scholarly journals El interés casacional objetivo como requisito único a acreditar en los escritos de preparación de recursos de casación ante la Sala 3.ª del Tribunal Supremo. Un análisis de la incipiente jurisprudencia de la Sala de Admisión del Alto Tribunal tras la entrada en vigor de la LO 7/2015

2017 ◽  
pp. 469-493
Author(s):  
David GARCÍA CASTRO
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Objective Interest ◽  
The Right ◽  
Unique Condition ◽  
The Way

LABURPENA: Botere Judizialari buruzko uztailaren 1eko 6/1985 Lege Organikoa aldatu duen 07/2015 Lege Organikoa indarrean jarri izanak irauli egin du Auzitegi Nagusiko hirugarren Salaren aurreko kasazio-errekurtsoa, antolakuntzako, legezko, prozesuzko eta prozedurazko berrikuntza garrantzitsuak sartu baititu. Horien artean, auziak onartzeko betekizun bakar gisa kasazio-interes objektiboa sartu izana nabarmentzen da. Legegileak ahalegina egin du bai zantzuen kasuak zehazteko (Administrazioarekiko Auzien Jurisdikzioa arautzen duen Legearen 88.2. artikulua), bai kasazio-intereseko ustekizunak zehazteko (Administrazioarekiko Auzien Jurisdikzioa arautzen duen Legearen 88.3. artikulua). Hala ere, kontzeptu berri hori sartu izanak zalantzak eragin ditu kasazio-interesaren kontzeptuaren eta interes hori egiaztatzeko moduaren inguruan. Auzitegi Nagusiko hirugarren Salaren onarpen-sekzioaren jurisprudentzia hasiberriaren azterketan zentratzen da lan hau, kasazio‑interesaren kontzeptua eta interes hori egiaztatzeko modua zehazteari begira. RESUMEN: La entrada en vigor de la LO 07/2015, por la que se reforma la LO 6/1985, de 1 de julio, del Poder Judicial, ha dado un vuelco al recurso de casación ante la Sala Tercera del Tribunal Supremo, introduciendo relevantes novedades organizativas, legales, procesales y procedimentales, entre los que destaca la incorporación del interés casacional objetivo como requisito único de admisión de los asuntos. La introducción de este nuevo concepto, pese al esfuerzo realizado por el legislador para concretar supuestos de indicios (art. 88.2 LJCA) y presunciones de interés casacional (art. 88.3 LJCA), ha generado dudas sobre el concepto mismo de interés casacional y sobre la forma de acreditarlo. Este trabajo se centra en analizar la incipiente jurisprudencia de la Sección de Admisión de la Sala Tercera del TS para concretar el concepto de interés casacional y la forma de acreditarloen los escritos de preparación de recursos de casación. ABSTRACT: The entry into force of Organic Act 7/2015 that amends Organic Act from July 1st of the Judiciary has drastically changed the right of appeal before the Supreme Court Third Chamber by introducing relevant organisational, legal, procedural and of proceeding novelties, among which stands the incorporation of objective interest for appeal as the unique condition for the admission of the cases. The introduction of that new concept, in spite of the legislator effort to establish specific cases for indications (art. 88.2 LJCA) and presumptions for the interest for appeal (art. 88.3 LJCA) has created doubts about the concept itself of interest for appeal and the way to demonstrate it. This work is focused on analyzing the incipient case law by the section for admissions within the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court in order to specify the concept of interest for appeal and the form to demonstrate it in the written pleadings of preparation of the rights of appeal.

scholarly journals Pravni položaj poštenog i nepoštenog posjednika u odnosu na vlasnika stvari

2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 527-543
Author(s):  
Jadranko Jug
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Basic Method ◽  
Unjust Enrichment ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Basic Characteristics ◽  
The Right

This paper deals with the problems related to the legal position of honest and dishonest possessors in relation to the owner of things, that is, it analyses the rights belonging to the possessors of things and the demands that possessors may require from the owners of things to whom the possessors must submit those things. Also, in contrast, the rights and requirements are analysed of the owners of things in relation to honest and dishonest possessors. In practice, a dilemma arises in defi ning the essential and benefi cial expenditure incurred by honest possessors, what the presumptions are for and until when the right of retention may be exercised for the sake of remuneration of that expenditure, when the statute of limitations expires on that claim, and the signifi cance of the provisions of the Civil Obligations Act in relation to unjust enrichment, management without mandate and the right of retention, and which provisions regulate these or similar issues. The answers to some of these dilemmas have been provided in case law, and therefore the basic method used in the paper was analysis and research of case law, especially decisions by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia. The introduction to the paper provides the basic characteristics of the concept of possession and possession of things, and the type and quality of possession, to provide a basis for the subsequent analysis of the legal position of the possessor of a thing in relation to the owner of that thing.

O caso Enka Insaat v. Insurance Company Chubb e a questão relativa à lei aplicável à cláusula arbitral: entre a lex contractus e a Lei da Sede

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (5) ◽  
pp. 159-194
Author(s):  
Nadia de Araujo ◽  
Caio Gomes de Freitas
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Insurance Company ◽  
Party Autonomy ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Way

When negotiating a contract, parties usually establish that future and eventual disputes arising out and related to the performance of their obligations shall be resolved by arbitration. Such a choice, a clear expression of the principle of party autonomy, is embedded in a contractual clause, commonly referred to as arbitration agreement. The way by which the agreement is written and, to some extent, how it is construed can, and most commonly will, result in extensive and costly disputes. In the UK, the Supreme Court has recently decided a case related to the construction of an arbitration agreement, specifically to the law applicable to its validity, scope and effectiveness. According to the Court, in the absence of an express choice made by the parties, the system of law chosen to govern the substance of the contract will apply to the validity and scope of the agreement to arbitrate. Where no such choice is expressly or implied made by the parties, it will be the law of the seat of arbitration since it represents the system of law most closely connected to the agreement. This article reviews the case-law and provides some relevant excerpts of the case.

PENALTIES PROVIDED FOR SERIOUS CRIMES IN THE CRIMINAL CODE OF UKRAINE

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oleksandra Skok ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Criminal Code ◽  
Legal Analysis ◽  
Judicial Practice ◽  
Criminal Offenses ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Special Part ◽  
The Right ◽  
National Police

The statistics of the Prosecutor General's Office on registered criminal offenses in the form of serious crimes for 2020 and 2021 were reviewed. Based on this, the number of serious crimes registered by the National Police of Ukraine during the reporting periods was determined. The provisions of the current Criminal Code of Ukraine, the Criminal-Executive Code of Ukraine, the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court No 7 of October 24, 2003 are analyzed, as well as some scientific positions of domestic scientists Knyzhenko O. O are taken into account. and Berezhnyuk V. M In addition, a review of the case law of the Supreme Court of Cassation on sentencing was studied. A thorough criminal-legal analysis of the sanctions of the articles of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine in the part of punishments established for the category of serious crimes was carried out. Based on the analysis, it was determined which main and additional punishments are regulated in the sanctions of the articles of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine for the investigated category of crimes. The quantitative and qualitative indicator of sanctions for serious crimes has been determined, which include: imprisonment for a definite term; punishments alternative to imprisonment; additional penalties. Legislative and doctrinal provisions on punishments in the form of imprisonment for a definite term, restriction of liberty, fine, correctional labor, arrest are considered. The judicial practice of Ukraine in the part of certain issues related to the execution of a penalty in the form of a fine and the replacement of a penalty in the form of a fine with a penalty in the form of correctional labor is analyzed. It is established that the Criminal Code of Ukraine, in the sanctions of the articles, provides for the application to a person who has committed a serious crime, punishment in the form of imprisonment, restriction of liberty, fine, correctional labor, arrest - as the main punishment. The range of additional punishments is defined, which determine: confiscation of property, deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities and a fine.

3 The Supreme Court and the Irish Free State

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dickson Brice
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
Free State ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Parliamentary Sovereignty ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Irish Free State ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Way

This chapter considers the performance of the Irish Supreme Court during the life of the Irish Free State (1922–37). It charts the way in which the right to appeal from the Supreme Court to the Privy Council was abolished (comparing the position in other Dominions) and shows that, despite the rhetoric of Irish politicians at the time, the judges were keen to uphold the British approach to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. The chapter then describes some of the emergency legislation enacted in the Free State to combat republican violence and examines how it was viewed by the Supreme Court, most notably in the very deferential (albeit split) decision in The State (Ryan) v Lennon. The chapter sums up the Court’s performance during the existence of the Irish Free State as disappointing and uninspiring.

scholarly journals Private Prosecutions in Mauritius: Clarifying Locus Standi and Making the Director of Public Prosecutions more Accountable

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Locus Standi ◽  
Statutory Requirement ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right

Case law shows that private prosecutions have been part of Mauritian law at least since 1873. In Mauritius there are two types of private prosecutions: private prosecutions by individuals; and private prosecutions by statutory bodies. Neither the Mauritian constitution nor legislation provides for the right to institute a private prosecution. Because of the fact that Mauritian legislation is not detailed on the issue of locus standi to institute private prosecutions and does not address the issue of whether or not the Director of Public Prosecutions has to give reasons when he takes over and discontinues a private prosecution, the Supreme Court has had to address these issues. The Mauritian Supreme Court has held, inter alia, that a private prosecution may only be instituted by an aggrieved party (even in lower courts where this is not a statutory requirement) and that the Director of Public Prosecutions may take over and discontinue a private prosecution without giving reasons for his decision. However, the Supreme Court does not define “an aggrieved party.” In this article the author takes issue with the Court’s findings in these cases and, relying on legislation from other African countries, recommends how the law could be amended to strengthen the private prosecutor’s position.

scholarly journals Obowiązek zwrotu nienależnie pobranego zasiłku chorobowego w związku z podjęciem pracy zarobkowej w orzecznictwie sądów powszechnych i Sądu Najwyższego

2019 ◽  
pp. 159-173
Author(s):  
Joanna Wojciechowicz
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Sickness Benefit ◽  
Paid Work ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Insured Person ◽  
Cash Benefits ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right

This paper deals with the problems relating to the obligation to return the sickness benefit in the event when an insured person takes up paid employment during confirmed incapacity for work due to illness. The reason for this analysis is the non-uniform or inconsistent practice of the Supreme Court. In the majority of its issued verdicts, the opinion of the Supreme Court is that the the claim for returning the undue bene-fit paid ought to be withdrawn and cancelled if there was no information provided in the instruction about the circumstances that may lead to the forfeiture of the entitlement to statutory sickness benefit under Article 17(1) of the Act of 25 June 1999 on cash benefits from social insurance in case of sickness and maternity. However, there is also a different standpoint according to which the lack of instruction is not a sufficient basis for adjudicating that the insured party is not obliged to return this benefit. In its judgments, the Supreme Court emphasises the importance of the way in which the insured person acts. Submitting a sick leave and performing paid work is tantamount to misleading the disability pension body as to the circumstances that determine the right to a sickness be-nefit. Divergences in the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court have an impact on the judgments issued by common courts, which results in different decisions in cases of identical factual status. The non-uni-form case law of common courts has a direct impact on the situation of individual beneficiaries. Despite the same factual circumstances some insured individuals have to return the benefit whereas others are exempted from this obligation. This creates secondary inequality of the insured persons who constitute a group of similar subjects and is inconsistent with the principle of equality expressed in Article 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.

Part V Rights and Freedoms, B Rights and Freedoms under the Charter, Ch.35 The Right to Protest, Freedom of Expression, and Freedom of Association

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cameron Jamie ◽  
Rosiers Nathalie Des
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Freedom Of Association ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Labour Relations ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
Key Aspects

Freedom of expression and freedom of association are guaranteed by section 2 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These freedoms are closely related, conceptually and philosophically, but evolved in different directions under the Charter. Whereas section 2(b)’s guarantee of expressive freedom generated a rich jurisprudence across diverse issues, section 2(d)’s attention focused on associational freedom in the context of labour union activities. The authors draw on a pocket of section 2(b) case law on picketing and other labour-related expressive activities to bring these guarantees into comparison. In doing so, they comment on the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation of each guarantee, including the constitutionalization of key aspects of labour relations under section 2(d). In addition, the authors critique the Court’s jurisprudence, emphasizing the central importance of protecting protest and dissent activities under both guarantees.

A Day in the Life: Aryanization Before the Swedish Supreme Court 1941–42

2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 593-617
Author(s):  
Anna Wallerman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Third Reich ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Business Owners ◽  
Private International Law ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Third Reich ◽  
Appointed Administrators

AbstractThis article examines the jurisprudence of the Swedish Supreme Court during WW2 in disputes between exiled Jewish business owners and the Nazi-appointed administrators of their companies over the rights to the enterprises’ assets in Sweden. Contrary to assertions in previous scholarship, this article argues that the judgments of the Supreme Court were dictated neither by moral indignation in the face of the treatment of Jews in the Third Reich, nor by political considerations in a time of war. Instead, they were based on principles of private international law that predated, and outlived, the Third Reich. The outcome of the cases hinged upon whether the claim to Swedish assets arose before or after the date when the enterprise was placed under forced administration. If before, the claims of the Jewish owners were in principle successful; if after, they were not. This reasoning was well in line with both previous and subsequent case law on confiscations effected abroad. The article therefore concludes that the Swedish Supreme Court's judgments on Jewish assets in Sweden should be viewed not as outflows of extrajudicial considerations, but rather as failures to recognize political or ethical responsibility.

scholarly journals THE ELIMINATION FROM THE RIGHT TO INHERITANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE

2020 ◽  
pp. 5-9
Author(s):  
M. Bondareva ◽  
S. Rabovska
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
The Right

The article deals with the legal regulation for removal from the right to inheritance and law enforcement of the norm of Art. 1224 of the Civil Code of Ukraine. The study aims at developing the theoretical foundations of the application of this legal norm on the basis of analysis of legislation and case law. Such methods and approaches as systematic analysis and competent legal interpretation have been applied. The Civil Code of Ukraine regulates cases and removal of grounds for the right to inheritance. Article 1224 of the Civil Code of Ukraine is applied to heirs at law; it distinguishes cases and grounds for exclusion from the right to inheritance by various criteria. However, what is typical for the countries of the continental group, the law needs to be clarified, first of all at the level of law enforcement practice. The highest jurisdiction of Ukraine – the Supreme Court of Ukraine and the Supreme Court, made appropriate clarifications and interpretations of relevant legal norms at the general theoretical level (decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Ukraine) and at the level of unification of general practice through expressing a legal position in specific cases. Such interpretation should be considered clearly and sufficiently for further processing. However, judicial interpretation is not competent to correct legislative inaccuracies. And the case law itself is characterized by a tautology and inconsistency, when the departure from the previously adopted legal position is disguised under the difference of legal and factual grounds of the claim. The results of such miscalculations include variability of methods of judicial protection for the heirs of the first turn (paragraph 2, part 3 of Article 1224 and part 5 of Article 1224 of the Civil Code of Ukraine) and procedural difficulties in proving claims – proving the testator's helplessness, address need assistance from the defendant, etc. In addition to legal uncertainty, which results in the poor functioning of institutions of exclusion from the right to inherit, this state of affairs creates grounds for abuse of rights. The authors propose measures to solve the problem, which can be divided into several groups. The first concerns amendments to Paragraph 2, Part 3 of Art. 1224 and Part 5 of Art. 1224 of the Civil Code of Ukraine: in terms of the subject composition, in particular, the permission of the heirs of other than the first turn, the order of inheritance, to sue on the basis of Paragraph 2 of part 3 of Article 1224 of the Civil Code of Ukraine. The second is aimed at intensifying the institution provided by Paragraph 2 of Part 3 of Article 1224 of the Civil Code of Ukraine, inter alia, due to the uniformity and consistency of judicial practice. The introduction of the principle of participation in inheritance by bona fide heirs as a reward for their care of the testator, and the relatively easy removal of the right to inherit those who did not show such care, will also contribute to the revival of law enforcement. Finally, the third group of measures is related to the promotion of inheritance through wills, which will limit the number of disputes in inheritance cases (mainly cases of invalidation of the will) and put an end to the issue of exclusion from the right to inherit.

scholarly journals Un aspect crucial mais délicat des libertés de conscience et de religion des articles 2 et 3 des Chartes canadienne et québécoise: l'objection de conscience

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-205
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Freedom Of Conscience ◽  
Current Case ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right

The Supreme Court of Canada, obiter, in the Big M Drug Mart Case, has spoken of the "Constitutional Exemption". It is the possibility not to be bound to obey the neutral laws that conflict with one's conscience or religion. It is what we call in French l'objection de conscience. The institution exists in Canadian and Québec Law as a part of the right to freedom of conscience or religion expressed in 2a) and 3 of the Canadian and Québec Charters of Rights. And it goes well beyond the right not to fight within the armed forces. The Supreme Court of Canada has actually delivered six judgments touching on the subject in 1985 and 1986. The conditions under which l'objection de conscience come into play are not so well known however. Does it cover matters of worship or only rules of morals ? Secular or only religious principles ? Personal or only group beliefs ? Do the existence of the rule, the sincerity of the objector and the reasonableness of the exemption have to be proved? Above all, what is the difference between a creed and an opinion ? The following article tries to formulate answers to these questions, with the help of current case-law.

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