments for this conclusion make pressing the question: what about philosophy? The answer, it will be concluded, is that philosophy is insulated from external influences to a considerable extent. In that lies both its importance and an explanation as to why much of it has little practical application.


1984 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 59-73
Author(s):  
W. Newton-Smith

A series of lectures organized in part by the Society for Applied Philosophy and entitled ‘Philosophy and Practice’ is presumably aimed at displaying the practical implications of philosophical doctrines and/or applying philosophical skills to practical questions. The topic of this paper, the role of interests in science, certainly meets the first condition. For as will be argued there are a number of theses concerning the role of interests in science which have considerable implications for how one should see the scientific enterprise in general and in particular for how one assesses the claim that science ought to be accorded its priviliged position in virtue of its results and/or methods And in view of the respect and resources accorded to science what could be of greater practical interest? It remains the case, however, that my interest may seem the inverse of that of the organizers of this series. For in looking at the role of interest in science, one is examining, so to speak, the extent to which the sphere of the practical determines what goes on in science. One is exploring ways in which the non-scientific impinges on the scientific. While my primary focus will be on the physical sciences, it will be argued that there is a significant difference between them and the social sciences; a difference which renders the social sciences intrinsically liable to penetration from outside. As will be seen, some of the particular arguments for this conclusion make pressing the question: what about philosophy? The answer, it will be concluded, is that philosophy is insulated from external influences to a considerable extent. In that lies both its importance and an explanation as to why much of it has little practical application.


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