scholarly journals Obowiązek zwrotu nienależnie pobranego zasiłku chorobowego w związku z podjęciem pracy zarobkowej w orzecznictwie sądów powszechnych i Sądu Najwyższego

2019 ◽  
pp. 159-173
Author(s):  
Joanna Wojciechowicz
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Sickness Benefit ◽  
Paid Work ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Insured Person ◽  
Cash Benefits ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right

This paper deals with the problems relating to the obligation to return the sickness benefit in the event when an insured person takes up paid employment during confirmed incapacity for work due to illness. The reason for this analysis is the non-uniform or inconsistent practice of the Supreme Court. In the majority of its issued verdicts, the opinion of the Supreme Court is that the the claim for returning the undue bene-fit paid ought to be withdrawn and cancelled if there was no information provided in the instruction about the circumstances that may lead to the forfeiture of the entitlement to statutory sickness benefit under Article 17(1) of the Act of 25 June 1999 on cash benefits from social insurance in case of sickness and maternity. However, there is also a different standpoint according to which the lack of instruction is not a sufficient basis for adjudicating that the insured party is not obliged to return this benefit. In its judgments, the Supreme Court emphasises the importance of the way in which the insured person acts. Submitting a sick leave and performing paid work is tantamount to misleading the disability pension body as to the circumstances that determine the right to a sickness be-nefit. Divergences in the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court have an impact on the judgments issued by common courts, which results in different decisions in cases of identical factual status. The non-uni-form case law of common courts has a direct impact on the situation of individual beneficiaries. Despite the same factual circumstances some insured individuals have to return the benefit whereas others are exempted from this obligation. This creates secondary inequality of the insured persons who constitute a group of similar subjects and is inconsistent with the principle of equality expressed in Article 32 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.

scholarly journals Pravni položaj poštenog i nepoštenog posjednika u odnosu na vlasnika stvari

2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 527-543
Author(s):  
Jadranko Jug
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Basic Method ◽  
Unjust Enrichment ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Basic Characteristics ◽  
The Right

This paper deals with the problems related to the legal position of honest and dishonest possessors in relation to the owner of things, that is, it analyses the rights belonging to the possessors of things and the demands that possessors may require from the owners of things to whom the possessors must submit those things. Also, in contrast, the rights and requirements are analysed of the owners of things in relation to honest and dishonest possessors. In practice, a dilemma arises in defi ning the essential and benefi cial expenditure incurred by honest possessors, what the presumptions are for and until when the right of retention may be exercised for the sake of remuneration of that expenditure, when the statute of limitations expires on that claim, and the signifi cance of the provisions of the Civil Obligations Act in relation to unjust enrichment, management without mandate and the right of retention, and which provisions regulate these or similar issues. The answers to some of these dilemmas have been provided in case law, and therefore the basic method used in the paper was analysis and research of case law, especially decisions by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia. The introduction to the paper provides the basic characteristics of the concept of possession and possession of things, and the type and quality of possession, to provide a basis for the subsequent analysis of the legal position of the possessor of a thing in relation to the owner of that thing.

PENALTIES PROVIDED FOR SERIOUS CRIMES IN THE CRIMINAL CODE OF UKRAINE

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oleksandra Skok ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Criminal Code ◽  
Legal Analysis ◽  
Judicial Practice ◽  
Criminal Offenses ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Special Part ◽  
The Right ◽  
National Police

The statistics of the Prosecutor General's Office on registered criminal offenses in the form of serious crimes for 2020 and 2021 were reviewed. Based on this, the number of serious crimes registered by the National Police of Ukraine during the reporting periods was determined. The provisions of the current Criminal Code of Ukraine, the Criminal-Executive Code of Ukraine, the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court No 7 of October 24, 2003 are analyzed, as well as some scientific positions of domestic scientists Knyzhenko O. O are taken into account. and Berezhnyuk V. M In addition, a review of the case law of the Supreme Court of Cassation on sentencing was studied. A thorough criminal-legal analysis of the sanctions of the articles of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine in the part of punishments established for the category of serious crimes was carried out. Based on the analysis, it was determined which main and additional punishments are regulated in the sanctions of the articles of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine for the investigated category of crimes. The quantitative and qualitative indicator of sanctions for serious crimes has been determined, which include: imprisonment for a definite term; punishments alternative to imprisonment; additional penalties. Legislative and doctrinal provisions on punishments in the form of imprisonment for a definite term, restriction of liberty, fine, correctional labor, arrest are considered. The judicial practice of Ukraine in the part of certain issues related to the execution of a penalty in the form of a fine and the replacement of a penalty in the form of a fine with a penalty in the form of correctional labor is analyzed. It is established that the Criminal Code of Ukraine, in the sanctions of the articles, provides for the application to a person who has committed a serious crime, punishment in the form of imprisonment, restriction of liberty, fine, correctional labor, arrest - as the main punishment. The range of additional punishments is defined, which determine: confiscation of property, deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities and a fine.

scholarly journals Private Prosecutions in Mauritius: Clarifying Locus Standi and Making the Director of Public Prosecutions more Accountable

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Locus Standi ◽  
Statutory Requirement ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right

Case law shows that private prosecutions have been part of Mauritian law at least since 1873. In Mauritius there are two types of private prosecutions: private prosecutions by individuals; and private prosecutions by statutory bodies. Neither the Mauritian constitution nor legislation provides for the right to institute a private prosecution. Because of the fact that Mauritian legislation is not detailed on the issue of locus standi to institute private prosecutions and does not address the issue of whether or not the Director of Public Prosecutions has to give reasons when he takes over and discontinues a private prosecution, the Supreme Court has had to address these issues. The Mauritian Supreme Court has held, inter alia, that a private prosecution may only be instituted by an aggrieved party (even in lower courts where this is not a statutory requirement) and that the Director of Public Prosecutions may take over and discontinue a private prosecution without giving reasons for his decision. However, the Supreme Court does not define “an aggrieved party.” In this article the author takes issue with the Court’s findings in these cases and, relying on legislation from other African countries, recommends how the law could be amended to strengthen the private prosecutor’s position.

scholarly journals Legal Aid by the State as a Constitutional Right of the Poor: Problems and Challenges in Indonesia

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-196
Author(s):  
Ari Wibowo ◽  
Michael Hagana Bangun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
The State ◽  
Legal Aid ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right

The provision of legal aid is one way to realize access to law and justice for the poor people provided by the state on the mandate of the constitution. Several regulations regarding legal aid have been issued by the state through the Act and its implementing regulations as well as from the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court through the Supreme Court Regulations and the Constitutional Court's decisions. Legal aid is the constitutional right of every citizen to guarantee legal protection and guarantee equality before the law stipulated in Law Number 16 of 2011, the State is responsible for recognizing and protecting the human rights of every individual without differing backgrounds so that everyone has the right to be treated equally before the law is contained in Article 28D of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. For the poor who experience legal problems in the form of injustice, they can request legal assistance from legal aid institutions that are regulated in legislation. The purpose of providing legal aid is to guarantee and fulfill the right for Legal Aid Recipients to gain access to justice, to realize the constitutional rights of all citizens in accordance with the principle of equality in law, to ensure the certainty that the implementation of Legal Aid is carried out equally across the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. , and to create an effective, efficient and accountable court.

Part V Rights and Freedoms, B Rights and Freedoms under the Charter, Ch.35 The Right to Protest, Freedom of Expression, and Freedom of Association

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cameron Jamie ◽  
Rosiers Nathalie Des
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Freedom Of Association ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Labour Relations ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
Key Aspects

Freedom of expression and freedom of association are guaranteed by section 2 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These freedoms are closely related, conceptually and philosophically, but evolved in different directions under the Charter. Whereas section 2(b)’s guarantee of expressive freedom generated a rich jurisprudence across diverse issues, section 2(d)’s attention focused on associational freedom in the context of labour union activities. The authors draw on a pocket of section 2(b) case law on picketing and other labour-related expressive activities to bring these guarantees into comparison. In doing so, they comment on the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation of each guarantee, including the constitutionalization of key aspects of labour relations under section 2(d). In addition, the authors critique the Court’s jurisprudence, emphasizing the central importance of protecting protest and dissent activities under both guarantees.

scholarly journals THE ELIMINATION FROM THE RIGHT TO INHERITANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE

2020 ◽  
pp. 5-9
Author(s):  
M. Bondareva ◽  
S. Rabovska
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
The Right

The article deals with the legal regulation for removal from the right to inheritance and law enforcement of the norm of Art. 1224 of the Civil Code of Ukraine. The study aims at developing the theoretical foundations of the application of this legal norm on the basis of analysis of legislation and case law. Such methods and approaches as systematic analysis and competent legal interpretation have been applied. The Civil Code of Ukraine regulates cases and removal of grounds for the right to inheritance. Article 1224 of the Civil Code of Ukraine is applied to heirs at law; it distinguishes cases and grounds for exclusion from the right to inheritance by various criteria. However, what is typical for the countries of the continental group, the law needs to be clarified, first of all at the level of law enforcement practice. The highest jurisdiction of Ukraine – the Supreme Court of Ukraine and the Supreme Court, made appropriate clarifications and interpretations of relevant legal norms at the general theoretical level (decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Ukraine) and at the level of unification of general practice through expressing a legal position in specific cases. Such interpretation should be considered clearly and sufficiently for further processing. However, judicial interpretation is not competent to correct legislative inaccuracies. And the case law itself is characterized by a tautology and inconsistency, when the departure from the previously adopted legal position is disguised under the difference of legal and factual grounds of the claim. The results of such miscalculations include variability of methods of judicial protection for the heirs of the first turn (paragraph 2, part 3 of Article 1224 and part 5 of Article 1224 of the Civil Code of Ukraine) and procedural difficulties in proving claims – proving the testator's helplessness, address need assistance from the defendant, etc. In addition to legal uncertainty, which results in the poor functioning of institutions of exclusion from the right to inherit, this state of affairs creates grounds for abuse of rights. The authors propose measures to solve the problem, which can be divided into several groups. The first concerns amendments to Paragraph 2, Part 3 of Art. 1224 and Part 5 of Art. 1224 of the Civil Code of Ukraine: in terms of the subject composition, in particular, the permission of the heirs of other than the first turn, the order of inheritance, to sue on the basis of Paragraph 2 of part 3 of Article 1224 of the Civil Code of Ukraine. The second is aimed at intensifying the institution provided by Paragraph 2 of Part 3 of Article 1224 of the Civil Code of Ukraine, inter alia, due to the uniformity and consistency of judicial practice. The introduction of the principle of participation in inheritance by bona fide heirs as a reward for their care of the testator, and the relatively easy removal of the right to inherit those who did not show such care, will also contribute to the revival of law enforcement. Finally, the third group of measures is related to the promotion of inheritance through wills, which will limit the number of disputes in inheritance cases (mainly cases of invalidation of the will) and put an end to the issue of exclusion from the right to inherit.

scholarly journals Defending the Absurd: The Iconoclast's Guide to Section 47(1) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 1827
Author(s):  
Haneen McCreath ◽  
Raymond Koen
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
South African ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Civil Litigation ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Core Value ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right ◽  
Right Of Access

This contribution was intended as a defence of section 25(1) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. However, the Supreme Court Act was repealed in August 2013 and replaced by the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, and in the process section 25(1) of the former gave way to section 47(1) of the latter. Both sections concern the doctrine of leave to sue judges in South Africa. Both prescribe that any civil litigation against a judge requires the consent of the court out of which such litigation is to be launched. Both apply to civil suits against judges for damage caused by either their judicial or their non-judicial conduct.Although section 25(1) had been one of the more inconspicuous sections of the Supreme Court Act, it was contested on occasion. Both curial and extra-curial challenges to section 25(1) assailed its constitutionality, alleging essentially that its provisions violated the right of access to courts enshrined in section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and that such violation did not meet the limitation criteria contained in section 36. It may be anticipated with considerable confidence, given its legal continuity with section 25(1), that any serious assault upon section 47(1) of the Superior Courts Act also will focus upon its relationship to section 34 of the Constitution.This contribution is a pre-emptive defence of section 47(1) of the Superior Courts Act and, by extrapolation, a belated justification of section 25(1) of the Supreme Court Act. An attempt will be made to demonstrate, contrary to conventional wisdom, that section 47(1) does not limit section 34 and passes constitutionalmuster at the first level of enquiry, thereby obviating the need for advancing to the second level of enquiry contained in section 36 of the Constitution.The jurisprudential crux of section 47(1) of the Superior Courts Act is embedded in the nature of the judicial office and its core value of judicial impartiality. The procedural immunity which the section affords South African judges is a mechanism for sparing them the nuisance of having to deal with frivolous litigation, either as defendant or as adjudicator. Every specious suit against a judge, per definitionem, represents an incursion into judicial impartiality by urging that the court give credence to a claim which does not qualify for curial adjudication. In this regard, the doctrine of leave to sue seeks to ensure that judges do not have to adjudicate claims which resort beyond the compass of their judicial capacity. It is a doctrine which operates to protect and advance the unimpeachable principle of judicial impartiality.

scholarly journals Comparative Analysis of Casework by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Latvia and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Finland

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (5) ◽  
pp. 74-85
Author(s):  
Vladimir Jilkine
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
European Convention ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Republic ◽  
National Constitution ◽  
Legal Meaning

The article deals with the legal meaning of the European Convention and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights for the national law proceedings in Latvia and Finland. Case-law of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Court and Supreme Court of Republic of Finland shows that the European Convention refers to important legal instruments, which must be taken into account when deciding on the case. When considering claims for cancellation of in force decisions on the basis of the ECHR Resolution on the recognition of a violation by Finland of Articles of the Convention, the Court refers to numerous decisions of the European Court of affecting the interests of Finland and the other member countries of the Convention, details examining and comparing the circumstances of each case. At the same time the final basis for a decision is based on the national Constitution of the Republic of Finland and Procedure. Rakstā tiek analizēta Eiropas Konvencijas juridiskā nozīme un Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesas lēmumi kontekstā ar nacionālajām tiesībām Latvijā un Somijā. Latvijas Augstākās tiesas un Somijas Republikas Augstākās tiesas judikatūra liecina, ka Eiropas Konvencija uzskatāma par svarīgu juridisku instrumentu, kas jāņem vērā, izskatot lietu. Kad tiek izskatītas sūdzības par spēkā esoša nolēmuma atcelšanu, pamatojoties uz ECT rezolūciju par pārkāpuma atzīšanu Somijā, tiesa atsaucas uz daudziem ECT lēmumiem par konvencijas pārkāpumiem Somijā un citās valstīs, detalizēti izskatot un salīdzinot apstākļus katrā lietā. Vienlaikus galīgais lēmums ir balstīts uz Somijas Republikas Konstitūciju un procedūru.

scholarly journals Mempertanyakan Legalitas Qanun Aceh: Sesuaikah dengan Sistem Peraturan Perundang-Undangan

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-294
Author(s):  
Andi Muhammad Asrun ◽  
Abdu Rahmat Rosyadi ◽  
Yennie K. Milono
Keyword(s):  
Literature Review ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Formal Method ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right ◽  
Legal Product ◽  
Laws And Regulations

Penelitian ini ingin menjawab kesesuaian Qanun Aceh dengan sistem peraturan perundang-undangan, dengan mengidentifikasi kedudukan qanun dalam sistem peraturan perundang-undangan, dan kewenangan lembaga dalam hak uji materil terhadap qanun sebagai produk hukum. Penelitian ini bersifat yuridis-formil melalui kajian pustaka terhadap peraturan perundang-undangan untuk mendeskripsikan kesesuaian qanun Aceh dalam sistem peraturan perundang-undangan. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa Qanun Aceh ada yang berkaitan dengan penyelenggaraan pemerintahan dan ada yang berkaitan dengan pelaksanaan syariat Islam kedudukannya dianggap sama dengan peraturan daerah pada umumnya dalam perspektif Undang-Undang Nomor 12 Tahun 2011 tentang Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-Undangan. Argumentasi yuridis yang menyatakan bahwa qanun sejajar dengan peraturan daerah ini diperkuat oleh Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri Republik Indonesia Nomor 53 Tahun 2011 tentang Pembentukan Produk Hukum Daerah. Namun berkenaan dengan hak menguji untuk membatalkan Qanun Aceh dalam pelaksanaan syariat Islam hanya dapat diuji dan dibatalkan melalui judicial review oleh Mahkamah Agung sebagaimana diatur dalam Pasal 235 ayat (4) UU Nomor 11 Tahun 2006. Asking for Aceh Qanun Legality: Compatible With Legislation System This study aims to answer the compatibility between the Aceh Qanun and the system of legislation by identifying the position of qanun in the system and the authority of the institution in the rights to materially verify qanun as a legal product. This study uses a juridical-formal method through a literature review of the laws and regulations to describe the suitability of the Aceh qanun in the statutory system. This study found that the Aceh Qanun relating to the administration of government and relating to the implementation of Islamic law, its position is considered the same as local regulations in general in the perspective of Law No. 12/2011 on the Formation of Legislation. The juridical argument that states that the qanun is in line with this regional regulation is reinforced by the Republic of Indonesia Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 53/2011 on the Establishment of Regional Legal Products. However, the right to examine the cancellation of qanun in the implementation of Islamic Shari'a, it can only be examined and canceled through a judicial review by the Supreme Court as stipulated in Article 235 paragraph (4) of Law Number 11/2006.

scholarly journals Un aspect crucial mais délicat des libertés de conscience et de religion des articles 2 et 3 des Chartes canadienne et québécoise: l'objection de conscience

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-205
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Freedom Of Conscience ◽  
Current Case ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right

The Supreme Court of Canada, obiter, in the Big M Drug Mart Case, has spoken of the "Constitutional Exemption". It is the possibility not to be bound to obey the neutral laws that conflict with one's conscience or religion. It is what we call in French l'objection de conscience. The institution exists in Canadian and Québec Law as a part of the right to freedom of conscience or religion expressed in 2a) and 3 of the Canadian and Québec Charters of Rights. And it goes well beyond the right not to fight within the armed forces. The Supreme Court of Canada has actually delivered six judgments touching on the subject in 1985 and 1986. The conditions under which l'objection de conscience come into play are not so well known however. Does it cover matters of worship or only rules of morals ? Secular or only religious principles ? Personal or only group beliefs ? Do the existence of the rule, the sincerity of the objector and the reasonableness of the exemption have to be proved? Above all, what is the difference between a creed and an opinion ? The following article tries to formulate answers to these questions, with the help of current case-law.

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