scholarly journals Aid/Watch and the Public Benefit of Advocacy for the Extra-territorial Relief of Poverty

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (3s) ◽  
pp. 9-19
Author(s):  
David Barnden ◽  
Giri Sivaraman
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Benefit ◽  
Revenue Collection ◽  
Charitable Organisation ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of

The disqualification of Aid/Watch as a charity and the High Court of Australia's subsequent decision shines a spotlight on the common law definition of charitable activity. The Aid/Watch decision enables charitable organisations to legitimately advocate for more efficient implementation of government policies on the relief of poverty and for the advancement of education and religion, without fear of reprisal. Initially we comment on the inherent tension the Australian Taxation Office experiences as a result of its status as a government department, its responsibilities to administer revenue collection and its role interpreting charity law. We then discuss the common law definition of charity and the Constitutional basis for the High Court’s decision in Aid/Watch. To conclude we outline areas of uncertainties but also potential benefits to charitable organisations which are relevant for any proposal to define ‘charitable organisation’.

scholarly journals Compensation Where No Land Is Taken: Update of the Law in Alberta

2010 ◽  
pp. 127
Author(s):  
Michael A. Marion
Keyword(s):  
Population Growth ◽  
Municipal Government ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Public Works ◽  
Private Landowners ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Benefit ◽  
The Common ◽  
Negative Impacts ◽  
The Impact

Economic and population growth in Alberta has led to a proliferation of projects and works for the public benefit, but the negative impacts of these are often borne by private landowners. The question arises as to what compensation should be given to landowners whose land is injuriously affected by public works, but is not actually expropriated. This article examines the common law remedies of negligence and nuisance; addresses the impact of the four tests set out in R. v. Loiselle for assessing statutory remedies; and provides a review of the evolution of and remedies available under the Municipal Government Act and Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

scholarly journals Thabo Meli Revisited: The Pernicious Effects of Result-Driven Decisions

2013 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-55
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Arenson
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Limited Extent ◽  
Natural Consequence ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
The Public ◽  
Adversarial System ◽  
The Common

Despite the hackneyed expression that ‘judges should interpret the law and not make it’, the fact remains that there is some scope within the separation of powers doctrine for the courts to develop the common law incrementally. To this extent, the courts can effectively legislate, but only to this limited extent if they are to respect the separation of powers doctrine. On occasion, however, the courts have usurped the power entrusted to Parliament, and particularly so in instances where a strict application of the existing law would lead to results that offend their personal notions of what is fair and just. When this occurs, the natural consequence is that lawyers, academics and the public in general lose respect for both the judges involved as well as the adversarial system of criminal justice. In order to illustrate this point, attention will focus on the case of Thabo Meli v United Kingdom in which the Privy Council, mistakenly believing that it could not reach its desired outcome through a strict application of the common law rule of temporal coincidence, emasculated the rule beyond recognition in order to convict the accused. Moreover, the discussion to follow will demonstrate that not only was the court wrong in its belief that the case involved the doctrine of temporal coincidence, but the same result would have been achieved had the Council correctly identified the issue as one of legal causation and correctly applied the principles relating thereto.

scholarly journals GOOD FAITH IN FRANCHISE CONTRACT

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (19) ◽  
pp. 118-127
Author(s):  
Nurli Yaacob ◽  
Nasri Naiimi
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Relational Contracts ◽  
Law System ◽  
Freedom Of Contract ◽  
Term Contract ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right

Good faith has been defined as justice, fairness, reasonableness, decency, taking no chances, and so on. The concept of good faith has long been rooted in contract law under the jurisdiction of Civil law, although the definition of it is still debated until today. However, the view of the Common Law tradition does not recognize the concept of good faith as long as the contract is entered into with the freedom of contract and both parties abide by the terms of the contract. Given that a franchise contract involves a long-term contract and always been developed, it is impossible to define both rights and responsibilities base on express terms only. As such, the franchise contract gives the franchisor the right to exercise its discretion in executing the contract. It is in this context that the element of good faith is very important to ensure that the franchisor does not take advantage of the franchisee and that the business continues to prosper. Therefore, the objective of this article is to discuss the concept of good faith in a franchise contract. The findings show that the common law system that initially rejected the application of the concept of good faith also changed its approach and began to recognize the concept of good faith as it is very important for relational contracts such as franchise contracts.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Wendell Bird
Keyword(s):  
First Amendment ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Freedom Of The Press ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
James Madison ◽  
Broad Definition ◽  
The Press ◽  
Narrow Definition ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of

The “father of the Bill of Rights,” James Madison, described the unqualified words protecting freedoms of speech and press as embodying a broad definition rather than a narrow definition of those liberties. Upon offering those provisions, he said that “freedom of the press and rights of conscience . . . are unguarded in the British constitution,” including the common law, and that “every government should be disarmed of powers which trench upon those particular rights.” In Madison’s draft and in the final First Amendment, each clause was worded to modify or to reject the English common law on point in order to provide for far greater protection of individual liberties; no clause was worded with the restrictions that the common law imposed. Was Madison right? Are freedoms of press and speech in the First Amendment broad or narrow protections?

The Relationship between Disability Non-Discrimination Law and Quota Schemes

2019 ◽  
pp. 94-117
Author(s):  
Lisa Waddington
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
People With Disabilities ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Common ◽  
Public And Private Sector ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter explores the relationship between disability quota schemes and non-discrimination law in Europe. While at first sight they seem to sit uneasily beside each other, the chapter reveals how, in some instances, quota schemes can serve to facilitate compliance with non-discrimination legislation. At the same time, the chapter explores seeming incompatibilities between the two approaches and considers whether there are differences between common and civil law jurisdictions in this respect. Tentative conclusions suggest that there is a greater willingness to establish quota schemes through legislation in civil law jurisdictions compared to common law jurisdictions, and that quota schemes in civil law jurisdictions are more likely to provide for the imposition of a levy in the case that employers fail to meet their quota obligations through employing the required number of people with disabilities. There also seems to be some indication that there is greater awareness of the potential for conflict or tension, in various forms, between non-discrimination law and quota schemes in common law jurisdictions than in civil law jurisdictions. Finally, the two schemes operating in the common law states are only applicable to the public sector—whilst in civil law states quotas are generally applied to both public and private sector employers. This may indicate different perceptions regarding the role of public sector employers and the legitimacy of imposing quota requirements.

scholarly journals THE NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES FOR OMISSIONS

2019 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 545-569
Author(s):  
Tom Cornford
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Public Authority ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Common

AbstractIn this article I address the question of whether the omissions principle – the principle that the common law does not impose liability for omissions – applies with the same force in negligence cases involving public authority defendants as in cases involving private defendants. My argument is that the answer depends upon the answer to a prior question: can a duty of care be based upon the public law powers and duties of a public authority? In making my argument, I refute the views both of those who insist that a claim in negligence against a public authority can be rejected purely because it relates to an omission not falling within one of the standard exceptions to the omissions principle and of those who insist that such a claim can succeed while at the same denying that a duty of care can be based on a public authority's public law powers and duties.

Reasoning with the Foundations of Rules

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-83
Author(s):  
Duncan Wallace
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Rule ◽  
High Court ◽  
Historical Fact ◽  
The Common ◽  
Over Time

In PGA v The Queen, the High Court found that a legal rule ceased to exist well before many people thought it did. In Mabo v Queensland [No 2], the Court found that a legal rule came into existence well before many people thought it did. These conclusions are obviously different, and so are the reasons that led to them. But in both decisions the Court relied on the foundation of a legal rule to account for the rule's validity over time. In PGA, the rule was founded on another legal rule. In Mabo, the rule was founded on an historical fact. I explain how the Court reasoned with these foundations, and what this reasoning suggests about the nature of the common law in Australia.

RECONCEPTUALISING THE EXPRESS TRUST

2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 657-683 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Parkinson
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Specific Subject ◽  
Core Content ◽  
Beneficial Ownership ◽  
The Common ◽  
Trust Property ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Irreducible Core ◽  
Traditional Understanding

This article argues that the express trust should be understood as a species of obligation rather than as a means of organising the ownership of property. Two propositions seem fundamental to the traditional understanding of the trust as an aspect of property law. Firstly, in the nature of the trust, there must be a separation of legal and beneficial ownership. Secondly, there must be trust property. Neither is necessarily true. With many discretionary trusts and other recognised types of express trust it is impossible to locate the beneficial estate. Furthermore, the requirement for there to be trust property is, on closer analysis, a requirement of certainty of obligation in relation to specific subject-matter within which the trust property can be located.The article explores the implications of understanding the trust as a species of obligation. It allows all express trusts, including charitable trusts, to be explained as resting on the same fundamental concepts. The trust in the common law world may still be distinguished from contract and from the civil law forms of the trust. This new conceptualisation also illuminates what is the irreducible core content of the trust. The article concludes with a new definition of the express trust.

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